November 12, 2025- Bruce Throne v. The Governing Body of the City of Santa Fe, No. A-1-CA-41954

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: November 12, 2025	3
No. A-1-CA-41954	4
BRUCE THRONE, ANNIE CAMPBELL,	5
MARK BAKER, ROBERT JOSEPHS,	6
CHRISTOPHER WORLAND,	7
STEVEN CLARK, SOL Y LOMAS	8
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION, INC.,	9
and PLAZAS AT PECOS TRAIL	10
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,	11
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,	12
v.	13
THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE	14
CITY OF SANTA FE,	15
Defendant-Respondent,	16
and	17
PIERRE AMESTOY,	18
Real Party in Interest-Respondent.	19
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY	20
Bryan Biedscheid, District Court Judge	21
Hinkle Shanor LLP	22
Thomas M. Hnasko	23
Santa Fe, NM	24
for Petitioners	25
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 11/12/2025 7:48 AM

City of Santa Fe	1
Erin K. McSherry, City Attorney	2
Rebecca Mnuk-Herrmann, Assistant City Attorney	3
Santa Fe, NM	4
for Respondent	5
Sommer Karnes & Associates, LLP	6
Joseph M. Karnes	7
Karl H. Sommer	8
Santa Fe, NM	9
for Real Party in Interest-Respondent	10

OPINION	1
WRAY, Judge.	2
{1} 	Multiple 	community 	members 	and 	community 	organizations 	(the	3
Community) appeal the decision (the Decision) to approve a request from Pierre	4
Amestoy (Developer) to rezone a piece of property (the Property) from one	5
residential unit per gross acre (R1) to three residential units per gross acre (R3). The	6
Property is adjacent to Old Pecos Trail, which the City of Santa Fe, N.M. General	7
Plan (the SF General Plan, the General Plan, or the general plan) describes as “an	8
unspoiled entryway into downtown.” SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3.5 at 3-13 (1999).	9
The Community opposed the rezoning and maintained that when the SF General	10
Plan was adopted in 1999, the Governing Body of the City of Santa Fe (the	11
Governing Body) had committed to (1) designating an area that included the	12
Property as a scenic corridor, and (2) developing land use, density, and design	13
control standards for that area through a public participation process. On appeal in	14
this Court, the Community maintains that the Governing Body disregarded the	15
promise for a public participation process regarding Old Pecos Trail that was	16
expressed in the SF General Plan and that as a result, the decision to approve the	17
rezoning (the Decision) misapplied the legal requirements for rezoning, was not	18
based on substantial evidence, and was arbitrary and capricious. The Community	19
additionally contends that it did not receive due process from the City of Santa Fe	20

2
(the City) during the rezoning proceedings. After careful attention to the record, the	1
relevant law, and the arguments made by the parties in briefing and at oral argument,	2
we affirm.	3
BACKGROUND	4
{2} 	To understand the particulars of the appeal, it is necessary to begin with the	5
structure and relevant contours of the SF General Plan and the rezoning ordinances	6
before turning to the facts of the present case.	7
The SF General Plan	8
{3} 	In 1999, the City passed what is titled, “A Resolution Adopting the Santa Fe	9
General Plan Update, Pursuant to [NMSA 1978,] Section 3-19-10 [(1965)].”	10
Resolution No. 1999-45, Governing Body (Santa Fe, N.M. Apr. 14, 1999). By this	11
resolution, the City adopted the SF General Plan, which is organized into ten	12
chapters that each address a general topic. The first chapter, “Introduction and	13
General Plan Themes,” explains that the SF General Plan is “at the heart of	14
community decision[-]making” and “provides guidance for development proposals”	15
as well as other considerations impacting the City. See SF General Plan, ch. 1, § 1.1	16
at 1-1 (1999). Also included in the first chapter is a detailed provision about public	17
participation and provisions outlining “General Plan Themes,” which include	18
creating affordable housing, ensuring sustainable growth, maintaining the City’s	19

3
unique character, and promoting a compact urban form and infill.0F
1 See SF General	1
Plan, ch. 1, §§ 1.6 at 1-6 to -7; 1.7.1 at 1-10; 1.7.5 at 1-11; 1.7.8 at 1-12; 1.7.9 at 1-	2
12 to -13 (1999). In the final paragraph of the first chapter, the SF General Plan	3
states:	4
With this General Plan, the [C]ity is committing itself to consistency	5
between 	the 	General 	Plan 	and 	the 	implementing 	programs 	and	6
regulations, including zoning and subdivision regulations and the	7
[Capital Improvements Program]. Criteria and procedures to ensure	8
consistency between the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance are also	9
established, including an orderly process for General Plan amendments.	10
See SF General Plan, ch. 1, § 1.7.14 at 1-14 (1999). The nine remaining chapters	11
include “Land Use” and “Community Services and Development.” See SF General	12
Plan, Table of Contents at i, vi (1999). Each chapter begins with a section titled,	13
“Themes,” 	followed 	by 	sections 	titled, 	“Guiding 	Policies” 	and 	ending 	with	14
“Implementing Policies.” Id.; see SF General Plan, ch. 1, § 1.3 at 1-4 (1999)	15
(describing the plan organization). The SF General Plan explains that “Guiding	16
Policies” set forth the City’s “goals and philosophy” and “describe ways or methods	17
that the themes listed in each chapter can be achieved.” SF General Plan, ch. 1, § 1.3	18
at 1-4 (1999). The “Implementing Policies” provisions “represent commitments to	19
1 The Santa Fe, N.M., City Code (SF Code) defines “infill” as “[t]he
development of more intensive land uses on vacant or underutilized sites.” SF Code,
ch. 14, art. 12, § 14-12.1, Infill (2025).

