Vedad v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Moshtaba Vedad, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212952

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-087
Heard January 9, 2014 – Filed March 5, 2014

AFFIRMED

Allan R. Holmes of Gibbs & Holmes, of Charleston, for
Appellant.

Natalie Jean Moore, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In an appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC),
Appellant Moshtaba Vedad (Vedad) seeks review of the ALC's order affirming the
decision of the State Employee Grievance Committee to uphold Vedad's
termination from his employment with Respondent South Carolina Department of
Transportation (SCDOT). Vedad contends that the ALC erred in finding that the
procedures employed in his termination provided adequate due process. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the ALC erred in concluding the South Carolina State
Employee Grievance Procedure Act does not create a property interest in
continued state employment: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-17-320 to -340 (Supp.
2013) (providing a "covered [state] employee" with grievance rights and a
procedure to appeal to the State Employee Grievance Committee for review
of an agency's final decision regarding an adverse action against the
employee; but not indicating a state employee has a "property interest" in
continued employment); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 538 (1985) (finding "property interests" are not created by the
Constitution, "'they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law . . . .'" (emphasis added)) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

2. As to whether the ALC erred in finding Vedad's post-termination hearing
before the State Employee Grievance Committee afforded Vedad adequate
due process in his termination proceedings: Kurschner v. City of Camden
Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Due
process does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of
government impairment of a private interest."); id. at 172, 656 S.E.2d at 350
("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."); see Olson v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 379 S.C. 57, 69, 663 S.E.2d 497, 504 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding no
violation of due process when post-termination hearing afforded notice and
an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner).

3. As to whether the ALC's decision to affirm Vedad's termination was
supported by substantial evidence: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B)(e) (Supp.
2013) (providing, in pertinent part, that the court may not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the administrative law judge as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse or modify the decision
if the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the
whole record); Greeneagle, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control,
399 S.C. 91, 95, 730 S.E.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 2012) ("'Substantial
evidence' sufficient to support a finding of the ALC is evidence which,
considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach
the conclusion that the administrative agency reached." (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)); id. ("The possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's
finding from being supported by substantial evidence.") (quoting Risher v.
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 198, 210, 712 S.E.2d 428,
434 (2011)). Based upon our review of the record, the ALC's order
affirming the decision to terminate Vedad is supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, the ALC's decision is supported by the GPS reports
indicating many of Vedad's trips appeared to be of a personal nature, a
photograph of Vedad's assigned SCDOT vehicle parked near his home on a
stop that was not logged-in on his mileage report, and other evidence
indicating discrepancies in his time and mileage logs.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.