Maurer v. Hilliard

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Christian E. Maurer,       
Appellant,

v.

Carol Hilliard, Sheila Maurer, James Kahn and Vincent Stafford,       
Defendants,

of whom Carol Hilliard is       
Respondent.

Appeal From Berkeley County

Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No.  2003-UP- 136

Submitted January 10, 2003- Filed February
19, 2003 

AFFIRMED

Mr. Christian E. Maurer; for Appellant.

William C. Helms, III, Esq.; Phillip S. Ferderigos; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Christian E. Maurer
appeals from an order dismissing his complaint against the respondent Carol
Hilliard on the ground the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. 
We affirm. [1]

Maurer, a South Carolina resident, brought
this action in Berkeley County against his former wife Sheila Maurer; his wife’s
attorney in their divorce action, James Kahn; his own attorney in their divorce
action, Vincent Stafford; and Hilliard, an attorney and the court-appointed
guardian ad litem for the Maurer children.  All defendants reside in Cleveland,
Ohio.  Maurer’s complaint alleges four causes of action against Hilliard: conspiracy,
breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary relationship. 

Maurer’s complaint alleges, among other
things: he and the defendants entered into a contract for the exercise by Maurer
of his visitation rights with his children in exchange for Hilliard receiving
$1,600; the parties wrote the contract “in order to grant enforcement in South
Carolina of such agreement”; and the defendants breached the agreement by denying
him visitation with his daughter. 

Maurer contends jurisdiction exists
under the South Carolina Long Arm Statute.
[2]   He argues it is enough to satisfy the requirements of that statute
that the visitation agreement was to be partly performed in South Carolina.

For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident, due process requires the existence of minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum state.
[3]   These contacts must be such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [4]   The party seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction
against a nonresident by utilization of this state’s long-arm statute carries
the burden of establishing jurisdiction.
[5]

We agree with the trial court.  Sufficient
minimum contacts between Hilliard and South Carolina do not exist.  For South
Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over her would, in our minds, offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [6]  

To begin with, nothing in the complaint suggests
that any act or omission committed by Hilliard (or by the other parties, for
that matter) occurred in South Carolina.  Hilliard, as the trial court noted,
is a court-appointed guardian ad litem in a divorce proceedings conducted in
Ohio.  She is a resident of that state and has had no contacts at all with the
State of South Carolina.  Whatever her duties are as a court-appointed guardian
ad litem and agent of the court, [7] they can only be exercised in
the State of Ohio in the particular action in which she was appointed [8] and only during pendency of that action. [9]   Moreover, to require her to
travel to South Carolina to defend a suit would pose a substantial inconvenience
for her.  Finally, South Carolina has no interest in exercising jurisdiction,
especially since the only link between Maurer and the subject matter of the
action is that Maurer resides here and since the contract allegedly at issue
between Maurer and Hilliard grew out of proceedings in the Ohio state court
and forms part of an Ohio judgment that establishes custody and visitation rights,
rights which Maurer can enforce there.
[10]

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ. concur.

[1]   We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]   South Carolina Code of Laws Ann. § 36-2-803 (1977).

[3]   Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce
Bank, 310 S.C. 256, 260, 423 S.E.2d 128, 130-31 (1992).

[4]   Id.

[5]   White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. 241, 244,
247, 387 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1990).

[6]   The supreme court in White v. Stephens,
300 S.C. at 247, 387 S.E.2d at 263, mentioned four factors a court may consider
when determining whether minimal contacts with the forum state exists.  They
are: (1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident in this state; (2)
the character and circumstances of the commission of the nonresident’s acts;
(3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by conferring or refusing to
confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and (4) South Carolina’s interest
in exercising jurisdiction. 

[7]   See 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 183,
at 143 (2000) (“A guardian ad litem appointed to represent an infant defendant
is regarded as an officer or agent of the court, or as a fiduciary.”).

[8]   Id. § 185, at 145 (“The power of a guardian
ad litem is . . . ordinarily limited to matters related to the particular
action in which he is appointed.”).

[9]   Wilson v. Ball, 337 S.C. 493, 497 n. 8,
523 S.E.2d 804, 806 n. 8 (Ct. App. 1999).

[10]   In its order, the trial court states Maurer
also has an action for defamation presently pending against Hilliard in Ohio. 
He fails to contest this finding in his brief.