Oakley v. Estate of Sedano

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Irene Oakley,       
Appellant,

v.

Estate of Arthur Oliver Sedano and John P.
Bacot, Jr., as Personal Representative for the Estate of Arthur Oliver Sedano,       
Respondents.

Appeal From Horry County

Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-194

Heard December 10, 2003 – Filed March
22, 2004

AFFIRMED

James L. Hills, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.

Ronald R. Norton, of Conway, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Irene Oakley filed
a creditor’s claim against the Estate of Arthur Oliver Sedano (“the Estate”)
to collect past due child support accruing during Sedano’s lifetime.  The Estate
denied Oakley’s claim.  Thereafter, Oakley sued the Estate to enforce the New
York child support order.  The Estate answered the complaint, asserting:  1)
Oakley’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and 2) Oakley’s claim
was barred by laches.  During trial, the Estate also asserted Oakley was required
to file her judgment pursuant to South Carolina Code Annotated section 20-7-1130,
et seq., (1985 & Supp. 2002), prior to enforcing the New York support
order in the South Carolina courts.  The probate court concluded none of the
Estate’s defenses applied.  The court ruled in favor of Oakley, awarding her
the child support arrearage and interest.  The Estate appealed to the circuit
court, and the circuit court reversed, ruling Oakley’s claim was barred:  1)
by the statute of limitations; 2) by laches; and 3) because she failed to file
her judgment pursuant to section 20-7-1130, et seq.  Oakley appeals. 
We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Oakley and Sedano were divorced in New
York on June 7, 1945.  Pursuant to their divorce decree, Sedano was required
to pay fifteen dollars per week in child support.  Sedano never made any child
support payments. 

In 1998, Sedano died in Surfside Beach, South Carolina. 
Thereafter, in 1999, Oakley filed a creditor’s claim for past due child support
against the Estate.  As stated earlier, the Estate denied the claim, and Oakley
sued the Estate in probate court, attempting to enforce the New York child support
order.   The Estate answered the complaint, arguing:  1) Oakley’s claim was
barred by the statute of limitations; and 2) Oakley’s claim was barred by laches. 
Additionally, during the trial, the Estate asserted Oakley was required to file
her judgment pursuant to section 20-7-1130, et seq., prior to enforcing
it in the South Carolina courts.  The probate court ruled none of the Estate’s
defenses applied, found in favor of Oakley, and awarded her $73,800.85, plus
attorney fees and costs.  Subsequently, the Estate appealed to the circuit court,
and the circuit court reversed, ruling Oakley’s claim is barred:  1) by the
statute of limitations; 2) by laches; and 3) because she failed to file her
judgment pursuant to section 20-7-1130, et seq.  Oakley appeals to this
Court, arguing the circuit court erred by ruling Oakley’s claim is barred: 
1) by the statute of limitations; 2) by the doctrine of laches; and 3) because
she failed to file her judgment pursuant to section 20-7-1130, et seq. 
We conclude laches bars Oakley’s claim, and thus, we need not address her remaining
issues. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applicable to cases originating
in the probate court is controlled by whether the underlying cause of action
is at law or in equity.  In re Thames, 344 S.C. 564, 568, 544 S.E.2d
854, 856 (Ct. App. 2001).  An action to enforce a child support decree is an
action in equity.  See Bentrim v. Bentrim, 282 S.C. 333, 335,
318 S.E.2d 131, 132-33 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Johnson v. Johnson,
194 S.C. 115, 122, 8 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1940) (holding the nature of an alimony
award is not altered by attempting to enforce it in a foreign jurisdiction,
and thus, it remains an action in equity).  “In an appeal in equity cases .
. . [an appellate] [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find the facts in accord with
its view of the preponderance of the evidence and may reverse findings of fact
by the trial court when the appellant satisfies . . . [the appellate] [c]ourt
that such findings are without evidentiary support or are against the clear
preponderance of the evidence.” Vereen v. Bell, 256 S.C. 249, 252-53,
182 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1971).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Oakley argues the circuit court erred
by applying the doctrine of laches.  We disagree.       

“Under the doctrine of laches, if a party,
knowing its rights, does not seasonably assert them, but by unreasonable delay
suffers its adversary to detrimentally change its position, then the courts
will ordinarily refuse to enforce these rights.”  Provident Life & Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Driver, 317 S.C. 471, 478, 451 S.E.2d 924, 929 (Ct. App. 1994). 
“Delay alone in the assertion of a right does not constitute laches.”  Id. 
“[L]aches arises upon the failure to assert a known right under circumstances
indicating that the lached party has abandoned or surrendered the right.”  Id.,
at 479, 451 S.E.2d at 929.  “The lached party must have had actual knowledge
or inquiry notice of the facts forming the basis of its claim, and its failure
to assert its right is irrelevant until there is a reason or situation that
demands assertion.”  Id. 

The evidence in the record indicates that following
the divorce in 1945, Oakley was awarded fifteen dollars a month in child support. 
Sedano did not pay any of the child support payments.  The record also indicates
Oakley attempted to find Sedano following the child support award.  However,
Oakley’s attempts to find Sedano were solely manifested by asking other family
members where he was.  By her own admission, she never used any other method
to attempt to locate Sedano.  Furthermore, according to Oakley’s own testimony,
Oakley ceased looking for Sedano in 1951 or 1952 when she remarried. 

Viewing this evidence, we conclude Oakley’s delay
in asserting her rights was unreasonable, as she did not attempt to enforce
the decree until fifty-five years after its issue, and, by her own admission,
she ceased her attempts to find Sedano after either 1951 or 1952. [1]   Thus, our only remaining inquiry
is whether the Estate has been prejudiced by Oakley’s unreasonable delay.

The child support decree required Sedano to pay
Oakley fifteen dollars per week.  Oakley’s complaint alleged Sedano’s arrearage
totaled $12,060.00 in principal.  Furthermore, with interest, Oakley’s complaint
alleged Sedano’s arrearage totaled $406,000.00.  The probate court awarded Oakley
$73,800.85 in arrearages against the Estate, due in a lump sum.

Based on this evidence, we conclude the Estate
has been prejudiced by Oakley’s delay in initiating this action, as interest
has been accruing on the arrearage for approximately fifty-five years.

Having concluded Oakley failed to seasonably initiate
this action and the Estate was prejudiced by her inaction, we hold the circuit
court properly applied the doctrine of laches to this case.    

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the decision of the
circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., HOWARD, and KITTREDGE,
JJ., concurring.

[1] Oakley argues her delay was reasonable because she was a waitress
in New York City, lacking the ability to hire a private investigator or the
knowledge to find Sedano herself.  However, Oakley did not present any evidence
outside her own testimony indicating her financial position during the fifty-five
years prior to filing this action.  Furthermore, her testimony indicates her
financial position improved following her remarriage in 1951, the same time
she ceased her efforts to find Sedano.