January 26, 2012 – City of Santa Fe ex rel. Santa Fe Police v. One (1) Black 2006 Jeep 2-Door V.I.N. 1J4FA6456P731037 New Mexico Licence No. 001 PND and Americredit Financial Services and Diego Olivas, No. 30,660

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: _______________
Filing Date: January 26, 2012
NO. 30,660
CITY OF SANTA FE ex rel.
SANTA FE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ONE (1) BLACK 2006 JEEP 2-DOOR
V.I.N. 1J4FA6456P731037
NEW MEXICO LICENSE NO. 001 PND,
Respondent,
and
AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Claimant,
and
DIEGO OLIVAS,
Claimant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Barbara J. Vigil, District Judge

R. Alfred Walker, Assistant City Attorney
Adrian Terry, Assistant City Attorney
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Cuddy & McCarthy, L.L.P.
Aaron J. Wolf
Santa Fe, NM
for Claimant-Appellee

OPINION
VANZI, Judge.
{1} 	The City of Santa Fe (City) appeals from an order of the district court
dismissing the City’s petition for forfeiture and directing it to return the motor vehicle
at issue in this case to Claimant, Diego Olivas. The district court concluded that the
City’s vehicle forfeiture ordinance, Santa Fe, N.M., Code § 24-9 SFCC 1987 (2007)
(the Ordinance), permitting forfeiture of a vehicle operated by a person whose license
is revoked as a result of a prior DWI conviction did not apply to Olivas’s conduct. In
a matter of first impression, the sole issue on appeal is whether a vehicle operated by
a person whose license has been revoked as a result of a conviction for driving while
under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI) but was eligible for reinstatement prior
to the time of the traffic stop that led to the forfeiture action, but who failed to obtain
reinstatement of the license before the stop, is subject to the Ordinance. We hold that
the Ordinance does not make any exceptions for drivers who, though they may be
eligible for reinstatement, continue to drive on a revoked license. 	We reverse the
district court.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	The following facts are undisputed. On February 25, 2010, Diego Olivas was
driving his 2006 Jeep within City limits when he was stopped and cited for a traffic

2
violation. At the time he was stopped, Olivas’s license was revoked as a result of a
conviction for DWI.
{3} 	Olivas committed the DWI on February 17, 2008, and he was convicted for the
offense on May 22, 2008. On March 8, 2008, the Motor Vehicle Division of the New
Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue (MVD) revoked Olivas’s driver’s
license. The MVD mailed Olivas a notice of revocation on July 9, 2008, informing
Olivas that his license had been revoked for a minimum of one year and that he was
eligible to have his license reinstated on March 8, 2009. 	The revocation notice
advised Olivas that reinstatement at the end of the revocation period was not
automatic and that he had to meet certain requirements, including payment of a
reinstatement fee.
{4} 	Although he was eligible to have his driving privileges restored, Olivas had not
paid the $100 reinstatement fee. 	Consequently, when he committed the traffic
violation on February 25, 2010, Olivas was cited for the violation and was arrested for
driving with a revoked license. 	The officer then impounded Olivas’s vehicle as a
nuisance under the Ordinance. Santa Fe, N.M., Code §§ 24-9.3(B), 24-9.4.
{5} 	On April 12, 2010, the City filed a verified petition for forfeiture of motor
vehicle. Olivas filed an answer and, on June 29, 2010, the district court held a hearing
on the merits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the City’s
application for forfeiture and dismissed the petition. The district court concluded that

3
the failure to pay a reinstatement fee was merely a pro forma requirement that did not
justify the forfeiture of Olivas’s vehicle and ordered the City to immediately return
the vehicle to him.
{6} 	The City timely appealed. We note that on appeal we are without the benefit
of an answer brief as Olivas has filed a notice of non-filing of answer brief, asserting
that he sold the vehicle and no longer has a continued interest in the outcome of this
matter.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
{7} 	“When there are no disputed material facts, an appellate court reviews all issues
on appeal under a de novo standard of review.” City of Albuquerque v. One (1) 1984
White Chevy, 2002-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 132 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94. “Interpretation of
municipal ordinances and statutes is a question of law that we review de novo.”
Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 13, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d 309. We
follow the same rules of statutory interpretation when interpreting ordinances.
Cadena v. Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2006-NMCA-036, ¶ 7, 139 N.M.
300, 131 P.3d 687. The guiding principle in statutory construction requires that we
look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply “the plain meaning rule,
recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous,
we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.”

