State v. Andrew Mangru

Supreme Court

No. 2023-368-C.A.
(P1/21-3503AG)
No. 2023-369-C.A.
(P2/22-646ADV)

State :

v. :

Andrew Mangru. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2023-368-C.A.
(P1/21-3503AG)
No. 2023-369-C.A.
(P2/22-646ADV)

State :

v. :

Andrew Mangru. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. In these consolidated appeals, the

defendant, Andrew Mangru, appeals from two judgments of conviction following a

jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree murder and other offenses. The

defendant raises one argument on appeal, asserting that the trial justice erred in

instructing the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it found that the state

did not prove either first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable

doubt. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgments of conviction of the

Superior Court.

I

Facts and Travel

We derive the following facts from the trial transcripts. In 2017, defendant

and Daniya Isom began dating. In 2019, defendant and Isom had a child together.

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The defendant and Isom’s relationship was “[o]n and off,” and the two would see

other people “[w]hen [they] were off * * *.” The defendant and Isom continued this

“[o]n and off” relationship through July 2021, when, according to Isom, they

permanently ended their relationship. Although the couple had separated, defendant

and Isom maintained contact via text messaging throughout August 2021. During

that same month, Isom became sexually intimate with Andrei Bonilla, the decedent

in the case at bar. At trial, Isom described her relationship with Bonilla as one of

“friends with benefits.”

On August 27, 2021, Isom spent time with her brother, her cousin, her

cousin’s girlfriend, and a friend. The group was gathered at the home of Isom’s

friend in Pawtucket, until about ten o’clock at night. At this time, the group left the

friend’s house in Pawtucket and moved to Isom’s house in Providence. Once at

Isom’s house, some of the group, including Isom, continued “[d]rinking, smoking

hookah, smoking weed, [and] listening to music[,]” as they had been doing since the

afternoon.

Andrei Bonilla arrived at Isom’s house around one o’clock in the morning on

August 28, 2021. After Bonilla arrived, Isom exited her house and got into Bonilla’s

car. Isom and Bonilla then “parked in the parking lot behind [Isom’s] house and

* * * had sex for a while.” After this, Isom and Bonilla sat in Bonilla’s car and

talked. While Isom was with Bonilla, defendant arrived at Isom’s house. The

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defendant was searching for Isom, questioning the individuals in Isom’s house as to

her whereabouts. The defendant then exited the house.

According to her testimony at trial, it was at this point that Isom saw defendant

on the street corner near her house. Isom then exited Bonilla’s car and questioned

defendant as to why he was there. In response, defendant asked Isom, “Who is that

in the car? Who the f*** is that in the car?” Following this exchange, Isom testified,

she informed defendant that her friend was in the car. Thereafter, Isom testified,

defendant slapped her, then banged on the car window, and fired gunshots through

the driver’s side window while Bonilla was still in the driver’s seat. At trial, Isom

testified that she heard about five shots fired and then saw Bonilla drive away. Isom

further testified that as Bonilla drove away, she observed defendant continue to fire

shots towards the car, until the firearm made “a clicking sound once there was [sic]

no more bullets.”

Eventually, defendant and Isom proceeded back inside Isom’s house, where,

according to Isom, defendant yelled at a guest and argued with Isom’s brother. At

trial, Isom testified that she stated to defendant that she would call the police “if

something bad happened to [Bonilla],” at which point defendant “r[an] out the door.”

Isom, and all of the other individuals at the gathering, then got in Isom’s car to search

for Bonilla. Shortly after turning onto Branch Avenue, Isom observed emergency

vehicles at the Cumberland Farms gas station and store. When she got closer, Isom

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observed that Bonilla’s car had crashed into the protective bollards in the parking lot

of Cumberland Farms. Isom then spoke with police officers on scene and gave them

a statement. Bonilla was deceased in his car.

