Miles v. Waffle House

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Virginia A. Miles, Employee, Appellant,

v.

Waffle House, Inc., Employer, and Brentwood Services,
Inc., Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2011-190726

Appeal From the Appellate Panel
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-552
Submitted August 1, 2012 – Filed October 10, 2012
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled January 9, 2013

AFFIRMED

Stephen B. Samuels, of Samuels Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Weston Adams, III, and Helen F. Hiser, both of
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, and
Erroll Anne Y. Hodges, of McAngus Goudelock &
Courie, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Virginia A. Miles (Employee) appeals the order of the Appellate
Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate
Panel) finding she failed to prove her alleged injuries arose out of and in the course
and scope of her employment with Waffle House, Inc. On appeal, Employee
argues (1) the Appellate Panel erred in finding her injuries arose outside the scope
of her employment, (2) the finding of a witness's credibility was arbitrary and
capricious, and (3) her injuries arose out of her employment under the sudden
emergency doctrine. We affirm1 pursuant to the following authorities:

1. As to whether the Appellate Panel erred in finding Employee's injuries did
not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment: Houston v.
Deloach & Deloach, 378 S.C. 543, 549, 663 S.E.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, an appellate court's review of a
decision of the Appellate Panel is limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel's
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of
law); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2011) ("The [appellate] court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the [Appellate Panel] as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact."); Houston, 378 S.C. at 550, 663 S.E.2d at 89
("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed
blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as
a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the [Appellate
Panel] reached in order to justify its action."); McCuen v. BMW Mfg. Corp., 383
S.C. 19, 24, 677 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 2009) ("For an injury to be compensable,
it must arise out of and in the course of employment." (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 42-
1-160(A) (Supp. 2011))); id. ("An injury arises out of employment if a causal
relationship between the conditions under which the work is to be performed and
the resulting injury is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the
circumstances."); id. at 24-25, 677 S.E.2d at 31-32 ("The claimant has the burden
of proving facts that will bring the injury within the workers' compensation law,
and such award must not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation." (citation
and quotation marks omitted)); Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 349, 656
S.E.2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 2007) ("In determining if an accident arose out of and in
the course of employment, each case must be decided with reference to its own
attendant circumstances."); Houston, 378 S.C. at 554, 663 S.E.2d at 91 ("The
phrase 'in the course of the employment' refers to the time, place, and

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
circumstances under which the accident occurred."); Wright v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 314
S.C. 152, 155, 442 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ct. App. 1994) ("When an employer limits the
sphere of employment by specific prohibitions, injuries incurred while violating
these prohibitions are not in the scope of employment and, therefore, not
compensable.").

2. As to whether the Appellate Panel erred in finding a witness credible:
Houston, 378 S.C. at 551, 663 S.E.2d at 89 ("The appellate court is prohibited from
overturning findings of fact of the [A]ppellate [P]anel unless there is no reasonable
probability the facts could be as related by the witness upon whose testimony the
finding was based."); Hall, 376 S.C. at 348, 656 S.E.2d at 758 ("The possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence.").

3. As to whether Employee's injuries arose out of her employment under the
sudden emergency doctrine, the Appellate Panel's factual findings, which are
supported by substantial evidence, preclude the application of what Employee calls
the "sudden emergency doctrine." See Hiers v. Brunson Constr. Co., 221 S.C. 212,
234-35, 70 S.E.2d 211, 222 (1952).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and WILLIAMS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.