S056910, Opinion — State v. McCullough

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Argued and submitted September 15, decision of Court of Appeals and judgment
of circuit court affirmed December 10, 2009

STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROY LEE MCCULLOUGH, JR.,
aka Roy Lee Mccullough, Sr.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 060834514; CA A134505; SC S056910)
220 P3d 1182

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CJS, Obstructing Justice or Governmental Administration § 3.

# En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals .*

Kenneth A. Kreuscher, Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services.

Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.

BALMER, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the circuit court are affirmed.

\* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Janice R. Wilson, Judge. 224
Or App 177, 197 P3d 1151 (2008).

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351-b

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# BALMER, J.

This case involves the construction of the statute
that defines the crime of hindering prosecution. That statute,
ORS 162.325(1), which we set out in full below, makes it ille-
gal to engage in certain acts intended "to hinder the appre-
hension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of a person
who has committed a crime punishable as a felony." The
question is whether ORS 162.325(1) can be applied to a
father (defendant) who provided money and an airline ticket
to his son (youth) so that youth could flee to the Philippines.
Youth had been on probation after he had been found within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for committing third-
degree assault. In anticipation of the possible revocation of
youth's probation for unacceptable behavior in his treatment
program, defendant sought to assist youth in fleeing the state
to avoid assignment to a juvenile correctional facility. A jury
subsequently convicted defendant of hindering prosecution.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed with-
out opinion. State v. Mccullough, 224 Or App 177, 197 P3d
1151 (2008). We allowed defendant's petition for review and
now conclude that ORS 162.325(1) applies when an individ-
ual interferes with the apprehension of a juvenile who has
been found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
engaging in conduct punishable as a felony.

The facts are undisputed. As previously noted,
defendant is youth's father. Youth was found to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court for engaging in conduct con-
stituting assault in the third degree, ORS 163.165, a Class C
felony. He was given probation and placed in a treatment
program. Later, youth violated his conditions of probation
when he was discharged from the treatment program for
behavioral problems. In response, youth's juvenile probation
officer scheduled a meeting with defendant and youth to dis-
cuss the possibility of placing youth in a juvenile correctional
facility. To avoid the possibility that his son might be sent to
such a facility, defendant formulated a plan to send him to
the Philippines to live with defendant's wife (youth's step-
mother). Accordingly, defendant made an airline reservation
for youth and assisted youth in obtaining an expedited pass-
port. Defendant also gave youth traveling money and drove
him to the airport. The probation officer, suspecting that

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defendant might assist youth in fleeing the jurisdiction, had
notified Port of Portland police. The probation officer also
sought and obtained a felony arrest warrant for youth. Police
later took defendant and youth into custody at the airport
when youth attempted to check in for his flight.

Defendant was charged with hindering prosecution
under ORS 162.325(1), and the case was tried to a jury. At
the close of the state's evidence, defendant moved for a judg-
ment of acquittal, arguing that ORS 162.325(1) does not pro-
scribe assisting a juvenile offender in attempting to evade
juvenile court proceedings. In the alternative, defendant
argued that ORS 162.325(1) applies only to efforts to hinder
felony prosecutions but does not apply to the hindrance of
subsequent probation-violation proceedings. The trial court
denied the motion, and the jury convicted defendant of violat-
ing ORS 162.325(1). As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion. Defendant then filed a petition for review,
which we allowed.

ORS 162.325(1) provides:

"A person commits the crime of hindering prosecution if,
with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, con-
viction or punishment of a person who has committed a
crime punishable as a felony, or with the intent to assist a
person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony in
profiting or benefiting from the commission of the crime,
the person:

"(a) Harbors or conceals such person; or

"(b) Warns such person of impending discovery or
apprehension; or

"(c) Provides or aids in providing such person with
money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of
avoiding discovery or apprehension; or

"(d) Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimi-
dation or deception, anyone from performing an act which
might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person;
or

"(e) Suppresses by any act of concealment, alteration
or destruction physical evidence which might aid in the dis-
covery or apprehension of such person; or

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"(f) Aids such person in securing or protecting the pro-
ceeds of the crime."

