October 29, 2012 – American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Council 18, AFL-CIO, CLC, AFSCME Local 1888, AFSCME Local 3022, AFSCME Local 624, and AFSCME Local 2962 v. City of Albuquerque, No. 30,927

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: 	October 29, 2012
NO. 30,927
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,
(AFSCME) COUNCIL 18, AFL-CIO, CLC,
AFSCME LOCAL 1888, AFSCME LOCAL
3022, AFSCME LOCAL 624, and AFSCME
LOCAL 2962,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Valerie A. Huling, District Judge
Youtz & Valdez, P.C.
Shane C. Youtz
Marianne Bowers
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellants

Replacement page--AFSCME v. City of Albuquerque; #30,927; (W/S-G); Filed 10/29/12;
on line 4, replaced “Gable” with “Goble”
Conklin, Woodcock & Ziegler, P.C.
Robin A. Goble
Albuquerque, NM
David Tourek, City Attorney
Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Assistant City Attorney
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	This appeal results from the breakdown in negotiations of collective bargaining
agreements between Plaintiffs American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) Council 18, AFL-CIO, CLC, AFSCME Local 1888, AFSCME
Local 3022, AFSCME Local 624, and AFSCME Local 2962 (the Unions) and
Defendant City of Albuquerque (the City) to succeed ones that had expired. We hold
that the failure of the City’s Labor Management Relations Ordinance (LMRO),
Albuquerque, N.M. Code of Ordinances, ch. 3, art. 2, §§ 3-2-1 to -18 (2003, as
amended through 2005) (Abq. Ord.) to include provisions for binding impasse
arbitration does not preclude the LMRO from grandfather status under the Public
Employee Bargaining Act (the PEBA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-7E-1 to -26 (2003, as
amended through 2005). We also hold that in this case the PEBA enforcement of an
existing collective bargaining agreement in the event of impasse (the PEBA evergreen
clause) is subject to the requirements of appropriation and availability of funds under
the PEBA and that the complaint was moot with respect to unions that had reached
collective bargaining agreements with the City. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	The Unions are the exclusive bargaining representatives for employees of the

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City. Because existing collective bargaining agreements were to expire on June 30,
2010, they engaged in negotiations with the City under the LMRO to replace the
existing collective bargaining agreements. 	During the negotiations, the Unions
brought suit, asking the district court to declare that the LMRO violates the PEBA
because the LMRO does not contain impasse arbitration and evergreen provisions that
are required by the PEBA.
{3} 	On June 30, 2010, the Unions filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to continue the expiring collective bargaining agreements
until new agreements were reached. The district court granted partial injunctive relief,
continuing the agreements with certain exceptions until a full evidentiary hearing
before the court.
{4} 	The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court
denied the Unions’ motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the City.
Following City of Deming v. Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, 141
N.M. 686, 160 P.3d 595, the district court concluded that the grandfather clause of the
PEBA, Section 10-7E-26(A), applies to the LMRO’s collective bargaining provisions.
The district court also granted the City’s motion to dismiss Local 1888 and Local
3022 because they reached new agreements with the City, and their claims in the
complaint were therefore moot.

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on line 4, inserted the word “not” after “in”
GRANDFATHER STATUS OF LMRO IMPASSE PROCEDURES
{5} 	On appeal, the Unions argue that the district court erred in not ruling that (1)
the impasse procedure of the LMRO violates the PEBA and (2) the lack of an
evergreen clause in the LMRO violates the PEBA. The City counters that the district
court properly concluded that the PEBA requirements do not apply because the
LMRO is entitled to grandfather status under the PEBA.
{6} 	Generally, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment under de
novo review. Vill. of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003-NMCA-035, ¶ 57, 133 N.M.
373, 62 P.3d 1255. 	Specifically, in this case, we review the district court’s
interpretation of the PEBA as a question of law subject to de novo review. See City
of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 6 (“To decide whether the grandfather clause applies,
we must interpret the PEBA and make a determination of law.”). 	“Summary
judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 334, 825
P.2d 1241, 1244 (1992).
{7} 	The PEBA was designed “to guarantee public employees the right to organize
and bargain collectively with their employers, to promote harmonious and cooperative
relationships between public employers and public employees and to protect the
public interest by ensuring, at all times, the orderly operation and functioning of the

