Puckett v. George

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Lester Joe Puckett, Sr.,       
Respondent,

v.

William George, Jr., also known as G.G. George,       
Appellant.

Appeal From York County

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2005-UP-073

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed January
27, 2005

AFFIRMED

James Mixon Griffin, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Charles S. Bradford, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a grant
of summary judgment in a foreclosure action.  We affirm.

FACTS

In 1999, William George contracted
with Larry Puckett to purchase Joe’s Mini-Mall.  Both the title to the real
estate and the closing statement identify the sales price as $1,100,000.  George
made a down payment of $100,000 and signed a promissory note for $1,000,000. 
At the real estate closing, George also executed a separate $150,000 mortgage
note. [1]   In October 2000, Puckett filed an action against George Properties,
LLC, for the foreclosure of Joe’s Mini-Mall.  On June 13, 2001, the court awarded
Puckett a judgment of $1,064,044.45 and ordered the property be sold at a public
auction.  Puckett purchased the property at the sale for $2,500.  George Properties,
LLC, did not appeal the decree of foreclosure and sale in the action concerning
Joe’s Mini Mall.   

Seven months prior to
the filing of that case, Puckett filed an action against George seeking to collect
on the $150,000 mortgage note.  The trial court granted Puckett’s motion for
summary judgment.  George appealed the decision to this court and we affirmed
the trial court.  Puckett v. George, 2002-UP-671 (Ct. App. 2002).  When
Puckett initiated actions to collect on the mortgage note judgment, George filed
a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming he should get credit
against the judgment for the amount that the fair market value of the property
exceeded the foreclosure judgment amount.  The trial court denied the motion
based on its finding that the mortgage note “was not related to a real estate
transaction, but to the sale of goodwill and other intangible property.”  This
appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

George claims the trial court erred
in failing to reduce the judgment on the mortgage note by the value of the property
obtained by the mortgagee in a prior foreclosure action on the promissory note. 
We disagree.

The $150,000 note signed by George was
unrelated to the real estate transaction and was clearly a separate debt on
which Puckett foreclosed.  The attorney for the real estate closing of Joe’s
Mini-Mall testified by affidavit that “the note represented the intangible value”
of the property, which included among other things, goodwill and location. 
He further stated, “The exact terms of the note were something that had been
discussed and agreed to, in [his] presence, several months prior to the actual
document closing.”  Furthermore, Puckett’s accountant’s affidavit cited the
total purchase price of Joe’s Mini-Mall as $1,250,000, a combined total price
of the note for the real estate and the note currently in dispute.  In its order
for summary judgment, the trial court found “no reference in the promissory
note to any real estate transaction.”  Finally, this court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment on this same issue. 

Any unappealed portion of a judgment is
the law of the case and must therefore be affirmed.  Toler’s Cove Homeowners
Ass’n, Inc. v. Trident Constr. Co., 355 S.C. 605, 610, 586 S.E.2d 581, 584
(2003); Rumpf v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 S.C. 386, 398,
593 S.E.2d 183, 189 (Ct. App. 2004).  George did not appeal this court’s decision;
he simply tried to make the same argument to the trial court once Puckett attempted
to enforce the judgment.  The trial court and the court of appeals have found
the notes to be separate and distinct debts.  In keeping with Toler’s Cove
and Rumpf, these factual and legal conclusions are “law of the case.” 
George was not entitled to a reduction of judgment on the mortgage note by the
value of the property obtained by the mortgagee in the prior foreclosure action
on the promissory note.      

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s
denial of relief from judgment is

AFFIRMED.
[2]

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1] Throughout his brief, George refers to the $150,000 note as the mortgage
note, and the $1,000,000 note as the promissory note.  To prevent confusion,
this opinion will identify the documents in the same manner.

[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.