4
specific actions” and “may refer to existing programs or call for establishment of	1
new ones.” Id.	2
{4} 	The Land Use chapter opens with the following introduction:	3
The text and policies of the Land Use chapter are expressed through the	4
Themes, Guiding Policies, and Implementing Policies. Land Policy	5
Overlays (Figure 3-1), and Future Land Use (Figure 3-2) are graphic	6
representations of these policies, designating only the proposed general	7
location, 	distribution, 	and 	extent 	of 	land 	uses; 	they 	are 	not 	by	8
themselves 	“the 	General 	Plan.” 	They 	should 	be 	used 	only 	in	9
conjunction with other figures and text in the Plan.	10
SF General Plan, ch. 3 at 3-1 (1999). The themes for the Land Use chapter repeat	11
many of the first chapter’s themes: affordable housing, sustainable growth, and	12
maintaining the City’s “unique personality.” Id. The Guiding Policies section repeats	13
the City’s commitment to affordable housing and infill, SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3-	14
G-3 at 3-2 (1999), and sets forth defined use classes for land, including “Very Low	15
Density Residential,” of one to three units per gross acre (R1-R3), and “Low Density	16
Residential,” of three to seven units per gross acre (R3-R7). SF General Plan, ch. 3,	17
§ 3.5 at 3-10 (1999).	18
{5} 	Another recognized use class is the “Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor,” which	19
the Land Use chapter designates “as a scenic roadway,” recognizing “its importance	20
as an unspoiled entryway into downtown” (the OPTSC Use Classification). SF	21
General Plan, ch. 3, § 3.5 at 3-10, -13 (1999). The OPTSC Use Classification directs	22
that “[d]evelopment standards, including land uses, density, and design controls, will	23

5
be developed through a public participation process.” Id. at 3-13. The Implementing	1
Policies section, which again the SF General Plan described as “commitments to	2
specific actions,” see SF General Plan, ch. 1, § 1.3 at 1-4 (1999), expressly lists the	3
following: 	“Adopt 	an 	Old 	Pecos 	Trail 	‘Scenic 	Corridor’ 	designation 	and	4
development standards for Old Pecos Trail between Cordova Road and I-25.” SF	5
General Plan, ch. 3, § 3.6(3-I-9) at 3-15 (1999) (OPTSC Implementing Policy). We	6
refer to the OPTSC Use Classification and the OPTSC Implementing Policy	7
collectively as the OPTSC Policies. Though efforts were made to implement the	8
OPTSC Policies, attempts at a draft ordinance stalled.	9
{6} 	In 2015, the City adopted Resolution No. 2015-92, Governing Body (Santa	10
Fe, N.M. Oct. 14, 2015) (Resolution 2015-92), which directed City staff (Staff) “to	11
complete the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor Plan by following the necessary public	12
process.” The parties agree that the OPTSC Policies and the directive in Resolution	13
2015-92 were never accomplished.	14
The City’s Rezoning Criteria	15
{7} 	The Santa Fe, N.M., City Code (SF Code), ch. 14, § 14-3.5 (2025),1F
2 governs	16
rezoning requests. The City “shall review all rezoning proposals” based on the	17
criteria set forth in SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5 (2025), and “make complete findings	18
2 The parties identify no relevant differences between the SF Code that was in
effect at the time of the application and the current code, and we therefore cite the
current code.

6
of fact sufficient to show” the criteria are met “before recommending or approving	1
any rezoning.” SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1) (2025). Three of the criteria are	2
relevant to this appeal. First, rezoning requires that “one or more” of three	3
conditions must be met, and for the present case, the disputed condition is whether	4
“a different use category is more advantageous to the community, as articulated in	5
the general plan or other adopted city plans.” 	See 	SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-	6
3.5(C)(1)(a)(iii) 	(2025) 	(Requirement 	1a). 	Second, 	the 	rezoning 	must 	be	7
“consistent with the applicable policies of the general plan, including the future	8
land use map.” SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1)(c) (2025) (Requirement 1c). Third,	9
“[u]nless the proposed rezoning is consistent with applicable general plan policies,	10
the planning commission and the governing body shall not recommend or approve	11
any rezoning, the practical effect of which is to”:	12
(a) 	allow uses or a change in character significantly different from	13
or inconsistent with the prevailing use and character in the area;	14
(b) 	affect an area of less than two acres, unless adjusting boundaries	15
between districts; or	16
(c) 	benefit 	one 	or 	a 	few 	landowners 	at 	the 	expense 	of 	the	17
surrounding landowners or general public.	18
SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(2) (2025) (Requirement 2).	19

7
The Planning Commission and Governing Body Process in the Present Case	1
{8} 	It was in this context that Developer applied for the rezoning, from R1 to R3,	2
of nearly ten acres of land located adjacent to Old Pecos Trail, “in order to allow	3
“a residential low-density development.” The rezoning request proceeded through	4
several steps. Developer, as required by the SF Code, first participated in early	5
neighborhood notification meetings with the public before submitting the rezoning	6
application to the planning commission. See SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.1(F)(2)(a)(iii)	7
(2025) (addressing early neighborhood notification); SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-	8
3.5(B)(1)(a) (2025) (requiring that “[a]ll proposed rezonings shall be submitted to	9
the planning commission for review and recommendation at a public hearing”).	10
The planning commission received extensive public comment on the application,	11
held public hearings, and recommended that the Governing Body approve the	12
rezoning request. See SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(B)(1) (2025).	13
{9} 	For its review of the rezoning application, the Governing Body received	14
additional extensive public comment as well as over one thousand pages from the	15
planning commission, which included a memorandum, supporting documents,	16
meeting 	minutes, 	and 	the 	written 	public 	comment 	submitted 	during 	that	17
proceeding. Before the first public hearing in front of the Governing Body, one of	18
the Community members, Mr. Throne, requested and was denied the opportunity	19
to cross-examine both Developer and the City land use staff. The first public	20