On November 15, 2021, a grand jury indictment was filed, charging defendant

with: murder (count one); discharge of a firearm while in the commission of a crime

of violence, to wit, murder (count two); assault with a dangerous weapon (count

three); use of a firearm while in the commission of a crime of violence, to wit,

domestic assault with a dangerous weapon (count four); assault or battery, or both,

by strangulation (count five); assault (count six); and possession of a pistol without

a license (count seven).

Thereafter, a criminal information in a second case against defendant was filed

on March 21, 2022, charging defendant with: the corrupt, malicious, or reckless

endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice (count

eight); felony solicitation to commit obstruction of the judicial system (count nine);

and attempted violation of a no contact order (count ten).1 These charges arose from

defendant’s conduct while incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions,

1
For clarity, we refer to all of the charges against defendant as counts one through
ten, as they were presented to the trial jury as such, in a consolidated case as
discussed supra. In the Superior Court, there were two separate judgments of
conviction entered under the two individual case numbers. The defendant appealed
from both judgments of conviction, and this Court granted defendant’s motion to
consolidate his appeals.

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awaiting trial for the charges on which he was indicted, as discussed supra. The two

cases were consolidated, pursuant to a motion by the state, over the objection of the

defendant, and all charges—ten in total—were tried in one trial.

A jury trial commenced in the Superior Court on November 30, 2022. After

the close of evidence, the trial justice instructed the jury according to her proposed

instructions. Prior to this, both the state and defendant, through counsel, had

objected to the trial justice’s proposed jury instructions. The state objected to the

inclusion of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and argued that there was no

evidence showing provocation that could have given rise to defendant losing self-

control, causing him to kill the decedent. This, according to the state, obviated the

need for any instruction on voluntary manslaughter. In response, defendant

countered that there need be only a scintilla of evidence of adequate provocation to

warrant such an instruction. The trial justice agreed and overruled the state’s

objection to the voluntary manslaughter instruction and included it in the final

instructions to be delivered to the jury.

The defendant also objected to the jury instructions as proposed by the trial

justice. Specifically, defendant objected “to language indicating that the jury should

only consider the charge of involuntary [sic] manslaughter if, in fact, they have found

that the [s]tate failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt elements of the crime of

either first-degree or second-degree [murder].” The defendant argued “that even if

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the jury finds that the elements of first- or second-degree [murder] have been

satisfied, they then can proceed * * * to determine whether or not there was adequate

provocation that would negate the malice aforethought or the malice element of

second- and first-degree murder.” In making this argument, defendant relied upon

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

Additionally, defendant argued that even if the jury is satisfied that the state

has proven the elements of first-degree or second-degree murder,

“the jury should be instructed that they must then consider
whether or not the [s]tate has negated any adequate
provocation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
inasmuch as a similar manner, that when self-defense is
presented in a case that would normally be a murder case
or a finding of second-degree murder, when self-defense
is presented, the [s]tate has the obligation to negate that by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The trial justice overruled this objection by defendant. The trial justice

reasoned:

“Rhode Island law is clear that voluntary manslaughter is
a lesser-included offense of a murder charge. It does not
require first that the [s]tate demonstrate a murder charge
and then disprove a lesser-included offense. I do not know
of any case law in Rhode Island that analogizes a
voluntar[y] manslaughter requested instruction with []
self-defense[.] * * * The [s]tate is required to prove each
and every element of the charge of voluntary manslaughter
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that voluntary
manslaughter comes about in this case only if the [s]tate
first does not prove first-degree murder, then the
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.”

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Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder on count

one, and guilty on counts two, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten. The jury found

defendant not guilty on counts three, four, and five. Accordingly, the trial justice

sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences for counts one and two, and

concurrent terms of one year for count six, ten years for count seven, five years for

count eight, five years for count nine, and one year for count ten. Judgments of

conviction entered to that effect on June 13, 2023. The defendant filed premature

but valid notices of appeal on May 22, 2023.

II

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews ‘jury instructions on a de novo basis.’” State v. Isom, 251

A.3d 1, 6 (R.I. 2021) (quoting State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148, 1166 (R.I. 2009)). “It is

well established that, on review, we examine jury instructions in their entirety to

ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have

understood them.” Id. (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166). “This Court will not

examine a single sentence apart from the rest of the instructions, but rather the

challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were rendered.”

