March 25, 2015 – Alfredo Rodriguez v. Stephen Williams, Nos. 33,138 and 3368 (consolidated)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: ___________	2
Filing Date: March 26, 2015	3
NOS. 33,138 and 33,668 (consolidated)	4
ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
STEPHAN WILLIAMS,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	10
Nan G. Nash, District Judge	11
Duhigg, Cronin, Spring & Berlin, P.A.	12
David L. Duhigg	13
Albuquerque, NM	14
for Appellee	15
Ripley B. Harwood, P.C.	16
Ripley B. Harwood	17
Albuquerque, NM	18
for Appellant	19

OPINION	1
GARCIA, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendant Stephan Williams appeals the judgment entered by the district court	3
against him and in favor of Plaintiff Alfredo Rodriguez after a bench trial on a	4
personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident. We affirm.	5
BACKGROUND	6
{2} 	In February 2012, Defendant ran a red light and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle,	7
injuring Plaintiff. At the time of the crash, Defendant’s blood-alcohol content was .11,	8
Plaintiff’s blood-alcohol content was .076, and Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt.	9
Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to the hospital where he underwent a	10
“craniotomy for evacuation of [a] subdural hematoma” and spent a total of eight days	11
in recovery. Plaintiff’s medical bills totaled $111,924.63. Plaintiff sued Defendant for	12
damages.	13
{3} 	Plaintiff, who had been earning $9.50 per hour as an auto dealership employee,	14
was unable to work for three months after the accident and was apparently uninsured	15
and unable to pay his medical bills. As a result, the hospital filed a lien in the event	16
he was awarded a judgment or received insurance proceeds. In response to the lien,	17
Plaintiff amended his complaint to include a claim against the hospital that his medical	18
bill was unreasonable. Plaintiff and the hospital eventually entered into a settlement	19

2
agreement in which the hospital agreed to accept one-third of “all monetary recovery	1
[Plaintiff] receives arising out of or relating to the [a]ccident” in full satisfaction of his	2
medical bill. The hospital’s chief financial officer (CFO) testified at trial that	3
Plaintiff’s medical bill of $111,924.63 was reasonable and necessary for Plaintiff’s	4
care. The district court asked the CFO whether the settlement agreement would allow	5
the hospital to recover more than what it had billed in the event one-third of Plaintiff’s	6
recovery exceeded the amount of his medical bill. The CFO replied that in her	7
experience with this type of settlement agreement, she had never seen a case where	8
the hospital recovered more than the billed amount, that the hospital usually receives	9
less than what it billed, and that she believed the agreement capped the hospital’s	10
recovery at the amount of the bill. The CFO explained that the hospital typically enters	11
into this kind of settlement agreement with an uninsured patient so that any award is	12
evenly split between the patient, the patient’s attorney, and the hospital.	13
{4} 	After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. It	14
concluded that Defendant was primarily at fault for Plaintiff’s injuries and that	15
Plaintiff was only 5% at fault due to his own alcohol impairment. The district court	16
declined to consider the fact that Plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt in its	17
comparative fault analysis because NMSA 1978, § 66-7-373(A) (2001) prohibits such	18
consideration. The district court found that Plaintiff’s total damages amounted to	19

3
$191,864.63, which consisted of $4,940 in lost wages; $111,924.63 in medical costs;	1
$25,000 in “[n]ature, extent and duration”; and $50,000 in pain and suffering. It	2
subtracted 5% off of Plaintiff’s total damages to account for his percentage of fault,	3
and entered judgment against Defendant in the amount of $182,271.40.	4
{5} 	Defendant renews four arguments on appeal: (1) the unlawful acts doctrine	5
barred Plaintiff’s claims; (2) the district court should have considered the fact that	6
Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt in determining Plaintiff’s comparative negligence;	7
(3) Plaintiff’s seat belt non-use barred operation of the collateral source rule; and (4)	8
Plaintiff’s medical damages should have been reduced to the amount that the hospital	9
eventually agreed to accept from Plaintiff, not what it initially billed.	10
DISCUSSION	11
A. 	Unlawful Acts Doctrine	12
{6} 	Defendant argues that our Supreme Court’s decision in Desmet v. Sublett	13
adopted a common law rule—the “unlawful acts” doctrine—that applies in this case	14
to preclude Plaintiff from recovering damages against Defendant because Plaintiff was	15
unlawfully driving under the influence of alcohol at the time Defendant ran a red light	16
and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle. See 1950-NMSC-057, 54 N.M. 355, 225 P.2d 141. We	17
disagree with Defendant’s argument for several reasons.	18
{7} 	First, although the facts of this case are distinguishable, the judgment in this	19