8
meeting included presentations from Developer and Staff as well as two-minute	1
statements from individual members of the public. The second public meeting	2
included questions by the Governing Body to Staff, Developer, and members of	3
the public. In the third hearing, the Governing Body continued questioning,	4
debated the issue, and ultimately, approved the rezoning request.	5
{10} 	The Governing Body adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law related	6
to Requirements 1a, 1c, and 2. To approve the rezoning, the Governing Body relied	7
on Requirement 1a and found as follows:	8
[T]he proposed use category of R-3 is more advantageous to the	9
community than R-1 for the following reasons:	10
(1) The proposed rezoning conforms with the 1999 General Plan’s	11
policy of adding infill housing at a denser rate than the already built	12
surrounding areas while still maintaining the residential character	13
of the neighborhood; and	14
(2) Allowing 25 units of housing with five affordable units is more	15
advantageous than a maximum of nine housing units on the same	16
amount of land; and	17
(3) The proposed rezoning aligns with the designation on the	18
General Plan Future Land Use map that this property should be Low	19
Density Residential, with 3 to 7 dwelling units per acre.	20
In accordance with Requirement 1c, the Governing Body found that the rezoning	21
proposal	22
aligns with the City’s General Plan policies, including by making	23
efficient use of vacant residentially designated land within the city	24
limits by having higher densities on infill sites than on already buil[t]	25
surrounding 	areas. 	The 	Governing 	Body 	further 	concludes 	that	26

9
[Developer]’s rezoning request with a proposed density of R-3 follows	1
the General Plan Future Land Use Map policy adopted in 1999, which	2
designates this Property as Low Density Residential, appropriate for 3	3
to 7 dwelling units per acre and resolves a conflict between the	4
General Plan’s Future Land Use Map designation and the existing R-1	5
zoning on the Property.	6
Relating to Requirement 2, the Governing Body found that “this change in density	7
aligns the Property with the General Plan for the benefit of the City. By adding to	8
the city community housing pool, the density increase will result in the benefit of	9
additional housing for the general public.”	10
{11} 	The Community appealed the Decision to the district court under Rule 1-074	11
NMRA, and argued that (1) the Decision did not comply with the SF Code or the SF	12
General Plan; and (2) the Governing Body’s procedures for considering Developer’s	13
rezoning application violated due process protections. The district court affirmed.	14
This Court then granted the Community’s petition to review the district court’s	15
decision. See Rule 1-074(V); Rule12-505(A) NMRA.	16
DISCUSSION	17
{12} 	The Community raises the same two categories of issues on appeal. The	18
Community challenges the correctness of the Decision to approve Developer’s	19
rezoning request and the processes used to consider the application. We review the	20
Decision and the Governing Body’s approval of the rezoning application to	21
determine whether it was contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or unsupported	22
by the evidence. See Shook v. Governing Body of City of Santa Fe, 2023-NMCA-	23

10
086, ¶ 18, 538 P.3d 466; see also NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(D) (1999) (outlining the	1
standard of review for administrative appeals to the district court); Gallup Westside	2
Dev., LLC v. City of Gallup, 2004-NMCA-010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 30, 84 P.3d 78	3
(applying the same standard of review on appeal as the district court). We consider	4
de novo whether the process afforded to the Community was constitutionally	5
adequate. See Shook, 2023-NMCA-086, ¶¶ 18, 21. We begin our analysis with the	6
merits of the rezoning decision.	7
I. 	The Decision Approving Developer’s Rezoning Application	8
{13} 	The Community maintains that the Governing Body’s approval of the	9
rezoning application was contrary to SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5 (2025) because the	10
Governing Body did not make complete findings of fact showing that the rezoning	11
request satisfied Requirement 1a and was more “advantageous to the community, as	12
articulated in the general plan or other adopted city plans.” See SF Code, ch. 14,	13
§ 14-3.5(C)(1)(a)(iii) (2025). In this regard, the Governing Body found, in relevant	14
part, that rezoning would be more “advantageous to the community” because (1) the	15
future 	land 	use 	map 	(the 	Map)2F
3 designated 	the 	property 	as 	“Low 	Density	16
Residential, with 3 to 7 dwelling units per acre” and the existing R-1 zoning on the	17
Property conflicted with 	the Map’s 	R3-R7 	designation; 	and 	(2) R-3 	zoning	18
3 By the term “the Map,” we refer to the Map that the Governing Body
considered in this proceeding, dated July 2003.

11
“conforms with the 1999 General Plan’s policy of adding infill housing at a denser	1
rate than the already built surrounding areas while still maintaining the residential	2
character of the neighborhood” and 25 houses with some affordable units are “more	3
advantageous” than nine houses on the same land. The Community argues that these	4
findings improperly rely entirely on the Map, disregard the OPTSC Policies, create	5
a conflict with the SF General Plan, and are therefore contrary to law, arbitrary and	6
capricious, and unsupported by the evidence. See Shook, 2023-NMCA-086, ¶ 18	7
(setting forth the standard for review of administrative decisions).	8
A. 	The Map	9
{14} 	The Community argues that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the	10
Governing Body’s reliance on the Map did not satisfy Requirement 1a, because the	11
Map cannot by itself establish policy; the Map is relevant only to determinations	12
under Requirement 1c; and the R3-R7 density indicated on the Map is not otherwise	13
supported by the text of the SF General Plan. As to the first argument, the Governing	14
Body’s findings explicitly indicate that rezoning is consistent with the SF General	15
Plan policies for infill, affordable housing, and maintaining the character of the area.	16
See SF General Plan, ch. 3 at 3-1 (1999); SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3-G-3 at 3-2	17
(1999); see also SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3.6 at 3-14 to -15 (1999) (identifying	18
similar implementing policies). Thus, the Governing Body did not rely solely on the	19
Map in order to satisfy Requirement 1a.	20

