S058081, Opinion — Hopkins v. SAIF

348
Argued and submitted September 13, decision of Court of Appeals and order of
Workers' Compensation Board affirmed December 9, 2010
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Barbara L. Hopkins, Claimant.
Barbara L. HOPKINS,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION
and Nyssa Gardens Adult Alternative Living,
Respondents on Review.
(WC 0407794; CAA138825; SC 8058081)
245 P3d 90

Cite as 349 Or 348
CJS, Workmen's Compensation§ 555(17).
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
R. Adian Martin, Ransom, Gilbertson, Martin, & Ratliff,
LLP, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review.
David L. Runner, Appellate Counsel, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Balmer, Walters, and Kistler, Justices.**
WALTERS,J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
Workers' Compensation Board are affirmed.
* On judicial review from an order of the Workers' Compensation Board. 232
Or App 439, 222P3d1140 (2009).
** Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

350 	Hopkins v. SAIF
WALTERS,J.
This 	case 	requires 	that 	we 	determine 	the leg-
islature's 	meaning 	of 	the 	term 	"arthritis" 	in 	ORS
656.005(24)(a)(A). We conclude that, in defining preexisting
conditions for workers' compensation claims, the legislature
intended the term "arthritis" to mean the inflammation of
one or more joints, due to infectious, metabolic, or constitu-
tional1 causes, and resulting in breakdown, degeneration, or
structural change. We also decide that the evidence in the
record was sufficient to permit the Workers' Compensation
Board (board) to find that, at the time of her work-related
injury, petitioner suffered from preexisting "arthritis" as we
define it. We therefore affirm the board's denial of peti-
tioner's claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Petitioner was a caretaker at an assisted-living facil-
ity. On May 3, 2004, petitioner was preparing medications for
the residents when she bent down to retrieve medication
from a drawer about eight inches from the ground. Petitioner
felt a sharp pain in her hip. When she stood again, her legs
felt numb and tingly. Shortly thereafter, petitioner's legs
became totally numb, and she was unable to move them.
Petitioner was transported by ambulance to the hospital and
the next day received an MRI of her thoracic spine, which
revealed disc herniations. Dr. Hajjar, a neurosurgeon, per-
formed multiple laminectomies, discectomies, and fusions on
petitioner's thoracic spine. Today, petitioner is paraplegic.
Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim for
her thoracic spine condition on May 5, 2004, and respondent
denied the claim on August 17, 2004. At the hearing on peti-
tioner's claim, 2 an administrative law judge (ALJ) considered
1 Although the term "constitutional" generally is used in judicial opinions to
mean of or pertaining to the Oregon or United States constitutions, we use that
term in this opinion to mean of or pertaining to the structure of the body. See
Webster's Third New Int'/ Dictionary 486 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining "consti-
tutional" as "having to do with, inherent in, or affecting the constitution or struc-
ture of body or mind").
2 ORS 656.283 provides that "any party or the Director of the Department of
Consumer and Business Services may at any time request a hearing on any matter
concerning a claim," and further provides procedures for that hearing.

Cite as 349 Or 348
both whether petitioner had suffered a compensable work-
related injury and whether she suffered from "arthritis."
Under ORS 656.266(1), a worker has the burden of
proving that he or she has suffered a "compensable injury." 3
To establish a "compensable injury," the worker must prove
that a work-related injury is a material contributing cause of
a disability or need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a); ORS
656.245(1)(a) ("For every compensable injury, the insurer
* * * shall cause to be provided medical services for condi-
tions caused in material part by the injury." (Emphasis
added.)). See SAIF u. Sprague, 346 Or 661, 663-64, 217 P3d
644 (2009) (discussing standards for showing injuries in
workers' compensation cases); Albany General Hospital v.
Gasparino, 113 Or App 411, 415, 833 P2d 1292 (1992) (dis-
cussing legislative history and concluding major contributing
cause standard not intended "to supplant the material con-
tributing cause test for every industrial injury claim"). If a
compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition to
cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the
combined condition is compensable only if the compensable
injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or
need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). In that instance,
3 ORS 656.266(1) provides, in part, that
"[t]he burden of proving that an injury or occupational disease is compensable
and of proving the nature and extent of any disability resulting therefrom is
upon the worker."
ORS 656.005(7)(a} provides the definition for "compensable injury":
"A 'compensable injury' is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to pros-
thetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring
medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the
result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is estab-
lished by medical evidence supported by objective findings, subject to the fol-
lowing limitations:
"(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensa-
ble injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the
consequential condition.
"(B) If an otherwise compensable injury combines at any time with a pre-
existing condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the
combined condition is compensable only if, so long as and to the extent that the
otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability
of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treat-
ment of the combined condition."