It is undisputed that youth engaged in conduct described in
ORS 163.1651 as third-degree assault-a felony-and that,
as a result of that conduct, he was found to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. It also is undisputed that
defendant provided youth with money and transportation as
part of a plan to help youth flee the jurisdiction and avoid
possible incarceration in a juvenile correction facility as a
penalty for his probation violation. The only question is a
legal one, specifically, the meaning of the first paragraph of
ORS 162.325(1) and its application to the facts of this case.

It is helpful to review briefly the historical back-
ground of the crime of hindering prosecution. At common
law, the analogous crime was known as accessory after the
fact. Accessories after the fact, like accessories before the
fact, were punished according to the liability of the principal.
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
39 (1769). An accessory after the fact had to know of the com-
mission of the felony. Id. at 37. The accessory could be liable
for providing even minimal assistance to the felon. See id. at
37-38 ("[A]ny assistance whatever given to a felon, to hinder
his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment,
makes the assistor an accessory."). Also, one could not be an
accessory to a misdemeanor, only to a felony. Id. at 37.

Oregon's early criminal statutes largely followed the
common law, and the standard for liability was substantially
the same as at common law: "All persons who, after the com-
mission of any felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowl-
edge that he has committed a felony, and with intent that he
may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punish-
ment, are accessories." General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code,
ch LIII, § 692, p 573-74 (Deady 1845-1864). As was the case
at common law, one who assisted a person who had commit-
ted a misdemeanor could not be punished as an accessory.

1 ORS 163.165(1) provides, in part:

"A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if the person:

"(a) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to another by means of a
deadly or dangerous weapon[.]"

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Id. § 693, p 574. However, an accessory after the fact could be
indicted, tried, and punished, whether or not the principal
was indicted or tried. Id. at ch VIII, § 91, p 456-57. Oregon
further departed from the common law by providing a spe-
cific range of penalties rather than tying the accessory's pun-
ishment to the principal's punishment. Id. at ch LIII, § 694,
p 574. On the eve of the 1971 revision of Oregon's criminal
law, those principles had changed little. See former ORS
161.230 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432
(defining accessory); former ORS 161.240 (1969), repealed by
Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (describing punishment); former
ORS 161.250 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432
(accessory punishable even if principal not tried).2

ORS 162.325 was adopted as part of the 1971 revi-
sion of Oregon's criminal code and has not been amended
since. See Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 207 (adopting statute). The
1971 statute changed the description of the crime of assisting
a person who has committed a felony from its previous focus
on a principal/accessory relationship to the more general con-
cept of hindering the prosecution of another person. The revi-
sion replaced the requirement that assistance occur "after
the commission of any felony" with the requirement that the
person assisted be one "who has committed a crime punish-
able as a felony." And it changed the requirement that the
accessory have actual knowledge of the felony, instead
requiring proof of the aider's "intent to hinder" certain
aspects of the law enforcement process. Finally, the object of
the aider's intent was changed from helping the offender to
"avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment"
to "hinder[ing] the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment" of the offender.3

2 The changes from early statehood were merely stylistic. Compare General
Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch LIII, § 692, p 573-74 (Deady 1845-1864) ("All per-
sons who, after the commission of any felony, conceal or aid the offender, with
knowledge that he has committed a felony, and with intent that he may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, are accessories."), with former
ORS 161.230 (1969) ("All persons are accessories who, after the commission of any
felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowledge that he has committed a felony,
and with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or
punishment.").

\* The commentary to the 1971 criminal code revision characterizes the intent
element of what became ORS 162.325 in general terms as "intent to hinder law
enforcement." Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed
Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 207, 205 (July 1970).

