Carroll v. Debra Mowery

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Terrence "Terry" Carroll, Appellant,

v.

Debra Mowery, TD Realty, Upstate RE Group, Hawk
Shadow Business Services, LLC, and Debra Mower
Realtor, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000396

Appeal From Pickens County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-274
Submitted June 1, 2023 – Filed July 26, 2023

AFFIRMED

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Oakland, Mississippi, for
Appellant.

Bruce Wyche Bannister, Luke Anthony Burke, and
Marcelo Torricos, III, all of Bannister, Wyatt & Stalvey,
LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Terrence "Terry" Carroll appeals the special referee's order
denying him relief and dismissing his causes of action for constructive fraud,
breach of trust, breach of contract, interest in and for real estate, quantum meruit,
unjust enrichment, and restitution against Debra Mowery; TD Realty; Upstate RE
Group; Hawk Shadow Business Services, LLC (Hawk Shadow); and Debra
Mowery in her professional capacity as a realtor (collectively, Respondents). On
appeal, Carroll argues the special referee erred in dismissing his causes of action
against Respondents under Rule 41(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2018, Carroll filed a complaint against Mowery alleging causes of action for
unjust enrichment, interest in and for real estate, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, specific performance of contract, breach of contract, temporary injunction,
restitution, constructive fraud, breach of trust, and quantum meruit. Carroll alleged
he and Mowery entered into a series of contracts to renovate and rent properties in
Maryland and South Carolina, which they purchased using joint funds while in a
romantic relationship. Carroll requested an equal division of all real estate and
funds acquired during their relationship, as well as $100,000 in damages.

On December 17, 2019, the special referee held a trial on the merits. Carroll
testified Mowery purchased a house for them in Maryland (the Maryland property)
that he renovated extensively. Carroll recalled that in 2010 he received a $117,000
settlement for injuries he suffered in a car accident. He indicated he used the
settlement proceeds to pay off the mortgage on the Maryland property and also
gave money to Mowery's tax preparation and accounting business, Hawk Shadow.

Carroll stated he and Mowery decided to buy a house in Easley, South Carolina—
the Linda Lane property—which Mowery paid for by taking out a second
mortgage on the Maryland property and with a loan she deposited into their joint
checking account. Carroll maintained he was not involved in the financial aspects
of buying the property. Carroll explained Mowery continued to live in Maryland
while he moved to Easley to renovate the Linda Lane property. He testified he and
Mowery decided to move to the Linda Lane property in 2015, and they lived there
until the end of their relationship in 2018.

Carroll recalled he and Mowery made a $71,000 profit from the sale of the
Maryland property after paying off the second mortgage, which they deposited into
their joint account. Carroll testified he and Mowery decided to use these proceeds
to purchase a second house in Easley, the South 9th Street property, for rental
purposes. He recalled Mowery purchased the South 9th Street property before she
became a licensed realtor. Carroll stated he and several family members renovated
the property with money from his and Mowery's joint account.

Carroll testified that shortly after buying the South 9th Street property, Mowery
bought a third home in Easley, the Pope Field Road property, for $42,000 with
money from their joint account. He explained they decided to put the three
properties located in Easley and the Maryland property (collectively, the
properties) in Mowery's name to ensure she would not require his signature on any
paperwork related to the properties.

Carroll stated that when they decided to end their relationship in 2018, Mowery
agreed to split their assets equally. Carroll testified he discovered that Mowery
cancelled his credit cards and took his name off their joint bank account the day
after they decided to end their relationship. He stated Mowery also continued to
drive a Jaguar convertible he bought at auction. Carroll indicated he wanted the
properties to be equally divided as he and Mowery originally discussed. He stated
he put his own money into the renovation of the properties, including $2,500 from
the sale of his boat, which they used to buy windows for the Linda Lane property.

On cross-examination, Carroll acknowledged he and Mowery never married but he
stated they acted like a married couple. He confirmed that the properties and the
convertible were all titled in Mowery's name. He testified he did not have any
written agreement or contract with Mowery regarding how they planned to manage
the properties because their agreement changed day to day. Carroll stated he
believed he held the title of vice president of Upstate RE Group, Mowery's real
estate business, and was vice president and part owner of TD Realty until he
received discovery for this case. He explained that the "TD" in the name TD
Realty stood for Terry and Debra. Carroll stated he contributed the $42,000 he
made from the sale of his boat to the joint account they used to buy the properties
and pay their living expenses. Carroll acknowledged he filed a mechanic's lien on
the Pope Field Road property to prevent Mowery from selling it without paying
him for his renovation work.