the employer, not the worker, shoulders the burden of estab-
lishing that the worker has a preexisting condition and that
the compensable injury is not the major contributing cause of
the disability or need for treatment. ORS 656.266(2)(a). 4 To
establish a preexisting condition, the employer must demon-
strate that the claimant "has been diagnosed with such con-
dition, or has obtained medical services for the symptoms of
the condition," or suffers from "arthritis or an arthritic con-
dition." ORS 656.005(24)(a)(A). 5 Thus, by proving that a
claimant suffers from preexisting "arthritis," 6 an employer is
relieved of the burden of establishing that that condition was
diagnosed or treated prior to the work-related injury.
In this case, the ALT understood, based on previous
board opinions, that both the meaning of the statutory term
"arthritis" and whether petitioner suffered from that condi-
tion were to be "determined by medical evidence on a case by
case basis. Adam M. Karjalainen, 57 Van Natta 172, 173
(2005)." With regard to the first issue-the meaning of
"arthritis"-petitioner's 	treating 	neurosurgeon, 	Ha.ijar,
opined that "arthritis" is a condition "which primarily is
caused by wear and tear, degeneration and erosion, of mobile
joints in the body." As to the second issue-whether peti-
tioner 	suffered 	from 	arthritis-Hajjar 	testified 	that,
although petitioner suffered from degenerative disc disease,
1 ORS 656.266(2)(a) provides:
"Once the worker establishes an otherwise compensable injury, the
employer shall bear the burden of proof to establish the otherwise compensable
injury is not, or is no longer, the major contributing cause of the disability of
the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treat-
ment of the combined condition."
5 ORS 656.005(24)(a) provides, in part:
"'Preexisting condition' means, for all industrial injury claims, any injury,
disease, congenital abnormality, personality disorder or similar condition that
contributes to disability or need for treatment, provided that:
"(A) Except for claims in which a preexisting condition is arthritis or an
arthritic condition, the worker has been diagnosed with such condition, or has
obtained medical services for the symptoms of the condition regardless of
diagnosis[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
6 Because we determine that petitioner in this case suffered from "arthritis,"
we do not need to determine whether she suffered from an "arthritic condition,"
and we are not called upon to define that term. For simplicity, we apply only the
statutory term "arthritis."

Cite as 349 Or 348 (2010) 	353
her need for treatment arose from the work-related injury to
her spine.
Respondent's medical experts also testified about
both issues. Dr. Warnock, a radiologist, testified that, "if one
assumes the intervertebral discs to be joints, as many do,
then there's an arthritic condition." Dr. Parsons, a neuro-
surgeon, opined that petitioner's thoracic spine condition was
"arthritis" because it was age-related and progressive over
time. Parsons considered the intervertebral disc a cartilagi-
nous body and testified that the erosion of such cartilage
comes within the definition of"arthritis." Dr. Carr, an ortho-
pedic surgeon, explained that the intervertebral disc is made
up of structures similar to articular cartilage and that degen-
erative disc disease met the definition of"arthritis" because it
"involved an inflammatory process or a degenerative condi-
tion of a soft tissue interface between two movable bones."
Two other experts, Dr. Rosenbaum, a neurosurgeon, and
Dr. Young, a radiologist, simply opined that petitioner's con-
dition met the definition of "arthritis."
The ALJ found the testimony ofrespondent's experts
more persuasive and concluded that petitioner had pre-
existing "arthritis" and that the employer had met its burden
to establish that petitioner's otherwise compensable injury
was not the major contributing cause of her disability or need
for treatment of a combined condition. The ALJ therefore
entered an order denying petitioner's claim.
Petitioner appealed to the board, pursuant to ORS
656.295(1).7 The board affirmed the ALJ's order, and peti-
tioner sought review by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
7 ORS 656.295(1) provides:
"The request for review by the Workers' Compensation Board of an order of
an Administrative Law Judge need only state that the party requests review of
the order."
Such review allows the board to
"affirm, reverse, modify or supplement the order of the Administrative Law
Judge and make such disposition of the case as it determines to be
appropriate."
ORS 656.295(6).

