October 28, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Richard Rodriguez, No. A-1-CA-36857

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	2
Plaintiff-Appellant,	3
v. 	No. A-1-CA-36857	4
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ,	5
Defendant-Appellee.	6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	7
Brett R. Loveless, District Judge	8
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	9
Anita Carson, Assistant Attorney General	10
Santa Fe, NM	11
for Appellant	12
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	13
C. David Henderson, Appellate Defender	14
Santa Fe, NM	15
for Appellee	16
MEMORANDUM OPINION	17
VARGAS, Judge.	18
{1} 	The State appeals the district court’s order sanctioning the State for violating	19
its discovery obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2) NMRA. We dismiss for lack of	20
jurisdiction.	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 10/28/2019 11:32 AM

2
BACKGROUND	1
{2} 	After filing a criminal complaint against Defendant Richard Rodriguez, the	2
State filed a motion for pretrial detention under Rule 5-409. Finding the State failed	3
to comply with its discovery obligations under the rule, the district court sanctioned	4
the State in the amount of $250 pursuant to its “inherent power” to sanction. This	5
appeal followed.	6
{3} 	Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the	7
facts and procedural background, we reserve discussion of the pertinent facts within	8
the context of the State’s arguments.	9
DISCUSSION	10
{4} 	As a threshold matter, we must first resolve the question of whether we have	11
jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal challenging the district court’s sanction. The	12
State does not argue we have jurisdiction to hear its appeal under its right to appeal	13
by statute or rule. See State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 138 N.M. 441, 121	14
P.3d 1040 (“The State’s right to appeal an adverse ruling in a criminal proceeding	15
exists only by constitutional provision, statute, or rule.”). Rather, the State argues it	16
has a constitutional right to appeal the district court’s sanction order. “In considering	17
whether the [s]tate has a constitutional right to appeal, we look at whether the district	18
court’s disposition was contrary to law.” State v. Grossetete, 2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 5,	19
144 N.M. 346, 187 P.3d 692. “[A]s a practical matter, we must decide the merits of	20

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the issues the [s]tate raises in order to determine if it has a constitutional right to	1
appeal.” State v. Horton, 2008-NMCA-061, ¶ 1, 144 N.M. 71, 183 P.3d 956.	2
{5} 	The State argues the district court’s sanction order was “contrary to law”	3
because: (1) the district court misinterpreted the scope of the State’s discovery	4
obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2), and (2) although the district court sanctioned	5
the State under its inherent power to sanction, it provided insufficient notice for the	6
subsequent sanction and erred in imposing a monetary sanction without making	7
findings 	regarding 	bad 	faith, 	prejudice, 	or 	its 	consideration 	of 	less 	severe	8
alternatives. We address both arguments in turn to determine whether the State has	9
a constitutional right to appeal.	10
Standard of Review	11
{6} 	“[District] courts 	possess 	broad 	discretionary authority to 	decide 	what	12
sanction to impose when a discovery order is violated.” State v. Le Mier, 2017-	13
NMSC-017, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 959. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is	14
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.	15
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “we may characterize	16
as 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	a 	discretionary 	decision 	that 	is 	premised 	on 	a	17
misapprehension of the law.” Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2013-	18
NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 311 P.3d 1236 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	19

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When the district court acts within its discretionary authority, its disposition is not	1
contrary to law. Grossetete, 2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 10.	2
The District Court Did Not Misinterpret the Scope of Rule 5-409(F)(2)	3
{7} 	The State first argues the district court’s sanction order was contrary to law	4
because it misinterpreted the scope of Rule 5-409(F)(2). We note that although the	5
State appears, at times, to limit its argument to an interpretation predicated on the	6
2019 version of Rule 5-409(F)(2), the district court considered the State’s pretrial	7
detention motion in September and October 2017, during which time the 2017	8
version of Rule 5-409(F)(2) was in effect. Compare Supreme Court Order No. 17-	9
8300-005 (2017) (adopting Rule 5-409 “effective for all cases pending or filed on or	10
after July 1, 2017”), with Supreme Court Order No. 18-8300-024 (2018) (amending	11
Rule 5-409 “effective for all cases pending or filed on or after February 1, 2019”).	12
We therefore review the district court’s order under the 2017 version of Rule 5-	13
409(F)(2).	14
{8} 	Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017) provided that “[a]t least twenty-four (24) hours	15
before the hearing, the prosecutor shall provide the defendant with all evidence	16
relating to the motion for pretrial detention that is in the possession of the prosecutor	17
or is reasonably available to the prosecutor.” (Emphasis added.)1 Further, the rule	18
1 The current version limits the State’s disclosure obligations to “all evidence
that the prosecutor intends to rely on at the hearing” at least twenty-four hours prior
to the hearing. Rule 5-409(F)(2) (emphasis added).

