A-1-CA-36191 | Omnilex

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 5/31/2019 11:03 AM

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 5/31/2019 11:03 AM

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW oad:

JAMES SNEED, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. A-1-CA-36191
STEPHAN A. VAUGHN,
Defendant-Appellee,
and

GREGG MARCANTEL and ELKE
JACKSON,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY
Cindy M. Mercer, District Judge

Stephen F. Lawless, PA
Stephen F. Lawless
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Kennedy, Moulton & Wells
Debra J. Moulton
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

nal . |
Nr Reynolds

MEMORANDUM OPINION
VANZI, Judge.
93 After four years of incarceration for trafficking in cocaine and possession of
marijuana, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant Dr. Stephen Vaughn,
then the Chief Medical Administrator for the New Mexico Department of
Corrections (NMDOC), violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment by acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical
care. U.S. const. amend. VIII. After a three-day bench trial, the district court found
that Defendant had not acted with deliberate indifference and entered judgment in
Defendant’s favor. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
23 The following facts derive largely from the district court’s findings of fact,
which are unchallenged on appeal. In February 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed with
end-stage renal disease and began treatment by dialysis three days per week.
Roughly eight months later, in October 2009, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of
one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of marijuana. The
mandatory sentence for these convictions was eighteen years’ incarceration.
Between the conviction and sentencing for those convictions, Plaintiff was
monitored by ankle monitor pursuant to his sentence in a prior, unrelated federal

matter. During this time, Plaintiff continued with dialysis and worked with

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University Medical Center (UMC) in Lubbock, Texas to complete the testing and
other tasks required before he could be added to the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS) list to receive a kidney from a deceased donor. In addition,
Plaintiff's son expressed interest in donating a kidney, but never completed the
testing to determine whether he was an appropriate donor for his father.
3} In preparation for sentencing, Judge Steven Quinn held a hearing on April 29,
2010. During the hearing, Judge Quinn telephoned Defendant. Judge Quinn told
Defendant that Plaintiff was “on line for a kidney transplant” and asked if it was
possible for NMDOC to take Plaintiff to UMC as needed for pre-operative
appointments and then the operation itself. Defendant responded:

Absolutely. A person doesn’t lose their right to access to transplant if

they are incarcerated. I would have to work on that with the, oh, our

central office but, uh, medically necessary transport out of state for the

purposes of inmate care, um, I would expect to say its mandatory and

that can’t be compromised . . . I’ll make sure it happens.
Defendant based his statements to Judge Quinn on his impression that Plaintiff had
already been approved by a transplant board for a kidney transplant and that it was
scheduled in the very near future. Defendant also explained that there were
transportation challenges because the NMDOC’s custody ends at the New Mexico
border. Judge Quinn asked Defendant to research the NUDOC’s ability to transport

Plaintiff to Texas and stated that he would contact Defendant again for a May

hearing.

4; After the April 29, 2010 hearing, Defendant contacted Plaintiff's Transplant
Coordinator at UMC to discuss Plaintiff's progress toward a kidney transplant and
learned that Plaintiff's son had not been evaluated for transplant, Plaintiff had not
been approved for transplant, and there was some question about whether he would
be approved. Then, at a hearing on May 5, 2010, Judge Quinn again contacted
Defendant by telephone and asked Defendant whether Plaintiff was “qualified for
transplant and all that.” Defendant told Judge Quinn that Plaintiff's candidacy for
transplant was at the discretion of the transplanting facility, UMC would not accept
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s son had not been matched with Plaintiff for transplant. He
also stated that, based upon his discussion with UMC, a kidney transplant was not
certain for Plaintiff. According to Defendant, if somebody is a good transplant
candidate pursuant to the rules of the transplant hospital and the hospital approves
him for transplant, the State’s position is to support it. Finally, Defendant told Judge
Quinn NMDOC would be able to continue Plaintiff's dialysis treatments if Plaintiff
was placed into the custody of the NMDOC. After questioning Defendant, Judge
Quinn terminated the call. Defendant was not involved in the rest of the sentencing
proceedings.

53} Atthe end of the May 5, 2010 hearing, Judge Quinn stated that Plaintiff would
be remanded to the custody of the NMDOC with assurances he would receive

dialysis three times per week and would be transported to Lubbock whenever it was

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necessary. However, the written judgment and sentence did not mention these
conditions. Instead, it ordered that Plaintiff be released on furlough to undergo
surgery on April 22, 2010, and recommended placement at the NUDOC’s Los Lunas
facility “for medical provisions.” It did not include any other mention of Plaintiffs
medical issues.

