June 5, 2019- Phil Sanchez and Tessie Sanchez v. David Sanchez, No. A-1-CA-36221

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 6/5/2019 11:40 AM

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IN UR, OF APPEAI OF THES.4_iG. 3 W : nark Reynol

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PHIL SANCHEZ and TESSIE SANCHEZ,
Plaintiffs-/ >ellants,
v. No. A-1-CA-36221
DAVID SANCH.Z,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee,
and
BARBARA SANCHEZ,
Counterplaintiff.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY
Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge

New Mexico Firm, LLC
Nathaniel V. Thompkins
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellants

Sommer, Udall, ardwick & Jones, P.A.
Jack N. Hardwick

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

1 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
2 	DUFFY, Judge.
3 	{t} 	Plaintiffs Phil Sanchez and Tessie Sanchez appeal the district court's final
4 judgment dismissing their complaint for quiet title and other relief with prejudice
5 	and awarding costs to their son and daughter-in-law, David Sanchez and Barbara
6 	Sanchez (collectively, Counterclaimants ). We affirm.
7 BACKGROUND
8 	{2} 	The parties dispute title to two New Me xico properties: one in Las Nutrias
9 	and one 	in Monero (the Properties). 	The Properties were originally owned by
10 Nicolas Sanchez , the father of Plaintiff Phil Sanchez and his brother, Fidel Sanchez.
11 	Nicolas conveyed all of his interest in the Properties to Plaintiffs, Fidel, and Fidel ' s
12 	wife , Gloria , under a deed that restricted future conveyances to the four of them. In
13 	1996, after Fidel died , Gloria conveyed her interest in the Properties to Plaintiffs
14 	under a warranty deed and installment payment agreement. David contends that the
15 	parties understood that he would pay the installments to purchase Gloria's one-half
16 	interest in the Properties and that, upon payment of the purchase price, Plaintiffs
17 	would convey a one-half interest in the Properties to David. No direct sale could be
18 	made to David because of the restriction on transfer set forth in the deed from
19 Nicolas, and consistent with David's understanding of the events, the 1996 deed
20 	from Gloria to Plaintiffs expressly stated that the limitation on future conveyances
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1 did not apply to the 1996 deed. David paid Plaintiffs, who in tum paid Gloria. Almost
2 nine years after the purchase contract was signed, Plaintiffs executed a warranty
3 deed from Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs and David on May 6, 2005, "for obtaining base
4 property for cattle permits."
5 	{3} 	On March 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a quiet title lawsuit against David and
6 sought to extinguish any claim of ownership he may have in the Properties. They
7 alleged that they did not intend to grant David a permanent interest in the Properties,
8 but rather intended only to temporarily convey an interest in the Properties so that
9 he 	could obtain grazing permit leases from the United States Forest Service.
10 According to Plaintiffs, they believed that David would convey the Properties back
11 	to them after he secured the grazing permits, as Plaintiffs and David had done with
12 	other properties. David filed a counterclaim alleging that he owned a one-half
13 	interest in the Properties and that his wife, Barbara, owned a community interest as
14 a result of her marriage to David.
15 	{4} 	After a three-day bench trial, the district court entered a written decision,
16 	findings and conclusions, and a final judgment in favor of David on count one of his
17 counterclaim, finding that he owned a one-half interest in the Properties. The district
18 	court found that "for [Plaintiffs] to succeed in their quiet title complaint, they must
19 	set aside the 2005 deed," and determined that the gravamen of their argument for
20 doing so was that David had fraudulently obtained the deed. Consequently, the
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1 district court determined that Plaintiffs were required to come within the four-year
2 statute of limitations for fraud, and because they had not, their claim was barred. The
3 court also concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented Plaintiffs from
4 denying David's interest in the properties. The district court further found that David
5 had not procured the 2005 deed by fraud, that Plaintiffs intended to grant David a
6 one-half interest in the Properties pursuant to the purchase contract, and that the 2005
7 deed "on its face grants David an interest in the [Properties]."
8 DISCUSSION
9 	{5} 	On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge only the district court's dismissal of their
10 complaint, arguing that the district court erred in ( 1) characterizing their quiet title
11 	claim as a fraud claim, subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and (2) applying
12 	equitable estoppel to preclude their denial of David's interest in the Properties. We