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Having sketched some of the history of the elements
of the crime of hindering prosecution, we turn to defendant's
first argument-that ORS 162.325(1) does not apply to acts
undertaken to hinder juvenile proceedings, but applies only
to acts undertaken to hinder criminal proceedings. If the leg-
islature had intended ORS 162.325(1) to apply to juvenile
proceedings, defendant asserts, it easily could have identified
juvenile proceedings by use of an alternative phrase or word-
ing. Defendant argues that,

"if the legislature had wanted to capture the hindrance of
non-criminal juvenile matters, it would have used the
phrase 'official proceeding' (as it did in other contextual
statutes) or by writing [some reference to] juvenile proceed-
ings into the law (as it did in other governmental adminis-
tration offenses and as other states have done in their hin-
dering prosecution statutes)."

In addition, defendant argues that youth was not a "person
who has committed a crime," ORS 162.325(1), because the
law did not authorize a "sentence" of imprisonment for
youth's conduct, precisely because he was a youth. See ORS
419C.411 (juvenile adjudications authorize dispositions
rather than sentences). Finally, defendant argues that the
terms that the legislature used in describing the required
intent-or, at least the terms "prosecution," "conviction," and
"punishment"-describe events that take place in criminal
proceedings but not juvenile proceedings. Thus, he argues,
the legislature demonstrated its intent that the statute apply
only to the hindrance of criminal proceedings.

We begin by examining the wording of the hindering
prosecution statute. As noted, ORS 162.325(1) provides that
"[a] person commits the crime of hindering prosecution if,
with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, convic-
tion or punishment of a person who has committed a crime
punishable as a felony," the person engages in certain con-
duct. That key sentence first announces the subject matter of
the provision, and then states that the actor must possess the
intent to hinder particular actions that represent govern-
mental interests in criminal law enforcement, namely, "the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of a
person."

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Next, ORS 162.325(1) refers to "a person who has
committed a crime punishable as a felony." It appears that
with those words, the legislature intended to adopt the
common-law principle discussed above, which limits criminal
liability to situations where the actor assists someone who
has committed a crime more serious than a misdemeanor.
Significantly, the legislature did not use the past participle
"punished," which would have suggested a requirement that
the person whom the actor is aiding engage in conduct and
subsequently be subjected to felony punishment for that con-
duct. The legislature's use of the term "punishable" instead
makes it clear that actual prosecution or conviction is not an
element of the crime. Indeed, a separate statute provides, "It
is no defense to a prosecution for hindering prosecution * * *
that the principal offender is not apprehended, prosecuted,
convicted or punished." ORS 162.345. Hindering prosecution
is unlawful if the crime is punishable-i.e., capable of being
punished-as a felony.

Moreover, ORS 162.325(1) focuses not on whether
the person who committed the crime will be or has been pun-
ished for a felony, but on whether the crime is "punishable as
a felony." ORS 161.515(1), in turn, provides, "A crime is an
offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized."
(Emphasis added.) ORS 161.505 defines the term "offense" as
"conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to
a fine is provided by any law of this state * * * ," (emphasis
added), and "conduct" means an act (or omission) accompa-
nied by a mental state. ORS 161.085(4). Accordingly, Oregon
statutes define the word "crime" as an act or omission and its
accompanying mental state, for which a sentence of impris-
onment may be imposed. The legislature's focus on whether
the "crime" is punishable as a felony indicates that the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the particular conduct is "punishable
as a felony," not whether the person who engaged in that con-
duct is punishable as a felon. That conclusion is buttressed by
the statutory definition of the term "felony." Subject to cer-
tain exceptions, "a crime is a felony if it is so designated in
any statute of this state or if a person convicted under a stat-
ute of this state may be sentenced to a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than one year." ORS 161.525 (empha-
sis added). In other words, if a person engages in conduct that

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is classified, by statute, as a felony, that person commits "a
crime punishable as a felony," whether or not that person is
actually punished for committing a felony.