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state and its political subdivisions.” 	Section 10-7E-2. 	It grants most public
employees the right to “form, join or assist a labor organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representatives chosen by public employees.” Section
10-7E-5. It sets forth various provisions and procedures to comply with its collective
bargaining requirement. 	As pertinent to this case, the PEBA requires public
employers other than the State of New Mexico and exclusive representatives to follow
impasse procedures that include mediation and binding arbitration, unless the public
employers and the exclusive representatives agree in writing to an alternative
procedure. Section 10-7E-18(B), (C). In addition, the PEBA requires, in the event
of impasse, that the existing contract “continue in full force and effect until it is
replaced by a subsequent written agreement.” Section 10-7E-18(D). {8} 	T h e
PEBA’s grandfather clause reads
A public employer other than the state that prior to October 1,
1991 adopted by ordinance, resolution or charter amendment a system
of provisions and procedures permitting employees to form, join or assist
a labor organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively through
exclusive representatives may continue to operate under those provisions
and procedures. 	Any substantial change after January 1, 2003 to any
ordinance, resolution or charter amendment shall subject the public
employer to full compliance with the provisions of Subsection B[.]
Section 10-7E-26(A). 	Section 10-7E-26(B)(8) requires any such public employer
making a substantial change to include within the change specific provisions and
procedures, including “impasse resolution procedures equivalent to those set forth in”

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Section 10-7E-18. Thus, the PEBA’s grandfather clause has two requirements: (1)
that a public employer have adopted “a system of provisions and procedures
permitting employees to form, join or assist a labor organization for the purpose of
bargaining collectively through exclusive representatives” and (2) that the public
employer has done so prior to October 1, 1991. 	Section 10-7E-26(A); Regents of
Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 34, 125 N.M. 401, 962
P.2d 1236; City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 9.
{9} 	The City originally adopted the LMRO in 1977 and last amended it in 2002.
The purposes of the LMRO are similar to those in the PEBA, including allowing
employees of the City “to organize and bargain collectively with” the City. Abq. Ord.
§ 3-2-2(A). It contains various provisions and procedures that control the collective
bargaining relationship of the City and the Unions. Abq. Ord. §§ 3-2-1 to -18. It does
not, however, contain binding arbitration or evergreen provisions.
{10} 	Our Supreme Court discussed the purposes of grandfather clauses in Regents,
1998-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 23-28, a case involving the prior version of the PEBA. 	It
observed that the effect of grandfather clauses is to “narrow, qualify, or otherwise
restrain the scope of the statute” or to “remove from the statute’s reach a class that
would otherwise be encompassed by its language.” Id. ¶ 24. As the Court stated, “[a]
grandfather clause preserves something old, while the remainder of the law of which
it is a part institutes something new.” 	Id. ¶ 25. 	It further noted that grandfather

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clauses should be construed strictly or narrowly and with the purpose of giving effect
to the Legislature’s intent. Id. ¶¶ 27, 48.
{11} 	This Court acknowledged those purposes in addressing impasse procedures in
City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 23. 	In that case, we held that the PEBA’s
grandfather clause applied to an ordinance provision that addressed impasse through
advisory arbitration. 	Id. ¶ 24. 	We reversed the district court that had denied
grandfather status because “the advisory arbitration impasse procedure of the
ordinance did not provide any more than the right to petition the government and thus
was not a meaningful opportunity to engage in collective bargaining.” 	Id. ¶ 19
(internal quotation marks omitted).
{12} 	The Unions make similar arguments in this case. The impasse provision of the
LMRO calls for mediation at the request of a party, and, if the mediation fails, binding
arbitration only upon voluntary agreement of the parties. Abq. Ord. § 3-2-14(A), (B).
The LMRO does not contain an evergreen provision. The Unions contend that, by
failing to provide binding impasse resolution procedures and evergreen protection, the
LMRO does not provide “a system allowing employees to form, join or assist a Union
in ‘collective bargaining’ as required by [the] PEBA.”
{13} 	We understand the Unions’ position to be that because the provisions and
procedures of the LMRO do not require binding arbitration and include evergreen
provisions, the LMRO does not satisfy the “collective bargaining” requirement for