ORS 656.298(1). 8 The Court of Appeals vacated the board's
decision and remanded it for reconsideration in light of its
opinion in Karjalainen u. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc.,
208 Or App 674, 146 P3d 336 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 473, 155
P3d 51 (2007). Hopkins u. SAIF, 215 Or App 356, 168 P3d
1259 (2007). In Karjalainen, the Court of Appeals had held
that the statutory term "arthritis" has a fixed legal meaning:
an "inflammation of one or more joints due to infectious, met-
abolic, or constitutional causes[.]" 208 Or App at 682 (quoting
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 123 (unabridged ed
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
On remand, the board decided that the record estab-
lished that petitioner suffered from "inflammation of ajoint" 9
and, therefore, that she suffered from "arthritis." The board
found that the testimony of respondent's expert, Carr, was
more "fully explained and more persuasive" than that of peti-
tioner's expert, Hajjar. The board again affirmed the order of
theALJ.
Petitioner again sought review by the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the board's order without opinion.
Hopkins u. SAIF, 232 Or App 439, 222 P3d 1140 (2009). Peti-
tioner filed a petition for review in this court, asserting that
the term "arthritis" has a fixed legal meaning that is not
dependent on case-by-case expert testimony and that the cor-
rect legal meaning is "inflammation of one or more synovial
(freely articulating) joints causing a breakdown and eventual
loss of cartilage, due to infectious, metabolic, or constitu-
tional causes." The definition used by the board-"inflam-
mation of ajoint"-was so broad, petitioner contended, that it
would include acute injuries such as ankle sprains, whereas,
under the correct definition of "arthritis," petitioner's pre-
existing condition would not qualify. Intervertebral discs
s ORS 656.298(1) provides:
"Within the time limit specified in ORS 656.295, any party affected by an
order of the Workers' Compensation Board * * * may request judicial review of
the order by the Court of Appeals."
The board expressly decided that petitioner suffered from "inflammation of a
joint," but did not reach an express conclusion that that inflammation was due to
"infectious, metabolic, or constitutional causes." Barbara L. Hopkins, 60 Van N atta
1034, 1038 (2008)

Cite as 349 Or 348 (2010) 	355
(where the inflammation in her spine is located), petitioner
asserted, are not mobile, or freely articulating, joints.
In its brief in this court, respondent agrees that the
term "arthritis" is a statutory term with a fixed legal meaning.
Respondent contends that the correct definition of "arthritis"
is that stated by the Court of Appeals in Karjalainen-
"inflammation of a joint due to infectious, metabolic, or con-
stitutional causes[.]" 208 Or App at 682 (quoting Webster's at
123) (internal quotation marks omitted). The causes required
by that definition, respondent asserts, eliminate the possibil-
ity that a sprained ankle could be considered "arthritis"
because those causes imply a disruption to "the integrity of
the joint and lead to degeneration over time."
Thus, the issue presented for our consideration is the
meaning of the statutory term "arthritis." We begin by con-
firming that the meaning of a statutory term is a matter of
law, not a question of fact for expert testimony. See Miller u.
Water Wonderland Improvement District, 326 Or 306, 309,
951 P2d 720 (1998) (meaning of statute presents question of
law). Whether one expert is more persuasive than another in
a particular case can be important in resolving a factual
question; it cannot, however, determine the legal meaning of
a statutory term.
We also think it helpful to note, preliminarily, that
the parties agree that the correct definition of the term
"arthritis" includes at least the following three elements,
which they take from standard and medical dictionary defi-
nitions: (1) inflammation of one or more joints, (2) due to
infectious, metabolic, or constitutional causes, and (3) result-
ing in breakdown, degeneration, or structural change. 10 The
10 In 2001, Webster's defined "arthritis" as follows:
"[I]nflammation of one or more joints due to infectious, metabolic, or constitu-
tional causes-compare DEGENERATIVE ARTHRITIS, GOUT, RHEUMATOID
ARTHRITIS."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 123 (unabridged ed 1993). Medical dictionar-
ies defined the term similarly:
"Inflammation of a joint or a state characterized by inflammation of joints."
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 149 (27th ed 2000).
"Inflammation of joints."
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 151 (29th ed 2000).

