State v. Martin

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Anthony Bradford Martin, Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

L. Henry McKellar, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-096

Submitted December 23, 2003 – Filed
February 13, 2004

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney General Joseph L. Savitz, III, Office
of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant,

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka,
Assistant Attorney General S. Creighton Waters, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Martin appeals his conviction
for murder, arguing the circuit court erred in failing to let him testify at
his competency hearing.  We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 1998, Martin was indicted for murdering
his girlfriend. 

A two-day competency hearing was conducted in September
1999.  During the hearing, the State offered expert testimony from psychiatrist
Steven Shea and forensic psychologist Pamela Crawford, both of whom had examined
Martin and opined that he was competent to stand trial but was malingering. 
Martin offered expert testimony from psychiatrist John Howard DeWitt, who opined
that Martin was not competent to stand trial.  The circuit court subsequently
ruled that Martin was competent to stand trial.

At the beginning of Martin’s December 1999 trial,
his attorney argued that Martin’s condition had worsened since his September
1999 competency hearing, rendering him incompetent to stand trial.  The circuit
court then conducted a second competency hearing, during which Dr. DeWitt again
testified that Martin was incompetent to stand trial. 

Following Dr. DeWitt’s testimony, Martin’s attorney
called Martin to testify.  However, Judge McKellar refused to allow Martin to
testify, explaining that Martin did not “have the right to take the stand and
tell us in a competency hearing that he’s not competent to stand trial.”  After
a bench conference, Martin’s attorney attempted to make an offer of proof. 
The circuit court refused, explaining that its decision regarding Martin’s competency
must be based on expert testimony.  It also suggested that Martin’s attempt
to have Martin testify was a “delaying tactic.”  The State brought no witnesses,
but instead rested on the expert testimony it provided during the first hearing. 

At the conclusion of the second competency hearing,
the circuit court concluded that Martin was competent to stand trial.  A jury
trial followed, culminating in Martin’s conviction for murder.  This appeal
follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The admission of evidence is within
the circuit judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse
of that discretion.”  State v. Slocumb, 336 S.C. 619, 626-27, 521 S.E.2d
507, 511 (Ct. App. 1996).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit judge’s
decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law.  
State v. Lopez, 352 S.C. 373, 378, 574 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2002).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Martin contends that the circuit court erred in
refusing to allow him to testify at his own incompetency hearing on the basis
that Martin’s testimony would be “biased.”  However, we find nothing in the
record suggesting bias was a concern of the circuit court, much less a basis
for its refusal to permit Martin to testify.  Instead, we find the circuit court
based its ruling on concerns for avoiding a “delay tactic” and obtaining evidence
cumulative to that provided by Martin’s own expert witness.  Martin’s
attorney sought Martin’s testimony not to introduce new evidence, but rather
to allow the circuit court to “have firsthand knowledge … on Anthony Martin’s
response or lack of responses to those same questions [posed by the experts].” 
(emphasis added).  Martin’s attorney noted the circuit court would be “better
served” by allowing Martin’s testimony.

While we tend to agree with Martin’s attorney,
we are not inclined to find, on this record, an abuse of discretion in refusing
Martin’s testimony.  The circuit court had conducted two competency hearings. 
The judge observed, “I’ve heard from Dr. Dewitt twice, I’ve heard from Dr. Crawford
and Dr. Shea … I kept real good notes. And to me, it would make no sense whatsoever
for you to put your defendant on the stand, for him to do the same thing he’s
done to your psychiatrist for the last year, to convince me he’s not competent
to stand trial ….”  (emphasis added).  Under those circumstances, where
the proposed testimony was merely to provide the circuit court with a “firsthand”
observation of Martin’s responses to the same questions posed by the various
experts, we find that the circuit court acted within its broad discretion in
refusing the testimony.

Martin’s final assignment of error is the claim
that the circuit court held that its decision regarding competence could only
be based on expert testimony.  It is true that the circuit court initially provided
its rationale for refusing to permit Martin’s testimony on this basis, but the
circuit court subsequently acknowledged that the determination of competency
is not confined to expert testimony. Martin’s attorney stated, “Expert testimony
is not the only testimony his Honor can consider for purposes of determining
whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial” and the circuit court
responded:  “I know.”  (emphasis added).  Martin, in essence, assigns
a holding to the circuit court that the circuit court rejected.  The circuit
court acknowledged that a competency determination is not limited to
expert testimony, but declined Martin’s testimony for the reasons discussed
above.  Thus, this ground provides no basis for relief.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court
is

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY, HOWARD and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.