13 	reviewed Plaintiffs' briefing for any argument challenging the district court's ruling
14 on the counterclaim and found none. While Plaintiffs raised the issue of"[ w ]hether
15 	the district court erred, as a matter of law, in [q]uieting [t] itle in favor of [David] on
16 his counterclaim" in their docketing statement, they did not present any argument
17 	addressed to this issue in their brief in chief. 1 "All issues raised in the docketing
1 We 	note that Counterclaimants invoked equitable estoppel both as an
affirmative defense to Plaintiffs' complaint and as a basis for granting their quiet
title claim in their counterclaim. We reviewed the briefing and the district court's
orders to evaluate whether Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel argument in their brief in
chief related to the complaint or to the counterclaim. The district court's orders make
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1 statement, but not argued in the brief in chief are deemed abandoned." Fleming v.
2 	Town of Silver City, 1999-NMCA-l 49, ~ 3, 128 N.M. 295, 992 P.2d 308; see also
3 	Gibbs v. Whelan, 1952-NMSC-005, ~ 15, 56 N.M. 38, 239 P.2d 727 ("[Our Supreme
4 C]ourt has repeatedly held that matters presented by assignments of error and not
5 followed up and argued in appellant's brief will be deemed to have been abandoned
6 or waived by [the appellant]."). Consequently, even if the district court erred in
7 dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs would be without a remedy
8 on remand because the district court decided the merits in favor of David on his
9 counterclaim, and that decision is unchallenged on appeal. Watkins v. Local Sch. Bd.
clear that it applied equitable estoppel only as an affirmative defense to Plaintiffs'
complaint, and granted the counterclaim for quiet title on different, independent
grounds. The district court structured its conclusions of law to separately address the
complaint and counterclaim, and further separated its conclusions to address each of
the causes of action set forth the respective pleadings. Under the section entitled
"PLAINTIFF'S 	COMPLAINT," 	the 	district 	court 	stated 	that 	"[Plaintiffs']
Complaint to Quiet Title is barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel." In
comparison, 	the 	two 	conclusions 	of 	law 	set 	forth 	under 	the 	heading
"COUNTERCLAIM, Quiet Title and Injunctive Relief' state that "David [was] the
owner of an undivided one-half interest in the [Properties] and the [c]ourt hereby
grants a decree quieting David's title to an undivided one-half interest in the ...
Properties," 	and 	that 	"[Plaintiffs] 	are 	enjoined 	from 	interfering 	with 	David's
peaceful use and enjoyment, as a co-tenant, of the ... [P]roperties." The district
court did not include equitable estoppel as a basis for granting the counterclaim.
Further, the district court's written decision contains a detailed discussion of the
court's equitable estoppel analysis and why, based on the facts of this case, equitable
estoppel operates to bar Plaintiffs' quiet title claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs' equitable
estoppel argument can only be considered a challenge to the dismissal 	of the
complaint, not a challenge to the grant of the counterclaim.
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l 	of Los Alamos Sch., 1975-NMSC-048, 19, 88 N.M. 276, 540 P.2d 206 (stating that
2 "a party to an action who does not appeal is presumed to be satisfied with the
3 judgment rendered by the court below"). As such, Plaintiffs' claims on appeal would
4 be moot as no actual controversy remains regarding title to the property and thus,
5 this Court can grant no actual relief. Gunaji v. Macias , 2001-NMSC-028, 19, 130
6 N.M . 734, 31 P.3d 1008 ("As a general rule, [the appellate courts do] not decide
7 moot cases. A case is moot when no actual controversy exists, and the court cannot
8 grant actual relief." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
9 	{6} 	We ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing to address "why this
10 matter is not moot, given that the district court decided the case on the merits in favor
11 	of [Counterclaimants on their] counterclaim for quiet title, and the court' s findings
12 	and 	conclusions 	as 	to 	that 	claim 	are 	not 	challenged 	on 	appeal." 	Plaintiffs'
13 	supplemental brief raised three arguments as to why their case is not moot. First,
14 they assert that this Court may consider arguments for the first time on appeal. While
15 	this is true, the question in this case is whether we should decide an issue that was
16 properly preserved in the district court yet not challenged on appeal. See Fleming,
17 	1999-NMCA-149, 1 3 (declining to address conclusions of law not challenged on
18 	appeal). Plaintiffs contend that they "implicitly and in some instances explicitly
19 attack the trial court' s granting of [Counterclaimants'] quiet title complaint." Our
20 rules of appellate procedure, however, provide no basis for a review of "implicit
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1 challenges" by this Court. Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA ("The argument [in the brief