356 	Hopkins v. SAIF
parties disagree about whether the term "arthritis" must be
further limited to inflammation of mobile or freely articulat-
ing joints and refer us to the legislative history of the work-
ers' compensation statutes for assistance.
To identify the correct interpretation of a statutory
term, we begin by considering the meaning of that term and
the context in which the legislature used it. PGE u. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).
In this case, having considered the relevant definitions of the
term "arthritis," and the context in which it is used in the
workers' compensation statutes, it is obvious to us that, to
resolve the question presented, we also must consult the leg-
islative history that the parties proffer. See State u. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (court free to consider
legislative history even if statute's text not ambiguous). It is
to that source that we now turn.
The 	statutory 	provision that includes the 	term
"arthritis," ORS 656.005(24)(a)(A), was enacted in 2001. Or
Laws 2001, ch 865, § 1. The legislature had directed a
Management-Labor Advisory Committee (MLAC) composed
of six members, three representing management and three
representing labor, to reevaluate the workers' compensation
statutes and offer proposed amendments. One of the amend-
ments that the MLAC proposed was to the definition of
"preexisting condition." Before amendment, former 	ORS
656.005(24)(1999) provided:
"'Preexisting condition' means any injury, disease, con-
genital abnormality, personality disorder or similar condi-
tion that contributes or predisposes a worker to disability or
need for treatment and that precedes the onset of an initial
claim for an injury or occupational disease, or that precedes
a claim for worsening pursuant to ORS 656.273."
"ARTHRITIS refers to any condition of joints of the limbs or spine associated
with inflammatory or structural change. It is distinguished from arthralgia
which simply implies joint pain with or without any inflammatory or struc-
tural change. The two main categories of arthritis are osteoarthritis, in which
the primary change is thought of as mechanical failure of articular cartilage,
and rheumatoid arthritis, in which the primary problem is a chronic
inflammation of the synovial lining, of joints, tendon sheaths and bursae.
* * * Spondarthritis refers to an inflammatory arthritis with involvement of
the spine and is often associated with the HLA B27 tissue type."
Black's Medical Dictionary 42 (39th ed 1999).

Cite as 349 Or
(Emphases added.) Under that provision, an employer could
establish that a worker had a preexisting condition by show-
ing that the worker had a condition that predisposed him or
her to disability or need for treatment and that that condition
preceded the work-related injury at issue.
Senate Bill (SB) 485 (2001) changed the definition of
"preexisting condition" to the following:
" 'Preexisting condition' means, for all industrial injury
claims, any injury, disease, congenital abnormality, person-
ality disorder or similar condition that contributes to disa-
bility or need for treatment, provided that:
"(A) Except for claims in which a preexisting condition
is arthritis or an arthritic condition, the worker has been
diagnosed with such condition, or has obtained medical
services for the symptoms of the condition regardless of
diagnosis[.]"
Under the amended definition, an employer could not estab-
lish a preexisting condition unless it proved either that the
worker previously had been diagnosed or treated for that con-
dition or that the condition was within the meaning of the
terms "arthritis" or "arthritic condition."
In written testimony, John Shilts, an MLAC mem-
ber, stated that the reason for the "arthritis" exception was
the "employer's desire to not be held responsible for condi-
tions that arise out of aging." Testimony, Senate Committee
on Business, Labor and Economic Development, SB 485,
Jan 31, 2001, Ex A at 3. When asked about the policy decision
underlying the arthritis exception, Shilts, testifying before
the House Committee on Business, Labor and Consumer
Affairs, responded that there was "a strong interest on the
management side, and labor agreed to this, to not pay for the
aging 	process." 	Tape 	Recording, 	House 	Committee 	on
Business, Labor, and Consumer Affairs, SB 485, May 15,
2001, Tape 114, Side B.
As a result of its significance, the meaning of the
term "arthritis" was quite a contentious topic. The original
draft of SB 485 contained the following definition of that
term:

