Orr v. Greenville Hospital System

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Frankie Orr, Respondent,

v.

Greenville Hospital System, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002583

Appeal From Greenville County
D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-308
Heard June 4, 2015 – Filed June 24, 2015

REVERSED

J. Ben Alexander and Kenneth Norman Shaw, both of
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Randall Lee Chambers, of The Chambers Law Firm, of
Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this civil appeal, Greenville Hospital System (GHS) argues
the circuit court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because Frankie Orr failed to submit any evidence in
support of her allegation that GHS's negligence caused her injuries. We agree and
reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Singleton
v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 200, 659 S.E.2d 196, 204 (Ct. App. 2008) ("To establish
negligence in a premises liability action, a plaintiff must prove the following three
elements: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach
of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting
from the breach of duty."); id. at 202, 659 S.E.2d at 205 ("[T]he owner of property
owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary
care for his safety and is liable for injuries resulting from the breach of such duty."
(citing Larimore v. Carolina Power & Light, 340 S.C. 438, 444, 531 S.E.2d 535,
538 (Ct. App. 2000))); id. ("[A]n invitee enters the premises with the implied
assurance of preparation and reasonable care for his protection and safety while he
is there." (citations omitted)); Garvin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 343 S.C. 625, 628, 541 S.E.2d
831, 832 (2001) ("To recover damages for injuries caused by a dangerous or
defective condition on a storekeeper's premises, the plaintiff must show either (1)
that the injury was caused by a specific act of the respondent which created the
dangerous condition; or (2) that the respondent had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it." (citations
omitted)); Pringle v. SLR, Inc. of Summerton, 382 S.C. 397, 404, 675 S.E.2d 783,
787 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The showing that a defendant created a condition that led to
a plaintiff's injury is not, however, sufficient to survive a summary judgment
motion unless there is evidence that[,] in creating the condition, the defendant
acted negligently."); Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 555, 409 S.E.2d 797,
803 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[The] burden of proof [for negligence] cannot be met by
relying on the theory that the thing speaks for itself or that the very fact of injury
indicates a failure to exercise reasonable care. No inference of negligence arises
from the mere fact of injury." (citations omitted)).

REVERSED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.