State v. Stukes

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dantae Stukes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-211706

Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-027
Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed January 22, 2014

AFFIRMED

George R. McElveen, III, of McElveen & McElveen, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 417, 200 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1973) ("A
motion to amend the date alleged in an indictment is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial [court], and the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and
resulting prejudice is upon the party adversely affected by [its] ruling thereon.");
State v. Means, 367 S.C. 374, 387, 626 S.E.2d 348, 356 (2006) ("[A] motion to
amend an indictment should be granted when the proposed amendment does not
change the nature of the offense or affect the sufficiency of the indictment."),
abrogated on other grounds by Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878
(2007); Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) ("The trial
court's refusal of a motion for continuance in a criminal case will not be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the appellant."); Ungar
v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of continuance is traditionally
within the discretion of the trial [court], and it is not every denial of a request for
more time that violates due process . . . .").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.