Beason v. Lowden

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kathy Beason, Respondent,

v.

Chatone Lowden, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-205827

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-131
Heard December 8, 2014 – Filed March 11, 2015

AFFIRMED

John Austin Hood, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Daniel W. Luginbill, of Wilson & Luginbill, LLC, of
Bamberg, and Clyde C. Dean, Jr., of Orangeburg, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this action for negligence, Chatone Lowden appeals the trial
court's order granting Kathy Beason's motion for a new trial nisi additur, arguing
the trial court abused its discretion by increasing the jury's verdict from $17,000 to
$80,000 without articulating compelling reasons for invading the jury's province in
determining damages. We affirm.

The car Lowden was driving rear-ended the car Beason was driving in Orangeburg,
South Carolina. Approximately three months later, Dr. Matthew Nelson, an
orthopedic surgeon, performed arthroscopic surgery on Beason's left shoulder,
during which he discovered Beason suffered from a labral tear and found several
parts of the shoulder contained inflamed tissue. Between the accident and her
surgery, Beason continued to work as a route driver for Atlas Foods, for whom she
stocked vending machines and set up coffee machines two days after the accident,
a job she admitted was physical.

The case was tried before a jury on March 2, 2011. Lowden admitted fault but
denied any damages suffered were causally related. Dr. Nelson testified the
injuries he discovered were consistent with a rear-end collision, and he believed "to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty" they were caused by the accident. He
also testified nothing he was aware of indicated any other cause.

On cross-examination, Dr. Nelson admitted Beason's MRI also showed
osteoarthritis of the acromioclavicular joint, a degenerative condition that develops
over time and would not have been caused by the accident, but did state the
majority of people over fifty years old suffer from asymptomatic arthritis,
especially if they use their hands to work. Dr. Nelson conceded the procedures
could be conducted on people who are simply suffering from osteoarthritis and had
not been involved in an automobile collision. However, he testified what he
observed during the surgery on Beason's shoulder could occur "from dormant
arthritis with a superimposed injury" and usually labral tears are caused by a
trauma and not overuse. Dr. Nelson also admitted Beason's shoulder pain could
have been caused by the nature of her job. However, he would have expected
complaints of pain in both of her shoulders, and his opinion of the cause of the
injury did not change after discovering Beason's job duties or that she continued to
work following the accident.

During jury deliberations, loud, angry, and aggressive male voices were heard
coming from the jury room. The jury initially reached a verdict in less than two
hours, but the foreperson indicated she had not taken part in the decision and
refused to sign the verdict form. The trial court ordered the jury to continue
deliberating, during which angry male voices were again heard. Shortly thereafter,
the jury unanimously returned with a plaintiff's verdict for $17,000.
Beason moved for new trial nisi additur for a total verdict of $80,000, which
comprised the economic damages of $38,245.21 in medical expenses,
approximately $2,700 in lost wages, and a one-to-one ratio for noneconomic pain
and suffering damages of approximately $39,000. The court granted her motion,
finding the verdict was "significantly insufficient and inadequate to compensate
[Beason] for the injuries which the evidence established."

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for additur, the appellate court
must determine whether the court acted within its discretion. Ligon v. Norris, 371
S.C. 625, 635, 640 S.E.2d 467, 472 (Ct. App. 2006). "The trial court has the power
to grant a new trial nisi additur when it finds the amount of the verdict to be
merely inadequate." Id. "The consideration of a motion for a new trial nisi additur
requires the court to consider the adequacy of the verdict in light of the evidence
presented." Id. However, the trial court must give substantial deference to the
jury's determination of damages and state compelling reasons for granting additur.
Todd v. Joyner, 385 S.C. 509, 517, 685 S.E.2d 613, 618 (Ct. App. 2008). The
"appellate court will only reverse if the trial court abused his discretion in deciding
a motion for new trial nisi additur to the extent that an error of law results." Id.

