Rayfield v. LifeQuest

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT

BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Jadie C. Rayfield,       
Appellant,

v.

LifeQuest,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Charleston County

Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-103

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed February 10, 2005

AFFIRMED

Marvin Lee Robertson, Jr., of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant

Steven McKelvey and Thomas William McGee, III, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:   Jadie C. Rayfield appeals
the circuit court’s order dismissing a rule to show cause, arguing the court
erred in finding no contempt of its order prohibiting the transfer of assets
by a judgment debtor in Rayfield’s personal injury action.  We affirm.

FACTS

Rayfield brought a personal injury action in 1998
in connection with injuries he sustained while using weightlifting equipment
at LifeQuest Fitness Center in Mount Pleasant.  In January 2000, he obtained
a $35,000 default judgment against “LIFEQUEST” and subsequently filed an execution
against property that was executed nulla bona. 

This case involves multiple corporate entities
with similar names, a common registered agent for service of process, and some
common shareholders.  The first entity is Life Quest, Inc. (LQ1), which incorporated
in August 1991.  In January 1992, LQ1’s shareholders changed the company’s name
to LifeQuest of Mount Pleasant, Inc. (LQMP) and filed the change with the secretary
of state’s office in April 1992.  The second entity, LifeQuest, Inc. (LQ2),
incorporated in April 1992.  The third entity, LifeQuest of Charleston, Inc.,
(LQC) incorporated later.  Wayne K. Caparas served as the registered agent for
each of these corporations. Steve DeGuzman and he owned LifeQuest shares. 

From 1992 to 1994, entities identified
as “Life Quest, Inc.” or “LifeQuest, Inc.” opened utility accounts with South
Carolina Electric and Gas, Inc. (SCE&G) for Mount Pleasant and Charleston
locations.  The entities made security deposits with SCE&G to open the accounts.

In 1998, a foreclosure action against LQMP and
LQC resulted in the judicial sale of all of their assets.  SSN, Inc. purchased
LQMP’s assets and SKS, Inc. purchased LQC’s assets.  Timothy R. Sebold was SSN’s
registered agent for service of process. 

In November 2002, following return of the nulla
bona execution, Rayfield obtained a circuit court order for supplemental
proceedings seeking to determine whether his judgment debtor, generally referred
to as “LifeQuest,” possessed any nonexempt property and assets that could be
used to satisfy his judgment.  Among other things, the order “enjoined the judgment
debtor … from making any transfer or other disposition of the property of the
judgment debtor, including … any funds due to the judgment debtor.”  In February
2003, the court filed a second order for supplemental proceedings with a similar
prohibition on asset transfers after Rayfield discovered SCE&G held approximately
$19,375 of deposits in LifeQuest’s name.

Later in February 2003, Caparas and DeGuzman went to SCE&G
and requested that the LifeQuest accounts be closed and the deposits be refunded
to them.  SCE&G closed the accounts as requested.  However, pursuant to
company policy, SCE&G first applied the deposits against LifeQuest’s unpaid
bill and current usage.  SCE&G did not terminate service because LifeQuest
continued to operate in the buildings.  Instead, it opened new accounts in SSN’s
name and credited the remainder of the deposits to the new accounts. 

The court issued a rule to show cause in March
2003.  After a hearing, the court dismissed the rule to show cause, finding
SSN had bought all LifeQuest assets, including rights to the SCE&G deposits,
at the 1998 foreclosure sale.  Rayfield’s motion to reconsider was denied. 
This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF
REVIEW

This appeal comes to us in the posture of a dismissal
of a rule to show cause.  As such, we may reverse the trial court’s decision
regarding contempt only if it is without evidentiary support or is an abuse
of discretion.  Stone v. Reddix-Smalls, 295 S.C. 514, 516, 369 S.E.2d
840, 840 (1988).  An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s ruling
is based on an error of law.  First Union Nat’l Bank v. First Citizens Bank
& Trust Co., 346 S.C. 462, 466, 551 S.E.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 2001).

DISCUSSION

Having carefully reviewed the
record, and based on our deferential standard of review, we find evidence to
support the findings of the trial court, even if were to consider the conflicting
evidence proferred by Rayfield.  Moreover, the confusion engendered by the various
corporate entities leads us to additionally conclude that, in any event, there
was no willful disobedience of a court order.  See I’On, L.L.C. v.
Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 417, 526 S.E.2d 716, 722 (2000) (stating
that the appellate court may affirm for any reason appearing in the record).

“It is well settled that contempt
results from willful disobedience of a court order; and before a person may
be held in contempt, the record must be clear and specific as to acts or conduct
upon which the contempt is based.”  Cheap-O’s Truck Stop, 350 S.C. 596,
607, 567 S.E.2d 596, 519 (Ct. App. 2002).  “A willful act is defined as one
done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something
the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law
requires to be done; that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard
the law.”  Id. at 607-08, 567 S.E.2d at 520.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, KITTREDGE, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.