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grandfather status. The Unions contend that without a procedure for finality in the
event of impasse a collective bargaining process is meaningless. They reason that the
Legislature did not intend to extend grandfather status to such a process.
{14} 	However, the 	Unions’ argument attaches an additional requirement to the
PEBA’s grandfather clause. 	For ordinances adopted before October 1, 1991, the
PEBA’s grandfather clause requires only that the system adopted permit “employees
to form, join or assist a labor organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively
through exclusive representatives.” 	Section 10-7E-26(A). 	The PEBA defines
“collective bargaining” as “the act of negotiating between a public employer and an
exclusive representative for the purpose of entering into a written agreement regarding
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment[.]” Section 10-7E-4(F).
The Unions’ argument demands that we evaluate the effectiveness of the LMRO as
an avenue for collective bargaining. The PEBA does not include this requirement.
See City of Albuquerque v. Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, ¶ 21, 274 P.3d 108 (holding
that the LMRO selection procedure for appointment of local board members “does not
violate the definition of collective bargaining under” the PEBA).
{15} 	The evolution of the PEBA assists in our analysis. It was originally enacted in
1992 and was effective until 1999. It was reenacted in 2003. The original version of
the PEBA, effective from 1992 to 1999, included language that granted grandfather
status to public employers other than the state or a municipality only if the public

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employer’s 	“ordinance, 	resolution 	or 	charter 	amendment 	has 	resulted 	in 	the
designation of appropriate bargaining units, the certification of exclusive bargaining
agents and the negotiation of existing collective bargaining agreements.” 	NMSA
1978, § 10-7D-26(B) (1992) (repealed 1999). 	This language, which contained an
effectiveness component necessary for grandfather status for public employers other
than the state and municipalities, was removed by the Legislature when it reenacted
the PEBA in 2003. Section 10-7E-26. We glean from the removal of this language
and the absence of any language concerning quality or effectiveness in the current
PEBA that the Legislature intended that a public employer’s system of provisions and
procedures permitting collective bargaining would not be subject to that type of
scrutiny to achieve grandfather status. See El Paso Elec. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation
Comm’n, 2010-NMSC-048, ¶ 16, 149 N.M. 174, 246 P.3d 443 (stating that when the
Legislature expressly removed part of a definition in a statute, the removed portion is
outside the scope of the statute).
{16} 	In addition, as we discussed in City of Deming, the original version of the
PEBA did not require binding arbitration; it required only advisory mediation. NMSA
1978, § 10-7D-18(B)(1) (1992) (repealed 1999); City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069,
¶ 22. Other than to eliminate the effectiveness component discussed above that did
not relate to municipalities and to address substantial changes after January 1, 2003,
the grandfather clause did not change on reenactment. Compare § 10-7E-26 and § 10-

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7D-26 (1992) (repealed 1999). 	Significantly, the Legislature did not add a
requirement that binding arbitration to resolve impasse was necessary for grandfather
status.
{17} 	Also significant to our analysis is that the Legislature did include requirements
for compliance with the PEBA in both versions of the PEBA but only if a public
employer other than the state adopts a system of provisions and procedures permitting
collective bargaining after October 1, 1991. In such instances, the grandfather clause
does require for grandfather status, among other provisions and procedures consistent
with the PEBA, that the newly adopted system include “impasse resolution procedures
equivalent to those set forth in” the PEBA. Section 10-7E-26(B)(8); Section 10-7D-
26(C) (1992) (repealed 1999). The Unions’ argument would extend this requirement
to systems adopted by public employers other than the state prior to October 1, 1991.
But the Legislature specifically did not include any such requirement for public
employers adopting ordinances prior to October 1, 1991. Section 10-7E-26.
{18} 	The Unions would limit City of Deming to its facts in which the city’s labor
relations ordinance, which, although it did not provide for binding arbitration,
required arbitration in which the arbitrator issues an opinion to the city council, which
then renders a final, binding decision. 	See City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 3.
While we agree with the Unions that the impasse procedure considered in City of
Deming may be more effective in resolving an impasse because there is a conclusion