John Noel Quinn, Carroll's brother-in-law, testified Carroll renovated the Easley
properties, as well as the Maryland property. He stated Carroll and Mowery acted
as a couple and as partners in a business until their relationship ended. Constance
Fern Quinn, Carroll's sister, also testified Carroll and Mowery were a couple and
stated they discussed their plan to run a rental business together to fund their
retirement with her and John.
At the close of Carroll's case, Mowery renewed her motion for partial summary
judgment as a motion for a directed verdict, which the special referee treated as a
motion for involuntary nonsuit. The special referee granted Mowery's motion for
involuntary nonsuit as to Carrol's claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, specific performance of a contract, constructive fraud, and breach of trust
and denied the motion as to Carroll's claims for constructive trust and breach of
contract.

Mowery testified Carroll did not have a full-time job when they met. She stated
she supported them with the money she made from Hawk Shadow. Mowery
indicated she took a mortgage out on the Maryland property to pay for the Linda
Lane property and stated Carroll had no responsibility for the mortgage payments.
Mowery acknowledged she gave Carroll access to her credit cards, which he used
to pay for living expenses and supplies while making repairs to the Linda Lane
property. Mowery testified she and Carroll never opened a joint bank account, but
she indicated she gave him signatory authority on her accounts. According to
Mowery, she spent $201,000 supporting Carroll between 2006 and 2018.

Mowery stated only her name appeared on the titles to the properties. Mowery
testified she never received an invoice from Carroll indicating he expected
payment for his work prior to him filing a mechanic's lien on the Pope Field Road
property. She testified that the articles of organization for TD Realty listed her as
the organizer of the company, and she denied ever discussing making Carroll an
officer of the company. Mowery stated Carroll was not involved in the operation
of Upstate RE Group. She testified she paid the taxes on the earnings from TD
Realty and Upstate RE Group. Mowery also confirmed only her name appeared on
the title for the Jaguar convertible and she paid the insurance for the vehicle.

Mowery stated she decided to end her relationship with Carroll in 2018 because
she had no more work available for him and she could not afford to continue
paying his expenses. She denied having any ongoing business agreement with
Carroll in which he renovated houses in exchange for compensation. Mowery
testified she believed paying his living expenses was fair compensation for
Carroll's work. She indicated she did not deceive Carroll about the fact that the
properties were in her name.

On cross-examination, Mowery stated she was not aware of what Carroll did with
the money he received from his car accident settlement. Although Mowery
acknowledged Carroll wrote a check for $30,752 after the settlement, she stated
she did not know the purpose of the check and denied it was written to pay the first
mortgage on the Maryland property. She testified Carroll worked on the properties
during their relationship but he did not pay for the properties or the materials
required for the renovations. She stated she purchased the Linda Lane property for
$61,000 and believed it was now worth approximately $169,000 but she did not
know what the proceeds of the sale of the house would be considering the money
she put into the renovations.

In rebuttal, Carroll testified he wrote Mowery a check for $30,712.45 to pay the
first mortgage on the Maryland property after Mowery told him she could not
afford to pay it. He indicated he also wrote her a check for $5,000 to put into
Hawk Shadow. Carroll stated he did not file taxes in his name between 2006 and
2018 because the only income he had to report was "the few jobs that [he] did
between friends." He stated Mowery claimed him as a dependent during several
years of their relationship to maximize her tax returns. Carroll testified their living
expenses were paid out of their joint bank account, which he contributed to, and
therefore Mowery did not completely support him financially during their
relationship.