4
case is consistent with the principles that our Supreme Court applied in Desmet.	1
There, the plaintiff bought a truck from a third party. Id. ¶ 2. The plaintiff and the	2
third party agreed that the third party would use the truck to haul logs for hire over the	3
public highways. Id. The defendant was a mechanic who had repaired the truck during	4
the time that the third party owned it. Id. The third party never paid the defendant for	5
those repairs. Id. After the plaintiff bought the truck from the third party, he	6
authorized the third party to take it to the defendant to repair it. Id. The defendant	7
repaired the truck, but refused to surrender the truck until he received payment for the	8
repairs that he made when the third party owned the truck. Id. The plaintiff sued the	9
defendant for return of the truck and for damages in the amount of income the plaintiff	10
lost from not being able to use the truck to haul logs for hire during the year in which	11
the defendant retained it. Id. The district court ordered the truck be returned to the	12
plaintiff and awarded the plaintiff damages in an amount equal to the fair rental value	13
of the truck for each day that the defendant refused to surrender it. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The	14
district court also found that the plaintiff had not properly registered the truck and that	15
he did not have the required permit to operate the truck for hire over the public	16
highways. Id. ¶ 3. Our Supreme Court upheld the order returning the truck to the	17
plaintiff, but it reversed the damages award based on the	18

5
well settled rule of law that a person cannot maintain an action if, in	1
order to establish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part,	2
on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party, or	3
where he must base his cause of action, in whole or in a part, on a	4
violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws.	5
Id. ¶ 9. It recognized that the policy behind this rule is that “[n]o court will lend its aid	6
to a man who [founded] his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.” Id. ¶ 11	7
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that	8
this rule precluded the plaintiff’s monetary recovery because “the plaintiff [founded]	9
his claim for damages on the fact that he was not allowed to operate his truck on the	10
public highways of this state in violation of its positive law.” Id. ¶ 12. In other words,	11
the plaintiff could not recover damages on a claim of lost income when the activity	12
that would have produced that income would have been done unlawfully. Id.	13
{8} 	Here, Plaintiff’s damages claim was based on injuries he sustained when	14
Defendant ran a red light and struck his vehicle. The district court found that a small	15
portion of Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from his own alcohol impairment, and it reduced	16
his damages accordingly. Thus, the damages that Plaintiff actually recovered were	17
founded solely on Defendant’s negligence in running a red light and striking	18
Plaintiff’s vehicle, not on Plaintiff’s unlawful act of driving impaired. In Desmet, one	19
hundred percent of the income that the plaintiff claimed to have lost due to the	20
defendant’s conduct would have been earned in violation of New Mexico law, and the	21

