State v. Fullbright

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Matthew Brandon Fullbright, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-207553

Appeal From Anderson County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-399
Heard September 10, 2014 – Filed November 12, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of South
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant
Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Christina Theos Adams, of Anderson, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Matthew Brandon Fullbright appeals his convictions for murder
and armed robbery, arguing: (1) his statements to law enforcement were obtained
in violation of his right against self-incrimination and, therefore, should not have
been admitted at trial; (2) his right against self-incrimination was violated by the
admission of a video recording of responses he made at his arraignment hearing to
a question from a family member of the victims; and (3) the danger of unfair
prejudice from the video recording substantially outweighed its probative value.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether law enforcement obtained Fullbright's statements in violation
of his right against self-incrimination: Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972)
(stating that when the prosecution seeks to use "a confession challenged as
involuntary," it "must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the
confession was voluntary") (quoted in State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 55, 370
S.E.2d 611, 612 (1988)); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252
(2001) ("The trial judge's determination of the voluntariness of a statement must be
made on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused."); State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 243,
471 S.E.2d 689, 694-95 (1996) ("A determination of whether a confession was
given voluntarily requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances."); id.
at 243, 471 S.E.2d at 695 ("On appeal, the conclusion of the trial judge as to the
voluntariness of a confession will not be reviewed unless so erroneous as to show
an abuse of discretion.").

2. As to whether Fullbright is entitled to a new trial because admission of the
video recording of his arraignment violated his right against self-incrimination:
State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 334, 563 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2002) ("'Harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt' means the reviewing court can conclude the error did
not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. Brooks, 341
S.C. 57, 62-63, 533 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2000) (indicating that in deciding whether the
improper admission of evidence is harmless in a criminal matter, the reviewing
court is required to look at other evidence admitted at trial and determine whether
competent evidence conclusively proves the defendant's guilt and could lead to no
other rational conclusion); State v. Arther, 290 S.C. 291, 296, 350 S.E.2d 187, 190
(1986) (stating that violation of an accused's constitutional protection against self-
incrimination "does not require reversal of a conviction if a review of the entire
record establishes that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
3. As to whether the video recording should have been suppressed because the
danger of unfair prejudice from admitting this evidence substantially outweighed
its probative value: Rule 403, SCRE (allowing the exclusion of relevant evidence
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice"); State v. Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 378, 580 S.E.2d 785, 794 (Ct. App.
2003) ("A trial judge's decision regarding the comparative probative value and
prejudicial effect of evidence should be reversed only in exceptional
circumstances."); State v. Gilchrist, 329 S.C. 621, 627, 496 S.E.2d 424, 427 (Ct.
App. 1998) ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.