{6} | While incarcerated, Plaintiff, who was receiving dialysis three times a week
communicated with Defendant several times about his medical care. In June and July
2010, Plaintiff submitted an inmate formal complaint and inmate grievances
requesting information about transportation to Lubbock for tests and appointments
related to a kidney transplant. Defendant responded in August 2010 in writing,
stating that the legal department had reviewed the judgment and sentence and that
NMDOC could assist the UMC with blood draws and medical feedback but could
not facilitate transport to and from Lubbock. Defendant also stated that solid organ
transplantation requires “patient availability and mobility,” which it could not
accommodate “under the terms of Plaintiff's sentence.”

{}} During his incarceration, Plaintiff filed both a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, in 2012, and the civil complaint presently at issue, in 2014. Judge Quinn
presided over the habeas petition. In a November 2012 order, he recounted his
communication with Defendant:

Prior to sentencing [Plaintiff] to [NMDOC] for the mandatory 18
years, the [district c]ourt placed a call to the [NMDOC] Medical Office

MA BWN

and spoke with [Defendant], the Director. [Defendant] assured the
Court that if [Plaintiff] was incarcerated at the department of
corrections, transportation arrangements could be made to send
[Plaintiff] to Lubbock for kidney transplant. Accordingly, the Court
sentenced [Plaintiff] to begin serving the 18[-]year commitment.
Plaintiff's habeas argument, as paraphrased by Judge Quinn, echoed his argument
here: “NMDOC refused to transport [Plaintiff] to Lubbock for a kidney transplant
contrary to pre-sentence assurances that they would.” In return for withdrawal of
Plaintiff's petition, the State agreed to stipulate to mitigation of Plaintiff's sentence
and, in March 2016, Judge Quinn issued a second amended judgment and sentence
in which he found “that due to the medical condition of [D]efendant, . . . mitigating
circumstances exist and . . . the sentence imposed in Count 1 shall be mitigated by
one third (1/3).” As a result of the amendment and various credits against his

sentence, Plaintiff was released in April 2016, after six years of incarceration. Trial

on the present civil complaint began approximately three months later. Plaintiff

states in his reply brief that he received a kidney transplant “within a short period
of a few months” after his release in April 2016.

DISCUSSION

83 “Claims of denial of appropriate medical treatment . . . can violate the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.” Griffin v. Penn, 2009-

NMCA-066, J 8, 146 N.M. 610, 213 P.3d 514. To state a cognizable claim under the

Eighth Amendment!, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Griffin, 2009-NMCA-
066, § 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “deliberate
indifference” standard includes both an objective component and a subjective
component. Jd. “To satisfy the objective component of the deliberate indifference
test and demonstrate a cognizable violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must
demonstrate an injury that is sufficiently serious.” /d. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A “sufficiently serious” injury requiring care includes “the
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily
activities[] or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” /d. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The subjective component requires a showing that an
officer acted with a sufficiently culpable mental state.” Jd. Hence, “inadvertent
failure to provide adequate medical care or a negligent diagnosis fails to establish
the requisite culpable state of mind.” Cordova, 2004-NMSC-026, { 30 (alterations,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Finally, a “difference of opinion as
to proper or reasonable treatment between the inmate and prison medical personnel

does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” /d. J 33.

* Although Plaintiff cited both the New Mexico and United States constitutions in

his complaint, his arguments on appeal pertain only to the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Cordova v. LeMaster, 2004-NMSC-026, 7 8, 136
N.M. 217, 96 P.3d 778 (addressing claims only under the federal constitution).

{93 As we understand it, Plaintiffs foundational premise is that his incarceration
was inherently cruel because the NMDOC was incapable of addressing his kidney
disease by facilitating a kidney transplant.* We have held that, even when a sentence
is mandatory under NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15 (2016), “it is possible . . . that a
prison term would violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as
applied to a particular defendant.” State v. Arrington (Arrington I), 1993-NMCA-
055, 7.9, 115 N.M. 559, 855 P.2d 133; see id. J 10 (noting that a sentence may be
“inherently cruel” in “exceedingly rare cases”). In Arrington I, for example, the
district court declined to sentence the defendant to incarceration on the ground that
incarceration would deprive the defendant of adequate treatment for her medical
condition. See id. J 11. This Court affirmed, stating that “[t]he evidence was
uncontroverted that incarceration would be life-threatening to [the d]efendant and
that adequate medical care would not be available to her in a correctional facility.”
Id.. However, when, two years later, the same defendant appealed a subsequent
district court order remanding her to custody in the same facility on new charges,

this Court affirmed her sentence because, unlike the evidence presented in

We note that it is unclear whether the Eighth Amendment applies in this case as,
for it to do so, there must be some tie between Defendant’s actions and actual post-
conviction punishment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (“[T]he
Eight Amendment’s protections did not attach until after conviction and sentence.”).
Nevertheless, because the parties and the district court have treated the issue as one
purely stemming from the Eighth Amendment, we do so as well.