We find the trial court provided compelling reasons for granting additur. In the
order granting Beason's motion for a new trial nisi additur, the trial court stated its
reasons for granting the motion were (1) "[t]he manner of the jury deliberations
was troublesome to this Court[]" and (2) "the verdict is significantly insufficient
and inadequate to compensate [Beason] for the injuries which the evidence
established." These two reasons combined to "lead[] [the trial court] to the
conclusion that [the] jury's verdict is simply not reasonable, in light of the evidence
presented." The trial court found the jury's verdict did not "bear[] [any] logical
relationship to the evidence submitted at trial" and found a reasonable verdict to be
$80,000. The trial court noted in its order that Dr. Nelson testified the wreck was
more likely than not the cause of her injuries and his treatment was medically
necessary and appropriate. Further, the trial court stated Lowden presented no
medical evidence to contradict Dr. Nelson's testimony.

In Green v. Fritz, this court reversed the trial court, concluding it had abused its
discretion in granting the motion for additur without articulating compelling
reasons for invading the province of the jury in determining damages. 356 S.C.
566, 571, 590 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2003). The plaintiff in Green brought suit
for injuries suffered during an automobile accident, claiming nearly $3,000 in
economic damages as well as noneconomic damages. Id. at 568-69, 590 S.E.2d at
40-41. The defendant admitted fault but argued the accident did not proximately
cause the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 569, 590 S.E.2d at 41. The jury awarded the
plaintiff $1,500 in actual damages, but the trial court granted additur and increased
the verdict to $14,000. Id. The trial court's order only listed the plaintiff's claimed
damages and noted its authority to increase or decrease a verdict. Id. In reversing
the grant of additur, this court held the trial court did not provide compelling
reasons for granting additur because when "the evidence of damages is disputed,
the mere listing of [the plaintiff]'s claimed damages . . . does not constitute
compelling reasons for invading the jury's province." Id. at 571, 590 S.E.2d at 41.

In Luchok v. Vena, this court again reversed the trial court's granting of additur for
lack of compelling reasons. 391 S.C. 262, 263, 705 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ct. App. 2010).
The plaintiff was involved in a car accident and claimed over $10,000 in medical
bills, of which $9,100 related to chiropractic treatment. Id. The defendant
admitted fault but argued the plaintiff did not prove the accident proximately
caused her injuries or the chiropractic treatments were reasonable and necessary.
Id. at 264, 705 S.E.2d at 72. The jury returned a verdict for $3,024, and the trial
court granted additur because "the amount awarded does not approach the amount
of the medical costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Plaintiff." Id. at
263-64, 705 S.E.2d at 72. In holding the trial court's reasons for granting additur
were not compelling, this court noted "[t]he amount of recoverable damages was
hotly contested" at trial. Id. at 263-65, 705 S.E.2d at 72-73. We found the trial
court's first reason—"the verdict did not cover all the chiropractic bills"—was not
compelling "[i]n the face of the sharply conflicting evidence." Id. at 265, 705
S.E.2d at 73. We also found the trial court's second reason—the charges for
chiropractic treatment were reasonable and necessary—was not compelling
because the trial court "is not entitled to make that determination as a matter of law
when the evidence is conflicting." Id.

Unlike in Green and Luchok, however, the trial court here did not merely list
Beason's claimed damages or conclude as a matter of law the medical expenses
were reasonable and necessary. Instead, the trial court noted specific reasons for
increasing the verdict. For example, the trial court pointed to the fact Beason
presented evidence of medical expenses of over $38,000, including costs for her
surgery, and Dr. Nelson testified her injuries were more likely than not caused by
the accident and his treatment was medically necessary. Whereas in Luchok, only
the plaintiff testified concerning the need for treatment, and in fact was the only
witness in her case-in-chief, but presented no medical testimony, and one of the
trial court's reasons for increasing the verdict was her testimony. Luchok, 391 S.C.
at 263-65, 705 S.E.2d at 72. Furthermore, the trial court here noted Lowden
presented no medical evidence to contradict Dr. Nelson's opinion. Finally, the trial
court concluded the $17,000 verdict did not bear any logical relationship to the
evidence presented. See Ligon, 371 S.C. at 635, 640 S.E.2d at 472 (noting the trial
court is required to consider the adequacy of the verdict in light of the evidence
presented when ruling on a motion for additur).

We find the trial court articulated compelling reasons for granting additur and
therefore did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, AND KONDUROS, JJ., concur.