Yslas v. Yslas

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Juan Yslas, Jr., Employee, Appellant,

v.

Juan Yslas, Employer, Riverport Insurance, Alleged
Carrier for Employer, Full Circle Construction, Alleged
Statutory Employer, and The South Carolina Uninsured
Employer's Fund, Defendants,

Of Whom Juan Yslas, Riverport Insurance, and Full
Circle Construction are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002025

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-186
Submitted March 1, 2015 – Filed April 8, 2015

AFFIRMED

James H. Moss, of Moss Kuhn & Fleming, PA, of
Beaufort, for Appellant.

Ryan Spence Montgomery, of Ryan Montgomery
Attorney at Law, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents
Juan Yslas and Full Circle Construction; Allison Molony
Carter, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Mount
Pleasant, for Respondent Riverpoint Insurance; Weston
Adams, III, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent Full Circle Construction; Otto
Edworth Liipfert, III, of Griffith Sadler & Sharp, PA, of
Beaufort, for Respondents Juan Yslas and The South
Carolina Uninsured Employer's Fund; and Helen Faith
Hiser, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant, for Respondent Full Circle Construction.

PER CURIAM: Juan Yslas, Jr. appeals an order of the Appellate Panel of the
Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel) denying his request for
benefits and referring him to the Attorney General for potential prosecution for
fraud. On appeal, Yslas argues the Appellate Panel's order is vague, ambiguous,
and subject to contradiction, and he asks this court to find the order has no
preclusive effect on any subsequent litigation. He also argues the Appellate Panel
erred by finding he was not a statutory employee of Full Circle Construction, LLC
(Full Circle) because he was excluded from coverage under his own workers'
compensation insurance policy, and by finding he was thus excluded from
coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act. Finally, Yslas argues the
Appellate Panel erred by finding he failed to honestly complete his insurance
application with People's Choice Insurance Agency and referring him to the
Attorney General. We affirm.

1. We find the Appellate Panel's order is not ambiguous or contradictory when
fairly read in its entirety. See Weil v. Weil, 299 S.C. 84, 90, 382 S.E.2d 471, 474
(Ct. App. 1989) ("The determinative factor [when construing a judgment] is the
intent of the court, as gathered, not from an isolated part thereof, but from all the
parts of the judgment itself.").

2. We find Yslas was not Full Circle's statutory employee. See S.C. Code Ann. §
42-1-130 (2015) ("Any sole proprietor or partner of a business whose employees
are eligible for benefits under this title may elect to be included as employees
under the workers' compensation coverage of the business if they are actively
engaged in the operation of the business and if the insurer is notified of their
election to be included. Any sole proprietor or partner, upon this election, is
entitled to employee benefits and is subject to employee responsibilities prescribed
in this title."); Smith v. Squires Timber Co., 311 S.C. 321, 325, 428 S.E.2d 878,
880 (1993) ("[A]n independent contractor may be a statutory employee if he has
elected coverage pursuant to section 42-1-130." (emphasis added)); Carver v. Bill
Pridemore & Co., 278 S.C. 235, 236-38, 294 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1982) (holding a
partner or sole proprietor of a business must elect for coverage under section 42-1-
130 to be considered a statutory employee).

3. We find the Appellate Panel did not err by finding Yslas failed to honestly
complete his insurance application with People's Choice Insurance Agency and
referring him to the Attorney General. See Pollack v. S. Wine & Spirits of Am.,
405 S.C. 9, 14, 747 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2013) ("This [c]ourt will not overturn a
decision by the [Appellate Panel] unless the determination is unsupported by
substantial evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-
440 (2015) ("The commission shall report all cases of suspected false statement or
misrepresentation, as defined in [s]ection 38-55-530(D), to the Insurance Fraud
Division of the Office of the Attorney General for investigation and prosecution, if
warranted, pursuant to the Omnibus Insurance Fraud and Reporting Immunity
Act."); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-55-530(D) (2015) ("'False statement or
misrepresentation' specifically includes, but is not limited to, an
intentional . . . miscount or misclassification by an employer of its
employees . . . .").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.