August 22, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Dimitrice Edwards, No. A-1-CA-37208

1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 Opinion Number: --,--------
3 Filing Date: August 22, 2019
4 No. A-1-CA-37208
5 	STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
6 	Plaintiff-Appellee,
7 v.
8 DIMITRICE EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
11 	Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
12 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
13 	Santa Fe, NM
14 Lauren J. W olongevicz, Assistant Attorney General
15 	Albuquerque, NM
16 for Appellee
17 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
18 	John Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
19 	Santa Fe, NM
20 for Appellant
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/22/2019 11:06 AM

1 	OPINION
2 HANISEE, Judge. _
3 	{t} 	Defendant Dimitrice Edwards conditionally pled guilty to possession of a
4 controlled substance, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (E) (2011 ), and
5 was sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. Having reserved the right
6 to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant now argues
7 that his constitutional rights were violated based upon an absence of reasonable
8 suspicion underlying the arresting officer's Terry stop. Applying the United States
9 Supreme Court's recent decision in Utah v. Strief!, 	136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), we
10 conclude that Defendant's preexisting, independent, valid arrest warrant was an
11 	intervening cause that attenuated any otherwise unlawful seizure of Defendant or
12 evidence from his person during a search incident to arrest. We therefore affirm the
13 	district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
14 BACKGROUND
15 	{2} 	Clovis Police Department Officer Christian Townsend was on patrol at
16 approximately 3:00 a.m. when he heard over his police radio that "shots had been
17 fired" at 2221 Llano Estacado, an event venue. Upon learning that a Curry County
18 	Sheriffs deputy was already at the scene and requesting assistance from other law
19 enforcement officers, Officer Townsend rushed to the location with his patrol unit's
20 emergency lights and siren on, unaware if a shooter was present at the scene. Upon

1 arrival, he saw "people leaving the scene" and decided to position his vehicle to
2 "block[] the eastbound lanes of Llano Estacado [to prevent] traffic from moving."
3 Officer Townsend observed there to be "approximately fifty people" in the roadway,
4 in vehicles, and in the parking lot.
5 {3} 	In order of proximity to him, Officer Townsend approached "the vehicles and
6 [asked occupants] what they had seen or heard, [their] names or phone numbers or
7 other basic information" and then, one by one, allowed them to leave. Defendant
8 was a passenger in the rear seat of the third or fourth vehicle Officer Townsend
9 approached. 	When 	questioned 	by 	Officer 	Townsend, 	the 	vehicle 	occupants
10 collectively responded that none had "seen ,or heard anything," which was contrary
11 	to Officer Townsend's interviews with people in preceding vehicles. Also, the
12 vehicle occupants claimed that they came to "pick somebody up," but had not yet
13 	done so, though all five seats in the vehicle were already occupied.
14 {4} 	Suspicious, Officer Townsend began what he described as an "investigative
15 	detention," requesting identification from each person, including Defendant, who
16 either handed Officer Townsend identification or provided his name and date of
17 birth. Officer Townsend quickly discovered that Defendant had an outstanding
18 warrant for his arrest, arrested Defendant, and when Defendant was later searched
19 	incident to his arrest, narcotics were found on his person. Defendant appeals his
20 conviction and sentence associated therewith.
2

1 DISCUSSION
2 {5} 	"Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
3 and fact." State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008,, 13, 437 P.3d 182 (internal quotation
4 marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	First, 	we 	review 	the 	district 	court's 	factual
5 determinations 	for 	substantial 	evidence, 	and 	then 	review 	the 	district 	court's
6 application of the law to those facts de novo. State v. Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017,, 10,
7 414 	P.3d 	332. 	Defendant 	has 	not 	argued 	on 	appeal 	that 	"the 	New 	Mexico
8 Constitution affords him greater protection than that afforded under the United
9 States Constitution[,]" and we review his claim only under the Fourth Amendment.
10 State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018,, 9, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856.
11 {6} 	Assuming 	without deciding the 	merit 	of Defendant's 	challenges to 	the
12 existence of reasonable suspicion related to the on-scene deputy's law enforcement
13 	bulletin and Officer Townsend's ensuing detention, identification, and arrest of
14 Defendant, we tum directly to the issue upon which we affirm. See State v. Gonzales,
15 	2011-NMCA-007,, 13, 149 N.M. 226,247 P.3d 1111 ("Even ifwe were to assume
16 without deciding that [the federal statute at issue] was violated in this case, [the
I
17 d]efendant ... is not entitled to exclusion of the evidence."). That is, we first resolve
18 	whether, under United States Supreme Court precedent, Defendant's preexisting
19 arrest warrant operates to excuse mistaken or unlawful police action preceding
20 Defendant's arrest. Defendant argues that Strief!does not justify Officer Townsend's
3

