April 29, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Phillip L. Littlefield, No. A-1-CA-37855

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 	Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. 	No. A-1-CA-37855
5 PHILLIP L. LITTLEFIELD a/k.a
6 PHILLIP LEE LITTLEFIELD,
7 	Defendant-Appellant.
8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
9 Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
10 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
11 	Santa Fe, NM
12 for Appellee
13 	Bennett J. Baur, 'Chief Public Defender
14 Will O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender
15 	Santa Fe, NM
16 for Appellant
17 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
18 VARGAS,Judge.
19 {I} 	Defendant has appealed following his conviction for receiving or transferring
20 a stolen vehicle (possession). We previously issued a notice of proposed summary
21. disposition in which we proposed to affirm. Defendant has filed a memorandum in
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 4/29/2019 11:43 AM
Mark Reynolds

1 opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded by the assertion of error.
2 We therefore uphold the conviction.
3 	{2} 	The relevant background information has previously been set forth. We will
4 avoid undue reiteration here, and instead address the content of the memorandum in
5 opposition, in which Defendant renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the
6 evidence, specifically and exclusively focusing on the element of knowledge. [MIO
7 1-8] We limit the scope of discussion accordingly. See generally State v. Dawson,
8 1999-NMCA-072, ,-r 13, 127 N.M. 472, 983 P.2d 421("We limit ourselves to those
9 elements that [the d]efendant claims to have been insufficiently proved.").
10 	{3} 	"Knowledge, like intent, is personal in its nature and may not be susceptible
11 	of proof by direct evidence. It may, however, be inferred from occurrences and
12 circumstances." State v. Montoya, 1966-NMSC-224, ,-r 10; 77 N.M. 129, 419 P.2d
13 	970. In this case, the circumstantial evidence was compelling. It is undisputed that
14 Defendant was in possession of a stolen motorcycle, which had been spray painted
15 	in an apparent effort to alter its appearance. [MIO 1-2, 4] When the investigating
16 officers knocked, Defendant attempted to evade them by.sneaking out the back door.
17 	[MIO 3] See State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ,-r 23, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641
18 ("[E]vidence of flight or an attempt to deceive the police may prove consciousness
19 	of guilt." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant gave the officers
2

1 an improbable account, claiming to have purchased the motorcycle for $300 at a
2 convenience store, when the owner had paid $5,000 for it. [MIO 2; RP 146] See, e.g.,
3 Statev. Wise, 1973-NMCA-138, 85 N.M. 640,515 P.2d644 (holding that possession
4 of a stolen vehicle, together with evidence of participation in a purchase for a very
5 low sum, supplied sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew or had
6 reason to believe the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken). Although
7 Defendant further claimed that his PT cruiser was part of the exchange, the officers
8 found the claim to be dubious, given that Defendant still had the PT cruiser in his
9 possession and was living out of the vehicle. [RP 150] When further questioned about
10 the alleged purchase, Defendant was unable to provide either a reasonable description
11 	of the seller or contact information. [RP 148, 151-52] Finally, the license plate did not
12 match the VIN number, Defendant had no title documents, and Defendant failed to
13 	mention the bill of sale that he later presented at trial. [MIO 3; RP 151] Cf City ofRio
14 Rancho v. Amrep Sw:, Inc., 2011-NMSC-037, 126, 150 N.M. 428,260 P.3d 414 ("A
15 person cannot be a good faith purchaser if that person is aware of facts that "should
16 have put him or her to an inquiry, which if pursued with due diligence, would have
17 led to a knowledge of the infirmities appearing upon the face of the instrument
18 	involved in the transaction." (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation
19 omitted)); Statev. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, 129,355 P.3d831 ("[T]heLegislature
3

1 intended to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in stolen vehicles by instituting a
2 vehicle registration system that maintains a history of individual vehicle ownership,
3 requires distinct identifiers be assigned and affixed to vehicles, and monitors the
4 transfer of vehicles from other states and between owners."); State v. Pacheco,
5 2007-NMCA-140, ,-r 17, 142 N.M. 773, 170 P.3d 1011 (observing that "prosecutors
6 may unquestionably endeavor to undermine alibis and other forms of exculpatory
7 testimony by suggesting recent fabrication"). We conclude that this evidence was
8 sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Defendant knew or had reason to
9 know that the motorcycle was stolen.
10 {4} 	In his memorandum in opposition Defendant contends that his own testimony,
11 	together with his possession of an apparently functional key, should have compelled
12 a different result. [MIO 1-8] However, the jury was free to reject Defendant's
13 	testimony, and his possession of a key is not conclusive, particularly in light of all of
14 the 	countervailing 	circumstantial 	evidence. 	See 	generally 	State 	v. 	Slade,
15 	2014-NMCA-088, ,-r 13, 331 P.3d 930 (noting that "the weight and effect of the
16 evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from both the direct and
17 circumstantial evidence is a matter reserved for determination by the Oury]" and
18 recognizing that this Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury
19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Gurule, 2004-NMCA-008,
4

1 1 38, 134 N.M. 804, 82 P.3d 975 ("[T]he jury is free to reject [the d]efendant's
2 version of the facts, and thus, evidence contrary to the verdict does not provide a
3 basis for reversal.").
4 {5} 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed summary
5 disposition and above, we affirm.
6 {6} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
~ 	4+.<1~9 WE CONCUR:
12 	~~13 	JE~i:ATTREP,Judge
5