State v. Andrew McLean

Supreme Court

No. 2024-48-C.A.
(P1/15-3840AG)

State :

v. :

Andrew McLean. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
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Supreme Court

No. 2024-48-C.A.
(P1/15-3840AG)

State :

v. :

Andrew McLean. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Robinson, for the Court. The defendant, Andrew McLean, who is

self-represented, appeals to this Court from a Superior Court order that denied his

motion filed pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure

seeking to reduce his sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial

justice erred by failing to recuse himself from ruling on the Rule 35 motion and also

erred by denying the defendant’s Rule 35 motion itself.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

summarily decided. After considering the written and oral submissions of the parties

and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown

and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument.

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
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I

Facts and Travel

On November 24, 2015, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on charges of

first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence,

assault with a dangerous weapon, and two charges of possessing pistols without

licenses.

Eventually, defendant and the state reached agreement as to what the “cap”

on defendant’s eventual sentence would be if he were to plead guilty to the charges

of first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence,

assault with a dangerous weapon, and possessing a pistol without a license. Pursuant

to that agreement, there would be a maximum sentence of eighty years with fifty

years to serve, twenty of which would be “nonparolable,” and a thirty-year

suspended sentence.

Thereafter, defendant did plead guilty to those charges, as is reflected on a

form entitled “Request to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere or Guilty.” The trial justice

had voiced no objection to the above-referenced agreement between defendant and

the state; and, on June 10, 2019, he signed an order accepting defendant’s plea of

guilty to the charges specified in the preceding paragraph. On August 1, 2019, the

trial justice entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to a term of

twenty years; a concurrent term of ten years; a consecutive term of twenty years, to

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be served without the possibility of parole; a consecutive suspended sentence of

twenty years; and a concurrent suspended sentence of ten years.

On November 5, 2019, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to reduce

his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. The state filed a timely objection to that motion,

asserting that defendant had forfeited his right to file a Rule 35 motion at the time of

his guilty plea.1 On February 10, 2020, defendant’s motion was heard by the same

justice as had entered defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him. At that hearing,

defendant contended that, at the time of sentencing, the justice had “misconceived

what was material evidence” and had “made adverse inferences against [him].” The

defendant further contended that the trial justice “failed to consider mitigating

factors,” namely defendant’s diminished mental capacity and his role in the

underlying crimes.

In addition to arguing that defendant had waived his right to file a Rule 35

motion, the state also contended that the agreed-upon facts were summarized by the

trial justice at the sentencing hearing. The state also argued that, at the time of

1
We have decided in this instance to address defendant’s substantive
contentions set forth in his motion filed pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure in spite of the fact that, as a condition of his written
plea agreement, he agreed not to file a Rule 35 motion. See State v. Roman, — A.3d
—, — (R.I. 2025), No. 2024-78-C.A., 2025 WL 1646116, at *4 (R.I. June 11, 2025).
(“This Court does not view the fact that the defendant placed a checkmark next to
that particular provision on the plea form as dispositive of the issue presented in this
case.”).
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sentencing, the trial justice had properly considered any mitigating circumstances

and “went through each [sentencing] factor and determined an appropriate

sentence.”

The trial justice noted that a defendant seeking a reduction of his or her

sentence “shoulders a heavy burden to persuade the trial court to decrease a

sentence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He went on to state that defendant’s

“suggestion that I misconceived or overlooked all manner of evidence favorable to

[defendant] is entirely misplaced, without even a patina of plausibility.” Ultimately,

the trial justice found that there were “insufficient grounds for relief,” and he denied

defendant’s Rule 35 motion. An order to that effect was entered on January 25,

2024, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

Issues on Appeal

The first issue to be addressed is defendant’s contention that the trial justice

should have recused himself from hearing defendant’s Rule 35 motion. The second

issue is defendant’s challenge to the denial of the Rule 35 motion itself; he contends

that, in sentencing him, the trial justice “materially misconceived evidence, failed to

properly consider sentencing factors, and did not properly consider the mitigating

substance of the [defendant]’s competency.”

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III

The Recusal Issue

It is well established that “judicial officers are duty-bound to recuse

themselves if they are unable to render a fair or an impartial decision in a particular

case.” Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit

Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999). “At the same time, * * * justices have

an equally great obligation not to disqualify themselves when there is no sound

reason to do so.” Ryan, 941 A.2d at 185 (emphasis in original). In order to

demonstrate that recusal is called for, a party “must establish affirmatively that the

trial justice had personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled

opinion of a character calculated to impair his impartiality seriously and to sway his

judgment.” Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608, 621, 375 A.2d 911, 917 (1977).

