State v. Maldonado

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kairon B. Maldonado, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000684

Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-132
Heard January 7, 2015 – Filed March 11, 2015

AFFIRMED

Rebecca Kinlein Lindahl, of Katten Muchin Rosenman,
LLP, of Charlotte, NC, and Chief Appellate Defender
Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, both for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Special
Assistant Attorney General Amie L. Clifford, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York,
all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Kairon B. Maldonado (Appellant) appeals his convictions for
attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. He argues that the trial court
erred by (1) allowing the admission of a witness's out-of-court identification of
Appellant; (2) not permitting Appellant to elicit testimony that both of his
statements to police were consistent; and (3) qualifying a police officer as an
expert on dog tracking. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred by allowing the admission of a witness's out-
of-court identification of Appellant: State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 288, 540 S.E.2d
445, 448 (2000) ("Generally, the decision to admit an eyewitness identification is
at the trial [court's] discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of [discretion] . . . ." (citation omitted)); id. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447 ("The United
States Supreme Court has developed a two-prong[ed] inquiry to determine the
admissibility of an out-of-court identification." (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 198-200 (1972))); id. (stating that a court must first determine whether the
identification procedure was unduly suggestive); id. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447-48
(stating that a court needs to consider the second prong—whether there was a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification—only if the identification
procedure was unduly suggestive); State v. Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 230, 522
S.E.2d 845, 852 (Ct. App. 1999) (determining that "there [was] no evidence
whatsoever of suggestiveness in the identification procedure used" because none of
the photographs in the lineup stood out from the others; the photographs were of
comparable size and composition; the subjects in the photographs were similar in
age, appearance, and physical characteristics; and the investigator never expressly
or implicitly suggested to the witness which photograph was the suspect's); State v.
Spears, 393 S.C. 466, 481, 713 S.E.2d 324, 331-32 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding that
the photographic lineups were not unduly suggestive and that no substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification existed when the witness was one
"hundred percent sure" the defendant committed the robbery and the witness
testified that she recognized the defendant "during the course of the robbery as
someone she knew 'from the neighborhood'").

2. As to whether the trial court erred by not permitting Appellant to elicit
testimony that both of his statements to police were consistent: State v. Williams,
386 S.C. 503, 509, 690 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2010) (stating that the admission or
exclusion of evidence is within the trial court's discretion and the decision will not
be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion); Altman v. Griffith, 372
S.C. 388, 401, 642 S.E.2d 619, 626 (Ct. App. 2007) ("To warrant reversal based on
the admission or exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must prove both
error and resulting prejudice." (citation omitted)); Rule 220(c), SCACR ("The
appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any
ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."); Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 402, SCRE ("Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."); State v. Lyles, 379 S.C. 328, 340, 665
S.E.2d 201, 207 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[The] absence of a logical connection to the
facts in debate makes the evidence irrelevant and inadmissible.").

3. As to whether the trial court erred by qualifying a police officer as an expert on
dog tracking: State v. Price, 368 S.C. 494, 498, 629 S.E.2d 363, 365 (2006)
(stating that a trial court's decision to admit or exclude the testimony of an expert
witness will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion); State v. White, 382 S.C.
265, 273, 676 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2009) ("The party offering the expert must
establish that his witness has the necessary qualifications in terms of 'knowledge,
skill, experience, training[,] or education.'" (quoting Rule 702, SCRE)).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.