Arrington I, the evidence “would support a determination that the medical care
available to [the djefendant in prison would likely be superior to what she could
otherwise obtain.” State v. Arrington (Arrington II), 1995-NMCA-057, § 6, 120
N.M. 54, 897 P.2d 241. The Arrington cases are not directly on point because they
do not address the deliberate indifference of individual defendants in a civil suit.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate that lack of access to medical care for a defendant’s
specific condition may be an important concern for the sentencing court, as it was
here.

410} Plaintiff argues that Defendant misled Judge Quinn about the NMDOC’s
ability to facilitate a kidney transplant and that, as a result, Judge Quinn sentenced
Plaintiff to incarceration, which was inherently cruel because it denied Plaintiff a
transplant and subjected him to years of difficult and life-shortening dialysis.
Plaintiff asserts that “the reason a [kidney] transplant could not be provided is
because of the reckless actions and omissions and misstatements by Defendant . . .
[which] placed [Plaintiff] in prison,” that Defendant’s “reckless misstatements”
constitute deliberate indifference to his medical care, and that the district court erred
in concluding otherwise. Plaintiffs arguments on appeal therefore focus specifically
on Defendant’s actions in the sentencing proceedings, i.e., before Plaintiff was

committed to NMDOC’s custody.

{11}. We review the district court’s ruling de novo. State v. Ira, 2002-NMCA-037,
q 17, 132 N.M. 8, 43 P.3d 359 (“Whether a particular sentence amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment raises a constitutional question of law that we review de novo
on appeal.”). “However, because -a cruel and unusual punishment challenge
necessarily focuses on the factual circumstances of the particular case, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision and defer to the district
court on evidentiary matters of weight and credibility.” Jd. We accept those findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence. See Arrington I, 1993-NMCA-
055, { 13 (noting that “substantial evidence is that evidence which is acceptable to a
reasonable mind as adequate support for a conclusion”).

412} Although Plaintiff states that this Court should assess the “sufficiency of the
evidence,” he did not specifically challenge the district court’s findings of fact in his
brief in chief. Defendant argued that, consequently, this Court is bound by the district
court’s findings of fact. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (stating that in the brief in
chief, an appellant shall “shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or the finding
shall be deemed conclusive”). In his reply brief, Plaintiff responded that he “has
directly challenged” ten specific findings of fact. Other than this single assertion,
however, Plaintiff does not address the substance of the findings nor specify how the
district court erred in its assessment of the evidence. Rather, in his briefing, Plaintiff

“discussed only those facts which [he] argues tend to show that some of the district

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court’s findings were contradicted” and “wholly fail[ed] to address the substance of
all the evidence bearing on the findings.” Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cty. Sheriff's
Dep’t, 2010-NMCA-021, 4 17, 147 N.M. 720, 228 P.3d 504, aff'd, 2011-NMSC-
039, 7 1, 150 N.M. 650, 265 P.3d 701. “In doing so, [Plaintiff] . . . did not
demonstrate how the evidence supporting the district court’s findings fails to amount
to substantial evidence.” Wachocki, 2010-NMCA-021, 4 17. Under these
circumstances, we decline to address Plaintiff's sufficiency of the evidence
argument. See id.
{13} Our focus, then, is on the district court’s legal conclusion that the findings of
fact, to which we are bound, failed to demonstrate that Defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical care. The district court did not make a
finding specifically addressing the objective component of the deliberate
indifference analysis. Nevertheless, assuming that component is satisfied, we
conclude that the subjective component was not. As to the subjective component,
the district court found as follows:
[6]c. [Defendant] based his statements to Judge Quinn [at the
April 29, 2010 hearing] on his impression that Plaintiff had already

been approved by a transplant board for a kidney transplant and that it
was scheduled in the very near future.