Id. (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166).

“Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-38, we determine whether the jury charge

sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable

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law.” Isom, 251 A.3d at 6 (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166). “In so doing, we examine

the record in a light most favorable to the defendant.” Id. (quoting State v. Soler, 140

A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016)). “An erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it

can be shown that the jury could have been misled to the resultant prejudice of the

complaining party.” Yangambi v. Providence School Board, 162 A.3d 1205, 1217

(R.I. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Long, 61 A.3d 439, 445 (R.I. 2013)).

III

Discussion

We begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent proceedings after both the

prosecution and defense had rested. First, the trial justice entertained and denied

defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Then, she took up the issue of jury

instructions, indicating that she had previously provided both parties with a copy of

her proposed instructions. The state objected to the inclusion of an instruction on

voluntary manslaughter, arguing that “the evidence wholly fails to support such a

charge.” The state elaborated that defendant may have been angry but there was

simply no evidence of provocation such as would entitle him to a manslaughter

instruction.

The defendant disagreed. It should be noted, however, that heat-of-passion

manslaughter was not his theory of defense. Instead, defendant maintained that he

was not the shooter; he argued that he was the victim of a sloppy and incomplete

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police investigation. Nevertheless, he suggested that an instruction on voluntary

manslaughter was appropriate because there was more than a scintilla of evidence to

support a finding of adequate provocation.

Additionally, defendant objected to language indicating that the jury should

consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter only if it first found that the state

failed to prove either first- or second-degree murder. In support, he cited Mullaney

v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), for the proposition that “the Due Process Clause

requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat

of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide

case.” Under this theory, defendant posited “that even if the jury finds that the

elements of first- or second-degree [murder] have been satisfied, they then can

proceed on to determine whether or not there was adequate provocation that would

negate the malice aforethought or the malice element of second- and first-degree

murder.” The defendant referred to his proposed instructions concerning

first-degree murder, which stated:2 “The state must also disprove beyond a

reasonable doubt that [defendant] did not act in the heat of passion under adequate

provocation.”

2
The defendant’s proposed instructions did not include an instruction on
second-degree murder.

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To this point, defendant requested that the jury be advised that, even if it finds

that the elements of first- or second-degree murder had been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, it also must consider “whether or not the State has negated any

provocation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt * * *.” The trial justice declined to

give defendant’s requested instructions, stating: “Rhode Island law is clear that

voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of a murder charge. It does not

require first that the State demonstrate a murder charge and then disprove a

lesser-included offense.”

On appeal, defendant submits that the trial justice erred in “giving an

instruction that did not allow the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter unless it

first found that the state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either first- or

second-degree murder.” According to defendant, “[t]he jury was not permitted to

consider whether the specific intent to kill had been negated by heat of passion,

which would have reduced the crime of murder to one of voluntary manslaughter.”

We disagree.

The trial justice clearly instructed the jurors that they “must consider these

instructions in their entirety.” She also emphasized on several occasions, in words

to the effect, that:

“[T]he burden at all times is on the State of Rhode Island
to prove to you with competent, credible evidence that this
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
defendant never has to prove his innocence. Therefore, if

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the State fails to establish each and every fact essential to
the defendant’s guilt of a crime charged because the
testimony in support of such element does not satisfy you
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant not guilty on that charge.”

Further, the trial justice informed the jurors that they may “infer a defendant’s

intent or state of mind from all of the surrounding circumstances [and] may consider

any statement made or acts done by [defendant] and all other facts and circumstances

in evidence which may indicate to you the defendant’s intent or state of mind.”

Finally, the trial justice explained the elements of the specific charges against

defendant, defining such terms as “malice,” “premeditation,” “willfully,” and

“malice aforethought.” Significantly, she instructed the jury that if the state proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had caused the death of Andrei Bonilla

with malice aforethought but failed to prove premeditation, then it should find

defendant not guilty of first-degree murder and proceed to consider the

lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Similarly, if the state failed to

prove any of the elements of second-degree murder, the jury should “take up and

consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.”

