State v. Gwinn

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Linda Wolfe Gwinn,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

Joseph J. Watson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion 2003-UP-687

Submitted September 17, 2003 – Submitted
November 24, 2003

AFFIRMED

Michael W. Barcroft, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia,
and Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Linda Wolfe Gwinn appeals her
conviction and sentence for possession of crack cocaine, arguing the evidence
was seized as the result of an unlawful traffic stop.  We affirm.
[1]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Greenville County Sheriff’s Deputy Tad
Clardy was patrolling a high-drug area when he witnessed two cars commit traffic
violations when turning onto Worley Road.  Gwinn made a wide right-hand turn
crossing the double yellow line of Worley Road.  Rather than stop Gwinn immediately,
the officer chose to pursue the other vehicle because its driver committed a
more serious violation.  That vehicle took off at a high rate of speed after
turning onto Worley Road and crossed the double yellow line near a dangerous
curve.  When he lost visual contact with the other vehicle, Clardy immediately
turned his attention to Gwinn’s vehicle.  Clardy testified several minutes passed
between the time he first saw Gwinn cross the double yellow line and when he
stopped her. 

When Clardy stopped Gwinn, he intended
to write her a ticket for crossing the double yellow line.  During the stop,
Clardy noticed Gwinn was nervous, jerky, and fidgety.  Because of her behavior,
Clardy became concerned about his own safety and asked Gwinn if she had any
weapons.  Gwinn produced a pair of scissors and continued to act strangely,
repeatedly reaching inside the car despite Clardy’s instructions to the contrary. 
Clardy instructed Gwinn to step out of the car and then to the rear of the car
when she continued to reach inside the vehicle.  Another officer who had arrived
on the scene observed Gwinn drop a white rocklike substance in her floorboard. 
The substance was .09 grams of crack cocaine.  After her arrest, Gwinn dropped
a piece of foil containing crack cocaine residue onto the seat of the patrol
car.  

LAW/ANALYSIS

Gwinn argues the drugs should have been suppressed
as the fruit of an unlawful traffic stop.  She contends the stop was arbitrary
and unreasonable.  Specifically, she asserts the officer lacked authority to
make the stop because he did not do so immediately after the violation as required
by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (2003).

Section 17-13-30 permits any sheriff or deputy
sheriff to make a warrantless arrest of anyone who violates a criminal law of
this state in the officer’s view if the arrest is made at the time of
the violation “or immediately thereafter.” 

It is a general rule that once an officer has the right
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or breach of the peace committed
in his presence he must do so as soon as he reasonably can, and if he delays
for purposes disassociated with the arrest or for such a length of time as to
necessarily indicate the interposition of other purposes, he cannot arrest without
a warrant.

H.D. Warren, Annotation, Peace Officer’s Delay
in Making Arrest Without a Warrant for Misdemeanor or Breach of Peace, 58
A.L.R.2d 1056, 1056-57 (1958).

Additionally, an officer may make a warrantless
arrest for a violation occurring outside the officer’s presence where the facts
and circumstances observed by the officer give him reason to believe a crime
was freshly committed.  See State v. Martin, 275 S.C. 141, 145-46,
268 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1980).  Clardy’s brief delay before stopping Gwinn was
proper under the circumstances because he was pursuing another person who committed
a more serious violation at virtually the same location and at almost the exact
time of Gwinn’s violation.  He delayed his stop of Gwinn only for public safety
purposes and stopped Gwinn within a reasonable amount of time after he saw her
violate the law.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.