358 	Hopkins v. SAIF
"For the purpose of this paragraph only, 'arthritis' or
'arthritic condition' means inflammation of a joint, usually
accompanied by pain, swelling and frequently, changes in
structure."
Bill 	File, 	Senate 	Committee 	on 	Business, 	Labor 	and
Economic Development, SB 485, Jan 25, 2001 (draft bill).
However, the MLAC members did not agree that that defi-
nition was appropriate and removed it from the bill. See
Testimony, 	Senate 	Committee 	on 	Business, 	Labor 	and
Economic Development, SB 485, Feb 21, 2001, Ex B at 1
(statement of John Shilts) ("There was controversy about the
definition as written."). When questioned about that deci-
sion, Shilts and fellow MLAC member J. L. Wilson indicated
that there already was case law that defined the term and
that the intention of the committee was that the existing law
discussing arthritis as a basis for the denial of claims would
remain unchanged. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on
Business, Labor and Economic Development, SB 485, Feb 21,
2001, Tape 32, Side B.
That assertion was repeated by management attor-
ney Jerry Keene, who testified that the Senate committee
had called on him to act as an observer of the MLAC process
and to create a thorough record of the legislative intent. Tape
Recording, 	Senate 	Committee 	on 	Business, 	Labor 	and
Economic Development, SB 485, Mar 14, 2001, Tape 49, Side
A. Keene testified that the MLAC left the meaning of the
term "arthritis" undefined "on purpose." He stated that work-
ers' compensation practitioners had an "idea or understand-
ing" of what those terms meant and that the bill did not
change that prior usage. There was no consensus, he stated,
to either restrict or expand that meaning. Tape Recording,
Senate 	Committee for 	Business, 	Labor, 	and 	Consumer
Affairs, SB 485, Mar 14, 2001, Tape 50, Side A. Keene also
predicted that, under a common-law approach, the board
eventually would supply a definition of those terms that
would be satisfactory. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on
Business, Labor and Economic Development, SB 485, Feb 21,
2001, Tape 33, Side B. According to Keene, the problem with
the definition that originally had been included in the pro-
posed 	amendment 	was 	that 	it 	was 	based 	on 	medical
dictionary definitions. Some MLAC members believed that

Cite as 349 Or 348 	359
those definitions were too narrow because they did not
account for the entire constellation of conditions that could be
considered "arthritic," whereas other members believed that
those definitions were too broad and that a symptomatic def-
inition was preferable. Id. But leaving the term undefined
also was problematic. Keene acknowledged that, at that
time, there was no one definition of "arthritis" in the case law
but, rather, "a trend." Id.
When the bill reached the Senate floor, Senator
Beyer said that he expected that judges would define the
term "arthritis" based on "experience and traditional usage."
Tape Recording, Senate Floor Proceedings, Mar 22, 2001,
Tape 93, Side B. Beyer predicted that the case law probably
would define "arthritis" to include such conditions as "degen-
erative joint disease" and other "compromises in the struc-
ture surrounding arthritic joints." Id.
Because those who testified before the legislature
when SB 485 was adopted indicated that existing case law
could give some meaning to the term "arthritis," we have
perused that case law, but find it, as Keene acknowledged we
would, less than definitive. The term "arthritis" had not been
used in the workers' compensation statutes before the enact-
ment of SB 485, and, as a result, no appellate court had had
occasion to interpret it. The most that it appears that either
appellate court had done was to describe how medical experts
had used the term "arthritis" in their diagnoses. In some
cases, experts associated arthritis with inflammation of the
joints. See, e.g., Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 103 Or App
508, 511, 798 P2d 265 (1990) (describing "low-grade inflam-
mation" and "changes * * * of osteoarthritis" as commonly
occurring conditions); Havice v. SAIF, 80 Or App 448, 450,
722 P2d 742 (1986) (describing arthritic condition as "swell-
ing in the joints" of claimant's hands); Wells v. Wells, 15 Or
App 507, 511, 516 P2d 480 (1973) (describing "arthritic swell-
ing'' of the hands). In others, experts linked the term "arthri-
tis" with the descriptor "degenerative." See, e.g., Kaspar v.
SAIF, 93 Or App 246, 250, 761 P2d 1345 (1988) (claimant's
"arthritis" included conditions of "spondylosis, osteoarthritis
and degenerative disc disease"); McHorse v. Portland General
Electric, 268 Or 323, 330, 521 P2d 315 (1974) (condition
described as "degenerative arthritis of the hip and spine");

360 	Hopkins v. SAIF
Russell v. Mount Hood Railroad Co., 267 Or 335, 338, 517
P2d 276 (1973) ("arthritis" described as "natural degenera-
tive changes * * * which exist because of age"); Stubbs v.
Mason, 252 Or 547, 549, 450 P2d 773 (1969) ("arthritis"
described as "chronic degenerative changes in the vertebra
and intervertebral disk of the neck"); Todd v. Occidental Life
Ins. Co., 208 Or 634, 639-40, 303 P2d 492 (1956) (describing
"arthritis" as including "deterioration or degeneration" of
bone and cartilage). And in still others, experts seemed to
assume that arthritis was distinct from degenerative disc dis-
ease. See, e.g., Worldmark The Club v. Travis, 161 Or App
644, 648, 984 P2d 898 (1999) (describing claimant's back con-
dition as "degenerative disc disease" and not arthritis);
Sheffield v. SAIF, 50 Or App 427, 429, 623 P2d 1082 (1981)
(diagnosing claimant with "arthritis and degenerative disc
disease").
Our review of the legislative history of SB 485 leads
us to conclude that the legislature amended the definition of
"preexisting condition" to implement a compromise that had
been reached between management and labor. That compro-
mise included a new requirement that, to establish a pre-
existing condition, an employer must establish that the con-
dition had been previously diagnosed or treated, but excluded
"arthritis" from that requirement. In doing so, the legislature
had an "idea" of the meaning of the term "arthritis" but also
knew that a compromise had not been reached on how to
define that term more precisely. Therefore, the legislature
intentionally left the word "arthritis" undefined and under-
stood that the task of defining it would be left to the common
law, the board, and the appellate courts.
With that understanding of the legislature's intent,
we conclude that we must proceed as follows. First, we must
identify the various definitions or usages that the term
"arthritis" had in 2001 and endeavor to identify their com-
mon elements. Those common or core elements would have
been considered essential to the 	definition of the term
"arthritis," and the legislature surely intended to include
them within its meaning. After identifying those common or
core elements, we will then consider the parties' arguments
that we interpret the term "arthritis" to include additional
elements or concepts.