The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the jury instructions did not allow

the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter unless it first found that the state had

failed to prove either first- or second-degree murder. His argument rests upon two

theories, neither of which we deem persuasive.

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First, citing to State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I. 1987), and State v.

Correra, 430 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 1981), as his principal authorities, defendant maintains

that the jury instructions are in error as a matter of Rhode Island common law.

Second, he posits that the instructions offend principles of due process under the

teachings of Mullaney.

Although it is true that the trial justice instructed the jurors that they could not

consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter unless the state had failed to prove

first- and second-degree murder, she never advised them that they could not consider

the heat of passion mitigating factors in their deliberations on the two murder

charges. Viewing the instructions in their entirety, as both the jury and we must, we

are of the opinion that the trial justice thoroughly explicated the criminal act of

voluntary manslaughter. As it pertained to the evidence in the instant case, she

explained:

“One, there must have been an adequate provocation for
the shooting; two, the shooting must have occurred in the
heat of passion; three, it must have been a sudden heat of
passion, that is, the shooting must have followed the
provocation before there was a reasonable opportunity for
the passion to cool; and, four, there must have been a
causal connection between the provocation, the passion,
and the fatal act.”

The trial justice then went on to define a few terms including “heat of

passion”—“it must be enough that he acted as a result of passion rather than reason.

Heat of passion may include anger, terror, or fear.” Armed with this information,

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the jury considered the crimes of first- and second-degree murder, ultimately

concluding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had

committed second-degree murder. At no point in her instructions did the trial justice

preclude the jury from considering whether defendant had acted in the heat of

passion due to adequate provocation. Rather, she informed the jurors that they must

consider her instructions in their entirety. Specifically, with respect to the issue of

intent, she said: “You should consider all of the circumstances in evidence that you

think are relevant in determining whether the State has fulfilled its burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent or state

of mind.”

As to the crime of second-degree murder (for which defendant was in fact

convicted), the trial justice explained that it was a willful killing committed with

malice, but when “a person’s conscious intent or design to kill existed only

momentarily or fleetingly, before he committed the fatal act * * *.” She further

defined malice as an essential element of first- or second-degree murder that, inter

alia, can arise from an express intent to kill or be implied from “wanton recklessness

and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life.”

The defendant takes primary issue with the following instruction: “If you find

the State has failed to prove * * * beyond a reasonable doubt the crime of murder,

either in the first degree or the second degree, you should then take up and consider

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the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.” Because of that instruction, defendant

argues that the “jury was not permitted to consider whether the specific intent to kill

had been negated by heat of passion, which would have reduced the crime of murder

to one of voluntary manslaughter.”

It is certainly true that the trial justice methodically instructed the jury to

consider three homicidal offenses in descending order of severity—first-degree

murder first; then, if the state failed to prove all of its elements, the lesser-included

offense of second-degree murder; and if the state failed to prove second-degree

murder, then the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Yet the jury

was never prevented from considering the evidence that may have supported a

finding of voluntary manslaughter. The jurors were specifically told that “voluntary

manslaughter is an intentional homicide that does not include the element of malice

aforethought by reason of one or more mitigating factors. Such mitigating factors

include the heat of passion that arises out of adequate provocation.” Thus, the

concern expressed in Hockenhull that “a jury may erroneously convict a criminal

defendant of the principal offense charged, despite the prosecution’s inability to

prove an element of that offense, when the jury is convinced that the defendant’s

conduct was criminal” was significantly reduced. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 930.

Here, the jury was aware that voluntary manslaughter was in play as a possible

alternative to the murder offenses. It had been instructed that adequate provocation

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“must be of a nature such that it would inflame the passion of a reasonable person in

similar circumstances causing that reasonable person to act for the moment from

passion rather than reason, that is, tending for the moment to cause a reasonable

person to lose self-control.” Having been instructed that “voluntary manslaughter is

an intentional homicide that does not include the element of malice aforethought by

reason of one or more mitigating factors,” the jury nevertheless returned a verdict of

guilty on second-degree murder, thereby finding beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant harbored a specific intent to kill, albeit of only a momentary duration. In

other words, the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted

with malice.