9. Judge Quinn contacted Defendant . . . at the subsequent
hearing held on May 5, 2010 and asked him to give an update as to

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being able to meet Plaintiff's needs “if he’s, uh, qualified for transplant
and all that.” Defendant . . . provided the following information:

a. Defendant . . . provided the information from the
[UMC] Transplant Coordinator including that Plaintiff's candidacy for
transplant was at the discretion of the transplanting facility, that UMC
would not accept Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff's son had not been matched
with Plaintiff for transplant.

b. Defendant . . . also stated that based upon his discussion
with UMC, Plaintiff was not that far along towards an evaluation and
that a kidney transplant was by no means a certain thing. They were
still unsure whether he would be a good candidate for it.

C. Defendant . . . stated that if Plaintiff was placed into the
custody of the [NMDOC], NMDOC did have the capabilities to

continue him on his dialysis treatments.

d. Defendant... further stated the position of the State is that
if somebody is a good transplant candidate pursuant to the rules of that
transplant hospital and they approve him for transplant, the State will
support it.

e. Judge Quinn advised Defendant . . . “we may be contacting
you further.” The call with [Defendant] was terminated and he was
absent for the remainder of the discussions during the hearing.

10. Following the two (2) hearings, Judge Quinn
ordered ... Plaintiff remanded to the custody of the NMDOC with
verbal assurances he would receive dialysis three (3) times per week
and would get transported to Lubbock whenever it was necessary.

[25]h. Although Defendant . . . mistakenly understood in
2010 that the University of New Mexico did not provide transplants for
inmates, Dr. Kumar informed Plaintiff that there were facilities that
provided transplant options in New Mexico.

Mm BWHN—

26. When Defendant Vaughn reviewed the Judgment [sic],
Sentence, Commitment and Order Partially Suspending Sentence and
Amended Judgment[sic], it lacked any reference to a requirement to
facilitate Plaintiff's transport to and from Lubbock, Texas during his
incarceration.

We agree with the district court that these facts do not demonstrate that Defendant
acted with “a sufficiently culpable mental state.” Griffin, 2009-NMCA-066, ¥ 9.
Defendant made the statement that NMDOC could “absolutely” transport Plaintiff
to Lubbock for a kidney transplant in the context of his understanding that Plaintiff
had been approved for a transplant and that surgery was imminent. The subsequent
statement that NMDOC “would support” a transplant if a hospital approved it
followed Defendant’s recitation of information from the UMC transplant
coordinator, to wit: UMC would not perform a transplant for Plaintiff and Plaintiff's
son had not been approved as a donor. Thus, Defendant’s statement about
NMDOC’s future support was general and theoretical. Under these circumstances,
Defendant’s statements in the April and May hearings do not constitute deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff's care. Moreover, the district court found that Defendant
“mistakenly” stated that the University of New Mexico did not perform kidney
transplants. A finding that Defendant was mistaken precludes the conclusion that he
made the statement with deliberate indifference. Cf Archuleta v. Goldman, 1987-
NMCA-049, 7 5, 107 N.M. 547, 761 P.2d 425 (“Inadvertent failure to provide

adequate medical care, e.g., negligent diagnosis or treatment does not ... state a

valid cause of action under Section 1983.”). In addition, the district court found that
Defendant was not present when Judge Quinn stated the conditions upon which
Plaintiff would be committed to NMUDOC’s custody. Consequently, Defendant had
no knowledge of those conditions and no opportunity to clarify whether NUDOC
could transport Plaintiff to Lubbock “whenever necessary.” Finally, the judgment
and sentence did not include Judge Quinn’s oral conditions. To the extent Plaintiff
argues that Defendant recklessly ignored the terms of his sentence, we conclude that
Defendant could not have been deliberately indifferent to conditions of Plaintiff's
sentence of which he was unaware.

{14} Viewing the district court’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to its
legal conclusion, see Ira, 2002-NMCA-037, J 17, we conclude that the facts here do
not rise to deliberate indifference. See Lessen v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-
085, 7 30, 144 N.M. 314, 187 P.3d 179 (stating that “allegations of conduct that is
merely negligent are insufficient to establish such a constitutional violation’); cf
Archuleta, 1987-NMCA-049, § 5 (stating that only medical care so “woefully
inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all[]” may “evidenc[e] a constitutional
violation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Conclusion

15} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that
Defendant did not act with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical care and its

judgment in favor of Defendant.

1 {16} IT IS SO ORDERED.
2 3
Tenda Wany
LINDA MI VANZI, Judge
4 WE CONCUR:
5 Kristina Bogardus
6
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
7 8
Megan P Dulles
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge
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May 31, 2019- James Sneed, Jr. v. Stephan A. Vaughn, No. A-1-CA-36191

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