Lindsey v. Spartan Roofing Company, Inc

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

James Lindsey,       
Respondent,

v.

Spartan Roofing Company, Inc.,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

John W. Kittredge, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-050

Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed January
22, 2004

AFFIRMED

Kirby D. Shealy III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Norman Douglas Brannon, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:   The Lindseys sued Spartan Roofing, alleging breach of contract.
The jury found for the Lindseys; Spartan Roofing appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

Homeowners James and Polly Lindsey sued Spartan
Roofing for negligence and breach of contract after Spartan failed to repair
the Lindseys’ home to the Lindseys’ satisfaction. The Lindseys alleged that
the roof of their home was still leaking, even after Polly Lindsey pointed out
the problem to Spartan. The Lindseys then consulted Mr. Burgess of Cannon Roofing.
Mr. Burgess determined that the roof was leaking in two places. Polly Lindsey
asked Mr. Burgess if he "could repair the leaks and provide a warranty” on it.
Mr. Burgess replied that he could warrant only a whole new roof, not one he
repaired in part. However, when asked whether the whole roof had to be replaced
because of the two leaks, Mr. Burgess  declined to offer an opinion. At trial,
the Lindseys attempted to introduce into evidence Mr. Burgess’s estimate to
replace the whole roof and to warrant it for two years. Spartan objected.

Spartan argued that the Lindseys were attempting
to arrive at a better position than where they were before; that the Lindseys
would in essence have a brand new roof with a two-year warranty, not just a
repaired roof. Spartan insisted that the measure of damages was the cost of
fixing the two leaks, not of replacing the whole roof. The Lindseys countered
that they had "contracted to replace the entire roof” originally with Spartan,
and were therefore entitled to the replacement and the warranty.

The trial judge first indicated that he might sustain
the objection. However, Mr. Albert, the owner of Spartan, subsequently testified
that the Lindseys had indeed contracted with Spartan to "install a new roofing
system.” Mr. Albert also testified that that work carried a two-year workmanship
warranty. The trial judge then allowed into evidence Mr. Burgess’s estimate
for the replacement and warranty of the whole roof. The jury found for the Lindseys
and awarded them $11,393 in "actual damages.”

ISSUES 

(1) Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Burgess’s
estimate since there was no testimony that the whole roof needed to be replaced? 

(2) Did the trial court err in denying Spartan’s
motion for a new trial since there was no evidence to substantiate the jury’s
award of damages?

ANALYSIS

"The admission or exclusion of evidence
at trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose discretion
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of such discretion
amounting to a manifest error of law.” Cooks v. S.C Dept. of Hwys. and Pub.
Transp., 309 S.C. 179, 184, 420 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1992) (citing Grand
Strand Constr. Co. v. Graves, 269 S.C. 594, 595, 239 S.E.2d 81, 81 (1977)).
"The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of the
trial judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless his findings
are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled
by error of law.” Vinson v. Harley, 324 S.C. 389, 405, 477 S.E.2d 715,
723 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Umhoefer v. Bollinger, 298 S.C. 221, 224,
379 S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ct. App. 1989)). "In deciding whether to assess error to
a court's denial of a motion for a new trial, [appellate courts] consider the
testimony and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

Spartan Roofing argues that the trial judge erred
when he allowed Mr. Burgess to introduce into evidence the estimate to replace
the whole roof. We disagree. At trial, Mr. Albert himself admitted that Spartan
had been hired to "install a new roofing system” and that Spartan "was paid
$14,218 for a new roof.” Mr. Albert also testified that a new roof carried a
two-year warranty. That testimony is bolstered by the Lindseys’ contention that
they contracted with Spartan to replace the roof completely. (R.179). There
is ample evidence to suggest that the Lindseys contracted for a new, warranted
roof with Spartan, and therefore were entitled to obtain the same. See
Minter v. GOCT, Inc., 322 S.C. 525, 528, 473 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ct. App.
1996) ("The purpose of an award of damages for breach of contract is to put
the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in if the contract
had been performed.”).  

Since the evidence supports the jury’s award, we
need not address Spartan’s other issues.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL and BEATTY, JJ., concur.