State v. Atchison

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Craig L. Atchison # 1,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Newberry County

James W. Johnson, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-045

Submitted November 19, 2003 – Filed
January 21, 2004

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, Office of Appellate
Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
Assistant Attorney General W. Rutledge Martin, all of Columbia;  and Solicitor
William Townes Jones, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Appellant, Craig L. Atchison,
was convicted of burglary in the second degree and petit larceny.  The trial
judge sentenced Atchison to consecutive terms of fifteen years on the burglary
charge and three years on the larceny charge.  We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Atchison was tried before a jury on January 17,
2002, for burglary and larceny involving the home and personal goods of Jodi
Sutton.  Following jury selection, Atchison objected and made a Batson
motion requesting the solicitor give race-neutral explanations for the striking
of three black males, jurors 23, 52 and 22.  The solicitor responded that he
struck juror number 23 "because he does have a magistrate’s court conviction
of public intoxication, DUI.” And that he struck juror number 52 "because he
had a magistrate’s court conviction for multiple counts of fraudulent checks
and also a DUI.”  As to juror number 22, the following colloquy occurred:

[Solicitor]:  And number 22 was Edward Chalmers.  I don’t
have any indication Mr. Chalmers has a record.  But in my discussions with Lieutenant
Boland, Lieutenant Boland tells me that he has been on several calls regarding
Mr., Mr. Chalmers’ niece and on those calls Mr. Chalmers was there and Mr. Boland
dealt with him.  He essentially, for lack of a better term, he hangs with the
wrong crowd and he’s not the type of individual the State would prefer to have
on this jury to hear this case.

[The Court]:  All right.  Mr. Jenkins, you want to be heard
on any or all of those?

[Defense Counsel]:  Yes, sir, your Honor.  On number 22.

[The Court]:  23?  22, Chalmers.

[Defense Counsel]:  The last one, Mr. Chalmers.  The Solicitor
indicated that the defendant hangs with the wrong crowd and indicated that the
officer had some type of interaction with him.  He did not allege any improper
conduct or anything that would lead the court to believe that it was a racially
neutral reason.  The hanging with the wrong crowd is simply saying that he’s
been where officers have been before.  They didn’t offer any information as
to his actions or interactions.  I would submit that the reason for striking
him is not racially neutral.

[The Court]:  All right.  Mr. Peace, you want to be heard?

[Solicitor]:  Well, your Honor, I don’t have to give any other
facts, I mean, on its face is the fact that the police have dealt with him and
they inform me based on those dealings that he’s not the type of individual
that we want sitting on the jury.  I don’t care if he’s black or white.  If
they dealt with him and the dealings haven’t been satisfactory, I think that’s
a sufficient reason for us to exercise a challenge.  And I think that’s a racial
neutral reason.

[The Court]:  All right, Mr. Jenkins, anything further?

[Defense Counsel]:  No, sir, your Honor.

[The Court]:  All right.  I find that the State has given
sufficient racially neutral reasons for having exercised the strikes on juror
number 23, 52, and 22.  And the jury as selected will stand.

Following submission of the case to the jury, Atchison
was convicted of second-degree burglary and petit larceny. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

On appeal, Atchison contends the trial judge erred
in refusing to quash the jury, as it was seated in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  He asserts the explanation given by the solicitor
was not racially neutral, but it was akin to saying the venireman "shucked and
jived,” an explanation which has been found to demonstrate an impermissible
subjective intent to discriminate.  We disagree. 

In State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 515 S.E.2d
88 (1999), our Supreme Court set forth the following relevant law where a Batson
motion is concerned:

A Batson hearing is conducted in the following
manner.  First, the trial judge must hold a Batson hearing when members
of a cognizable racial group or gender are struck and the opposing party requests
a hearing.  Second, the proponent of the strike must present a race- or gender-neutral
explanation.  At this second step, the proponent of the strike no longer is
required to offer a reason that is race or gender-neutral and clear,
reasonably specific, and legitimate.  The reason must only be race- or gender-neutral. 
Third, the opponent of the strike must show that the race- or gender-neutral
explanation given was mere pretext.  The burden of persuading the court that
a Batson violation has occurred remains at all times on the opponent
of the strike.

*        *        *

Whether a party’s proffered reason for exercising
a peremptory strike is discriminatory must be determined by examining the totality
of the facts and circumstances in the record.

Id. at 629, 515 S.E.2d at 90-91 (citations
omitted). 

Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
proponent’s explanation at the second step, the reason offered will be deemed
race-neutral.  State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1, 8, 512 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1999). 
Further, a trial judge’s determination regarding purposeful discrimination rests
largely on his evaluation of demeanor and credibility, and because the demeanor
of the challenged attorney is often the best and only evidence of possible discrimination,
the evaluation lies peculiarly within the trial judge’s province.  State
v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 615-16, 545 S.E.2d 805, 810 (2001).  Thus, the
appellate court must give the trial judge’s findings great deference, and review
the judge’s ruling under a clearly erroneous standard.  Id. at 615, 545
S.E.2d at 810.

The Solicitor explained he struck Mr. Chalmers because
(1) he "hangs with the wrong crowd and he’s not the type of individual the State
would prefer to have on this jury” and (2) the investigating officer on the
case had dealt with him and those dealings had been unsatisfactory.  We discern
no discriminatory intent inherent in the Solicitor’s explanation.  See
State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. at 630, 515 S.E.2d at 91 (prosecutor’s primary
reason for striking potential juror, because lead detective in case knew her
to be a high-strung, critical person who would be a polarizing force on the
jury, was a race-neutral reason for the strike); State v. Smith, 321
S.C. 471, 474, 469 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Ct. App. 1996) (trooper’s personal contact
with the venirepersons or family members on previous occasions and his obvious
belief they may be biased against law enforcement or otherwise partial to defendant
were legitimate and racially neutral, and were related to his views concerning
the outcome of the case to be tried); State v. Richburg, 304 S.C. 162,
163-64, 403 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1991) (officer’s apparent knowledge that venireperson
had anti-law enforcement bias found to be legitimate race-neutral reason for
strike); State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 246, 395 S.E.2d 167, 168-69
(1990) (following explanations were found to be racially neutral and sufficient
to withstand Batson inquiry:  (1) juror’s neighbor had been arrested by one
of the officers involved in the case; (2) juror lived near and frequented an
establishment which has had great conflict with the law enforcement of the county;
(3) juror lived next door to and had a close relationship with a man who had
recently been convicted of a drug offense).

For the foregoing reasons, Atchison’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL,
and BEATTY, JJ., concur.