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required the State to disclose “[a]ll exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor[.]”	1
Id. Defendant did not argue, and the district court did not find, that the State failed	2
to disclose any exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor. We therefore limit	3
our discussion of the district court’s order insofar as it required the State to disclose	4
“all evidence relating to the motion for pretrial detention.”	5
{9} 	When the State filed its pretrial detention motion, it noted Defendant’s prior	6
convictions and provided, with the motion, a warrant and criminal complaint for the	7
current charges, a public safety assessment of Defendant, and a booking sheet from	8
the Bernalillo County Detention Center showing his current charges and a parole	9
violation. After the State filed its pretrial detention motion, the district court entered	10
a discovery order directing the State to disclose “all evidence relating to the [m]otion	11
for [p]retrial [d]etention that is in the possession or is reasonably available to the	12
prosecution, including that evidence in the possession of law enforcement that is	13
reasonably available to the prosecution.” The district court further ordered that “[a]ll	14
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor must be disclosed[,]” that these	15
disclosures “must be provided at least twenty-four (24) hours before the [pretrial	16
detention] hearing[,]” and that “[t]he failure to comply with this [o]rder may result	17
in sanctions.”	18
{10} 	During the original hearing on the State’s pretrial detention motion, the State	19
acknowledged it had not yet provided additional discovery, explaining that there was	20

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a miscommunication between prosecutors regarding the date of the hearing. The	1
district court continued the hearing, sanctioned the State for failing to comply with	2
its discovery obligations, and reiterated the State’s obligation to turn over discovery.	3
Following 	the 	original 	hearing, 	the 	State 	provided 	Defendant 	with 	witness	4
statements, police reports, and a criminal history report. In a report by a responding	5
officer, he noted that his “taser camera video was submitted and uploaded to	6
evidence.com.”	7
{11} 	At the subsequent hearing on the State’s pretrial detention motion, Defendant	8
objected to the adequacy of the State’s disclosures, arguing that because the State	9
failed to provide lapel camera footage or a 911 call, the district court should deny	10
the State’s pretrial detention motion. Notwithstanding its finding that the State’s	11
failure to provide these pieces of evidence constituted a continuing violation of the	12
State’s discovery obligation, the district court denied Defendant’s request.	13
{12} 	Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the district	14
court’s sanction order was an abuse of its discretion. The State failed to provide	15
“evidence relating to [its] motion for pretrial detention” that was either in its	16
possession or was reasonably available to the State when it did not turn over the	17
witness statements, police reports or criminal history reports. Accordingly, we	18
conclude the district court’s sanction order was not contrary to law. See Grossetete,	19

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2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 10 (explaining that a disposition is not contrary to law when	1
“the district court acted within its discretionary authority”).	2
The District Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Monetary Sanction	3
{13} 	Having concluded the district court’s interpretation of the State’s discovery	4
obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017) was not contrary to law, we now turn to	5
whether the district court’s monetary sanction was contrary to law. As the State	6
notes, Rule 5-409 does not provide for sanctions for violations of its discovery	7
requirements. Nevertheless, the district court retains inherent authority to sanction	8
parties, including public entities, “to ensure compliance with the proceedings of the	9
court.” Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 15, 26; see In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058,	10
¶ 27, 130 N.M. 687, 30 P.3d 376 (explaining that “even though specific judicial	11
authority is not delineated by statute, or stated in a rule of court, a court may exercise	12
authority that is essential to the court’s fulfilling its judicial functions[,]” and that	13
“[t]his authority embraces the ability of a court to control its docket and the	14
proceedings before it”).	15
{14} 	The State first argues the district court’s discovery order provided insufficient	16
notice that sanctions would be imposed based on its interpretation of the scope of	17
Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017). However, the State relies on Rule 5-112 NMRA, which	18
provides procedural requirements before imposing sanctions for criminal contempt	19
of court. As the State neither argues the district court’s sanction rose to the level of	20