2 in chief] shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or the finding shall be
3 deemed conclusive. A contention that a verdict, judgment, or finding of fact is not
4 supported by substantial evidence shall be deemed waived unless the argument
5 identifies with particularity the fact or facts that are not supported by substantial
6 evidence[.]"). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they adequately challenged the
7 district court's findings, 	conclusions, and judgment in 	favor 	of David on his
8 counterclaim, and as a result, we conclude the matter is moot.
9 {7} 	Plaintiffs argue that, if we conclude this case is moot, we should nevertheless
10 review it as being a matter of substantial public interest or as one which is capable
11 	of repetition yet evades review. See Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, ~ 10. First, we are not
12 	persuaded that this case raises an issue of substantial public interest, as Plaintiffs
13 	have not shown that the issues underlying the parties' litigation-ownership interests
14 	in the Properties-impact anyone other than the parties. Cf Republican Party of
15 	NM v. N.M Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMSC-026, ~ 10,283 P.3d 853 ("A
16 case presents an issue of substantial public interest if it involves a constitutional
17 question or affects a fundamental right such as voting."). Second, the judgment in
18 	favor of David's counterclaim was capable of review, and therefore, Plaintiffs have
19 failed to demonstrate how the second mootness exception is applicable here. Id. ("An
20 issue is capable of repetition yet evading review if the issue is likely to arise in a
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1 future lawsuit, regardless of the identity of the parties." (internal quotation marks
2 and 	citation 	omitted)). 	Consequently, 	we 	conclude 	that 	Plaintiffs' 	failure 	to
3 challenge the district court's findings and conclusions in favor of David on his
4 counterclaim, and the final judgment entered thereupon, renders Plaintiff's appeal
5 of the dismissal of their claims moot. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims.
6 Costs
7 	{8} 	Plaintiffs 	also 	challenge 	the 	district 	court's 	award 	of 	costs 	to
8 Counterclaimants as the prevailing party. Rule l-054(D)(l) NMRA states that the
9 prevailing party shall recover its costs "unless the court otherwise directs." "The
10 prevailing party in litigation is the party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the
11 	action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though
12 not necessarily to the extent of his original contention." Allred v. N.M Dep 't of
13 	Transp., 2017-NMCA-019, ,r 63,388 P.3d 998 (internal quotation marks and citation
14 omitted). We review the district court's assessment of costs for abuse of discretion.
15 	Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-014, ,r 24, 111 N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59; see
16 Mayeux v. Winder, 2006-NMCA-028, ,r 40, 139 N.M. 235, 131 P.3d 85 (stating that
17 the district court has broad discretion to award costs or refuse them).
18 	{9} 	Counterclaimants were the prevailing parties. They successfully defeated all
19 	of Plaintiffs' 	claims 	and 	received 	the 	relief requested 	in 	count 	one 	of their
20 	counterclaim-an interest in the Properties, which was the central issue in both
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1 lawsuits. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that Counterclaimants' costs bill should be
2 reduced to exclude costs incurred in litigation of any ultimately unsuccessful causes
3 of action raised in their counterclaim. Plaintiffs, however, do not point to any items
4 in Counterclaimants' cost bill-either in their objections filed in the district court or
5 on appeal-that are clearly attributable to any unsuccessful claim. Further, Plaintiffs
6 point to no authority requiring a breakdown or explanation of what percentage of
7 each cost item pertains to each issue, nor are we aware of any such authority. We
8 decline their invitation to create such a requirement here. We note that Plaintiffs filed
9 objections to Counterclaimants' costs bill in the proceedings below and challenged
10 a number of Counterclaimants' itemized costs. The district court's final judgment
11 	on Counterclaimants' cost bill demonstrates that the court duly considered Plaintiffs'
12 	objections and that the court reduced Counterclaimants' 	requested amount by
13 	$634.59 as a result. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of
14 costs to Counterclaimants.
15 	CONCLUSION
16 	{IO} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
17 	{It} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
:~ 	MEGkt!?d/;
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WE CONCUR:
Linda Wany
2 3| LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
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4 5| ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
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