State v. Chandler

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Timothy O. Chandler, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-179766

Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-557
Heard September 12, 2012 – Filed October 10, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Timothy Chandler appeals his conviction for indecent exposure.
He argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an incriminating
statement he made to a detention center officer and in denying his request for a
mistrial based upon the State's closing argument. We affirm the trial court's
rulings.

1. Admission of Incriminating Statement

Chandler contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an admission of
guilt that he made to a detention center officer because at the time of Chandler's
admission: (1) Chandler was in the officer's custody; (2) the officer had failed to
inform Chandler of his Miranda rights; and (3) the officer had subjected Chandler
"to words that [the officer] should have known were likely to elicit a response from
Chandler that the prosecution may seek to later introduce at trial." We disagree.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court set
forth rules for enforcing the Constitution's Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination. Miranda warnings must be given prior to a custodial
interrogation: "To give force to the Constitution's protection against compelled
self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court established in Miranda
'certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of
their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing
custodial interrogation.'" State v. Hoyle, 397 S.C. 622, 626, 725 S.E.2d 720, 722
(Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201 (1989)
(emphasis added)). "Interrogation is either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. It includes words or actions on the part of police that police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." State v. Easler,
327 S.C. 121, 127, 489 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1997) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980)). "'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. However, Miranda's reach does not extend to voluntary
statements: "Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.

In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court defined the term "interrogation" under the
standards promulgated in the Miranda opinion. 446 U.S. at 298. The Court
explained that the definition of interrogation extends only to words or actions that
the police "should have known" were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response:

We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is
to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. . . . A practice
that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke
an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words
or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only
to words or actions on the part of police officers that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

The court in Rhode Island v. Innis found there had been no interrogation of the
respondent where there was no express questioning, and the respondent had not
been subjected to the "functional equivalent" of express questioning: "It cannot be
said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have known that
their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the respondent." Id. at 302 (emphasis added).

The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a
brief conversation, the officers should have known that
the respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self-
incriminating response. Given the fact that the entire
conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a
few off hand remarks, we cannot say that the officers
should have known that it was reasonably likely that
Innis would so respond. This is not a case where the
police carried on a lengthy harangue in the presence of
the suspect. Nor does the record support the respondent's
contention that, under the circumstances, the officers'
comments were particularly "evocative." It is our view,
therefore, that the respondent was not subjected by
the police to words or actions that the police should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from him.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added).

Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), Chandler asserts that his
confession to the officer "falls within the sweep of the Miranda presumption of
compulsion, and was inadmissible evidence in the State's case-in-chief." We
disagree, and we note that Elstad explains: "We must conclude that, absent
deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere
fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion." Id. at 314. In our case, as in Elstad, the "mere fact"
that Chandler made an unwarned admission does not warrant the presumption of
compulsion.

The State maintains that Chandler's admission to the officer was voluntary; the
admission was made during the course of a casual conversation; the officer was
acting in a caretaker capacity, and not in an investigative capacity, when the
conversation occurred; and the conversation between the officer and Chandler
never approached the level of interrogation. We agree.

The standard for requiring Miranda warnings is not whether the officer's remark
did in fact elicit an incriminating response, but rather whether the officer should
have known that his actions or words were "reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response." Although the State acknowledges that the officer's
remark may have elicited Chandler's subsequent admission of guilt, there is no
evidence in the record that the officer should have known that his remark was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Chandler. The record
shows that Chandler initiated the conversation and that he volunteered his
incriminating statement during a casual conversation with the officer. Moreover,
the officer's remark, made during his search of Chandler, was separate in time from
Chandler's incriminating statement, which he made while being escorted to his cell.
Furthermore, we find it significant that the officer was not acting in an
investigative capacity when he had the conversation with Chandler; in fact,
Chandler's incriminating statement did not come to the State's attention, and then
upon happenstance, until a week before trial. We find that there was no
interrogation of Chandler; therefore, Miranda warnings were not warranted and
Chandler's voluntary statement was properly admitted into evidence.

Furthermore, the failure to suppress evidence due to a possible Miranda violation
is harmless "if the record contains sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Lynch, 375 S.C. 628, 636, 654 S.E.2d 292, 296 (Ct.
App. 2007). Here, two other officers directly witnessed Chandler's act of indecent
exposure, and both officers testified compellingly. The testimony of these officers
who witnessed Chandler's act was sufficient to prove Chandler's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's admission of Chandler's
incriminating statement.

2. Closing Argument
Chandler also argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial based
on the State's closing argument. Chandler contends the State made an
"impermissible comment" on Chandler's exercise of his constitutional right to
remain silent. We disagree.

"A mistrial should only be granted when 'absolutely necessary,' and a defendant
must show both error and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial."
State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 34, 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005).

We find absolutely no support in the record for Chandler's contention that the
State's closing argument "constituted an indirect, yet effective comment on
Chandler's right to remain silent." Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury
that no inference or presumption may be drawn from Chandler's decision not to
testify or present a defense, and [this] could not be discussed. The trial court
instructed the jury:

No presumption of guilt may be raised. No inference of
any kind may be drawn from this Defendant's decision
not to testify. Our law never imposes upon a Defendant
in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any
witnesses or testifying. Therefore, the decision of this
Defendant not to take the stand and testify in his behalf
cannot be taken down, discussed or considered against
him in any manner whatsoever.

Accordingly, because we find no error, we reject Chandler's argument and affirm
the trial court's ruling.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.