In the order denying relief to Mowery and Carroll, the special referee dismissed
Carroll's action for constructive fraud, finding Carroll failed to present evidence of
falsity on Mowery's part or that he reasonably relied on such a falsity. The special
referee dismissed Carroll's breach of trust action, finding Carroll failed to present
any evidence of a fiduciary relationship between him and Mowery. The special
referee also denied Carroll relief based on his causes of action for interest in and
for real estate, which the special referee considered as a constructive trust claim,
and breach of contract. Additionally, the special referee denied Carroll relief based
on unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and restitution because he found there was
insufficient evidence to determine what financial contributions each party made to
the relationship or to the expenses related to the real estate transactions that
occurred during their relationship. The special referee stated that likely neither
party contributed significantly more or less money and time to the relationship but
if one party did contribute more than the other, any such contribution should be
considered a gift to the other party.1 Carroll filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing unjust enrichment occurred because Mowery profited from his financial

1
The order stated Carroll argued the special referee "should enforce a
marriage-like contract between the parties even though no marriage existed." This
reflected the special referee's belief that Carroll sought equitable distribution,
which was not available to him.
contributions and labor during their relationship.2 The special referee denied the
motion, finding the arguments raised in the motion had been considered during the
trial. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the special referee err in dismissing Carroll's cause of action for
constructive fraud?

2. Did the special referee err in dismissing Carroll's cause of action for breach of
trust based on a finding that no evidence was offered to prove a fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties?

3. Did the special referee err in denying Carroll's causes of action for unjust
enrichment, interest in and for real estate, breach of contract, restitution, and
quantum meruit?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, . . . may move for a dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief."
Rule 41(b), SCRCP. "Rule 41(b) allows the judge as the trier of facts to weigh the
evidence, determine the facts and render a judgment against the plaintiff at the
close of his case if justified." Johnson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 308 S.C. 116, 118,
417 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1992).

"When legal and equitable actions are maintained in one suit, the court is presented
with a divided scope of review, and each action retains its own identity as legal or
equitable for purposes of review on appeal." Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 17, 640
S.E.2d 486, 495 (Ct. App. 2006). "In an action at law tried without a jury, an
appellate court's scope of review extends merely to the correction of errors of law."
Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc., 381 S.C. 597, 599-600, 675 S.E.2d 414, 415 (2009). "[An
appellate court] will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are found to be
without evidence that reasonably supports those findings." Id. "In an action at
equity, a reviewing court can find facts in accordance with its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence." Wright, 372 S.C. at 19, 640 S.E.2d at 496.
"However, this broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to

2
Carroll's reconsideration motion was not included in the record on appeal.
disregard the findings made [by the special referee]." Goldman v. RBC, Inc., 369
S.C. 462, 465, 632 S.E.2d 850, 851 (2006).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Constructive Fraud

Carroll argues the special referee erred in dismissing his claim for constructive
fraud based on the finding that he knew Mowery titled the properties in her name.
He contends Mowery used her extensive business knowledge and position as a
realtor to mislead him in regard to the ownership of the properties and TD Realty.
We disagree.

"To establish constructive fraud, all elements of actual fraud except the element of
intent must be established." Ardis v. Cox, 314 S.C. 512, 516, 431 S.E.2d 267, 269
(Ct. App. 1993).

In order to prove [actual] fraud, the following elements
must be shown: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) either knowledge of its falsity or a
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the
representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance
of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the
hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer's
consequent and proximate injury.

Id. at 515, 431 S.E.2d at 269. "Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to
deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud while intent to deceive is an
essential element of actual fraud." Id. at 516, 431 S.E.2d at 269-70. "[I]n a
constructive fraud case, where there is no confidential or fiduciary relationship,
and an arm's length transaction between mature, educated people is involved, there
is no right to rely." Id. at 516, 431 S.E.2d at 270. "This is especially true in
circumstances where one should have utilized precaution and protection to
safeguard his interests." Id. at 516-17, 431 S.E.2d at 270.

"A confidential or fiduciary relationship exists when one imposes a special
confidence in another so that the latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to
act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the
confidence." SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 794
(1990). "To establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the facts and
circumstances must indicate the party reposing trust in another has some
foundation for believing the one so entrusted will act not in his own behalf but in
the interest of the party so reposing." Moore v. Moore, 360 S.C. 241, 251, 599
S.E.2d 467, 472 (Ct. App. 2004).