1 detention of him because the State did not "show how much time elapsed between
2 	[Officer Townsend's] act of obtaining [Defendant's] identification and the discovery
3 	of the contraband, or any intervening circumstances besides the discovery of the
4 warrant via the impermissible request for [Defendant's] identification." Defendant
5 further contends that "the police conduct was flagrant" because there were "three
6 separate 	search-and-seizure 	violations 	of [Defendant's] 	rights." 	Asserting 	that
7 Defendant was seized from the moment Officer Townsend initially began his
8 interaction with the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, Defendant argues
9 that the lack of reasonable suspicion to request his identification cannot be excused
10 under Strie.ff.
11 	{7} 	The State answers that under Strief!, the preexisting warrant for Defendant's
12 arrest 	constitutes 	"an 	intervening 	circumstance" 	that 	in 	this 	instance 	excuses
13 	whatever constitutional impropriety this Court might find preceded Defendant's
14 	seizure, identification, warrant-based arrest, and the discovery of contraband in the
15 	ensuing search of Defendant's person. Speaking to the collective facts of this case,
16 the State asserts "there is no evidence of police misconduct [despite the lack of
17 evidence regarding] . . . the lapsed time between the possible illegality and the
18 	acquisition of evidence." We agree with the State and explain.
4

1 Defendant's Arrest Warrant Was an Intervening Cause That Attenuated His
2 	Unlawful Seizure From Evidence Obtained After His Arrest
3 	{8} 	Long ago, the United States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule
4 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other grounds by
5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), disallowing as trial evidence that seized in
6 contravention of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (declaring such
7 evidence 	to 	be 	inadmissible 	as 	well 	in 	state 	courts 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
8 Amendment's Due Process Clause). However, under the Fourth Amendment, the
9 exclusionary rule is applied "only ... where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
10 	substantial 	social 	costs," 	consistent with the principle that 	"[s]uppression 	of
11 	evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse." Hudson v.
12 Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
13 	Accordingly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	several 	exceptions 	to 	the
14 exclusionary rule, one of which is the attenuation doctrine, addressed in Strief!under
15 	very similar circumstances to those with which we are faced, and which held that
16 "[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police
17 conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
18 	circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
19 been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained." 136 S.
20 	Ct. at 2061 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
5

1 {9} 	Indeed, Strief! too evaluated an unconstitutional encounter during which an
2 officer requested the defendant's identification, learned of a preexisting and valid
3 arrest warrant, arrested the defendant, and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia
4 during a search incident to arrest. Id. at 2060. Considering three factors originally
5 set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), namely: (1) the lapsed
6 time between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) "the presence of
· 7 intervening circumstances," and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official
8 misconduct," the 	Supreme Court in Strief! held that the "unlawful 	stop was
9 sufficiently attenuated by the pre[]existing arrest warrant." Streiff, 	136 S. Ct. at
10 2062-63; 	see also 	Tapia, 	2018-NMSC-017, 	, 	15 	(applying 	Brown 	factors 	to
11 	attenuation inquiry). Strieff noted as well that the officer that initiated the mistaken
12 	stop acted lawfully thereafter, that the warrant check "was a negligibly burdensome
13 	precaution for officer safety[,]" that the unlawful stop was not "part 	of any
14 systematic or recurrent police misconduct[,]" and that the officer's instance of
15 	negligence "occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation." 136 S. Ct. at
16 	2063 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
17 	{to} 	We therefore tum to the facts of this case to ascertain whether or not the
18 	attenuation doctrine, as applied to the preexisting, active arrest warrant in Strief!,
19 acts similarly here to permit the seizure of evidence from Defendant's person
20 following his arrest, even if that seizure were otherwise unlawful. We proceed to
6

1 apply the Brown factors to this case determine "whether the discovery of a valid
2 arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain between
3 the unlawful [detention of Defendant] and the discovery of drug-related evidence on
4 [Defendant's] person." Id. at 2061.
5 {11} 	Beginning with the first Brown factor, the lapsed time between the illegality
6 and the acquisition of the evidence, we agree with Defendant and the State that there
7 is no evidence regarding how much time elapsed between Officer Townsend's
8 unlawful detention of Defendant when he initially made contact with his vehicle, or
9 in the alternative when Officer Townsend requested Defendant's identification. See
10 	Tapia, 2018-NMSC-O 17, 1 3 5. Generally, this factor weighs in favor of suppression
11 	"unless substantial time elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is
12 obtained." Strief!, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we
13 	lack information that would assist us in determining this factor, we conclude that it
14 	favors suppression.
15 	{12} 	Second, we consider "any intervening circumstances that serve to attenuate
16 the illegal detention from the discovery of the evidence." Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017,
17 1 36. Here, because Defendant had a preexisting, untainted, valid arrest warrant,
18 	which obligated Officer Townsend to arrest Defendant when he discovered it, this
19 factor "strongly favors" attenuation. See Strief!, 136 S. Ct. at 2062-63 (holding that
20 the existence of an arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance where it "was
7

1 valid, it predated [the officer's] investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with
2 the [investigatory detention]"). Finally, "we assess the purpose and flagrancy of the
3 police misconduct." Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017,, 38. "For the violation to be flagrant,
4 more severe police misconduct is required than the mere absence of proper cause for
5 the seizure." Strief!, 136 S. Ct. at 2064. Here, Officer Townsend's investigation was
6 clearly not "a suspicionless fishing expedition in the hope that something would tum
7 up." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, Officer Townsend's
8 aim was to investigate the report of a possible serious crime, a shooting, and so he
9 sought to interview potential departing witnesses in order to ascertain whether they
10 had information that could assist the investigation. At worst, Officer Townsend's
11 	mistake in detaining Defendant until he answered questions and provided his identity
12 was negligent insofar as he lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity related
13 	to Defendant. This is especially so given that Officer Townsend was attempting to
14 investigate a purported shooting contemporaneous to its reported occurrence. There
15 	is no evidence that Officer Townsend "approached and addressed Defendant for
16 arbitrary reasons[,]" and similarly "nothing suggests that admission of the evidence
17 will embolden police to engage in unconstitutional" investigatory detentions. Tapia,
18 	2018-NMSC-017, , 	38. 	We cannot conclude that Officer Townsend detained
19 Defendant for an improper purpose or that ·he was flagrant in his unlawful conduct.
20 This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of attenuation. Accordingly, based upon our
8

1 application of the Brown factors in a circumstance markedly similar to Strief!, we
2 conclude that Defendant's arrest warrant was an intervening cause that broke the
3 causal chain between Officer Townsend's unlawful detention of Defendant and the
4 	seizurerof ·evidence from Defendant after his arrest. As such, under the attenuation
5 doctrine, the evidence discovered on Defendant's person is not subject to the
6 exclusionary rule. We therefore affirm the district court. See State v. Gallegos, 2007-
7 NMSC-007, , 	26, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 ("[W]e will affirm the [district]
8 court's decision ifit was right for any reason so long as it is not unfair to the appellant
9 for us to do so.").
10 	CONCLUSION
11 	{13} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's
12 motion to suppress.
13 	{14}
14
15
IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 WE CONCUR:
17 	,¥,,/--~
18 	KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
19~~p~20 MEGNP. nuFFY,u
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
9