Cite as 349 Or 348 (2010) 	361
In 2001, Webster's defined "arthritis" as follows:
"[I]nflammation of one or more joints due to infectious, met-
abolic, or constitutional causes-compare DEGENERATIVE
ARTHRITIS, GOUT, RHEUMATOID ARTHRITIS."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 123 (unabridged ed
1993). Medical dictionaries defined the term similarly:
"Inflammation of a joint or a state characterized by inflam-
mation of joints."
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 149 (27th ed 2000).
"Inflammation of joints."
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 151 (29th ed 2000).
"ARTHRITIS refers to any condition of joints of the limbs or
spine associated with inflammatory or structural change. It
is distinguished from arthralgia which simply implies joint
pain with or without any inflammatory or structural
change. The two main categories of arthritis are osteo-
arthritis, in which the primary change is thought of as
mechanical failure of articular cartilage, and rheumatoid
arthritis, in which the primary problem is a chronic inflam-
mation of the synovial lining, of joints, tendon sheaths and
bursae. * * * Spondarthritis refers to an inflammatory
arthritis with involvement of the spine and is often associ-
ated with the HLA B27 tissue type."
Black's Medical Dictionary 42 (39th ed 1999).
The definition in Webster's starts with a concept that
all parties to this case consider essential to the term "arthri-
tis": "inflammation of a joint." The medical dictionaries that
we have consulted include that concept as well. We also find
reference 	to inflammation in 	the 	appellate 	court cases
decided before 2001. We conclude that "inflammation of a
joint" is a core element of the meaning of the term "arthritis."
Webster's also includes, in its definition of"arthritis,"
the requirement that inflammation be "due to infectious,
metabolic, or constitutional causes." We agree with the par-
ties that those causes operate to exclude traumatic injury as
a cause of "arthritis" and that the legislature intended such

362 	Hopkins v. SAIF
an exclusion. Before enactment of SB 485, the term "preexist-
ing condition" applied to all conditions that preceded a work-
related injury and predisposed a worker to disability or need
for treatment. In enacting SB 485, the legislature required
that the worker have received prior diagnosis or treatment
for all predisposing conditions except "arthritis," presumably
because "arthritis" may occur slowly over time as a part of the
aging process and thus may not have been immediately diag-
nosed or treated. There is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the legislature intended to treat traumatically
inflicted inflammation of a joint, such as may occur when one
sprains an ankle, similarly. The appellate cases decided
before 2001 do not demonstrate that medical experts consid-
ered traumatically caused inflammation of a joint to be
"arthritis." We conclude that a core element of the definition
of "arthritis" is that inflammation of the joint occur over time
and that the Webster's definition requiring that the inflam-
mation of a joint result from "infectious, metabolic, or consti-
tutional causes" carries that concept.
Both parties suggest an additional element to a cor-
rect definition of "arthritis": that the condition results in
some breakdown, degeneration, or structural change. The
definition 	of 	"arthritis" 	in 	Black's 	Medical 	Dictionary
includes that concept:
"ARTHRITIS refers to any condition of joints of the limbs or
spine associated with inflammatory or strnctural change. It
is distinguished from arthralgia which simply implies joint
pain with or without any inflammatory or structural
change. * * *."
Black's Medical Dictionary 42 (39th ed 1999). Respondent
also finds 	that requirement in the Webster's 	definition,
explaining that the requirement that the inflammation of the
joints be caused by "infectious, metabolic, or constitutional
causes" means that the inflammation must "disrupt the
integrity of the joint and lead to its degeneration over time."
Expert testimony recounted in appellate cases decided before
SB 485 was enacted also referred to "arthritis" as "degenera-
tive." We conclude that a core element of the definition of
"arthritis" is that inflammation of a joint result in break-
down, degeneration, or structural change.

