State v. Eddy

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Emmett Eddy,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-708

Submitted September 17, 2003 – Filed December 9, 2003

APPEAL DISMISSED

Assistant Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare, Office of
Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W.
McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson;  and Solicitor
Warren Blair Giese, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Defendant Eddy appeals from the condition of his plea agreement
that bars him from entering the state capital grounds. We affirm.

FACTS

On April 17, 2003 Defendant Emmett Eddy climbed
a latter to the Confederate Flag and set the flag on fire. He was then charged
with defacing a public monument. Eddy appeared before Judge Williams. After
extensive questioning by the judge to both Eddy and his attorney, Eddy pled
guilty to the charge and was sentenced to two years imprisonment, suspended
to probation for the two years. One of the conditions of his probation was a
requirement that he not enter the state house grounds. The security officers
had requested that condition because Eddy had previously handcuffed himself
to a monument on the state house grounds. Eddy is appealing that condition.

ISSUE

Is the condition of Eddy’s probation unreasonable
because it violates Eddy’s constitutional right to petition the government?

ANALYSIS

“Probation is a matter of grace.” State v. Hamilton,
333 S.C. 642, 648, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96, 97 (Ct. App. 1999). However, a court may
not impose conditions that are unreasonable or disproportionate. It is well
settled law that South Carolina citizens are entitled have a constitutional
right to petition the government. See U.S. Const. Amends. 1,14; S.C.
Const., Art. I § 2; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969). But that right is not absolute. See City of Darlington v.
Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 139, 122 S.E.2d 207, 109 (1961); City of Florence
v. George, 241 S.C. 77, 127 S.E.2d 210, 211 (1962).  

Here, Eddy had prior run-ins with law enforcement involving
the state house grounds. Additionally, the judge found that Eddy understood
the charge he was facing and willingly accepted the probation plea agreement,
including the restriction about the state house grounds. Moreover, Eddy has
failed to show how his right to petition the government has been violated. The
conditions of his probation do not prevent him from protesting outside of the
state house grounds in the same manner as any other protester. Therefore, the
restriction imposed by the trial judge is not unreasonable or disproportionate.
The judge acted within his discretion and was not arbitrary. See Hamilton,
333 S.C. 647, 511 S.E.2d 96 (“This [C]ourt’s authority to review [a probation]
decision is confined to correcting errors of law unless … the circuit judge’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious.”).

Moreover, an appellant, if he is to properly preserve the
defectiveness of a plea agreement for appellate review, must raise that claim
before the trial court. State v. Mckinney, 278 S.C. 107, 107, 292 S.E.2d
598, 598 (1982). That principle “is consistent with the general rule requiring
a contemporaneous objection” and applies even when the objection involves “federal
constitutional claims.” Id. Counsel’s petition to be relieved is granted.

Appeal Dismissed.

Huff, Stilwell, and Beatty, JJ., concur.