SCDSS v. Marcy B.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Marcy B., Donald C., Christopher G., Defendants,

Of Whom Donald C. is the Appellant,

v.

Joyce L. and William L., Intervenors.

In the interest of a minor under the age of 18.

Appellate Case No. 2011-202740

Appeal From Cherokee County
Phillip K. Sinclair, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-472
Submitted July 2, 2012 – Filed July 27, 2012

AFFIRMED

Kenneth P. Shabel, of Campbell & Shabel, LLC, of
Spartanburg, for Appellant.
Beth R. Faulkner, of Brice Law Firm, LLC, of York, for
Respondent.

Beth Bullock, of Gaffney, for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Donald C. (Father) appeals from the family court's order
awarding custody of his child (Child) to the South Carolina Department of Social
Services (DSS) and relieving DSS from providing treatment services to him.
Father argues the family court erred in authorizing DSS to terminate reasonable
efforts to provide treatment services that would assist in him in remedying the
cause of Child's placement in foster care. We affirm.1

We find a preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's holding that
DSS made reasonable efforts to provide treatment services that would assist Father
in remedying the cause of Child's placement in foster care and authorizing DSS to
terminate those efforts. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640 (Supp. 2011) (identifying
several factors for the family court to consider when determining whether to
authorize DSS to terminate or forego reasonable efforts to reunify a family). Here,
it was in Child's best interests for DSS to terminate reasonable efforts to provide
further treatment services for Father because of Father's extensive history of
involvement with DSS and his failure to complete the goals of his treatment plan
as well as the necessity of providing a stable placement for Child. A review of the
record indicates Father failed to complete his court-ordered anger-management
classes and continued to be involved in incidents of domestic violence throughout
the time period of DSS's involvement with him. Additionally, Father repeatedly
and consistently cooperated with Child's mother to enable her to violate the terms
of her treatment and safety plans. Finally, given Father's recent marriage to Child's
mother and the fact that the family court has previously allowed DSS to terminate
reasonable efforts to reunify the family with regard to Child's mother, continuing
efforts with regard to Father would be inconsistent with the permanent plan for
Child. Accordingly, the family court did not err in authorizing DSS to terminate
reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Child.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
AFFIRMED.

FEW, HUFF, and SHORT, JJ., concur.