6
Supreme Court accordingly reduced his recovery by one hundred percent. Id. ¶ 15.	1
Here, consistent with Desmet, Plaintiff’s recovery was reduced by the portion of the	2
damages attributed to his unlawful act.	3
{9} 	Second, Defendant urges this Court to follow the rule adopted by New York	4
courts, one that precludes a plaintiff from recovering any damages for injuries	5
sustained while committing an unlawful act, under certain circumstances. In	6
particular, Defendant cites Alami v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 766 N.E.2d 574, 575	7
(N.Y. App. 2002) (involving an intoxicated driver who crashed his Volkswagen Jetta	8
into a utility pole and was killed). However, Alami does not support Defendant’s	9
argument. Id. at 578.	10
{10} 	In Alami, the driver’s widow sued Volkswagen and claimed that a defect in the	11
Jetta’s design enhanced the driver’s injuries. Id. at 575. The trial court granted	12
summary judgment in favor of Volkswagen, dismissing the widow’s damages claim	13
because the decedent’s act of driving intoxicated was a serious violation of the law	14
that directly resulted in his injuries. Id. In reversing summary judgment, New York’s	15
highest court recognized that driving intoxicated was “indisputably a serious violation	16
of the law.” Id. However, it concluded that the rule precluding recovery based on	17
unlawful acts did not apply because (1) “[i]f Volkswagen did defectively design the	18
Jetta . . . it breached a duty to any driver of a Jetta involved in a crash regardless of the	19

7
initial 	cause”; 	(2) 	the 	plaintiff 	did 	not 	“seek 	to 	profit 	from 	her 	husband’s	1
intoxication—she ask[ed] only that Volkswagen honor its well-recognized duty to	2
produce a product that does not unreasonably enhance or aggravate a user’s injuries”;	3
and (3) “[t]he duty she [sought] to impose on Volkswagen originates not from her	4
husband’s act [of driving intoxicated], but from Volkswagen’s obligation to design,	5
manufacture and market a safe vehicle.” Id. at 577. In reaching this conclusion, the	6
New York court emphasized that the unlawful acts rule “embodies a narrow	7
application of public policy imperatives under limited circumstances[,]” and that	8
“[e]xtension of the rule here would abrogate legislatively mandated comparative fault	9
analysis in a wide range of tort claims.” Id.	10
{11} 	Other New York cases also address whether an intoxicated driver can recover	11
in a negligence action where the driver’s intoxication was a partial cause of his or her	12
injuries. In LaPage v. Smith, 563 N.Y.S.2d 174, 174-75 (App. Div. 1990), a New	13
York appellate court concluded that the plaintiff was barred from recovering against	14
a defendant in a wrongful death action where the plaintiff’s son was killed while drag	15
racing at speeds over one hundred miles per hour and was intoxicated. There, the court	16
distinguished the drag racing scenario from previous scenarios in two other cases	17
involving car accidents “‘occasioned’ by the criminal act of a plaintiff’s drunk	18
driving.” Id. at 175. One such previous case, Humphrey v. State of N.Y., 457 N.E.2d	19

8
767, 768 (N.Y. 1983), involved a decedent motorist’s estate that sued the State of New	1
York 	for 	wrongful 	death. 	Although 	the 	decedent 	in 	Humphrey 	was 	driving	2
intoxicated, the trial court found that the State of New York was 60% at fault for	3
failing to provide adequate warning of the highway conditions. Id. In affirming the	4
judgment, the appellate court concluded that “[t]he fact that decedent’s ability to drive	5
was impaired does not exonerate the State from liability[.]” Id. The second case was	6
Clark v. State of N.Y., 508 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 1986), which involved a motorist	7
that sued the state for injuries suffered when she crashed into a defective guardrail.	8
Although the trial court found that the plaintiff hit the guardrail because she was	9
driving intoxicated, it found the State one hundred percent liable for her injuries. Id.	10
at 649. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the plaintiff’s award should have	11
been reduced—though not eliminated—by allocating part of the plaintiff’s damages	12
to her own fault in driving intoxicated. Id. The appellate court explained, “Without the	13
confluence of the [s]tate’s negligence and [the plaintiff’s] negligence in operating her	14
vehicle while intoxicated and failing to negotiate a curve . . . the accident and [the	15
plaintiff’s] unfortunate injuries would not have occurred. Each party’s negligence was	16
a substantial factor and, therefore, a proximate cause of the ultimate harm.” Id.	17
{12} 	Even if this Court agreed with Defendant and adopted New York’s analysis of	18
whether an intoxicated driver can recover against another party in a negligence action,	19