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built into the procedure, the effectiveness of the procedure in City of Deming, or its
closer compliance to the PEBA than the LMRO, was not part of the City of Deming
analysis.
{19} 	Rather, as we discussed in City of Deming, we interpret the PEBA’s grandfather
clause to effectuate legislative intent. City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 23. As
fully discussed in Regents, the grandfather clause preserves “something old, while the
remainder of the law of which it is a part institutes something new.” Regents, 1998-
NMSC-020, ¶ 25; see City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 23. 	In reenacting the
PEBA, the Legislature preserved efforts by public employers to adopt systems of
provisions and procedures permitting collective bargaining while enacting a new law
that applied when grandfather status did not apply. 	The Legislature did not limit
grandfather status to public employers adopting ordinances prior to October 1, 1991
in the way it did for later actions. Although the procedures under the PEBA providing
binding arbitration to resolve impasse are more effective in concluding disputes, the
PEBA does not require that the LMRO, adopted prior to October 1, 1991, contain such
procedures in order to receive grandfather status. The failure of the LMRO to provide
for binding-impasse arbitration does not preclude the LMRO from grandfather status
under the PEBA.
APPLICATION OF THE EVERGREEN PROVISION
{20} 	The PEBA evergreen clause requires expiring collective bargaining agreements

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to continue until replacement agreements are in place. 	Section 10-7E-18(D). 	The
LMRO does not contain an evergreen provision. The Unions argue on appeal that the
LMRO violates the PEBA because it does not have an evergreen provision and that
“the LMRO should be deemed to contain” an evergreen provision.
{21} 	The district court held that the PEBA evergreen clause does not apply to the
economic components of the existing agreements in part because the evergreen clause
“is subject to the requirements of appropriation and availability of funds under Section
10-7E-17(E)” of the PEBA. 	That section, in pertinent part, provides that “[a]n
impasse resolution or an agreement provision [of a collective bargaining agreement]
by a public employer other than the state or the public schools and an exclusive
representative that requires the expenditure of funds shall be contingent upon the
specific appropriation of funds by the appropriate governing body and the availability
of funds.” Section 10-7E-17(E).
{22} 	Important to the Unions’ appeal are the arguments that are not before us
concerning the evergreen clause. In the district court, the City did not argue, as it does
on appeal, that the grandfather clause of the PEBA applies to the LMRO with respect
to the LMRO’s silence concerning evergreen status. Indeed, the district court noted
that the City agreed that the PEBA evergreen clause applied to it, subject to the City’s
arguments that the Bateman Act and the LMRO trump the requirements of the
evergreen provision. Although the district court also relied upon the Bateman Act in

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its decision, we do not discuss this argument because Section 10-7E-17(E) sufficiently
supports the district court’s decision. We do not address the City’s grandfather clause
argument because the City did not raise it before the district court. Additionally, the
Unions did not argue below, and do not argue on appeal, that the PEBA does not
apply to the City in every respect. Significantly, no argument has been made that,
even if the impasse resolution procedures of the LMRO are entitled to grandfather
status, Section 10-7E-17(E) of the PEBA does not apply to the City. Regents, 1998-
NMSC-020, ¶ 35 (stating that grandfather clauses should be construed strictly or
narrowly). 	Indeed, Regents instructs that the requirements for grandfather clause
status be construed narrowly, analyzing portions of a public employer’s policy
separately. Id.
{23} 	On the record before us, we thus conclude that Section 10-7E-17(E) applies to
economic 	components 	of 	the 	extension 	of 	the 	expired 	collective 	bargaining
agreements under the PEBA evergreen provision. 	Under Section 10-7E-17(E),
agreement provisions that require the expenditure of funds are subject to “the specific
appropriation of funds” and “the availability of funds.” See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters
v. City of Carlsbad, 2009-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 1, 16, 147 N.M. 6, 216 P.3d 256 (holding
that Section 10-7E-17(E) prevails over a binding arbitration award issued pursuant to
Section 10-7E-18(B)(2)). It is not an issue whether the City appropriated funds for
or during the term of the agreements. No City appropriation has occurred to extend

