Arnold v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON
AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Rodney T. Arnold,       
Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Greenville County

Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-066

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed January
25, 2005

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott
and Assistant Attorney General Christopher L. Newton, all of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Rodney Arnold filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.  The trial court dismissed the petition, holding
the allegations raised by Arnold could not be raised in a petition for habeas
corpus since they were cognizable under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 (2003).  Arnold argues on appeal he
is entitled to seek relief through habeas corpus because he could not now
raise the issues in post-conviction relief proceedings since he had already
been through post-conviction relief proceedings and any future applications
under the act would be treated as successive and since he would also be barred
by the statute of limitations contained in the act.  Arnold does not claim that
the issues he now wishes to raise could not have been raised before in a post-conviction
relief application. We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following
authorities:  Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 42, 495 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1998)
(holding the trial court could entertain a habeas corpus petition if, among
other things, the applicant could show that “the issues raised now could not
have been raised in their [sic] prior PCR applications”; Simpson v. State,
329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1998) (holding “a matter which is cognizable
under the Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before
the circuit or other lower courts”); Keeler v. Mauney, 330 S.C. 568,
571, 500 S.E.2d 123, 124 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding if “[a] person is procedurally
barred from petitioning the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus where
the matter alleged is one which could have been raised in a PCR application
. . . his only means of obtaining state habeas corpus relief is to file a petition
in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ. concur. 

[1]   Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues
on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215,
SCACR.