The general structure of the criminal code and the
juvenile code further support our conclusion that an individ-
ual "has committed a crime punishable as a felony" when he
or she engages in criminal conduct even if that individual
cannot be held criminally responsible. With rare exception,
the criminal code does not distinguish between adults and
juveniles in defining crimes.4 Instead, the criminal code pro-
hibits specific conduct along with an accompanying mental
state, regardless of age. See generally ORS chapters 161-67
(defining most crimes in terms of conduct by "persons,"
rather than persons over 18 years of age). When juveniles
commit crimes, however, the juvenile code provides for a dif-
ferent procedure for addressing that activity and imposing
consequences for it.5

Although juveniles, in certain circumstances, cannot
be held criminally responsible for their criminal conduct,
nothing in the juvenile code transforms the juvenile's conduct
from criminal to noncriminal.6 Indeed, one means by which a
juvenile comes within the jurisdiction of the court is pre-
cisely because the juvenile "has committed an act that is a
violation" of state law. ORS 419C.005(1). Although ORS
419C.005(1) also grants jurisdiction over juveniles who com-
mit acts "that if done by an adult would constitute a viola-
tion" of state law, that provision refers to the few crimes
described above where a juvenile cannot actually commit the

4 As noted, there are rare exceptions. See ORS 163.165(1)(h) (one method of
committing assault in the third degree is when a person 18 years or older inten-
tionally or knowingly causes physical injury to someone 10 years or younger); ORS
163.432 (online sexual corruption of a child requires that the actor be 18 years or
older); ORS 163.435 (contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor requires
that the actor be 18 years or older).

" In some cases, age may also be a defense to criminal conduct, See ORS
163.345 (age as a defense to certain crimes); ORS 161.290 (defense of lack of crim-
inal responsibility for crimes committed when an individual is under 12 years of
age).

" We emphasize that juvenile adjudications themselves are not the equivalent
of criminal proceedings. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or 560, 567-74,
857 P2d 560 (1993) (describing history and purpose of juvenile system). Nonethe-
less, the conduct of the juvenile remains criminal regardless of the ultimate
adjudication.

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crime because age is incorporated as an element. See note 4.
Thus, ORS 419C.005(1) expressly acknowledges that juve-
niles can commit not only acts that "would constitute" viola-
tions of state criminal law if committed by an adult; they also
can commit acts that are violations of state criminal law in
and of themselves. In other words, juveniles can engage in
conduct constituting a crime, even though they may not be
held criminally responsible in certain cases. Similarly, other
statutes in the juvenile code acknowledge that, although they
are subject to a different system of adjudication, juveniles can
commit crimes. See ORS 419C.001(1) (one purpose of juvenile
justice system is to prevent "further criminal activity" by
youths).

The function of the felony requirement in ORS
162.325(1), as suggested earlier, is to remove hindrance of
the prosecution of lesser crimes (such as misdemeanors) from
the scope of the statute. That function does not depend on
whether any particular offender is prosecuted, whether the
offender is prosecuted for a felony, or what punishment the
offender receives. Rather, the emphasis is on the conduct of
the offender. As noted previously, it is not a defense that the
principal offender has not been apprehended, prosecuted,
convicted, or punished. ORS 162.345. The offender's conduct
is still "punishable as a felony" even if it in fact was not pros-
ecuted or punished as one. We conclude that the phrase "a
person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony"
focuses on the offender's conduct-and, specifically, the seri-
ousness of the conduct-rather than on whether a particular
offender may be held liable for a criminal act. It thus is suffi-
cient here that youth engaged in conduct punishable as a fel-
ony, namely third-degree assault, for the state to satisfy the
elements of ORS 162.325(1).

