Glover v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Antonio Glover, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-202772

Appeal From Anderson County
Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-350
Heard September 11, 2014 – Filed October 8, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General Kaelon E. May, and Assistant Attorney
General John Walter Whitmire, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This is a belated appeal pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110,
208 S.E.2d 35 (1974), in which Antonio Glover argues the trial court erred by: (1)
denying his motion to suppress and (2) declining his motion to remove two jurors.
Glover contends his convictions should be reversed on these grounds. We affirm,
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Glover's motion to suppress
evidence seized from his person based on a lack of reasonable suspicion:1 Ex parte
McMillan, 319 S.C. 331, 335, 461 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1995) (providing a party cannot
concede an issue at trial and then complain on appeal).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon
Glover's argument that his arrest was unlawful: State v. Gamble, 405 S.C. 409,
416, 747 S.E.2d 784, 787 (2013) (stating that a search incident to a lawful arrest is
one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures); State v. Robinson, 335 S.C. 620, 634, 518 S.E.2d 269, 276
(Ct. App. 1999) (holding that when determining whether an arrest was lawful, a
court must consider "'whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had
probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [appellant] had
committed . . . an offense'" (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)

1
Even if this issue was not procedurally barred, we note there was evidence to
support the trial court's decision that reasonable suspicion existed to briefly detain
Glover. See State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 251, 639 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2006) ("Our
review in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases is limited to determining
whether any evidence supports the trial court's finding."); see also State v.
Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2002) ("A police officer
may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative purposes,
without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause for
arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion
requires a particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another
of criminal activity. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture— must be considered." (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
(alteration by court)); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(E)(1) (Supp. 2013) (providing
that "[a] person commits the offense of assault and battery in the third degree if the
person unlawfully injures another person, or offers or attempts to injure another
person with the present ability to do so."); State v. Goodwin, 351 S.C. 105, 110-11,
567 S.E.2d 912, 914-15 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the underlying arrest "need
not be prosecuted in order to successfully prosecute for resisting arrest," and
similarly, "neither should the absence of a charge on the underlying arrest bar
evidence seized subsequent to a proper resisting arrest charge).

3. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon
Glover's argument that the chain of custody was unreliable: State v. Taylor, 360
S.C. 18, 23, 598 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The admission of evidence is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge."); id. at 22-23, 598 S.E.2d at
737 ("A party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood
samples must establish a chain of custody as far as practicable. Where the
analyzed substance has passed through several hands, the evidence must not leave
it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and
the analysis.") (citation omitted); id. at 24, 598 S.E.2d at 737 (If "there is evidence
to establish the identity of those who have handled the evidence and the manner in
which it was handled, a weakness in the chain merely raises a question of
credibility, not admissibility."); see also State v. Johnson, 318 S.C. 194, 196, 456
S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding a discrepancy between the dates on
which a handler in the chain of custody received the evidence merely reflected
upon the credibility of the evidence when no facts were presented to indicate the
drugs were not within the control of identifiable people during the entire time).

4. As to whether the trial court erred in declining to remove two jurors after the
jury had been impaneled: Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 111,
512 S.E.2d 510, 518 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[Section 14-7-1030 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2013)], provides that any objection to a juror is waived if not made
before the jury is impaneled."); id. (holding that "[a] party objecting to a juror after
the jury is impaneled must show that he could not have, in the exercise of due
diligence, discovered the ground for objection before the impanelling of the jury.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.