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a punishment for criminal contempt of court, nor cites authority supporting its	1
argument that Rule 5-112’s procedural requirements apply outside the context of	2
criminal contempt sanctions, we decline to review this argument further. See State	3
v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts	4
do not review unclear or undeveloped arguments, and that where a party cites to no	5
supporting authority, we assume none exists).	6
{15} 	Next, the State argues the district court was obligated, but failed, to consider	7
whether the State’s failure to comply with the discovery order was willful or in bad	8
faith, whether it was prejudicial, and whether there were less severe sanctions. Our	9
Supreme Court has recognized that district courts have the inherent authority “to	10
avail themselves of, and impose, meaningful sanctions where discovery orders are	11
not obeyed and a party’s conduct injects needless delay into the proceedings.” Le	12
Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 16 (citing State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp.	13
Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148). When a district	14
court imposes sanctions for discovery violations, it must evaluate culpability,	15
prejudice, and lesser sanctions and must explain its decision. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-	16
017, ¶ 20. However, the Le Mier Court clarified that to justify a district court’s	17
sanction, these considerations need not all weigh in favor of the sanction. Id.	18
{16} 	Here, the district court appropriately weighed the State’s culpability, finding	19
that the State “did not provide or attempt to provide the information in a timely	20

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fashion.” See id. ¶ 24 (concluding that the State’s repeated failure to comply with	1
the district court’s discovery orders was “sufficiently culpable conduct[,]” and that	2
“a single violation of a discovery order may suffice to support a finding of	3
culpability”). The district court also considered whether the State’s conduct gave	4
rise to prejudice, explaining that “[t]he untimely disclosure . . . resulted in prejudice	5
to Defendant to adequately prepare for the pretrial detention hearing.” See id. ¶ 25	6
(concluding that the defendant was prejudiced after the state’s failure to comply with	7
the district court’s discovery order caused the court to reset trial, thereby “needlessly	8
delaying [the defendant’s] proverbial ‘day in court’ ”). Finally, the district court	9
evaluated whether the sanction imposed was the least severe sanction. The district	10
court is not “obligated to consider every conceivable lesser sanction[,]” but must	11
instead “fashion the least severe sanction that best fit the situation and which	12
accomplished the desired result.” Id. ¶ 27. The district court met its obligation when	13
it reset the hearing “to enable the State an opportunity to prove that no conditions	14
will reasonably protect the community and Defendant an opportunity to argue	15
against pretrial detention.” See id. ¶ 28 (approving of the district court’s sanction	16
when it granted the state’s continuance request, thus providing “ample opportunity	17
to comply with reasonable and clear orders”) Furthermore, the district court’s	18
imposition of a monetary sanction against the State was a lesser sanction than the	19
dismissal sought by Defendant. See id. ¶ 29 (holding that a sanction is the least	20

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severe sanction in the light of the circumstances when “the district court responded	1
to [a] specific violation at issue with a sanction tailored to fit that violation”). We	2
therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the	3
monetary sanction against the State.	4
{17} 	The State cites Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 for the proposition that the	5
district court was required to find the State willfully violated its discovery obligation	6
and/or did so in bad faith. However, the State’s reliance is misplaced, as Baca	7
required such findings when awarding attorney fees as a sanction. See id. (holding	8
that a court may “award attorney[] fees as a sanction for bad faith or vexatious	9
litigation or for defiance of a court order”). As the State has failed to cite authority	10
requiring such findings outside the context of awarding attorney fees as a sanction,	11
we assume no such authority exists, and we decline to review this argument further.	12
See Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 622,	13
857 P.2d 22 (“The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not	14
considered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-	15
NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in	16
briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable	17
to find any supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for counsel.	18
Issues raised in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be	19
reviewed by us on appeal.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the district	20

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court’s order was not a disposition contrary to law, and therefore the State does not	1
have a constitutional right to appeal.	2
CONCLUSION	3
{18} 	Because the district court’s sanction order was not a disposition contrary to	4
law, we dismiss the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Grossetete, 2008-	5
NMCA-088, ¶ 15 (dismissing the state’s appeal because the district court’s order	6
was not contrary to law and thus the State did not have a constitutional right to	7
appeal).	8
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	9
______________________________	10
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	11
WE CONCUR:	12
_______________________________	13
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge	14
________________________________	15
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	16