9
we conclude that the judgment entered by the district court would be affirmed. Like	1
New York, New Mexico has adopted a comparative fault analysis of tort claims. See	2
Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 22, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (adopting the	3
comparative fault rule), superseded in part by statute, NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987),	4
as recognized in Reichert v. Atler, 1992-NMCA-134, ¶ 34, 117 N.M. 628, 875 P.2d	5
384. Thus, we agree with the court in Alami that extension of the unlawful acts rule	6
in this case “would abrogate [judicially and] legislatively mandated comparative fault	7
analysis in a wide range of tort claims.” 766 N.E.2d at 577. Like the circumstances in	8
Alami, when Defendant in this case ran a red light and crashed into a vehicle that had	9
the right-of-way, Defendant breached an established duty, irrespective of whether the	10
driver of the vehicle he crashed into was intoxicated. Plaintiff did not seek to profit	11
from any impairment to his driving, but only that Defendant honor his well-	12
recognized duty to stop at an intersection displaying a red light. See id. at 577	13
(recognizing and distinguishing the separate duties imposed upon each party that	14
reasonably contribute to an accident). Our conclusion is also consistent with the	15
reasoning in Humphrey and Clark. See Humphrey, 457 N.E.2d at 768 (“The fact that	16
[the plaintiff’s] ability to drive was impaired does not exonerate the [defendant] from	17
liability[.]”); 	Clark, 	508 	N.Y.S.2d 	at 	649 	(“Without 	the 	confluence 	of 	the	18
[defendant’s] negligence and [the plaintiff’s] negligence in operating h[is] vehicle	19

10
while intoxicated . . . the accident and [the plaintiff’s] unfortunate injuries would not	1
have occurred. Each party’s negligence was a . . . factor and, therefore, a proximate	2
cause of the ultimate harm.”).	3
{13} 	Finally, our conclusion is consistent with at least one treatise that has	4
considered the effect of a plaintiff’s unlawful act in connection with his or her	5
negligence action:	6
The plaintiff’s violation of [a] statute is ordinarily relevant, of course, as	7
showing [his or] her negligence, but not as forbidding the claim entirely.	8
The fact that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence per se in	9
violating a statute shows negligence but it does not show how much, so	10
a comparison of the plaintiff’s per se fault and the defendant’s	11
negligence is still appropriate.	12
1 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 228, at 818 (2d ed. 2011). For all of these	13
reasons, we conclude—the fact that Plaintiff’s blood-alcohol content was .076 at the	14
time Defendant ran the red light and struck the Plaintiff’s vehicle does not preclude	15
Plaintiff from recovering damages attributed to Defendant’s comparative negligence.	16
B. 	Seat Belt Non-Use	17
1. 	Statutory Interpretation of Section 66-7-373(A)	18
{14} 	Defendant asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that Section 66-	19
7-373(A) barred it from considering the fact that Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt	20
in determining Plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Section 66-7-373(A) provides, in	21
pertinent part, “Failure to be secured . . . by a safety belt as required by the Safety Belt	22

11
Use Act shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or	1
apportion damages.” Defendant contends that Section 66-7-373(A)’s language “only	2
forecloses parties from invoking the statute to establish negligence per se[,]” and that	3
“[i]t does not foreclose the assertion that seat belt non-use constitutes comparative	4
negligence at common law.” We disagree.	5
{15} 	We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. Chatterjee v. King, 2012-	6
NMSC-019, ¶ 11, 280 P.3d 283. In construing a statute, we determine the	7
Legislature’s intent by giving effect to its entire text in accordance with its objective	8
and purpose. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-18(A) (1997). We do not give effect to the	9
Legislature’s intent by reading a statute in a way that would render it meaningless.	10
City of Deming v. Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 23, 141 N.M.	11
686, 160 P.3d 595. “We presume that the [L]egislature is well informed as to existing	12
statutory and common law and does not intend to enact a nullity[.]” Inc. Cnty. of Los	13
Alamos v. Johnson, 1989-NMSC-045, ¶ 4, 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252.	14
{16} 	Our Supreme Court adopted the comparative fault doctrine in 1981. See Scott,	15
1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 22. In November 1984, this Court concluded that a plaintiff’s	16
damages caused by his failure to wear a seat belt could be considered under a	17
comparative fault analysis. Thomas v. Henson, 1984-NMCA-113, ¶ 24, 102 N.M. 417,	18
696 P.2d 1010, rev’d in part by 1985-NMSC-010, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476. Our	19