12
{15} 	Nor are we persuaded that the Governing Body improperly considered the	1
Map as a factor in the Requirement 1a balance. The Community maintains that the	2
Governing Body improperly used the Map in two respects. First, the Community	3
argues that the Map was exclusively relevant to Requirement 1c, because only that	4
criteria directly refers to the Map. Compare SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1)(a)(iii)	5
(2025), with SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1)(c) (2025). Second, the Community	6
points to the limitations imposed on the use of the Map by the SF General Plan. See	7
SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3.4 at 3-9 (1999) (explaining that the Map “is a graphic	8
representation of policies contained in the General Plan” and “is to be used and	9
interpreted only in conjunction with the text and other figures contained in the	10
General Plan”); SF General Plan, ch. 3, § 3 at 3-1 (1999) (same). We do not read the	11
Governing 	Body’s 	finding 	that 	referenced 	the Map to 	incorporate irrelevant	12
information or disregard the SF General Plan’s limitations. The Governing Body	13
found that the SF General Plan—as indicated on the Map—expressed a policy in	14
favor of R3-R7 density for the Property. That SF General Plan policy in turn relates	15
the Map to the Requirement 1a criteria—that the rezoning be “more advantageous	16
to the community, as articulated in the general plan.” See SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-	17
3.5(C)(1)(a)(iii) (2025). The Map was further “used only in conjunction with other	18
figures and text in the Plan” because the findings also refer to the SF General Plan	19
policies favoring infill, density, character, and affordable units. SF General Plan, ch.	20

13
3 at 3-1 (1999). In combination, the Governing Body’s findings regarding the Map	1
and the other identified SF General Plan policies satisfied Requirement 1a.	2
{16} 	The Community counters that in light of the OPTSC Policies and Resolution	3
2015-92, the Map was an insufficient basis on which to find that the SF General Plan	4
included a policy favoring R3-R7 density for the Property. Before we turn to this	5
question of sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the Community’s argument that	6
the findings did not legally satisfy SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5 (2025), because they	7
did not address either the OPTSC Policies or Resolution 2015-92.	8
B. 	The OPTSC Policies	9
{17} 	The Community rests its second statutory construction challenge on the	10
absence from the Decision of any discussion of the OPTSC Policies or Resolution	11
2015-92, which establish a specific policy for the creation of development standards	12
for the area including the Property. Based on this silence, the Community argues that	13
the Decision (1) did not satisfy Requirement 1a, which required the Governing Body	14
to make “complete findings” that the rezoning was “more advantageous to the	15
community, as articulated in the general plan,” or Requirement 1c, which mandated	16
that rezoning be “consistent with the applicable policies of the general plan,” see SF	17
Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1)(a)(iii), (c) (2025); and (2) effectuated an amendment to	18
the policy of the SF General Plan without using the required procedures. To address	19
these arguments, we return to the rezoning ordinance.	20

14
{18} 	We disagree that the SF Code requires an explicit finding that a rezoning	1
aligns with every policy asserted in the SF General Plan. As we have explained, the	2
Decision describes the ways in which Developer’s application meets Requirements	3
1a and 1c—how the rezoning “is more advantageous to the community, as	4
articulated in the general plan” and “is consistent with the applicable policies of the	5
general plan,” by articulating SF General Plan policies in favor of infill, higher	6
density, maintaining character, and affordable housing. Requirement 1a does not	7
state that the Governing Body must identify and describe all SF General Plan	8
policies, nor does Requirement 1c mandate that rezoning be “consistent with [all of]	9
the applicable policies of the SF General Plan.” For the purposes of these two	10
Requirements, the Decision’s findings were legally sufficient to be “complete	11
findings of fact sufficient to show that the[] criteria have been met,” SF Code, ch.	12
14, § 14-3.5(C)(1) (2025), even though the findings did not address all of the	13
“articulated” or “applicable policies.”	14
{19} 	The Community contends that not only did the Governing Body not address	15
the OPTSC Policies in the findings and conclusions but that the City attorney	16
advised the Governing Body to not include these policies in the balance—	17
specifically Resolution 2015-92. This, the Community argues, was arbitrary and	18
capricious. The extensive record in this case suggests to the contrary. During one	19
exchange, a City councilor asked whether Resolution 2015-92 could be considered	20

15
an “other adopted city plan” for the purposes of Requirement 1a, and the City	1
attorney responded that Resolution 2015-92 was a “future plan,” suggesting that	2
Resolution 2015-92 was not an “other adopted city plan.” Later in the conversation,	3
the same City councilor stated, in relation to Resolution 2015-92, that “we can’t refer	4
to that as why this application does or doesn’t meet the third criteria,” Requirement	5
1a, for rezoning. The City attorney provided a reason why Resolution 2015-92 was	6
not relevant to Requirement 1a, and this exchange therefore was not arbitrary and	7
capricious. See Behles v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Co. (In re Application of Timberon Water	8
Co.), 1992-NMSC-047, ¶ 8, 114 N.M. 154, 836 P.2d 73 (“For administrative	9
agencies, 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	action 	has 	been 	defined 	as 	willful 	and	10
unreasonable 	action, 	without 	consideration 	and 	in 	disregard 	of 	facts 	or	11
circumstances.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	12
{20} 	Nevertheless, the Community asserts that because the Decision did not	13
explicitly address the OPTSC Policies, the result was an implicit and improper	14
amendment to the SF General Plan. The SF Code, however, in Requirement 2,	15
contemplates that a rezoning decision might not be entirely consistent with the SF	16
General Plan.	17
Unless the proposed change is consistent with applicable general plan	18
policies, the planning commission and the governing body shall not	19
recommend or approve any rezoning, the practical effect of which is	20
to:	21

16
(a) 	allow uses or a change in character significantly different	1
from or inconsistent with the prevailing use and character in	2
the area;	3
(b) 	affect an area of less than two acres, unless adjusting	4
boundaries between districts; or	5
(c) 	benefit one or a few landowners at the expense of the	6
surrounding landowners or general public.	7
SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(2) (2025). In this way, if a rezoning request meets	8
Requirement 1a and 1c because the request aligns with some SF General Plan	9
policies but is still inconsistent with other SF General Plan policies, as in the present	10
case, the rezoning may still be approved under the circumstances outlined in	11
Requirement 2. Id. The Governing Body made those findings in the Decision, and	12
the Community does not challenge them.	13
{21} 	Instead, the Community argues that Requirement 2 does not justify the	14
Decision, and a SF General Plan amendment was required to approve the rezoning.	15
Specifically, the Community argues that Requirement 2 is not satisfied because the	16
Decision contains no finding that the rezoning is “inconsistent” with the OPTSC	17
Policies and because the OPTSC Policies are not inconsistent with the affordable	18
housing policies. To the contrary, however, the evidence presented supports a	19
reasonable inference that the rezoning conflicted with some portion of the SF	20
General Plan. See Baca v. Emp. Servs. Div. of Hum. Servs. Dep’t of N.M., 1982-	21
NMSC-096, ¶ 4, 98 N.M. 617, 651 P.2d 1261 (reviewing findings for substantial	22