We hold the special referee properly dismissed Carroll's cause of action for
constructive fraud. See Ardis, 314 S.C. at 516, 431 S.E.2d at 269 ("To establish
constructive fraud, all elements of actual fraud except the element of intent must be
established."). We find Carroll failed to establish his right to rely on Mowery's
alleged representations because he did not present evidence showing a confidential
or fiduciary relationship existed between him and Mowery. See SSI Med. Servs.,
Inc., 301 S.C. at 500, 392 S.E.2d at 794 ("A confidential or fiduciary relationship
exists when one imposes a special confidence in another so that the latter, in equity
and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests of the one reposing the confidence."); Ardis, 314 S.C. at 516, 431 S.E.2d
at 270 ("[I]n a constructive fraud case, where there is no confidential or fiduciary
relationship, and an arm's length transaction between mature, educated people is
involved, there is no right to rely."). Carroll did not present evidence a business
transaction took place between him and Mowery. Although Mowery owned a real
estate business and an accounting and tax preparation business, Mowery did not act
as a realtor or accountant for Carroll during their relationship. Carroll testified he
did not file taxes during their relationship and the properties purchased during their
relationship were titled in Mowery's name. See Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 353
S.C. 449, 459, 578 S.E.2d 711, 716 (2003) ("Historically, [our supreme c]ourt has
reserved imposition of fiduciary duties to legal or business settings, often in which
one person entrusts money to another, such as with lawyers, brokers, corporate
directors, and corporate promoters."). Accordingly, we find Carroll failed to show
he had a right to rely on Mowery's alleged representations because he did not
present evidence showing he and Mowery had a confidential or fiduciary
relationship or that a business transaction took place between them.

In addition, Carroll did not present sufficient evidence showing Mowery made
false representations about the ownership of the properties and TD Realty. See
Ardis, 314 S.C. at 515, 431 S.E.2d at 269 (listing the elements of actual fraud,
including that the plaintiff must establish the defendant made a false
representation). Although Carroll believed Mowery planned to transfer ownership
of the properties to TD Realty, he testified he knew Mowery titled the properties
solely in her name. Mowery testified she did not deceive Carroll about the fact
that she titled the properties in her name and she denied ever discussing making
Carroll an officer of TD Realty. The deeds to the properties listed her as the sole
owner of the properties. The articles of organization for TD Realty, the company
Carroll believed he and Mowery owned together, listed only Mowery as the
organizer of the business. Based on the foregoing, we find Carroll failed to show
Mowery made affirmative representations to him regarding the ownership of the
properties and TD Realty. Accordingly, we hold the special referee did not err in
dismissing Carrol's constructive fraud claim.

II. Breach of Trust

Carroll argues the special referee erred in dismissing his claim for breach of trust
because evidence supported a finding that he and Mowery had a fiduciary
relationship. He asserts Mowery owed him a duty of disclosure and honesty
regarding the properties she bought and he renovated based on her position as a
realtor and broker. We disagree.

We hold the special referee did not err in dismissing Carroll's cause of action for
breach of trust because, as discussed above, he failed to present evidence showing
he and Mowery had a fiduciary relationship. See SSI Med. Servs., Inc., 301 S.C. at
500, 392 S.E.2d at 794 ("A confidential or fiduciary relationship exists when one
imposes a special confidence in another so that the latter, in equity and good
conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the
one reposing the confidence."); Moore, 360 S.C. at 251, 599 S.E.2d at 472 ("To
establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the facts and circumstances must
indicate the party reposing trust in another has some foundation for believing the
one so entrusted will act not in his own behalf but in the interest of the party so
reposing."); Hendricks, 353 S.C. at 459, 578 S.E.2d at 716 ("Historically, [our
supreme court] has reserved imposition of fiduciary duties to legal or business
settings, often in which one person entrusts money to another, such as with
lawyers, brokers, corporate directors, and corporate promoters."). Carroll had no
fiduciary relationship with Mowery related to her work as a real estate agent or
accountant. Mowery did not perform any tax preparation or accounting work for
Carroll because he did not file taxes during their relationship. Mowery also did not
act as Carroll's realtor because the properties purchased during their relationship
were titled in her name and she was not a licensed realtor at the time the properties
were purchased. Therefore, we hold the special referee did not err in dismissing
Carroll's claim for breach of trust.

III. Breach of Contract and Interest in and for Real Estate
Carroll argues the special referee erred in dismissing his claims for breach of
contract and interest in and for real estate because he provided sufficient evidence
an agreement existed between the parties. He contends the record shows he and
Mowery had an agreement in which she arranged the purchase of the properties
and handled the paperwork associated with the purchases while he renovated the
properties. We disagree.