As noted, however, defendant's principal argument
is based on the legislature's use of the words "apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment" in describing the req-
uisite intent. Those terms, defendant argues, describe events
in criminal proceedings, not those that occur in juvenile pro-
ceedings, and youth was the subject of a juvenile proceeding.
The use of those familiar terms of criminal procedure, he con-
tends, demonstrates a legislative intent that ORS 162.325(1)
should apply only to hindering criminal proceedings and not

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juvenile proceedings. Defendant explains that "youths in the
delinquency system are neither 'prosecuted' nor 'convicted.'
They instead are 'petitioned' to be in the 'jurisdiction' of the
juvenile court and 'adjudicated' as delinquent." Defendant
notes that the juvenile code uses the term "prosecution" to
describe what happens after a youth's case is transferred to
the adult criminal justice system. See ORS 419C.349(1) (juve-
nile court may transfer "a youth to a circuit, justice or munic-
ipal court of competent jurisdiction for prosecution as an
adult" under specified circumstances); ORS 419C.352 (juve-
nile court may transfer "a youth under 15 years of age at the
time the act was committed to circuit court for prosecution as
an adult" under specified circumstances). Further, he notes,
the term "punishment" does not describe what happens to
juveniles, because they are placed on probation when it is in
their "best interest and welfare," ORS 419C.446(1), or they
are detained in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority
"for care, placement and supervision," ORS 419C.478.

Even assuming that defendant's argument regard-
ing the terms "prosecution," "conviction," and "punishment,"
is correct, defendant fails to demonstrate why the term
"apprehension" would not include apprehension of a juvenile
offender who is seeking to avoid referral to a correctional
facility and instead would include the apprehension of only
an adult criminal. "Apprehension" refers to "the taking by
legal, esp. criminal, process: ARREST." Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 106 (unabridged ed 2002). Defendant con-
cedes that the term "apprehension," unlike the other terms
discussed above, could be understood in isolation to apply to
juvenile offenders. He argues, however, that the placement of
apprehension in a list of other terms that apply only to adult
criminal offenders suggests that the term apprehension
should be construed in light of the other terms. ORS
162.325(1) applies only to certain acts performed with the
intent to hinder "apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment" in a criminal case, according to defendant, but
not to acts performed with the intent to hinder a youth's
apprehension and referral to a juvenile correctional facility.

Defendant asks us to apply certain maxims of statu-
tory construction that, he argues, support his position-in

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pari materia (statutes on the same subject should be con-
strued together);7 noscitur a sociis (meaning of unclear word
may be clarified by other words in context);8 and ejusdem
generis (when legislature uses general term and also lists
specific examples, general term is interpreted using the other
terms in the list).9 None of those maxims applies here, how-
ever. In pari materia refers to comparing statutes rather
than a list of words in a particular statute; noscitur a sociis
refers to interpreting an unclear term according to its con-
text, but, as we explain below, the term "apprehension" is not
ambiguous; and ejusdem generis assists in giving content to a
general phrase when the statute also lists specific examples,
which is not the issue confronting us.

The central flaw in defendant's argument with
respect to the term "apprehension" is that the term is not
ambiguous: it simply represents the idea of capture. In the
criminal-law context, apprehension involves restraining an
individual's liberty so that the state can assert the authority
of legal process over that individual. In many cases, that
legal process leads to prosecution, conviction, or punishment,
but not always. Some offenders are apprehended, but the
state elects not to prosecute them. More importantly, some
offenders cannot be subjected to criminal liability, even if
they have committed a crime punishable as a felony. For
example, some offenders are mentally ill and for that reason
are guilty except for insanity. See ORS 161.295 ("A person is
guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or
defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person

7 Under the canon that courts should read statutes in pari materia,
"[s]tatutory provisions on the same subject are construed together." Griffin v.
Tri-Met, 318 Or 500, 524, 870 P2d 808 (1994).

8 Noscitur a sociis "is an old maxim which summarizes the rule both of lan-
guage and of law that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those
with which they are associated." Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Or 575, 609, 51 P2d 839
(1935). The maxim is useful if a particular word is ambiguous. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1084 (7th ed 1999) ("A canon of construction holding that the meaning
of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately sur-
rounding it.").

9 "When the legislature uses 'nonspecific or general phrases' as well as a list of
items, this court, under the principle of ejusdem generis, construes the statute
'as referring only to other items of the same kind.'" Liberty v. State Dept. of
Transportation, 342 Or 11, 20, 148 P3d 909 (2006) (citation omitted).