12
Supreme Court swiftly reversed that portion of our Thomas decision, holding that no	1
common law “seat belt defense” existed in New Mexico and that the creation of such	2
a defense was within the purview of the Legislature. 1985-NMSC-010, ¶ 4. Within	3
weeks of the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas, the Legislature enacted the Safety	4
Belt Use Act, which created a statutory duty to wear a seat belt. See 1985 N.M. Laws,	5
ch. 131, §§ 1-4. However, in doing so, the Legislature could not have been clearer	6
when it included a provision stating that breaching the statutory duty to wear a seat	7
belt “shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or	8
apportion damages.” 1985 N.M. Laws, ch. 131, § 4 (emphasis added) (now codified	9
at § 66-7-373(A)). We presume that, at the time that it enacted this new statutory	10
provision, the Legislature was aware of our Supreme Court’s adoption of comparative	11
fault for tort claim lawsuits and of both this Court’s and our Supreme Court’s	12
decisions 	in 	Thomas. 	See 	Johnson, 	1989-NMSC-045, 	¶ 	4 	(recognizing 	the	13
presumption that the Legislature is aware of existing legal precedent). However	14
unreasonable it may seem from the contemporary view of comparative fault,	15
commentators recognize that numerous states have enacted statutes barring the	16
consideration of seat belt non-use from the comparative fault analysis:	17
In the light of safety factors involved, the plaintiff’s failure to wear an	18
available seat[]belt or safety harness may be quite unreasonable. Today,	19
with pervasive seat[]belt use and statutes requiring it, failure to wear a	20
seat[]belt certainly could count as comparative fault. However, this result	21

13
is barred by many state statutes.	1
1 Dobbs, supra, § 231, at 827. If we were to conclude, as Defendant urges, that	2
Section 66-7-373(A) does not bar consideration of an injured plaintiff’s failure to wear	3
a seat belt in a comparative fault analysis, then a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt	4
would almost certainly “constitute fault or negligence” resulting in “limit[ing] or	5
apportion[ing]” a plaintiff’s damages. Section 66-7-373(A). Such an interpretation	6
would render the relevant portion of Section 66-7-373(A) meaningless and a nullity.	7
See Johnson, 1989-NMSC-045, ¶ 4; see also Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-	8
NMCA-069, ¶ 23. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Section 66-7-373(A)	9
bars consideration of seat belt non-use in a comparative fault analysis of liability.	10
2. 	Constitutional Arguments	11
{17} 	Defendant asserts that if Section 66-7-373(A) bars consideration of seat belt	12
non-use in a comparative fault analysis, we should conclude that Section 66-7-373(A)	13
is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine set forth in	14
Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution and it violates Defendant’s due	15
process and equal protection rights. We are not persuaded.	16
{18} 	Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that “[n]o act	17
of the [L]egislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules	18
of evidence or procedure, in any pending case.” The purpose of this provision is to	19

