Amanda L. Delk

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Amanda Lynn Delk and Jake Wethington, Defendants,
of whom Amanda Lynn Delk is the Appellant.
In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2026-000349
Appeal From Lexington County
Huntley S. Crouch, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-455
Submitted October 8, 2026 – Filed October 15, 2026
AFFIRMED
Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Charleston, for Appellant.
Jordan Alexander McWilliams, of the South Carolina
Department of Social Services, of Lexington, for
Respondent.

Machelle Yvonne Thompson, of Thompson & Sete'fano,
LLC, of Columbia, for the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Amanda Lynn Delk (Mother) appeals a family court order
terminating her parental rights to her minor child (Child). On appeal, Mother
argues the family court erred in finding termination of parental rights (TPR) was in
Child's best interest.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the family court did not err in finding TPR was in Child's best interest.
See Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2019) ("On
appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo."); Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[D]e
novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of fact; however,
this standard does not abrogate two long-standing principles still recognized by our
courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in a superior position
to assess witness credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden of showing the
appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the
trial [court]."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d
285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the children are
the paramount consideration."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C.
324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must consider the
child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining
whether TPR is appropriate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests
of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict.").
Mother's arguments on appeal center around her attempts to complete her
court-ordered placement plan and efforts to maintain a relationship with Child.
The evidence, however, showed she made little to no progress on the plan, and one
year after the plan was ordered, the family court relieved the Department of Social
Services (DSS) of offering her further services due to her lack of progress. Mother
explained her failure to complete several of the plan's requirements by claiming
she was unaware of these requirements, despite being present at the merits removal
1 The family court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds
for TPR. In her appellate brief, Mother stated she "recognize[d] that at least one
statutory ground for TPR [wa]s unlikely to be disturbed on appeal." See S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2025) (explaining that "[t]he family court may order
[TPR] upon a finding of one or more of [twelve statutory] grounds and a finding
that termination is in the best interest of the child").

hearing and agreeing to the plan at the hearing. As to her relationship with Child,
the DSS program coordinator testified Mother sometimes went months at a time
without seeing Child, Child did not recognize Mother as her parent, and Mother's
inconsistency confused Child when she did exercise visitation. The GAL and DSS
employee noted a lack of bond between Mother and Child at visitations, but both
testified Child was bonded to her foster family. The testimony showed Child had
been placed with the same foster family since she entered foster care in January
2024, and the foster family ensured Child's "substantial" needs were met, helped
Child make developmental strides, and wished to adopt Child. The GAL believed
TPR was in Child's best interest. Based on Mother's lack of involvement in Child's
life, Child's notable improvement since entering foster care, and the potential for
Child to be adopted, we find TPR is in Child's best interest. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2510 (2010) (describing the purpose of the TPR statute as "to establish
procedures for the reasonable and compassionate termination of parental rights
where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned in order to protect the health
and welfare of these children and make them eligible for adoption by persons who
will provide a suitable home environment and the love and care necessary for a
happy, healthful, and productive life").
AFFIRMED.2
GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.