State v. Collington

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ladorrean Collington, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-194088

Appeal From Horry County
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-225
Heard April 10, 2013 – Filed May 22, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan B. Hackett, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ladorrean Collington appeals her convictions of accessory
before the fact of burglary in the first degree and accessory before the fact of
armed robbery. Collington argues the trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of
prior difficulties between her and the victim; (2) admitting evidence of threats she
allegedly made to the victim in a voicemail message; and (3) denying her motion
for severance. We affirm.

1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior difficulties
between Collington and the victim, we affirm. To the extent Collington challenges
Anthony Graham's and Officer Daniel Cradic's testimony concerning Collington's
prior difficulties with the victim, we find these arguments are not preserved for
appellate review. See State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523
(2005) (stating that to preserve an issue for appellate review there must be a
contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial court); State v. Dunbar,
356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) (holding that in order to preserve
an issue for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the
trial court); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 (stating a party may not argue one ground
at trial and an alternate ground on appeal). As to the testimony of victim's live-in
girlfriend, Frankie Davis, regarding a confrontation she had with Collington in the
days preceding the home invasion, we find the evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b), SCRE and the res gestae theory. Here, the evidence of Collington's anger
and jealousy over the victim's relationship with Davis was probative of
Collington's motive and provided the jury with a context for the home invasion.
See Rule 404(b), SCRE (stating that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
generally inadmissible to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged, but
recognizing an exception to this rule when such evidence shows "motive, identity,
the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or
intent"); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 122, 470 S.E.2d 366, 370-71 (1996)
(holding evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible under the res gestae theory
when it "furnishes part of the context of the crime" or is necessary to a "full
presentation" of the case). Accordingly, we find the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting Davis's testimony. See State v. Morris, 376 S.C. 189, 205-
06, 656 S.E.2d 359, 368 (2008) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and the [trial] court's decision will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (citation omitted)).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting the contents of a voicemail
message Collington left on the phone of the victim's friend during the week of the
home invasion, we affirm. In the voicemail message, Collington indicated the
victim "done made [her] mad" by living with another woman and that victim was
"bouts to get it" and "better watch his . . . back." We find this evidence was
logically relevant to show Collington's motive and intent to plan the home
invasion. See Rule 404(b), SCRE; State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 29, 667 S.E.2dd
728, 731 (2008) (holding "[t]o be admissible, the bad act must logically relate to
the crime with which the defendant has been charged"). Additionally, we find the
voicemail message was admissible under the res gestae theory. See Adams, 322
S.C. at 122, 470 S.E.2d at 370-71 (holding evidence of prior bad acts may be
admissible under the res gestae theory when it "furnishes part of the context of the
crime" or is necessary to a "full presentation" of the case). Accordingly, we find
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence. See Morris,
376 S.C. at 205-06, 656 S.E.2d at 368 (holding the admission or exclusion of
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court's
decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion).

3. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Collington's motion to sever her
trial from that of her co-defendant, we find the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying Collington's motion to sever the joint trial. See State v.
Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 350, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding a
motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and such
determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion). In
this instance, Collington failed to show that she was prejudiced by the joint trial.
See State v. Halcomb, 382 S.C. 432, 440, 676 S.E.2d 149, 153 (Ct. App. 2009)
(holding a "defendant who alleges he was improperly tried jointly must show
prejudice before an appellate court will reverse his conviction" (citations omitted)).
Furthermore, the trial court's curative instruction helped to protect Collington's
rights and ensure that no prejudice resulted from the joint trial with her co-
defendant. See id. (stating a "proper cautionary instruction may help protect the
individual rights of each defendant and ensure that no prejudice results from a joint
trial").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.