"The elements for a breach of contract are the existence of a contract, its breach,
and damages caused by such breach." S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C.
483, 491-92, 732 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Ct. App. 2012). "The necessary elements of a
contract are an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration." Roberts v. Gaskins,
327 S.C. 478, 483, 486 S.E.2d 771, 773 (Ct. App. 1997). "[I]n order to have a
valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the
parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the agreement." Player v.
Chandler, 299 S.C. 101, 105, 382 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1989). "The intention of the
parties should be determined from the surrounding circumstances, as well as from
the testimony of all the witnesses; and subsequent acts are relevant to show
whether a contract was intended." Wright v. Trask, 329 S.C. 170, 178, 495 S.E.2d
222, 226 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Caulder v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 345, 162 S.E.2d
262, 266 (1968)).

Under the Statute of Frauds, contracts for the sale of real property must be reduced
to a signed writing in order to be enforceable. S.C. Code Ann. § 32-3-10(4)
(2007). "To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, every essential element of the contract
must be expressed in a writing signed by the party to be compelled." Fici v. Koon,
372 S.C. 341, 346, 642 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2007).

"A constructive trust will arise whenever the circumstances under which property
was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the one holding the
legal title." Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 529, 354 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1987). "A
constructive trust results from fraud, bad faith, abuse of confidence, or violation of
a fiduciary duty which gives rise to an obligation in equity to make restitution." Id.
"Fraud is an essential element, although it need not be actual fraud." Id. "In order
to establish a constructive trust, the evidence must be clear and convincing." SSI
Med. Servs., 301 S.C. at 500, 392 S.E.2d at 794.

We affirm the special referee's denial of Carroll's causes of action for breach of
contract and interest in and for real estate. First, we find Carroll was not entitled to
relief based on a breach of contract because he failed to present evidence proving
the existence of contract between him and Mowery. See S. Glass & Plastics Co.,
399 S.C. at 491-92, 732 S.E.2d at 209 ("The elements for a breach of contract are
the existence of a contract, its breach, and damages caused by such breach.").
Although Carroll testified he and Mowery had an agreement that he would
renovate the properties, he stated he and Mowery did not have a contract
concerning how they planned to manage the properties. Mowery testified she
never agreed to compensate Carroll in exchange for his work on the properties and
she believed the financial support she offered Carroll during their relationship was
fair compensation for his work. See Player, 299 S.C. at 105, 382 S.E.2d at 893
("[I]n order to have a valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the
minds between the parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the
agreement."). Although the testimonies of Carroll's sister and brother-in-law
suggested Carroll and Mowery agreed to run the business together, the articles of
organization for TD Realty did not list Carroll as an organizer of the business and
his name was not included on the deeds for any of the properties. Based on the
foregoing, we find Carroll failed to present evidence proving an offer and
acceptance occurred to form a contract between him and Mowery. See Roberts,
327 S.C. at 483, 486 S.E.2d at 773 ("The necessary elements of a contract are an
offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration."). Accordingly, we hold the special
referee did not err in dismissing Carroll's breach of contract cause of action.

Second, we find Carroll was not entitled to relief based on his interest in and for
real estate claim. We find no agreement granting Carroll ownership interest in the
properties can be upheld under the Statute of Frauds, which requires contracts for
land to be in writing. See S.C. Code Ann. § 32-3-10(4) (2007) (codifying the
Statute of Frauds and requiring that contracts for the sale of real property be
reduced to writing to be enforceable). Carroll testified he and Mowery did not
have a written agreement regarding the ownership of the properties and the deeds
to the properties were titled in Mowery's name. Additionally, we find Carroll
failed to present evidence supporting a constructive trust cause of action because
he did not prove Mowery's actions amounted to fraud. See Lollis, 291 S.C. at 529,
354 S.E.2d at 561 ("A constructive trust will arise whenever the circumstances
under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by
the one holding the legal title."); id. ("Fraud is an essential element[ of constructive
trust], although it need not be actual fraud."). Carroll testified he knew Mowery
titled the properties in her name and he failed to present evidence showing he and
Mowery had a confidential or fiduciary relationship requiring Mowery to inform
him she did not transfer the titles to the properties to TD Realty. Based on the
foregoing, we hold the special referee did not err in dismissing Carroll's interest in
and for real estate cause of action.
IV. Quantum Meruit, Unjust Enrichment, and Restitution

Carroll argues the special referee erred in dismissing his claims for quantum
meruit, unjust enrichment, and restitution because Mowery benefited financially
from the renovation work he completed on the properties. He asserts he
contributed financially to the renovation of the properties and any difficulty in
calculating the contributions each party made was a result of Mowery's failure to
properly maintain her records. We disagree.

