Powell v. Boheler

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ryan Powell, Appellant,

v.

Amy Boheler d/b/a York County Auditor, Beth Latham
d/b/a York County Treasurer, and Robert Kiser d/b/a
York County Delinquent Tax Collector, each in their
individual and official capacities, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002578

Appeal From York County
S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-199
Submitted February 1, 2016 – Filed May 11, 2016

AFFIRMED

Ryan Powell, of Fort Mill, pro se.

Walter Keith Martens, of Hamilton Martens, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Ryan Powell argues the trial court erred in (1) dismissing his
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) dismissing his tort claims as barred
by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, (3) dismissing his breach of contract claim,
and (4) prohibiting his mother from representing him and speaking on his behalf.
We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in dismissing Ryan Powell's claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction: Simmons v. Simmons, 370 S.C. 109, 113, 634 S.E.2d 1,
3 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's 'power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.'" (quoting Watson v. Watson, 319 S.C. 92, 93, 460 S.E.2d 394, 395
(1995))); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-80(A)-(B) (2014) (providing that except for a
declaratory judgment action on the constitutionality of a statute, "there is no
remedy other than those provided in this chapter in any case involving the illegal
or wrongful collection of taxes, or attempt to collect taxes"); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-
60-3390 (2014) (stating the circuit court shall dismiss without prejudice an action
covered by this chapter); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-30(22) (2014) (defining
"property taxpayer" as "a person who is liable for, or whose property or interest in
property, is subject to, or liable for, a property tax").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in dismissing his tort claims as barred by the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act: Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d
431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the
trial court."); id. ("That standard requires the [c]ourt to construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if the 'facts alleged and the
inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to
relief on any theory of the case.'" (quoting Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 233,
553 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2001))); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (2005)
(stating the South Carolina Tort Claims Act "grants the State, its political
subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty,
immunity from liability and suit for any tort except as waived"); S.C. Code Ann. §
15-78-60(11) (2005) ("The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting
from . . . assessment or collection of taxes or special assessments or enforcement of
the tax laws . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(d) (2005) (defining "governmental
entity" to mean "the State and its political subdivisions"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-
30(c) (Supp. 2015) (defining employee as "any officer, employee, agent, or court
appointed representative of the State or its political subdivisions").

3. As to whether the trial court erred in dismissing Powell's breach of contract
claim: Rydde, 381 S.C. at 646, 675 S.E.2d at 433 ("On appeal from the dismissal

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an appellate court applies the same
standard of review as the trial court."); id. ("That standard requires the [c]ourt to
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if
the 'facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would
entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case.'" (quoting Williams, 347 S.C.
at 233, 553 S.E.2d at 499)).

4. As to Powell's arguments that the trial court erred in prohibiting Powell's
mother from arguing on his behalf and that the supreme court lacks the authority to
require a person to obtain a license to practice law: S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-310
(2011) (stating a person is prohibited from practicing law or soliciting the legal
cause of another person unless he or she is a member of the South Carolina Bar);
S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301, 641
S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) (stating an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal but must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, LOCKEMY, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.