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lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminal-
ity of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the require-
ments of law."). Other offenders are juveniles and therefore
not subject to prosecution in circuit court in the same manner
as adults. See ORS 419C.005(1) (juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over most violations of criminal laws
committed by minors). An evaluation of the lack of culpability
and the need for alternative treatment for certain offenders,
however, cannot be undertaken unless and until they are
apprehended and examined. Thus, the legislature presuma-
bly would not want other persons assisting offenders in evad-
ing the justice system, particularly if they have engaged in
conduct that is punishable as a felony.

As noted, defendant argues that the final terms in the
sequence should be used to apply a narrow meaning to the
initial term. Defendant is incorrect because he is, in effect,
inviting us to look through the wrong end of the telescope. He
attempts to narrow the otherwise natural meaning of the
word "apprehension" by reference to the other terms in the
list. Because of the nature of the criminal process, however,
each of the first two terms in the sequence "apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment" casts a wider net
than the terms that follow. Suspects are apprehended; after
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the identification
of juveniles and the mentally ill, fewer will be prosecuted;
after prosecution, even fewer will be convicted and punished.
(Regarding the terms "conviction" and "punishment," in gen-
eral, one may assume that those who are convicted will be
punished, but even then, exceptions exist.) Hence, the term
"apprehension" is broader and more general than the terms
that follow it, because it encompasses both persons who are
subject to criminal sanction as well as persons who turn out
to be, for whatever reason, not subject to criminal prosecu-
tion, conviction, or punishment. We therefore reject defen-
dant's argument that the word "apprehension" should be
understood in the narrow sense for which he argues.

We now turn to defendant' second argument-that,
even if ORS 162.325(1) applies to the hindrance of juvenile
proceedings, it does not apply here because defendant hin-
dered youth's apprehension for a probation violation, rather

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than for his initial crime. According to defendant, ORS
162.325(1) criminalizes only "specified acts that hinder the
initial process of catching, trying, convicting, and sentencing
a criminal." (Emphasis in original.) His argument is that
ORS 162.325(1) does not apply to hindrance of apprehension
for a probation violation, because a probation violation and
referral to a correctional facility occur later than the tempo-
ral sequence of apprehension through punishment set out in
the statute. In other words, he contends, youth's "punish-
ment" concluded with the imposition of probation, and
when youth allegedly violated his probation, that probation
violation occurred after the span of events listed in ORS
162.325(1).

The list of four stages set out in ORS 162.325(1), how-
ever, does not indicate a temporal limitation imposing a par-
ticular order of events. Of course, the list reflects the ordinary
sequence of events in a criminal case. Even though prosecu-
tion occurs before conviction, which occurs before punish-
ment, there is nothing in the statute indicating that the leg-
islature understood that apprehension can occur only before
prosecution. An attempt to evade the justice system can take
place at any time in the process, and the state has an interest
in securing the presence of the offender for the purpose of
carrying out criminal or juvenile proceedings. Here, youth
already had been through some juvenile proceedings regard-
ing his third-degree assault, but it later was necessary to
apprehend him. He was about to evade the further process of
the juvenile court and circumvent possible referral to a juve-
nile correctional facility by flying to the Philippines. Indeed,
as noted, when youth sought to board the airplane to leave
the jurisdiction after violating his conditions of probation, a
warrant was outstanding for his arrest. Youth's probation
officer had anticipated that youth, with defendant's assis-
tance, might seek to avoid the legal process by fleeing and
had obtained an arrest warrant. Defendant's act of assisting
youth in fleeing when a warrant had issued for his arrest hin-
dered youth's apprehension in the same manner as if he had
hindered youth's initial apprehension. We reject defendant's
argument that ORS 162.325(1) does not apply to hindering
the apprehension of an offender for a probation violation.

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We conclude that ORS 162.325(1) applies when an
individual aids a juvenile in avoiding apprehension for a pro-
bation violation, as long as the juvenile was on probation
because he or she engaged in conduct punishable as a felony.
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for judg-
ment of acquittal.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.