Hutto v. County of Aiken

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Beverly Hutto,       
Appellant,

v.

County of Aiken,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Aiken County

Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-101

Submitted December 23, 2003 – Filed February 18, 2004

AFFIRMED

James Chaplin Cox, III, of Columbia, for Appellant,

F. Matlock Elliott and  Phillip Florence, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Beverly Hutto appeals a grant
of summary judgment to the County of Aiken based on her failure to serve the
summons and complaint in her civil action against the County within the prescribed
statute of limitations.  Hutto contends that, as a matter of law, service was
sufficiently completed before the statute of limitations expired.  We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2000, a family court judge in Aiken County
issued a bench warrant for Hutto, alleging she failed to pay child support “as
ordered.”  Consequently, Hutto was arrested and incarcerated in June 2000.
[1]  

Hutto initiated the present action, claiming she
was improperly arrested because the bench warrant was issued based on false
information given to the family court by an employee of the Aiken County Clerk
of Court. [2]   According to a signed “certified mail receipt”,
she mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to “Joan Williams Interim Adm.
828 Richland Ave., W. Aiken, SC 29801” in December 2001.  A person named Sherry
Mathis apparently signed the receipt on December 12, 2001, indicating receipt
of the summons and complaint.

The County did not answer the summons and complaint,
prompting Hutto to seek an order granting entry of default against the county. 
The County subsequently moved to set aside the entry of default.  In August
2, 2002 order, the master-in-equity set aside the entry of default, finding
“the Complaint was never properly served on the Defendant [County] in this matter.” 
Additionally, he specified that attorney James M. Davis was the County’s proper
agent for service of process, and directed Hutto to effect service on him. 
Hutto then served the summons and complaint on Davis on August 8, 2002. 

After receiving service of Hutto’s summons and
complaint, the County filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action
was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations provided by the
S.C. Tort Claims Act.  Following a hearing, the master-in-equity granted the
County’s summary judgment motion based upon his finding that Hutto’s action
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided by the S.C. Tort
Claim’s Act, since Hutto’s cause of action arose in June 2000 but she didn’t
complete service until August 2002.  This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate
when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Café Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6, 9, 406 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1991).  “In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences which can
be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”  Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Hutto argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the County on the ground that her action was bared by the
applicable statute of limitations.  We disagree.

As an initial matter, we note that Hutto does not
dispute that the action is subject to a two-year statute of limitations provided
by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.  See S.C. Code Ann. 15-78-110
(Supp. 2001); Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 134, 580 S.E.2d 109,
112 (2003) (“[A]ny action brought pursuant to this chapter is forever barred
unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or
should have been discovered.”)  Instead, she contends that service was effectuated
when she mailed the summons and complaint to “Joan Williams” in December 2001. 
Specifically, she contends she substantially complied with the rule of civil
procedure regarding service of process by mailing the documents to the Aiken
County Administrator, “the proper agent for service of process against the County
of Aiken.”

Rule 4(d), SCRCP, provides service of process may
be made:

(1)     Upon an individual other than a minor under the age
of 14 years or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process.

…

(3)     Upon a corporation or upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process and if the agent is one authorized by statute
to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant.

(emphasis added).  This rule serves the dual purposes of conferring personal
jurisdiction on the court and assuring the defendant of reasonable notice of
the action.  Id. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Moore v. Simpson,
322 S.C. 518, 523, 473 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1996).  Exacting compliance with the rules
of civil procedure is not required to effect service of process.  Id. 
“Rather, inquiry must be made as to whether the plaintiff has sufficiently complied
with the rules such that the court has personal jurisdiction of the defendant
and the defendant has notice of the proceedings.”  Id. 

Here, Hutto attempted service, as required
by Rule 4(d), SCRCP, on a person named Joan Williams, as the purported Interim
Aiken County Administrator.  However, the record contains no dispute as to the
fact that Aiken County did not employ a person named Joan Williams or that it
did not have an interim county administrator at the time service was attempted. 
The summons and complaint were apparently received by a person named Sherry
Mathis, who signed the receipt returned from the summons and complaint.  There
is no allegation that any person named Sherry Mathis had specific authorization
to receive service on behalf of the County.  Thus, we find as a matter of law
that Hutto did not sufficiently comply with the applicable rules of civil procedure,
and consequently failed to effectuate service upon the County during her December
2001 attempt.  See Moore v. Simpson, 322 S.C. at 523-24, 473 S.E.2d
at 56-57 (determining that without specific authorization to receive service,
service is not effected upon an employee of a Defendant.)  While exacting compliance
with service of process rules is not required, the departure here is too substantial. 
To uphold this attempted service as valid would effectively render the requirements
of Rule 4 meaningless.

We find that the record indicates Hutto’s cause
of action arose in June 2000 and a two-year statute of limitations applies. 
Accordingly, the statutory period within which she was required to complete
service of process sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the County
expired in June 2002.  Because the record indicates that Hutto did not properly
effect service on the County until two months later, in August 2002, we find
as a matter of law that the master-in-equity properly granted summary judgment
to the County on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the Master-in-Equity
is

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY, HOWARD, and KITTREDGE, JJ.,
concur.

[1]        The record is unclear as the specific date of her arrest or
the duration of her incarceration.  The parties do not dispute that she was
arrested in June 2000.  As to the duration of her incarceration, Hutto’s brief
states she “remained in custody against her will until she was released by
the presiding Family Court Judge of Aiken County.”  The County of Aiken’s
brief specifies that she only remained in jail “over night.”

[2]        The summons and complaint does not appear in the record, but
the record and briefs indicate Hutto brought a negligence action against the
County for false arrest.