4
Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); 	State v. Johnson,
2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”). Accordingly, “a statute must
be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think
it should be or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the
problems and complications which might arise in the course of its administration.”
State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we
now turn to the City’s argument in this case.
The Ordinance Applies to a Vehicle Operated by a Person Whose License Is
Currently Revoked for DWI and Who Has Not Met All the Requirements for
Reinstatement
{8} 	The City asserts that once Olivas’s driving privileges were revoked for DWI,
they remained revoked until he took affirmative steps and met all the requirements for
reinstatement. The City argues that because Olivas failed to have his driver’s license
reinstated, his vehicle was subject to forfeiture pursuant to the Ordinance. 	Thus, the
City contends, the district court erred in finding that the Ordinance did not apply to
Olivas’s conduct and in ordering the return of the vehicle to him. 	We agree. 	We
begin with a review of Section 24-9 and then turn to the question of whether a driver’s
failure to pay a reinstatement fee is merely “a pro forma requirement” of the MVD

5
that does not justify the forfeiture of a vehicle operated by that person under the
Ordinance.
{9} 	In 2007, the City’s governing body adopted the Ordinance with the intent of
protecting the health and safety of its citizens by abating motor vehicle nuisances.
Santa Fe, N.M., Code § 24-9.2(A). Specifically, the City enacted the Ordinance in
response to the serious problems caused by those who drive under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or “who drive in violation of driver’s license restrictions” and
therefore create the potential for serious injury and loss of life to innocent persons.
Id. The City determined that the way to achieve the objective of keeping alcohol- and
drug-impaired drivers off the roadways is to subject the vehicle they are driving to
forfeiture if they are caught driving with a revoked license because of a previous DWI
conviction. 	See Santa Fe, N.M., Code § 24-9.3 (declaring as a nuisance a motor
vehicle that is “[o]perated by a person who is arrested for DWI or operated by a
person whose license is currently revoked or denied as a result of a DWI arrest”);
Santa Fe, N.M., Code § 24-9.4 (stating that motor vehicles declared to be a nuisance
are subject to forfeiture by the City). 	There is no constitutional challenge to the
Ordinance here. 	We note that our Supreme Court has previously upheld the
constitutionality of a similar forfeiture ordinance on the ground that it did not violate
double jeopardy, indicating that the ordinance was “a remedial measure [designed] to

Correction: Page 7, line 8: Change “in” to “is”. City of Santa Fe v. One Black Jeep, No. 30,660 (filed 1/26/12),
VzSK
6
protect the public from those drivers who persist in driving after license revocation
and multiple DWI offenses.” One (1) 1984 White Chevy, 2002-NMSC-014, ¶ 18.
{10} 	In this case, the MVD revoked Olivas’s license on March 8, 2008, as a result
of a DWI conviction. Although the one-year revocation period had passed, Olivas had
not paid the reinstatement fee. Thus, the City argues, Olivas drove his vehicle on City
streets while his license was “currently revoked or denied as a result of a DWI arrest
or conviction prohibiting [him] from driving[.]” Santa Fe, N.M., Code § 24-9.3(B).
As a result, his vehicle was determined to be a nuisance and subject to civil forfeiture.
The district court, however, found otherwise. 	It concluded that the Ordinance, as
written, was “draconian in certain circumstances and is not meeting the public purpose
for which it was enacted.” Accordingly, the district court held:
The Ordinance does not apply to [Olivas’s] conduct, in that his license
was on revoked status at the time of his being stopped and cited merely
for the failure to pay a reinstatement fee, a pro forma requirement of the
[MVD], and the failure to pay such fee, standing alone does not
constitute a substantial risk of harm to the public justifying the forfeiture
of a motor vehicle.
For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded by the district court’s analysis.
{11} 	We begin with the statutory scheme governing the authority of the MVD to
revoke and subsequently reinstate a driver’s license, and we then consider the
pertinent provisions of the Ordinance. NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-29(C) (2007) sets
forth the applicable period of time a person who is convicted of DWI shall have his