17
evidence and explaining that the standard of review for administrative decisions	1
requires a reviewing court to indulge “all reasonable inferences” in support of a	2
conclusion (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	3
{22} 	Although, as we have explained, the rezoning request was consistent with	4
certain aspects of the SF General Plan, it was inconsistent with others. Requirement	5
2 contemplates whether the rezoning request is consistent “with applicable general	6
plan policies.” S.F.Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(2) (2025). The Community, rather than	7
considering inconsistency between the rezoning application and the SF General	8
Plan, focuses on the consistency within the SF General Plan—the OPTSC Policies	9
and the affordable housing policies—and maintains that the policy to have a public	10
process to generate development standards is not inconsistent with the affordable	11
housing policies. This may be true, but importantly for Requirement 2, the	12
application to rezone a single property was not consistent with the OPTSC Policies	13
that provided for a public participation process to determine the development	14
standards for an area that encompassed multiple properties, including the Property	15
at issue. As a result, even though the SF General Plan policies may be consistent	16
with each other, the rezoning application was not consistent with both of the SF	17
General Plan policies. For these reasons, the findings in the Decision that satisfy	18
Requirement 2 were sufficient bases on which to grant the rezoning request. Because	19
the Code permits rezoning that is not consistent with the SF General Plan, an	20

18
amendment to the SF General Plan was not the only pathway to approving the	1
application.	2
{23} 	Throughout 	the 	proceedings, 	the 	Governing 	Body 	was 	provided 	with	3
substantial information about the OPTSC Policies from the public and Staff. During	4
deliberations, more than one Governing Body member referenced aspects of the	5
OPTSC Policies, the need to set standards for the area, and the unfulfilled promise	6
for 	a public 	participation 	process 	to 	set 	development 	standards. 	The 	record	7
demonstrates that the Governing Body weighed and considered the OPTSC Policies.	8
Although the written Decision does not reflect either the extent of the evidence	9
received or all of the arguments made, the findings of fact and conclusions of law	10
include the findings necessary to support the legal requirements for rezoning that are	11
set forth in SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5 (2025). As a result, we conclude that the	12
Decision is not contrary to law. See Gallup Westside Dev., LLC, 2004-NMCA-010,	13
¶ 10 (noting in part that this Court “may reverse an administrative decision,” if the	14
decision-maker “did not act in accordance with the law”).	15
C. 	Conflict With the SF General Plan	16
{24} 	We return to the Community’s argument that the evidence did not support a	17
finding that the SF General Plan, based on the Map alone, expressed an intent for	18
R3-R7 zoning. “Substantial evidence supporting administrative agency action is	19
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a	20

19
conclusion.” See id. ¶¶ 10-11. Before we turn to the evidence, however, we address	1
a threshold issue to the Community’s argument.	2
{25} 	The Community asserts that the Governing Body made no factual finding that	3
the SF General Plan incorporated a policy for R3-R7 zoning, but instead “treat[ed]	4
this as an issue of law.” This argument is apparently based on the placement of the	5
language in the “Conclusions of Law” section of the Decision rather than the section	6
titled “Findings of Fact.” We, however, are not bound by the labels attached to	7
findings of fact and conclusions of law, Comm’r of Motor Vehicles v. McCain (In re	8
McCain), 1973-NMSC-023, ¶ 5, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204, and “the question of	9
whether a particular issue is a question of fact or a question of law is itself a legal	10
issue upon which we are free to make our own determination,” State ex rel. Martinez	11
v. Lewis, 1993-NMCA-063, ¶ 25, 116 N.M. 194, 861 P.2d 235.	12
{26} 	In the present case, the Map has generated both factual and legal disputes	13
regarding the intent of the SF General Plan. Factually, the record shows that the	14
parties disputed whether the SF General Plan, when it was adopted in 1999, actually	15
incorporated the Map, which is dated 2003. We understand the Community to argue	16
that if the Map was not adopted by the SF General Plan, the Map could not inform	17
the SF General Plan’s intent. The Governing Body’s Decision resolves this factual	18
dispute, and we therefore view the Decision’s reference to the intent expressed by	19

20
the Map as a factual finding, which we review for substantial evidence. See Gallup	1
Westside Dev., LLC, 2004-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 10-11.	2
{27} 	The Governing Body heard evidence to support the finding that the Map was	3
part of the SF General Plan when it was adopted in 1999. Staff’s report to the	4
Governing Body stated that	5
[t]he property zoning is R-1 (Residential—one dwelling unit per acre),	6
established at the time of annexation (1961). The General Plan was	7
adopted in 1997 and revised in 1999. The General Plan identified a	8
higher residential density for the property and the properties to the	9
southeast along Old Pecos Trail; that of three to seven dwelling units	10
per acre (R-3 to R-7), characterized as “Low Density.” The General	11
Plan maintained the land west of the Project site (Sol y Lomas	12
Subdivision) at one dwelling unit per acre (R-1) or “Very Low	13
Density.”	14
This statement in the report reflects Staff’s interpretation of the Map. Staff explained	15
that (1) the Map does not depict, and the SF General Plan does not otherwise state,	16
actual dimensions for the area that was intended to be the Old Pecos Trail Scenic	17
Corridor; (2) the Map depicts different zoning preferences for different areas along	18
Old Pecos Trail; and (3) in the project site area, the Map shows R3-R7 zoning. At	19
the third hearing before the Governing Body, Staff produced a large color map, dated	20
1999, that shows the “Low Density Residential” designation (R3-R7) as it also	21
appears to be represented on the Map. Staff’s view of the evidence is implicit in the	22
Decision’s determination about the Map. The Community maintains that this	23
determination, based on Staff’s view of the Map, contradicts the text of the SF	24

21
General Plan—specifically, the OPTSC Policies and Resolution 2015-92—because	1
the SF General Plan adopted no density standards for the area to be designated as	2
the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor and anticipated a public process to create such	3
development standards.	4
{28} 	The difficulty with the Community’s argument is that the SF General Plan did	5
not designate a specific area to be the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor. The OPTSC	6
Policies identify points on Old Pecos Trail that signify the beginning and the ending	7
of what would be the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor. The Map appears to extend	8
the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor onto the properties that abut Old Pecos Trail,	9
but no width for the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor is stated in the SF General Plan	10
or is discernable from the Map. Nor does Resolution 2015-92 provide any clarity.	11
Instead, Resolution 2015-92 observes that the OPTSC Use Classification designated	12
the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor as a “scenic roadway,” describes how the width	13
of another scenic corridor protection district was defined by feet from the roadway	14
and inclusion on a zoning map, notes that “more specific standards” for the Old	15
Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor were not adopted during a public process “in the early	16
2000’s,” and expresses concern that the lack of specificity has “imperiled” the Old	17
Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor. In this way, Resolution 2015-92 highlights the	18
ambiguity in the OPTSC Policies—because the area that the Old Pecos Trail Scenic	19
Corridor was intended to encompass was left largely undefined.	20

22
{29} 	Nevertheless, the ambiguously defined area for the Old Pecos Trail Scenic	1
Corridor easily coexists with the Map’s R3-R7 density standard and the OPTSC	2
Policies. The Map shows that the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor would have	3
abutted the Property, which the Map also shows as an area with R3-R7 zoning. The	4
OPTSC Policies state a directive to engage in a public process to set standards for	5
an unknown area that might include some or all of the Property. Had the public	6
process designated the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor and established development	7
standards, the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor would still have abutted an area with	8
R3-R7 zoning—the boundaries of both would simply be delineated. Thus, the Map	9
does not create a conflict with the SF General Plan. Instead, the policy expressed is	10
that the Old Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor exists and that at least some of the area	11
abutting should be zoned R3-R7.3F
4
12
{30} 	Staff’s view that the Map reflects a policy for R3-R7 zoning is otherwise	13
supported by the SF General Plan’s text. The SF General Plan specifically	14
encourages minimum density standards “of at least five units per acre” to support	15
4 For the same reason, the Community’s arguments for the application of the
general/specific 	rule 	of 	statutory 	interpretation 	are 	of 	little 	assistance. 	The
general/specific rule directs that a more specific statute prevails over a general
statute. See Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty.,
2005-NMSC-023, ¶ 11, 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932. The Community argues that
the OPTSC Policies are more specific policies that create a carve out from other
more 	general 	policies 	and 	therefore 	should 	prevail. 	We 	do 	not 	apply 	the
general/specific 	rule, 	however, 	if 	“it 	is 	possible 	to 	harmonize” 	the 	relevant
provisions, see id., which we have done.

23
affordable housing. See SF General Plan, ch. 9, § 9.1.6 at 9-7 (1999) (providing that	1
“[t]he most important element of planning for affordable housing is higher density”	2
and directs that “[a]long with mandatory minimum densities of at least five units per	3
acre, design and development guidelines should be created”). This section of the SF	4
General Plan is directly referenced in the Land Use chapter’s Guiding Policies. See	5
SF General Plan, ch. 3, at 3-1 (1999) (incorporating SF General Plan, ch. 9, §§ 9.1,	6
9.2 at 9-4, -8 (1999) into the Land Use “Guiding Policies”). As a result, Staff’s	7
interpretation of the Map is in line with “[t]he text and policies of the Land Use	8
chapter” 	that 	“are 	expressed 	through 	the 	Themes, 	Guiding 	Policies, 	and	9
Implementing Policies.” See SF General Plan, ch. 3, at 3-1 (1999).	10
{31} 	The Governing Body adopted Staff’s view of the Map, and in this regard, we	11
do not reweigh or reassess the evidence. See City of Sunland Park v. Harris News,	12
Inc., 2005-NMCA-128, ¶ 21, 138 N.M. 588, 124 P.3d 566 (“We do not reweigh the	13
evidence.”). Staff’s interpretation of the Map did not otherwise contradict the SF	14
General Plan. For these reasons, we conclude that the Governing Body’s Decision	15
was supported by substantial evidence.	16
D. 	The Decision to Approve	17
{32} 	To summarize, the Decision is not contrary to the SF Code. The application	18
satisfied Requirements 1a and 1c because the requested rezoning was “more	19
advantageous to the community, as articulated in the general plan” and was	20

24
“consistent with” the SF General Plan based on policies regarding affordable	1
housing, infill, and the R3-R7 designation that is articulated on the Map. See SF	2
Code, ch. 14, § 14-3.5(C)(1) (2025). Nevertheless, rezoning for a single property	3
could be inconsistent with the OPTSC Policies, which envisioned development	4
standards being created by public process for an entire area designated as the Old	5
Pecos Trail Scenic Corridor. Because the Governing Body’s Decision made findings	6
under Requirement 2, which the Community does not challenge, the rezoning	7
application could be approved despite the inconsistency. See SF Code, ch. 14, § 14-	8
3.5(C)(2) (2025). The record demonstrates that the Governing Body considered the	9
evidence presented by Developer, Staff, and the Community and voted to approve	10
the rezoning. We have examined the entire record, and considering the evidence in	11
the light most favorable to the Decision, we affirm. See Gallup Westside Dev., LLC,	12
2004-NMCA-010, ¶ 11.	13
II. 	The Procedures Afforded to the Community by the City	14
{33} 	The Community argues that reversal is nevertheless required because its	15
members were not afforded due process during the rezoning proceedings. See	16
Albuquerque Commons P’ship v. City Council of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-025,	17
¶ 34, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411 (“[I]n addition to the right to individual notice,	18
interested parties in a quasi-judicial zoning matter are entitled to an opportunity to	19
be heard, to an opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is	20

25
impartial in the matter—i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts	1
concerning the question at issue—and to a record made and adequate findings	2
executed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Community and the	3
Governing Body agree that to evaluate the adequacy of the process afforded, we	4
consider the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as this	5
Court explained in Shook, 2023-NMCA-086, ¶¶ 21-22.	6
{34} 	The Mathews test balances three elements:	7
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the	8
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures	9
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute	10
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the	11
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the	12
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.	13
Shook, 2023-NMCA-086, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The	14
Governing Body does not contest that the Community has a “property interest” that	15
would be affected by the rezoning. Instead, the Governing Body contends that the	16
Community has not shown that the procedures afforded deprived the Community of	17
the private interest, how additional safeguards would have protected the private	18
interest, or that the protections afforded by the procedures that the Community seeks	19
would outweigh any administrative burden on the City in providing them. As we	20
explain, we agree with the Governing Body in the final balance. Under the	21
circumstances of the present case, the administrative burden that would result from	22

26
the additional protections sought by the Community would not have reduced the risk	1
that the Community would be erroneously deprived of rights.	2
{35} 	The additional protections that the Community seeks arose from the following	3
circumstances: (1) one of its members was not permitted to intervene in the	4
proceedings; (2) not all witnesses were sworn before they provided testimony; (3)	5
the Governing Body permitted Staff, but not the public, to submit additional	6
evidence after a prehearing deadline; and (4) the Governing Body allowed Staff to	7
present evidence that the Community did not have an opportunity to rebut or cross-	8
examine. “In conducting quasi[-]judicial hearings an administrative body is not	9
required to observe the same evidentiary standards applied by a court, nevertheless	10
administrative adjudicatory proceedings involving substantial rights of an applicant	11
must adhere to fundamental principles of justice and procedural due process.” State	12
ex rel. Battershell v. City of Albuquerque, 1989-NMCA-045, ¶ 17, 108 N.M. 658,	13
777 P.2d 386; see id. (“In administrative proceedings due process is flexible in	14
nature and may adhere to such requisite procedural protections as the particular	15
situation demands.”). With these precepts in mind, we consider the facts and	16
circumstances of the request for intervention, the late administration of the oath, the	17
submission of evidence, and the ability to cross-examine.	18
{36} 	The intervention of a member of the public would not have provided sufficient	19
additional protection for the rights of the Community to justify the administrative	20

27
burden that would result. The Community argues that the Governing Body should	1
have permitted Mr. Throne to intervene as a party, with additional rights to cross-	2
examine, submit evidence, and object to evidence and procedures. The video record	3
of the three hearing days, however, demonstrates that the Community was able to	4
present evidence, raise questions, and answer inquiries from the Governing Body.	5
Apart from the slide presentation and some testimony at the second hearing day,	6
which we address separately, the Community had notice of the arguments and	7
evidence that would be presented and was able to admirably shape responsive	8
testimony, both in writing and at the hearing. At the time that Mr. Throne moved to	9
intervene, hundreds of community members had submitted public comment to the	10
planning commission. The Community does not acknowledge the administrative	11
burden 	that 	would 	accompany a 	constitutional 	requirement 	to 	permit 	public	12
intervention or explain how the City would accommodate such a requirement. The	13
structure of the public hearings involves written submission, testimony from the	14
applicant, Staff, and the public, and questioning by the Governing Body. See	15
Albuquerque Commons P’ship, 2008-NMSC-025, ¶ 34 (instructing that to satisfy	16
due process, interested parties have a right to be heard by an impartial tribunal,	17
present and rebut evidence, have a record made, and receive adequate findings).	18
Under these circumstances, the Governing Body’s refusal to permit Mr. Throne’s	19
intervention did not violate due process protections.	20

28
{37} 	Nor did the Governing Body’s failure to consistently place witnesses under	1
oath before they testified violate the Community’s right to due process under the	2
circumstances. 	We 	pause 	to 	note 	that 	the 	Governing 	Body 	argues 	that 	no	3
requirement 	existed 	“that 	the 	Governing 	Body 	decision 	be 	based 	on 	sworn	4
testimony.” During the hearings, however, the Governing Body asserted that all of	5
the witnesses would be sworn, the City attorney referenced concerns about unsworn	6
testimony, and generally, the witnesses were systematically sworn. The Governing	7
Body created the perception that the oath was necessary and “fundamental principles	8
of justice” do not allow the Governing Body to disavow a procedure that it adopted.	9
See Battershell, 1989-NMCA-045, ¶ 17 (noting that adherence “to fundamental	10
principles of justice” is required when “substantial rights” are involved in a quasi-	11
judicial administrative proceeding); see also id. ¶ 20 (“The general rule with respect	12
to zoning hearings is that witnesses should be sworn, and their testimony taken only	13
on oath, unless the administration of the oath to witnesses has been waived.”	14
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).	15
{38} 	Nevertheless, we agree with the Governing body that the Community has not	16
identified a substantial right affected by the late provision of the oath to the two Staff	17
witnesses on whom the Community focuses (Witness 1 and Witness 2). At the initial	18
hearing, Witness 1 was not sworn before testifying. At the second hearing, Witness	19
2 testified about the factual history of the OPTSC Policies and Resolution 2015-92	20

29
but was not sworn until a few minutes into the testimony. At the third hearing,	1
Witness 1 was sworn because the City attorney anticipated that the testimony he	2
would give would be “going to stuff that’s outside anything” from Witness 1’s	3
“record from the proceedings below.” The record thus reflects that the oath was	4
eventually administered to both witnesses. The Community does not acknowledge	5
that the impact of the late-administered oaths is a complicated legal question that	6
implicates conflicting policies. See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &	7
Victor J. Gold, 27 Federal Practice & Procedure § 6045 (2d ed. 2025) (describing	8
conflicting policies); cf. State v. Arellano, 1998-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 8-9, 125 N.M. 709,	9
965 P.2d 293 (noting that “irregularities in the swearing of the jury may be waived	10
and do not necessarily constitute reversible error” (internal quotations marks and	11
citation omitted)). The Staff witnesses heard the oath repeated multiple times by	12
other witnesses, were present for the explanation of the procedures and goals for the	13
quasi-judicial hearing, and they themselves swore to tell the truth during the	14
proceedings. Cf. Arellano, 1998-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 11-13 (distinguishing “a complete	15
failure to swear the jury” from administering the oath late and observing that the jury	16
instructions “impressed upon” them “the solemnity of the jury selection process and	17
its important purpose to find impartial persons to try the case” (internal quotation	18
marks and citation omitted)). The record therefore suggests that the Staff appreciated	19
the solemnity of the hearing or were otherwise aware of the consequences of	20

30
dishonesty. As a result, although the impact on the City to require oaths before Staff	1
testimony would have been minimal, the failure to do so under these circumstances	2
did not violate the substantial rights of the Community so as to implicate due process	3
protections.	4
{39} 	The Community’s final two due process arguments relate to evidence	5
submitted during the Governing Body process. Between the first and second	6
hearings before the Governing Body, Mr. Throne asked the City to include minutes	7
from an April 14, 1999 City council meeting, which Mr. Throne asserted “directly	8
address[ed]” the Map and the R3-R7 indication. Mr. Throne acknowledged that the	9
time for public comment had expired but argued that the minutes were relevant to	10
arguments that had been made in the first hearing. The City attorney responded that	11
the period of time to submit written documents had expired, but “if the Governing	12
Body members ask a question that relates to information in a written document, the	13
person(s) responding to such questions are welcome to include information they	14
know based on reviewing written documents in their responses.” Throne replied by	15
pointing out that it was not certain such an opportunity to answer questions would	16
arise and maintained an objection to the procedure. During the second hearing and	17
in response to Governing Body questions, Staff was permitted to present slides that	18
had previously not been shared with the public. The slides set forth a rough outline	19
of the history of the OPTSC Policies, including the Map. On appeal, the Community	20

31
argues that (1) the City unfairly rejected Mr. Throne’s documentary submission but	1
accepted Staff’s slides; and (2) because the slides were not previously disclosed, the	2
Community had no opportunity to challenge that evidence. Though we acknowledge	3
the initial appearance of unfairness, on closer examination, we conclude that the	4
Community had an opportunity to be heard before the Governing Body on these	5
issues and due process was therefore not denied.	6
{40} 	First, the documents offered by Mr. Throne were of a different character than	7
the slides presented by Staff. The slides were not submitted by Staff as documentary	8
evidence and were used as a demonstrative throughout Staff’s presentation and	9
exchange with the Governing Body. 	During the public comment phase, the	10
Governing Body also permitted the public to display slides and videos that had not	11
been submitted as written public comment. The City attorney explained the policy	12
during the third hearing—although the deadline had passed for written submissions,	13
witnesses were permitted to display materials when they spoke with the Governing	14
Body. Thus, permitting Staff to use the slides did not run afoul of the time deadlines	15
the City had set. Indeed, as we have noted, the City attorney had already intimated	16
as much to Mr. Throne when he sought to submit the meeting minutes as written	17
public comment. At the hearing, the City attorney again suggested that Mr. Throne	18
could display the minutes while he was answering the Governing Body’s questions.	19

32
Mr. Throne therefore had the opportunity to use the minutes as a demonstrative	1
exhibit during questioning with the Governing Body.	2
{41} 	Mr. Throne also had the opportunity to comment on Staff’s slides, even	3
though the slides had not been disclosed before the close of public comment. During	4
the third day of the hearings, a City councilor asked Mr. Throne a question, and Mr.	5
Throne took the opportunity to comment fairly extensively on the Map and the	6
R3-R7 indication that Staff had used the slides to explain. The Community protests	7
that Mr. Throne was cutoff, and he was. But not before he expressed his view of the	8
intent in 1999 for the SF General Plan, the inconsistency of the R3-R7 indication	9
with that intent, his attempt to add the meeting minutes to the materials, and what	10
those materials contained. Later in the hearing, Mr. Throne was asked additional	11
questions that allowed him to further expand on the Map, the Governing Body’s	12
intent, and the defects in Developer’s application.	13
{42} 	In this regard, the record shows that the Community had an opportunity to be	14
heard by the Governing Body. “Procedural due process is ultimately about fairness,	15
ensuring that the public is notified about a proposed government action and afforded	16
the opportunity to make its voice heard before that action takes effect.” Rayellen	17
Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Properties Rev. Comm., 2014-NMSC-006, ¶ 28, 319 P.3d	18
639. In this way, due process is not limited to the opportunity to speak, but instead	19
affords the opportunity to be meaningfully heard by those who make decisions that	20

33
could result in a deprivation of protected rights. See Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v.	1
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 2005-NMSC-023, ¶ 28, 138 N.M. 126, 117	2
P.3d 932 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be	3
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”). The Governing Body	4
heard from all participants in a quasi-judicial hearing, and the participants were able	5
to respond to the points that were made by those with opposing views. Considering	6
the circumstances of the hearings, due process was not denied.	7
CONCLUSION	8
{43} 	The unfulfilled promises of the OPTSC Policies are the source of the	9
Community’s discontent, because the Community believed it would have the	10
opportunity to shape the development standards for an area that all agreed is entitled	11
to “special protections.” As a matter of law, our role in the controversy is narrow—	12
to apply the standard of review to ensure that the Governing Body complied with the	13
law, including constitutional protections, and that evidence was presented to support	14
the Decision. See Gallup Westside Dev., LLC, 2004-NMCA-010, ¶ 11 (“We may, if	15
we were fact-finders in this case, come to a different conclusion than the [c]ity; but	16
we may only evaluate whether the record supports the result reached, not whether a	17
different result could have been reached.”). We have reviewed the record and the	18
law, and considering the issues raised in the light of our standard of review, we	19
affirm.	20

34
{44} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
______________________________	2
KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
__________________________	5
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	6
__________________________	7
GERALD E. BACA, Judge	8