Haley v. Tire Kingdom

CourtListener 10147764Scctapp24 de abr. de 2013

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Megan Haley, Employee, Respondent,

v.

Tire Kingdom, Employer, and Hartford Insurance Co. of
Midwest, Insurance Carrier, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2011-204708

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-166
Submitted February 1, 2013 – Filed April 24, 2013

AFFIRMED

Ajerenal Danley, of Columbia, for Appellants.

Megan Haley, of Walterboro, pro se Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation case, the single commissioner
denied a motion by Tire Kingdom and its carrier (collectively "Tire Kingdom") to
enforce a settlement agreement. Tire Kingdom appealed the denial to the full
commission, which dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. We affirm.1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
In September 2010, the single commissioner signed a consent order involving Tire
Kingdom and Respondent Megan Haley. Under the order, Tire Kingdom was to
pay Haley temporary total disability, but the full extent of its liability was to be
held in abeyance. Tire Kingdom was also to pay certain medical bills and choose
the authorized treating physicians.

In April 2011, Tire Kingdom requested a hearing, alleging Haley reached
maximum medical improvement and refused medical treatment. Tire Kingdom
sought to terminate compensation and credit for alleged overpayments. On July 7,
2011, the commission sent a notice to the law firm then representing Haley and to
counsel for Tire Kingdom that a hearing was scheduled for July 26, 2011. On July
20, 2011, Haley's attorney advised the commission that the parties settled the
matter on a clincher. Tire Kingdom confirmed the message, and the commission
removed the hearing from its docket.

Haley's attorney later advised Tire Kingdom that Haley would not accept the
agreement and returned all settlement documents to Tire Kingdom's attorney. Tire
Kingdom then moved for an order from the commission requiring Haley to execute
the clincher agreement. The single commissioner denied the motion in a summary
order. Tire Kingdom requested review by the full commission, which dismissed its
appeal as interlocutory.

1. Tire Kingdom argues the full commission erred in dismissing its appeal as
interlocutory because (1) the order it sought to appeal involved the merits of the
case and (2) the order affected a substantial right. We disagree.

Under section 42-17-50 of the South Carolina Code (1985 and Supp. 2012), the
commission shall review a workers' compensation award upon a timely application
for review. Under 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701 (2012), either or both of the
parties may request commission review of a decision by a single commissioner.

Regarding settlement agreements, this court has stated:

[Section 42-9-390 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2012)] requires settlement agreements to be in writing
and filed with the Commission. The requirement that a
settlement agreement be committed to writing necessarily
anticipates that the agreement will also be signed by the
parties and that it will not be binding until they have done
so. While closing papers which reflected the agreement
of the parties had in fact been prepared in this instance,
they were never signed; and until they were signed, the
papers represented nothing more than a settlement
proposal.

Mackey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Co., 280 S.C. 265, 271, 312 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct.
App. 1984) (emphases added).2 We found nothing in the record on appeal
indicating the agreement had been signed by the parties and filed with the
commission. Tire Kingdom had only a settlement proposal, which conferred no
enforceable rights. Moreover, it still has the option to request another hearing
before the commission to terminate compensation and receive credit for
overpayments.

2. In any event, we reject Tire Kingdom's second argument, i.e., that the
commission erred in failing to find Haley entered into a binding agreement to
dispose of her case.

Citing the current version of section 42-9-390 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2012), Tire Kingdom correctly argues there is no longer any requirement that the
commission approve a settlement if the claimant and employer are represented by
counsel. Section 42-9-390, however, still requires the employer to "file a copy of
the settlement agreement with the commission." This requirement also appears in
8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-803 (2012), which includes specific instructions on
how the filing is to be accomplished. The record contains no evidence that Tire
Kingdom complied with the statute or the regulation; therefore, there was no
binding agreement that could be enforced by the commission.

3. Finally, Tire Kingdom complains that the orders of both the single
commissioner and the full commission did not include sufficient findings of fact
and conclusions of law for meaningful review by this court. We disagree.

2
The version of section 42-9-390 appearing in the 2012 Supplement to the South
Carolina Code was in effect during this litigation. Under the version of the statute
in effect when Mackey was decided, all settlement agreements had to be approved
by the commission. The present version of the statute does not require approval by
the commission if each party is represented by an attorney; however, in such a
case, the employer must still file a copy of the agreement with the commission.
We found no evidence in the record that Haley executed the clincher agreement or
that Tire Kingdom filed it with the commission. Without these formalities, the
agreement cannot be enforced. The absence of specific findings of facts in the
orders of the single commissioner and the full commission does not prevent
meaningful review by this court. See Aristizabal v. I.J. Woodside-Div. of Dan
River, Inc., 268 S.C. 366, 370-71, 234 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1977) (stating the hearing
commissioner must make a specific, express finding "[i]f a material fact is
contested").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

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