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice should have recused

himself from hearing his Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence. He contends that

the trial justice “materially misconceived evidence” and that he “failed to properly

consider sentencing factors.” It is defendant’s contention that the trial justice lacked

impartiality due to the justice’s previous interactions with him. He contends that the

trial justice had previously made adverse comments about him and that the trial

justice had “laid * * * the ground work to deny the * * * Rule 35 motion * * *.” The

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defendant specifically points to comments made by the trial justice at the time of his

guilty plea. At that time, the trial justice stated that he wanted to ensure that

defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to the charges that were read at the

hearing. The trial justice stated as follows:

“I’m certainly not going to take a plea when you are
actually secretly harboring unto yourself and saying to
yourself, [‘y]ou know what, I’ll go through this charade,
but six months from now or a year from now or some other
time in the future, if I don’t like the sentence that [the trial
justice] gives me, I’m going to say I didn’t understand a
thing that was going on[.’] * * * If that’s what’s going on
in your mind, we’re not going to make any headway at
all.”

The state asserts that defendant “offers no support for his apparent contention

that a Superior Court justice who takes a defendant’s plea is obligated to sua sponte

recuse upon receipt of a motion to reduce sentence.” It contends that defendant’s

argument that the trial justice had “predetermined the outcome of the [Rule 35]

motion” was meritless and that the trial justice “had done exactly what was required

of him in accepting [defendant]’s plea.”

We understand the above-referenced comments by the trial justice to represent

his effort to ensure that defendant understood the conditions of his guilty plea.

Although defendant argues that those comments are of a nature that would require

recusal on the part of the trial justice, we fail to see any impropriety in the trial

justice’s statements made when he accepted defendant’s plea and when he sentenced

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him. It should further be noted that that trial justice ultimately sentenced defendant

to a term of imprisonment that was less than the maximum sentence that could have

been imposed in light of the crimes to which he pled guilty. Upon our review of the

record and these statements, it is our opinion that the trial justice did not demonstrate

prejudice or a personal bias against defendant and that his decision not to recuse

himself from hearing defendant’s Rule 35 motion was proper. See Mattatall v. State,

947 A.2d 896, 903 (R.I. 2008); Cavanagh, 118 R.I. at 621, 375 A.2d at 917.

IV

The Rule 35 Issue

With respect to Rule 35 motions, “[t]his Court follows a strong policy against

interfering with a trial justice’s discretion in sentencing matters.” State v. Davis, 295

A.3d 65, 67 (R.I. 2023) (quoting State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288, 1292-93 (R.I.

2019)). It follows that “this Court’s review of a trial justice’s decision on a Rule 35

motion is extremely limited.” Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1293 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Such a “motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice,

who may grant it if he or she decides on reflection or on the basis of changed

circumstances that the sentence originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly

severe.” State v. Ruffner, 5 A.3d 864, 867 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Mendoza,

958 A.2d 1159, 1161 (R.I. 2008)).

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The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying his Rule 35

motion. It is his contention that the trial justice misconceived material evidence

relative to his diminished mental capacity and his role in the underlying crimes. The

defendant submits that this resulted in the trial justice’s imposition of a harsher

sentence than was appropriate under the facts of this case.

For its part, the state contends that defendant “entered a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary guilty plea,” and it notes that “[h]e admitted that the * * * facts were

true and [that he] understood the potential sentence.” The state further contends that

the trial justice appropriately weighed the evidence and mitigating factors when

sentencing defendant to a term of imprisonment that was less than the “cap” on the

sentence which was agreed to in defendant’s guilty plea.

This Court has stated that a Rule 35 motion is “essentially a plea for leniency.”

State v. Farooq, 115 A.3d 961, 964 (R.I. 2015) (mem.) (quoting Ruffner, 5 A.3d at

867).2 While a trial justice must “consider[] a number of factors when determining

a fair sentence,” it is within his or her discretion to assess if any of those factors

warrant a reduction in a defendant’s sentence. Ruffner, 5 A.3d at 867; see Davis, 295

A.3d at 67. We are “loath[] to interfere with a trial justice’s discretionary resolution

of a Rule 35 motion except in the rarest of cases when the sentence is without

2
Pursuant to Rule 35, the court may correct or reduce (1) an illegal sentence;
(2) a sentence imposed in an illegal manner; and (3) any sentence when a motion is
filed within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.
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justification.” Mendoza, 958 A.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Smith, 676 A.2d 765,

767 (R.I. 1996)).

In the case at bar, the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory

maximum for the crimes to which he pled guilty, and his sentence was below the

sentencing cap that he agreed to when submitting his guilty plea. See State v. Chase,

9 A.3d 1248, 1255 (R.I. 2010) (holding that the trial justice did not err in his denial

of a defendant’s Rule 35 motion where the defendant had been sentenced “in accord

with a plea bargain”). It is noteworthy that the trial justice stated at the Rule 35

hearing that he had “painstakingly reviewed every document, every report, and every

medical and psychiatric study related to [defendant]” and that he considered all of

those factors when sentencing the defendant. Upon careful review of the trial

justice’s decision denying the defendant’s Rule 35 motion, we perceive no abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial justice.

V

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

The record may be returned to that tribunal.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Andrew McLean.

No. 2024-48-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/15-3840AG)

Date Opinion Filed July 2, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

For State:

Brendan P. Sullivan
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:

Andrew McLean, pro se