Larson v. Larson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Suzanne Marie Pearson Larson, Respondent,

v.

Jonathan Eric Larson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001790

Appeal From Spartanburg County
James F. Fraley, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-541
Submitted October 1, 2015 – Filed November 25, 2015

AFFIRMED

Richard H. Rhodes and William Hardwick Rhodes, Burts
Turner & Rhodes, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Scott Franklin Talley, Talley Law Firm, P.A., of
Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jonathan Larson (Husband) appeals the family court's divorce
decree and final order, arguing the family court erred in apportioning half of the
student loan debt incurred by Suzanne Larson (Wife). First, Husband argues the
family court erred in requiring him to pay half of the student loans which were
used to pay educational institutions because Wife obtained the college credits.
Second, Husband argues the family court erred in requiring him to pay half of all
of the college loans because Wife forged Husband's name on the loans and he was
not aware of the loans. Third, Husband argues the family court erred in requiring
him to pay half of all the college loans because Wife did not document that all of
the loan proceeds were used for marital purposes. Fourth, Husband argues the
family court erred because, in equity, Husband should not have been required to
pay half of all of the loans. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to Husband's first argument: Sanderson v. Sanderson, 391 S.C. 249, 255,
705 S.E.2d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A point not specifically raised to and ruled
upon by the [family] court will not be considered on appeal."); Doe v. Roe, 369
S.C. 351, 376, 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue is not preserved
where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant
does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.").

2. As to Husband's second and third argument: Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532,
546, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) (defining marital debt as "debt incurred for the
joint benefit of the parties regardless of whether the parties are legally liable or
whether one party is individually liable"); id. (stating section 20-3-620(13) of the
South Carolina Code "creates a rebuttable presumption that a debt of either spouse
incurred prior to the beginning of marital litigation is a marital debt and must be
factored in the totality of equitable apportionment"); id. ("Marital debt, like marital
property, must be specifically identified and apportioned in equitable
distribution."); Schultze v. Schultze, 403 S.C. 1, 9, 741 S.E.2d 593, 597-98 (Ct.
App. 2013) (holding lack of knowledge regarding debt accrued during the marriage
is insufficient to sustain the burden of showing the debts were non-marital).

3. As to Husband's fourth argument: Sanderson, 391 S.C. at 255, 705 S.E.2d at 67
("A point not specifically raised to and ruled upon by the [family] court will not be
considered on appeal."); Roe, 369 S.C. at 376, 631 S.E.2d at 330 ("An issue is not
preserved where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the
appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.