Melette v. Hannaford Brothers

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Fannie Melette,       
Appellant,

v.

Hannaford Brothers, Co., d/b/a Wilson's Grocery Store,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Marion County

James E. Brogdon, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-686

Submitted September 17, 2003 – Filed
November 24, 2003

AFFIRMED

Fannie Melette, of Marion, for Appellant.

William E. Hopkins, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Fannie Melette appeals the
trial court’s grant of directed verdict in favor of Hannaford Brothers Company. 
We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR
and the following authorities:  Hopson v. Clary, 321 S.C. 312, 468 S.E.2d
305 (Ct. App. 1996) (On appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this
court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was
granted.); see also Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 529 S.E.2d
710 (2000) (If the evidence as a whole is susceptible to only one reasonable
inference, no jury issue is created and a directed verdict motion is properly
granted.); Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc., 344 S.C. 32, 35, 542 S.E.2d
728, 729 (2001) (“To recover damages for injuries caused by dangerous or defective
conditions on a storekeeper’s premises, the Plaintiff must show either (1) that
the injury was caused by a specific act of the defendant which created the dangerous
condition: or (2) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of
the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it.”); Calvert v. House Beautiful
Paint and Decorating Center, Inc., 313 S.C. 494, 443 S.E.2d 398 (1994) (The
mere fact a foreign substance was on the floor is insufficient standing alone
to charge the store with negligence.); Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina,
Inc., 344 S.C. 194, 206, 544 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The defendant
will be charged with constructive notice whenever it appears that the condition
has existed for such length of time prior to the injury that, under existing
circumstances, he should have discovered and remedied it in the exercise of
due care; conversely, absent evidence of such preexistence, the defendant may
not be so charged.”), aff’d 354 S.C. 161, 580 S.E.2d 440 (2003).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.