14
“prevent legislative interference with adjudication of pending cases.” Brazos Land,	1
Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 1993-NMCA-013, ¶ 14, 115 N.M. 168, 848 P.2d 1095	2
(emphasis added.) “The term ‘pending case’ ordinarily refers to a suit pending on	3
some court’s docket and does not include a suit filed after the statute became	4
effective[.]” DiMatteo v. Cnty. of Dona Ana, 1989-NMCA-108, ¶ 13, 109 N.M. 374,	5
785 P.2d 285. The provision now codified at Section 66-7-373(A) was first enacted	6
in 1985, removed by amendment in 1991, re-enacted in 1993, and has remained	7
effective without interruption ever since. See Mott v. Sun Country Garden Prods.,	8
Inc., 1995-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 8-9, 120 N.M. 261, 901 P.2d 192 (explaining the history	9
of Section 66-7-373(A)). In this case, Plaintiff’s cause of action against Defendant	10
arose in 2012. Therefore, because Section 66-7-373(A) was effective for nearly two	11
decades prior to 2012, Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution does	12
not apply to Plaintiff’s claim. See DiMatteo, 1989-NMCA-108, ¶ 13.	13
{19} 	As 	to 	Defendant’s 	remaining 	constitutional 	arguments, 	this 	Court 	has	14
previously considered and rejected those arguments in Mott and we are not persuaded	15
to revisit this precedent. See 1995-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 14-21 (concluding that Section 66-	16
7-373(A) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the defendant’s due	17
process or equal protection rights). Therefore, we shall proceed to address Plaintiff’s	18
remaining arguments.	19

15
C. 	Collateral Source Rule	1
{20} 	Generally, “plaintiffs may not collect more than the damages awarded to them,	2
or, put another way, they may not receive compensation twice for the same injury.”	3
Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op, 2013-NMSC-017, ¶ 47, 301 P.3d	4
387. “However, the collateral source rule is an exception to the [general] rule against	5
double recovery.” Id. ¶ 48. This rule states that compensation received from a	6
collateral source, i.e., a third party, “does not operate to reduce damages recoverable	7
from a wrongdoer.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The policy	8
behind this rule is that “the interests of society are likely to be better served if the	9
injured person is benefitted than if the wrongdoer is benefitted.” Id. ¶ 50 (internal	10
quotation marks and citation omitted). One justification for this rule is that third	11
parties will be more likely to help injured persons if they know they are likely to be	12
reimbursed. Id. ¶ 49. “Charity cannot be made a substitute for such right, nor can	13
benevolence be made a set-off against the acts of a [tortfeasor].” Id. (internal quotation	14
marks and citation omitted). Where a third party who helps an injured person does not	15
seek full reimbursement, “the collateral source rule [in New Mexico] dictates that the	16
contribution of a collateral source must operate to benefit the plaintiff rather than the	17
defendant.” Id. ¶ 50.	18
{21} 	Defendant argues that the collateral source rule should not apply in this case	19

16
because both Plaintiff and Defendant were wrongdoers in that they both drove	1
impaired and Plaintiff additionally failed to wear his seat belt. Because Defendant	2
provides no authority for the proposition that the collateral source rule does not apply	3
where the plaintiff in a negligence action shares some degree of fault for his injuries,	4
we decline to review this argument on appeal. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-	5
NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in	6
briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable to	7
find any supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for counsel.	8
Issues raised in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be	9
reviewed by us on appeal.” (citation omitted)).	10
D. 	Medical Costs Award	11
{22} 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s settlement agreement with the hospital	12
“represents either a de facto or de jure medical damages cap in this case” and this	13
Court should “remand with instructions . . . to reduce the medical damages award . . .	14
to $37,308.21[,]” representing one-third of the hospital’s $111,924.63 bill. He argues	15
that, because Plaintiff’s settlement agreement with the hospital did not result in the	16
hospital being reimbursed for Defendant’s entire $111,924.63 hospital bill in this case,	17
the judgment awarding Plaintiff the full amount of his medical bills provides Plaintiff	18
with a “windfall[.]” Again, Defendant does not cite any authority in support of his	19

17
argument. See id. (explaining that the appellate courts will not research for authority	1
supporting a position where no cited authority is provided in the briefing). Instead,	2
Defendant refers us to the record for a motion he filed in the district court that	3
purportedly contains “ample support for his argument in the general case law on the	4
subject” and a law review article that “examine[s] the general issues of medical billing	5
in America.” We decline to consider such an argument because he does not cite any	6
authority to support it in his brief in chief. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA.	7
CONCLUSION	8
{23} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment entered by the district court.	9
{24} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	10
__________________________________	11
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge	12
WE CONCUR:	13
___________________________________	14
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge	15
___________________________________	16
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge	17