Having done so, the state necessarily disproved beyond a reasonable doubt

that defendant acted in a heat of passion upon adequate provocation. Malice and

heat of passion signify two contrary states of mind. To kill with malice, one must

act with deliberation. In second-degree murder the deliberation is only momentary;

nevertheless, the intent to kill must be formed before the killing itself. See State v.

Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 88-89 (R.I. 2013).

Heat of passion, however, requires a loss of self-control. The fatal act is

committed out of passion rather than reason. “Malice and heat of passion are

mutually exclusive; malice excludes passion, and passion presupposes the absence

of malice.” Dandridge v. Commonwealth, 852 S.E.2d 488, 493 (Va. Ct. App. 2021)

- 15 -
(quoting Canipe v. Commonwealth, 491 S.E.2d 747, 753 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)). By

proving the existence of the former beyond a reasonable doubt, the state necessarily

disproved the existence of the latter beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.

Hinrichsen, 877 N.W.2d 211, 227 (Neb. 2016).

“In determining the correctness of a jury charge, ‘we determine how a jury

composed of ordinarily intelligent persons listening to that instruction at the close of

trial would have [interpreted] the instructions as a whole.’” State v. Parkhurst, 706

A.2d 412, 418 (R.I. 1998) (quoting State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1262 (R.I.

1981)). Viewing the instructions in their entirety, we are satisfied that they

adequately explained the relevant law and were appropriate. Notwithstanding the

fact that neither defendant nor the state advocated for a finding of voluntary

manslaughter, the trial justice determined that such a charge was warranted. See

State v. Esdel, 317 A.3d 756, 766 (R.I. 2024) (“[I]n determining whether the

evidence calls for a lesser-included-offense instruction, the trial justice should * * *

consider whether, at the very least, some minimal evidence exists that, if credited by

the jury, could support a conviction for the lesser-included offense.”) (quoting State

v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 414 (R.I. 2008) (emphasis omitted)). We perceive no error

in the instructions given, nor in the order in which the jury was to consider each

individual charge. The crime of voluntary manslaughter committed in the heat of

passion upon adequate provocation was explained to the jury. Similar to the

- 16 -
Hinrichsen case, “[w]hen [the jury] decided beyond a reasonable doubt that [the

defendant] killed with deliberate and premeditated malice, it necessarily also

decided beyond a reasonable doubt that the converse was true—i.e., his actions were

not the result of a sudden quarrel, done rashly, without due deliberation and

reflection.” Hinrichsen, 877 N.W.2d at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Most significantly, the trial justice instructed the jurors, clearly and on multiple

occasions, that the state bore the burden to prove the elements of each offense

beyond a reasonable doubt:

“[T]he burden at all times is on the State of Rhode Island
to prove to you with competent, credible evidence that this
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
defendant never has to prove his innocence. Therefore, if
the State fails to establish each and every fact essential to
the defendant’s guilt of a crime charged because the
testimony in support of such element does not satisfy you
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant not guilty on that charge.

“* * *

“You should consider all of the circumstances in evidence
that you think are relevant in determining whether the
State has fulfilled its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the
required intent or state of mind.”

Considering the jury instructions in their entirety, as this Court is compelled

to do, we hold that the trial justice adequately described the law, so that a lay jury of

ordinary intelligence would have understood it. See Isom, 251 A.3d at 6 (“This Court

- 17 -
will not examine a single sentence apart from the rest of the instructions, but rather

the challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were

rendered.”) (quoting Ros, 973 A.2d at 1166).

The trial justice explained all elements required to prove voluntary

manslaughter, including what factors, such as heat of passion from adequate

provocation, can mitigate the malice aforethought required to commit first-degree or

second-degree murder. When taken with the rest of the jury instructions, it is clear

that a lay jury of ordinary intelligence would understand that if they found that

defendant had not acted with malice, he could not be found guilty of either first- or

second-degree murder. It is within the province of the jury alone to make that

determination based upon their findings of fact. See Joplin v. Cassin, 252 A.3d 271,

281-82 (R.I. 2021) (“It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It

weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of

witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the

facts.”) (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)).

Accordingly, we find that the jury was not misled by the trial justice’s instructions

and a reversal is not warranted.

Additionally, we are of the opinion that defendant’s reliance on Mullaney is

flawed. On appeal, defendant maintains that Mullaney “requires that the prosecution

‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden

- 18 -
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.’” (Quoting

Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704.) Further, defendant argues that “[t]his Court has long

since adopted the holding in Mullaney[,]” citing to State v. McGehearty, 121 R.I.

55, 394 A.2d 1348 (1978), and State v. Smith, 121 R.I. 495, 401 A.2d 41 (1979).

These cases are markedly different from the case at bar, however. In

McGehearty, the issue before the Court was whether or not the properly proffered

affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication warranted a jury instruction on the

prosecution’s burden to prove “that defendant was not so intoxicated as to be unable

to harbor a specific intention to steal.” McGehearty, 121 R.I. at 60, 394 A.2d at 1351.

Similarly, as the state points out on appeal, Smith deals with an affirmative defense

issue where “the State merely conceded that it was the ‘state’s burden to prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was not so intoxicated as to be unable to

harbor a specific intention to kill.’” (Quoting Smith, 121 R.I. at 496, 401 A.2d at 41.)

Once again, that was a case involving an affirmative defense and was therefore

distinct from the case at bar. In the case before us, the trial justice clearly instructed

the jury that the state bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the

elements of the enumerated offenses.

We now turn to the Supreme Court of the United States’ own interpretation

of Mullaney. Two years after the publication of Mullaney, the Supreme Court

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“sharply limited”3 the decision’s potential reach in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.

197 (1977). The Supreme Court recalled that, in Mullaney, “[m]alice, as the statute

[in question] indicated and as the court instructed, could be implied and was to be

implied from ‘any deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another

suddenly * * * or without a considerable provocation,’ in which event an intentional

killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the evidence it was shown that the

act was committed ‘in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation.’” Patterson, 432

U.S. at 212. The Supreme Court further clarified that “Mullaney surely held that a

State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that

it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient

upon proof of the other elements of the offense.” Id. at 215 (emphasis added). The

Supreme Court went on to explain that, in Mullaney, “malice, i.e., lack of

provocation, was presumed and could be rebutted by the defendant only by proving

by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden

provocation. * * * [H]owever traditional this mode of proceeding might have been,

it is contrary to the Due Process Clause * * *.” Id. at 216.

As the state points out, however, the Mullaney trial court “instructed the jury

that ‘if the prosecution established the homicide was both intentional and unlawful,

malice aforethought (murder) was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant

3
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 94 (1977).

- 20 -
proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion

on sudden provocation’ * * *.” (Quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 (emphasis

added).) This presumption is what did not comport with the Due Process Clause,

because the state bears the burden to prove each element of the charged crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Haffner, 242 A.3d 468, 476 (R.I. 2020).

In the case at bar, no such presumptions were made. As discussed supra, the trial

justice repeatedly reminded the jury that the state bore the burden to prove each of

the elements of each of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point

was the burden of proof shifted to the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant’s

reliance on Mullaney is misplaced.

IV

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of conviction of the

Superior Court. The papers in this case may be remanded to that tribunal.

Justice Robinson did not participate.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Andrew Mangru.

No. 2023-368-C.A.
(P1/21-3503AG)
Case Number
No. 2023-369-C.A.
(P2/22-646ADV)

Date Opinion Filed July 15, 2025

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers

For State:

Sean P. Malloy
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Petitioner:

Megan F. Jackson
Rhode Island Public Defender