Cite as 349 Or 348 	363
Petitioner proffers another element to the definition
of "arthritis" for our consideration. She argues that that term
should be limited to inflammation of moveable, or what she
calls "freely articulating," joints. Petitioner asserts that the
facet joints of the back are freely articulating and can be
affected by arthritis, but that the intervertebral discs of the
spine are not and cannot. Petitioner bases that argument on
medical dictionary definitions, which, she asserts, "suggest
articular or mobile joints" as the usual site for "arthritis."
However, the definitions to which petitioner points us are
definitions 	of "osteoarthritis." 	See 	Dorland's 	Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 1333 (30th ed 2003) (defining "osteo-
arthritis" as "characterized by degeneration of the articular
cartilage, hypertrophy of bone at the margins, and changes in
the synovial membrane"); Stedman's Medical Dictionary
1107 (25th ed 1990) and 1388 (28th ed 2006) (defining
"osteoarthritis" as "characterized by erosion of articular
cartilage"). Perhaps petitioner is correct in her definition of
"osteoarthritis," 	but 	the 	legislature 	did 	not 	limit 	the
term "arthritis" to a particular form of "arthritis"-"osteo-
arthritis."
Petitioner also cites decisions of the board for the
proposition that the board does not consider intervertebral
discs to be joints. However, those cases merely demonstrate
that an employer must establish, by expert testimony, that a
claimant suffers from inflammation of whatever joint or
joints it contends are affected by the arthritic condition. See,
e.g., 	Terry 	L. 	George, 61 Van Natta 1539, 1542 (2009)
(arthritic condition not proved when medical expert asserted
claimant "did not have an 'inflammatory' arthritic back con-
dition"); Brett J. Cameron, 61 Van Natta 1515, 1518 (2009)
(arthritic condition not proved when record contains no evi-
dence of"either a joint or inflammation" but only conclusory
references to arthritic condition); Danny Kalaveras, 61 Van
Natta 964, 967 (2009) (arthritic condition not proved when
medical testimony described disc as "desiccated" or "dried up"
and not inflamed).
We do not agree with petitioner that the legislature
intended to limit "arthritis" to the inflammation of mobile
joints or to certain joints in the back and not to others. We

364 	Hopkins v. SAIF
cannot find that limitation in the definitions of "arthritis" in
use or in the appellate cases that had been decided in 2001.
Neither party proposes that we include other ele-
ments in the definition of the statutory term "arthritis," and
we decline to do so. We conclude that, when the legislature
adopted SB 485, it intended the term "arthritis" to mean the
inflammation of one or more joints, due to infectious, meta-
bolic, or constitutional causes, and resulting in breakdown,
degeneration, or structural change.
The question remains whether, given that definition,
the board erred in deciding that petitioner in this case suffers
from "arthritis." That depends, of course, on whether there is
substantial evidence in the record to support a conclusion
that petitioner has "arthritis" as we have now defined that
term. 	See 	ORS 656.298(7); ORS 183.482(8)(c);11 Erck 	u.
Brown Oldsmobile, 311 Or 519, 524, 815 P2d 1251 (1991)
(Court of Appeals and this court review agency decisions for
legal issues under standards set forth in ORS 183.482(7) and
(8)).
The board expressly concluded that the evidence in
the record was sufficient to establish that petitioner suffered
from 	the 	"inflammation of a joint"; the board 	did 	not
expressly conclude that the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish that that inflammation was due to infectious, metabolic,
or constitutional causes or that it resulted in breakdown,
degeneration, or structural change. However, respondent
presented substantial evidence that petitioner's condition
was a result of progressive degeneration that manifested in
the erosion of the intervertebral discs in her spine. Although
petitioner presented evidence from her treating neurologist
that the inflammation of her discs was not damage to a joint
and was caused by acute trauma, there was substantial evi-
dence to support a contrary conclusion. See SAIF u. Sprague,
11 ORS 656.298(7) provides that judicial review of Workers' Compensation
Board orders "shall be as provided in ORS 183.482(7) and (8)."
ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides:
"The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence
exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would
permit a reasonable person to make that finding."

Cite as 349 Or 348 (2010) 	365
346 Or 661, 67 4-75, 217 P3d 644 (2009) (affirming board deci-
sion when there was substantial evidence in record support-
ing board's factual findings). Consequently, the board did not
err in concluding that petitioner had preexisting "arthritis"
or in denying petitioner's claim for benefits. 12
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the Workers' Compensation Board are affirmed.
12 Having concluded that petitioner suffered from pre-existing "arthritis," the
board went on to consider whether respondent had established that petitioner's
workplace injury was not the major contributing cause of her disability or need for
treatment of the combined condition and concluded that it had. Petitioner does not
challenge that conclusion in this court.