Spartanburg County v. Lancaster

Spartanburg County v. Samuel T.D. Lancaster

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The Spartanburg County Building Codes Board of Appeals,       
Respondent,

v.

Samuel T. D. Lancaster,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

Donald W. Beatty, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-055

Submitted January 12, 2004 – Filed January
28, 2004

AFFIRMED

Samuel T.D. Lancaster, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

William McBee Smith, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Samuel Lancaster appeals from
the circuit court’s dismissal of his appeal from the Spartanburg County Building
Codes Board of Appeals (the Board).  We affirm.

FACTS

In June 2001, Spartanburg County (the
County) informed Lancaster that the storage of inoperable vehicles and appliances
on his property was in violation of a County ordinance.  To that end, the County
served Lancaster with a “Notice of Violation and Order,” which ordered Lancaster
to comply with the ordinance.  In response, Lancaster filed a request for a
variance with the Board.  The Board subsequently denied Lancaster’s request
for a variance.   

Lancaster appealed the Board’s ruling to the circuit
court.  The circuit court judge dismissed Lancaster’s appeal, finding (1) Lancaster’s
allegations of collusion and equal protection violations were not preserved
for review and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusions. 
The final order also instructed Lancaster to comply with the Board’s final decision
within thirty days, and authorized County law enforcement officers to enter
Lancaster’s property to determine compliance with the order.  Lancaster appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Lancaster argues the circuit court erred
in upholding the Board’s decision.  We do not agree.

Initially, we note the circuit court was
correct in finding Lancaster’s collusion and equal protection arguments were
procedurally barred.  As Lancaster had not raised these arguments to the Board,
he was prohibited from subsequently presenting these issues to the circuit court. 
See, e.g.,  Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl.
Control, 348 S.C. 507, 519, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002) (finding issues not
raised to and ruled on by an administrative agency are not preserved for judicial
consideration) (citations omitted).

Therefore, the sole issue before this court is
whether the circuit court erred in dismissing Lancaster’s appeal and upholding
the Board’s decision.  As Lancaster failed to appear for the Board’s hearing
on this matter, the hearing was held in his absence.  The inspector who issued
the Notice of Violation for Lancaster’s property testified that Lancaster’s
storage of eight inoperable motor vehicles, appliances, shelving, and pipe on
his property violated the Property Maintenance Code.  The inspector also stated
“the property is obviously in violation of the Code,” and added that a neighbor
had lodged an informal complaint about Lancaster’s property approximately four
months earlier.  The Board then viewed the inspector’s videotape of the debris
on Lancaster’s property.  After agreeing with the inspector that Lancaster’s
property was in clear violation of the Code, the Board unanimously voted to
deny Lancaster’s motion for a variance. 

We find the circuit court was correct in affirming
the Board.  There was more than enough evidence presented at the Board hearing
to support the Board’s decision to deny the variance and hold Lancaster in violation
of the Code.  Further, other than presenting a brief to the Board, Lancaster
did not present any other evidence to support his motion for a variance.  As
the arguments in Lancaster’s brief cannot be considered as evidence and Lancaster
did not appear at the hearing, Lancaster effectively did not present any evidence
to the Board. 

Similar to our review of zoning appeals,
we employ an abuse of discretion standard of review in the instant case.  See
Peterson Outdoor Adver. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230, 235, 489
S.E.2d 630, 633 (1997) (“[T]he decision of the zoning board will not be upheld
where it is based on errors of law, . . .  or where there is no legal evidence
to support it, or where the board acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, . . . or
where, in general, the board has abused its discretion.”) (citation omitted). 
As such, we find (1) there is substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s
order dismissing Lancaster’s appeal and (2) the Board neither acted arbitrarily
nor abused its discretion in denying Lancaster’s motion for a variance.  Accordingly,
the circuit court did not err in dismissing Lancaster’s appeal from the Board’s
ruling.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the circuit
court’s order dismissing Lancaster’s appeal is

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, KITTREDGE, and CURETON,
A.J., concur.