Adoptive Father 1 v. Adoptive Father 2

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Adoptive Father 1 and Adoptive Mother 1, Appellants,

v.

Adoptive Father 2 and Adoptive Mother 2, Respondents.

In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002408

Appeal From Anderson County
Edgar H. Long, Jr., Family Court Judge
W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-407
Submitted August 4, 2016 – Filed August 24, 2016

AFFIRMED

Thomas W. Dunaway, III, of Dunaway & Assoc., of
Anderson; Lisa Richardson Mobley, of Mobley Law
Firm, of Greenville; Nicole Nicolette Mace, of The Mace
Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach; and Amy Kristan Raffaldt,
of Myrtle Beach, for Appellants.

James Fletcher Thompson, of James Fletcher Thompson,
LLC, of Spartanburg; and Betsy Buchanan Tanner, of
Anderson Law Firm, LLC, of Fountain Inn, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: This is a contested adoption case between two sets of adoptive
parents. Adoptive Father 1 and Adoptive Mother 1 (collectively, Appellants) seek
to withdraw their consents for adoption, through which they relinquished their
parental rights to their adopted child to Adoptive Father 2 and Adoptive Mother 2
(collectively, Respondents). Appellants argue (1) the family court erred in failing
to consider the issue of fraud when considering their request for revocation of their
consents and the adoption decree; (2) their consents for adoption were involuntary
because they were under duress when they signed the consent forms or were
coerced into consenting to the adoption, (3) it is in the child's best interest that a
withdrawal of the consents for adoption be granted, and (4) the family court erred
in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing in a matter involving the interest of a
minor child. We affirm.

1. As to the first issue, we find the issue of fraud is not preserved. See S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 252, 551 S.E.2d 274, 280 (Ct. App. 2001)
(stating an issue not raised to or ruled upon by the family court should not be
considered by the appellate court); Altman v. Griffith, 372 S.C. 388, 396, 642
S.E.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Where a party raises an issue, but the issue is
never ruled on by the [family] court, and the party fails to file a motion to alter or
amend, the issue is not preserved." (quoting Jean Hoefer Toal, Shahin Vafai &
Robert A. Muckenfuss, Appellate Practice in South Carolina 58 (2d ed. 2002)));
Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 65, 624 S.E.2d 649, 653-54 (2006) (noting
"procedural rules are subservient to the court's duty to zealously guard the rights of
minors" but "declin[ing] to exercise [its] discretion to avoid application of the
procedural bar" (quoting Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 107, 536
S.E.2d 372, 374 (2000))).

2. As to the second and third issues, we find the family court did not err when it
determined Appellants could not challenge their consents on the grounds of
coercion or duress and best interest. See S.C. Code Ann § 63-9-350 (2010)
(permitting parents to withdraw their consents if the consents were obtained
through duress or coercion and if withdrawal would be in the best interest of the
child); id. ("The entry of the final decree of adoption renders any consent or
relinquishment irrevocable."); McCann v. Doe, 377 S.C. 373, 389 n.8, 660 S.E.2d
500, 509 n.8 (2008) ("[A] challenge to the consent for relinquishment may only
occur prior to an adoption . . . ."); Brown v. Baby Girl Harper, 410 S.C. 446, 454,
766 S.E.2d 375, 379 (2014) ("What a legislature says in the text of a statute is
considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts
are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." (quoting Hodges
v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000))).

3. As to the remaining issue, we find the family court did not err by not holding an
evidentiary hearing in this case. Because Appellants did not sufficiently allege
fraud and could not challenge their consents under section 63-9-350 on the grounds
of duress or best interest after the adoption was finalized, we find an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.