State v. Williams

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Gerald Vincent Williams       
Appellant.

Appeal From Chester County

Paul E. Short, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2003-UP-303

Submitted February 20, 2003 – Filed
May 1, 2003 

VACATED

Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia;
for Appellant.

Deputy Director for Legal Services Teresa A. Knox; Legal Counsel
Tommy Evans, Jr.; Legal Counsel J. Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Gerald Vincent Williams appeals
the decision of the circuit court denying his pro se motion for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(a), SCRCP.  Williams insists the South Carolina Department
of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services improperly revoked his parole eligibility. 
Williams contends the trial judge erred in declining to clarify which version
of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370 he was sentenced under.

After a thorough review of the record
and Williams’ pro se brief, we dismiss Williams’ appeal and vacate [1] the judgment of the circuit court pursuant
to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Lee v. Thermal
Engineering Corp., 352 S.C. 81, 572 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 2002), Rule 60(a),
SCRCP (“Rule 60(a), SCRCP provides ‘[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion
of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.’”);  Michel
v. Michel, 289 S.C. 187, 345 S.E.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Black’s
Law Dictionary 252 (6th ed. 1990)) (“Generally a clerical error is
defined as a mistake in writing or copying.  As applied to judgments and decrees,
it is a mistake or omission by a clerk, counsel, judge or printer which is not
the result of exercise of judicial function.  While a court may correct mistakes
or clerical errors in its own process to make it conform to the record, it cannot
change the scope of the judgment.”). [2]

VACATED.

HEARN, C.J., CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ.,
concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Following the DPPPS’s determination that Williams
was ineligible for parole under 1990 Act No. 694 § 17 as applied to S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-53-370(e), Williams then had the same right to review as the inmate
in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (1999).  In Al-Shabazz,
the Court outlined the nature of the review available to inmates raising non-collateral
issues that implicate liberty interests; these procedures apply equally to
inmates affected by final decisions of the DPPPS that affect the permanent
denial of parole eligibility.  See Furtick v. South Carolina Department
of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, Op. No. 25581 (S.C. Sup. Ct.
filed Jan. 13, 2003) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 14 at 73).