"Restitution is a remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment." Sauner v. Pub.
Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 409, 581 S.E.2d 161, 167 (2003). "The terms
'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment' are modern designations for the older doctrine
of quasi-contracts." JASDIP Props. SC, LLC v. Est. of Richardson, 395 S.C. 633,
640, 720 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Ellis v. Smith Grading &
Paving, Inc., 294 S.C. 470, 473, 366 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ct. App. 1988)). "[Q]uantum
meruit, quasi-contract, and implied by law contract are equivalent terms for an
equitable remedy." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting QHG of Lake City, Inc. v.
McCutcheon, 360 S.C. 196, 202, 600 S.E.2d 105, 108 (Ct. App. 2004)).

"Implied in law or quasi-contracts are not considered contracts at all, but are akin
to restitution which permits recovery of that amount the defendant has been
benefitted at the expense of the plaintiff in order to preclude unjust enrichment."
Costa & Sons Constr. Co. v. Long, 306 S.C. 465, 468 n.1, 412 S.E.2d 450, 452 n.1
(Ct. App. 1991). "[Our supreme c]ourt has recognized quantum meruit as an
equitable doctrine to allow recovery for unjust enrichment." Columbia Wholesale
Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 312 S.C. 259, 261, 440 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1994). "Absent
an express contract, recovery under quantum meruit is based on quasi-contract."
Earthscapes Unlimited, Inc. v. Ulbrich, 390 S.C. 609, 616, 703 S.E.2d 221, 225
(2010).
To recover on a theory of restitution, the plaintiff must
show (1) that he conferred a non-gratuitous benefit on the
defendant; (2) that the defendant realized some value
from the benefit; and (3) that it would be inequitable for
the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the
plaintiff for its value.

Sauner, 354 S.C. at 409, 581 S.E.2d at 167; see also Earthscapes Unlimited, Inc.,
390 S.C. at 616-17, 703 S.E.2d at 225 (providing the elements to recover on a
theory of restitution apply to claims seeking to recover under the doctrine of
quantum meruit).
We hold the special referee did not err in dismissing Carroll's causes of action for
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and restitution because Carroll failed to
present evidence showing Mowery received a benefit from his renovation work.
See Columbia Wholesale Co., 312 S.C. at 261, 440 S.E.2d at 130 ("[Our supreme
c]ourt has recognized quantum meruit as an equitable doctrine to allow recovery
for unjust enrichment."); Sauner, 354 S.C. at 409, 581 S.E.2d at 167 ("Restitution
is a remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment."); id. (enumerating the
elements of a restitution claim, including that the defendant must realize some
value from the benefit conferred by the plaintiff); see also Earthscapes Unlimited,
Inc., 390 S.C. at 616-17, 703 S.E.2d at 225 (providing the elements to recover on a
theory of restitution apply to claims seeking to recover under the doctrine of
quantum meruit). Carroll did not present evidence detailing how his personal and
financial contributions to the renovation of the properties raised the value of the
properties. Although Carroll testified he and Mowery used the money from the
sale of his boat and his car accident settlement to pay for their living expenses and
to renovate the properties, he did not present evidence demonstrating how his
money was used in a way that increased the profit Mowery made from the sale and
rental of the properties. Both parties claim to have contributed to the value of the
properties and Mowery's real estate business; however, neither could provide
sufficient evidence for the court to ascertain the values of their contributions
exceeded those of the other. Therefore, we find insufficient evidence was
presented to allow the special referee to determine how much money each party
contributed to the renovation projects and their living expenses during the
relationship. Accordingly, we hold the special referee did not err in dismissing
Carroll's claims for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and restitution.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the special referee's order dismissing Carroll's causes of
action for unjust enrichment, interest in and for real estate, breach of contract,
restitution, constructive fraud, breach of trust, and quantum meruit is

AFFIRMED.3

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.