Correction: Page 7, line 8: Change “in” to “is”. City of Santa Fe v. One Black Jeep, No. 30,660 (filed 1/26/12),
VzSK
7
driver’s license revoked. 	Here, Olivas’s license was revoked for a minimum
mandatory period of one year. Next, NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-33.1 (2009), provides
the procedure for reinstatement of a driver’s license that is revoked. Our Legislature
is unequivocal that an application for reinstatement and payment of a $25 fee is a
prerequisite to reinstatement of a revoked license. Section 66-5-33.1(A). And if the
revocation is due to a DWI, an additional fee of $75 is required to be paid to reinstate
the license. Section 66-5-33.1(B). The plain language of Section 66-5-33.1 is clear
and unambiguous. The revocation period continues until the fee is paid. Nowhere
does the statute state that a person’s driving privileges are automatically restored upon
the expiration of the penalty period or that the period of revocation is not extended by
a driver’s failure to pay the reinstatement fee. We conclude that a driver’s license
cannot be reinstated—and therefore remains revoked—until compliance with all
provisions and payment of the requisite fee is accomplished.
{12} 	Consistent with the statutory provision governing reinstatement of a revoked
license, we also observe that on July 9, 2008, the MVD mailed a notice of revocation
to Olivas, informing him that his privilege to drive had been revoked for a minimum
period of one year beginning on March 8, 2008. Among other things, the notice of
revocation stated:
IMPORTANT: 	REINSTATEMENT 	AT 	THE 	END 	OF 	THE
REVOCATION PERIOD OR DISQUALIFICATION PERIOD IS NOT

8
AUTOMATIC. 	THE REVOCATION WILL REMAIN EFFECTIVE
UNTIL ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR REINSTATEMENT ARE MET
INCLUDING PAYMENT OF A REINSTATEMENT FEE.
The plain language of the notice makes clear that a driver’s license revoked under
Section 66-5-29 remains revoked until the driver has complied with all requirements
for reinstatement, including payment of the reinstatement fee.
{13} 	For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the New Mexico Legislature
intended the revocation period set forth in Section 66-5-29(C) to continue beyond the
period required and said so explicitly when it stated that payment of a fee is a
prerequisite to the reinstatement of any license or registration and that an additional
payment is required if the revocation was due to a DWI. 	Section 66-5-33.1. 	We
cannot read into the statute any meaning other than what is stated in the plain
language. 	Further, the notice of revocation, which unequivocally states that “the
revocation will remain effective until all requirements for reinstatement are met
including payment of a reinstatement fee[,]” also leads to the conclusion that failure
to pay the reinstatement fee extends the period of revocation.
{14} 	We now turn to the Ordinance to ascertain whether any of its provisions afford
relief to a driver whose license has been revoked for DWI but who is eligible for
reinstatement of that license from having the vehicle he is operating forfeited. As we
have noted, Santa Fe, N.M., Code Section 24-9.3(B) declares a motor vehicle to be a
public nuisance if it is “[o]perated by a person whose license is currently revoked or

9
denied as a result of a DWI arrest or conviction prohibiting them from driving[.]”
Santa Fe, N.M., Code Section 24-9.4 then provides that any motor vehicle declared
to be a public nuisance is subject to forfeiture proceedings. 	The City’s governing
body’s stated purpose and intent of enacting the Ordinance is to protect the public
from drivers who continue driving after license revocation. In that regard, the plain
language of Section 24-9.3(B) does not provide any exceptions for drivers whose
licenses are revoked and not reinstated. Nor does it explicitly—or implicitly—state
that a driver who operates a motor vehicle following a period of revocation of his
driving privileges, but prior to reinstatement, is exempt from having the vehicle he is
operating declared a public nuisance and subject to forfeiture.
{15} 	We conclude that Olivas was operating a motor vehicle without a valid license
when he was stopped on February 25, 2010, and his vehicle was subject to forfeiture
under the Ordinance. Although the result here may seem harsh given that Olivas was
eligible for reinstatement of his license, we are not at liberty to create an exception to
or engage in further interpretation of the plain language of the statutes and Ordinance
as written. Thus, a driver’s license that has been revoked under Section 66-5-29(C)
must remain revoked until the driver has applied for reinstatement, complied with all
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, and paid to MVD a fee of $100. Section 66-5-
33.1.
CONCLUSION

10
{16} 	We hold that a driver’s license that has been revoked as a result of a DWI
conviction remains revoked until all the requirements of reinstatement have been met.
We also hold that a vehicle operated by a person with a revoked license whose license
is eligible for reinstatement but that license had not been reinstated is subject to the
forfeiture provision of the Ordinance. We reverse the decision of the district court.
{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
_________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge