State v/ Bailey

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Lucas Lorenzo Bailey,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-744

Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed December
17, 2003

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
and Assistant Attorney General W. Rutledge Martin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Barbara R. Morgan, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Lucas Lorenzo Bailey
appeals his conviction and sentence for homicide by child abuse, arguing the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.  We affirm. [1]  

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bailey was charged with homicide by child abuse
following the death of his girlfriend’s 16-month-old son, Devon.  During the
last two days of Devon’s life, Bailey and his girlfriend, Amy Hughes, were the
only adults alone with him.  The day before Devon died, he had a cold and Hughes
stayed home with him.  A little after midnight on the day Devon died, Bailey
fixed some food while Hughes stayed in bed.  Devon was in the kitchen with Bailey
when Hughes heard a loud noise followed by Devon crying.  She did not get up,
however, and Bailey put the child to bed with Hughes’ daughters, ages 5 and
6.  She later asked Bailey what happened and he said it was nothing.  During
the night, one of the girls reported Devon was vomiting.  Bailey immediately
volunteered to take care of the boy.  During the day, the child was very lethargic,
did not make any noise or reach out for his mother as he normally would, and
vomited all liquid he was offered.  Devon was unable to sit up on his own. 
Hughes tried to give him medicine, most of which he vomited. 

Devon was in the bed with Bailey when Hughes’
mother came for a visit.  Hughes heard a loud hitting sound, but initially thought
it was one of her daughters.  When she sent her daughter to get Devon, Bailey
refused to let the girl take Devon out of the room.  Hughes sent for the child
again later.  When he was brought into the room, he was worse.  He was droopy,
made no noise, and Hughes saw his eyes roll back into his head.  Hughes later
took a nap with Devon.  When she got up, he was still sleeping and she could
see he was breathing.  Hughes and Bailey played cards for a while and at about
5:00 p.m., Hughes left to take Bailey’s mother to the store in exchange for
gas money.  She testified if Devon was not feeling better when he woke up she
planned to take him to the emergency room.  When she left, only her daughters
and Bailey were alone with the child.  While she was out of the house, Bailey
called 911 and reported Devon was not breathing. 

When police arrived, Devon was dead and lying
face down on a toddler bed.  Hughes arrived a short time later.  Tim Carlton,
one of the deputy coroners, reported Bailey was behaving strangely when Carlton
was trying to take Devon’s medical history from Hughes.  Carlton became concerned
with the number of times Bailey entered the room during the interview.  Writing
on a piece of paper, Carlton asked Hughes whether someone had injured the child. 
Hughes responded that she would call him later.  When Carlton interviewed Bailey,
he said Devon was a spoiled and crying baby.  Another deputy coroner found small
round bruises on Devon’s abdomen.  

An autopsy confirmed Devon was a homicide victim. 
During the autopsy, the pathologist discovered several small round injuries
to various places on Devon’s head, indicating the child suffered several blows
to the head by a human fist.  Additionally, the child suffered at least two
blows to the abdomen, leaving small round bruises below his belly button.  The
pathologist reported the head injuries were so severe that his brain was flattened
out where it had swollen against his skull.  The head injuries would have caused
the child to vomit and be lethargic and could have resulted in death.  However,
the pathologist opined Devon bled to death within minutes of the final blunt
force blow to his abdomen, which lacerated his intestines and mesentery arteries
and veins.  After Hughes left, the only people home with Devon were his two
sisters and Bailey.  The pathologist testified a child would not have adequate
strength to cause the injury that killed Devon. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

In considering a motion for directed
verdict, the trial court is only concerned with the existence of evidence, not
with its weight.  State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544 S.E.2d 30, 36
(2001).  “When a motion for a directed verdict is made in a criminal case where
the State relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, ‘[t]he trial judge
is required to submit the case to the jury if there is any substantial evidence
which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his
guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.’”  State v. Lollis, 343 S.C.
580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 341
S.C. 406, 535 S.E.2d 126 (2000)).  On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict,
this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. 
McHoney, 344 S.C. at 97, 544 S.E.2d at 36. 

Homicide by child abuse is committed
when a person, while committing child abuse or neglect, causes the child’s death
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.  S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-85 (2003).  The indictment against Bailey alleged he committed this
crime in that he was responsible for Devon’s welfare and inflicted injuries
to the child’s abdomen resulting in exsanguination and, consequently, death.

Although Bailey asks this court to find there was insufficient
evidence of his guilt of homicide by child abuse to submit the charge to the
jury, he has failed to provide us with a complete copy of the evidence presented
at trial.  He failed to provide complete copies of the trial testimony of several
State witnesses.  Additionally, he failed to provide us with the State’s exhibits,
with the exception of the 911 tape designated by the State.  At trial the State
presented photographs of the child’s body at the crime scene and a diagram of
the home, none of which were provided to this court to review the trial court’s
decision that sufficient evidence of Bailey’s guilt existed to submit the case
to the jury.  As appellant, Bailey had the burden of providing this court with
a record adequate for consideration of his issues on appeal.  State v.
Mitchell, 330 S.C. 189, 194, 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998).

Although Bailey did not provide a complete record,
the evidence in the portion of the record before us is sufficient to support
the trial court’s denial of his directed verdict motion.  Viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, the evidence demonstrates the child was not well
during his final two days and that he cried following a loud noise when he was
alone with Bailey.  After that event, he had difficulty keeping food down and
was lethargic, symptoms consistent with the head injuries the pathologist found. 
Additionally, on the day Devon died, he was sleeping in his mother’s bed when
she last saw him and, while she was away, died from an injury the pathologist
opined only took minutes to result in his death.  When police arrived, Devon
was not on his mother’s bed, but was dead, face down on his toddler bed.  While
Hughes was away, Bailey was the only adult home with Devon and, according to
the testimony of the pathologist, the fatal injury was inflicted by an adult. 
Furthermore, the fatal injury was a severe blow to the abdomen violent enough
to lacerate his intestines and mesentery arteries and veins.  This constitutes
substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could logically deduce
Hughes abused the child, causing his death, under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life.  Thus the trial court properly denied Bailey’s
motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury.

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL and BEATTY, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.