State v. Collins

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Jerry M. Collins,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-131

Submitted January 10, 2003 – Filed February
19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia;
for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, of Columbia; Robert M. Ariail, of
Greenville; for Respondent.

 

PER CURIAM: Jerry M. Collins was convicted
of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime.  He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years imprisonment
for trafficking and five years for the weapons charge.  Collins appeals his
convictions and sentences.  We affirm.

FACTS

Police received an anonymous tip that Collins was
at a local residence.  As there was an outstanding arrest warrant on Collins,
the officers decided to effect a stop of his vehicle after he left the residence. 
The officers noted that Collins was driving a car registered to Patsy Burns,
who was known to be Collins’ sister.  In an attempt to stop Collins without
incident, the officers set up a drivers’ license checkpoint.  However, Collins
evaded the checkpoint and, after being boxed in by several police vehicles,
he attempted to accelerate and push one of the vehicles out of the way.  After
Collins was removed from the vehicle, officers found several items on his person
including a 9 mm handgun, two small plastic bags containing white powder, some
loose green plant material, and $1897 in cash.  The white powder substance field-tested
positive as methamphetamine. 

The officers also recovered a .32 caliber revolver
and two bank bags from the vehicle.  The first bank bag contained a set of digital
scales and a total of seven small plastic bags containing a white powder.  The
powder in six of these bags field-tested positive as methamphetamine.  The second
bank bag contained a small plastic bag with a “green flake material” that later
field-tested positive as marijuana.  There were also two pill bottles in the
bag, containing a total of 36 pills that field-tested as a controlled substance. 
Patsy Burns’ name was on one of the pill bottles. 

Collins’ counsel made a pre-trial motion, stating
that, though he served a motion for discovery on the solicitor’s office, he
had not received important documents.  Counsel stated he received the incident
report before trial, but had not yet received:  a copy of the warrant, a copy
of Collins’ confession, or any information about whether Patsy Burns was charged
in this case.  Counsel then asked for a continuance in order to “get that discovery.” 
The State countered that the only evidence not turned over to the defense were
property and evidence sheets and a statement by Patsy Burns that “the car was
in her name, and that the car belonged to [Collins].”  The State also clarified
that, while Patsy Burns was not charged in the instant case, she was charged
with the underlying conspiracy.  The trial judge denied the motion, finding
the information about Patsy Burns’ involvement in a conspiracy was not exculpatory. 
Collins was subsequently convicted of trafficking methamphetamine and possession
of a firearm. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

Collins argues the trial judge erred in refusing to
grant his discovery request.  Collins argues the State should have given him
information about both his arrest warrant and Patsy Burns’ drug activities because
of their exculpatory nature.  We do not agree.

Brady [1] requires the prosecution to disclose
evidence in its possession which is favorable to a defendant and material to
guilt or punishment.  State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 452, 503 S.E.2d
214, 219-20 (Ct. App. 1998).  Evidence is “material” under Brady only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  State
v. Cain, 297 S.C. 497, 503, 377 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1988).  A “reasonable probability”
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id. 

While Brady mandates the State’s
disclosure of exculpatory evidence, we find neither the arrest warrant nor the
information about Patsy Burns was “material to guilt or punishment.”  The arrest
warrant is not material under Brady because there is no reasonable probability
that the outcome of the case would have changed if Collins had a copy of the
arrest warrant.  Though Collins argues he would have had a better opportunity
to challenge the search and seizure of the vehicle, even without an outstanding
warrant, the drugs and weapons would have been discovered.  Collins evaded a
license checkpoint and attempted to push a pursuing police car out of his way. 
At that point, officers were justified in removing Collins from the vehicle
and searching his person.  And, as Collins was sitting on the two bank bags,
they would have been in plain view of the officers.  In the search that would
have followed, the handguns and drugs would have been discovered.  Thus, we
find there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of Collins’ case would
have been different if he had received a copy of his arrest warrant.   

Likewise, information about Patsy Burns’ indictment
for the underlying conspiracy does not qualify as material under a Brady
analysis.  The defense was aware that Collins was driving Burns’ car and that
police found a controlled substance in a bottle with Burns’ name on the label. 
While the defense may not have been informed that Burns had been indicted in
the underlying conspiracy, there was clearly enough evidence to put the defense
on notice that Burns was involved in some kind of drug activity.  See
State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. at 453, 503 S.E.2d at 220 (finding under
a Brady analysis, “information is not deemed ‘material’ if the defense
discovers the information in time to adequately use it at trial”).  As such,
there is no reasonable probability that, had Collins been informed of Burns’
indictment, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Accordingly, we find the trial judge did
not err in denying Collins’ discovery request.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Collins’ convictions and
sentences are 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.

[1] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.
1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).