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the agreements, and the City contends that it does not have available funds to fund the
economic components of the extension. The PEBA leaves that determination to the
legislative functions of the public employer. 	The PEBA does not require the
extension of existing collective bargaining agreements in conflict with Section 10-7E-
17(E).
MOOTNESS WITH RESPECT TO AFSCME LOCAL 1888 AND AFSCME
LOCAL 3022
{24} 	While this lawsuit was pending, AFSCME Local 1888 and AFSCME Local
3022 entered into new contracts with the City. The Unions contend that the district
court improperly granted the City’s motion to dismiss the two unions as moot. We
address the issue under de novo review. Garcia v. Dorsey, 2006-NMSC-052, ¶ 13,
140 N.M. 746, 149 P.3d 62.
{25} 	We test for mootness by determining whether an actual controversy exists. City
of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1998-NMSC-006, ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d
72. Our Supreme Court has stated “[t]he prerequisites of actual controversy . . . in a
declaratory judgment action are: 	a controversy involving rights or other legal
relations of the parties seeking declaratory relief; a claim of right or other legal
interest asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; interests of
the parties must be real and adverse; and the issue . . . must be ripe for judicial
determination.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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{26} 	The Unions argue that an actual controversy continues to exist despite the new
agreements 	because 	the 	new 	agreements 	will 	expire 	in 	the 	next 	two 	years.
Secondarily, they contend that, even assuming an actual controversy no longer exists,
this case presents an issue of public interest that is likely to reoccur. They rely on
Bradbury & Stamm Construction v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo
County, 2001-NMCA-106, ¶¶ 10-11, 131 N.M. 293, 35 P.3d 298. In that case, the
plaintiff had claimed that the county had improperly declined to apply a statutory
residential preference in the bidding on a construction project. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. The district
court ruled for the plaintiff, and the county granted the plaintiff the bid because it
disqualified the low bidder, not because of a residential preference. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. This
Court determined that, although there no longer appeared to be an actual controversy
concerning the residential preference statute, it nevertheless denied the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because the issue was of substantial public
importance that “may well reoccur[.]” Id. ¶ 12.
{27} 	Although Bradbury & Stamm does not indicate that an actual controversy
continues to exist in this case, it does address the Unions’ secondary position.
However, in Bradbury & Stamm, the issue “may well” have reoccurred if the Court
did not decide the issue between the parties before it. In this case, the issues raised
by AFSCME Local 1888 and AFSCME Local 3022 are the same issues raised by the
other unions, and the Court is deciding the issues.

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CONCLUSION
{28} 	The PEBA grandfather clause applies to the LMRO impasse resolution
procedures notwithstanding the failure of the LMRO to require binding arbitration to
resolve impasse. 	The PEBA evergreen clause does not apply to the economic
components of the existing collective bargaining agreements, at least in the manner
in which this case was argued, because of the PEBA’s requirements that provisions
of collective bargaining agreements that require an expenditure of funds are subject
to the “specific appropriation of funds” and “the availability of funds” in Section 10-
7E-17(E). 	The complaint was moot with respect to AFSCME Local 1888 and
AFSCME Local 3022. We affirm.
{29} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
I CONCUR:
________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring)

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GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring).
{30} 	I agree that the language in City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 22-24,
appears to control our decision in this case. I write to specially concur because the
broad language in City of Deming appears to extend the current version of the PEBA
into situations where the resolution of an impasse in a collective bargaining agreement
is never required. 	Id. 	Such a situation actually exists under the facts in this case.
Unlike City of Deming, the LMRO has no provision to finally resolve the impasse that
arose under the collective bargaining process between AFSCME and the City.
Majority Opinion ¶ 9.
{31} 	The original version of the PEBA only required advisory mediation to resolve
an impasse in collective bargaining negotiations. 	Section 10-7D-18(B) (1992)
(repealed 1999). The current version does require a final resolution of any impasse
by binding arbitration. 	Section 10-7E-18. 	City of Deming continues to allow
ordinances that are only consistent with the non-binding impasse resolution provisions
of the original version of the PEBA rather than the current version of the PEBA that
requires a binding resolution. 2007-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 20-22. If the ultimate resolution
of an impasse is now required under the current version of the PEBA in order for its
grandfather clause to also apply, then City of Deming needs to be appropriately
addressed anew.
{32} 	Presently, City of Deming allows the unchanged version of Section 10-7E-

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26(A) to continue to apply under either version of the PEBA statutory scheme. 2007-
NMCA-069, ¶ 22. If this Court has failed to properly construe the strict and narrow
construction of the statutory grandfather clause in light of the overall purposes and
intent set forth in the current version of the PEBA, then City of Deming needs to be
narrowed accordingly. See Regents, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 23-28 (giving effect to the
Legislative intent regarding grandfather clauses under the prior version of the PEBA
that did not mandate a final impasse resolution procedure through binding arbitration).
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the purposes of the current version
of the PEBA require a more strict and narrow construction of the grandfather clause
in the PEBA.
__________________________________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge