June 30, 2009 – Chris L. West v. Washington Tru Solutions, LLC, No. 28,443

28,443Nmctapp

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: 	June 30 , 2009
NO. 28,443
CHRIS L. WEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON TRU SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY
Charles C. Currier, District Judge
Martin Law Firm
W.T. Martin, Jr.
Carlsbad, NM
for Appellant
Sheehan, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A.
Jaime Dawes
Kim A. Griffith
Luis G. Stelzner
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	Chris West (Employee) appeals that portion of an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Washington Tru Solutions, LLC (Employer) on Employee’s
claims of breach of an implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. As there are questions of material fact regarding the existence
of an implied contract that Employee would not be terminated except for just cause
and after the use of progressive disciplinary procedures, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Employee was a long-time management-level employee of Employer. In June
2001, Employer decided to merge Employee’s department with another department
and replace Employee as manager of communications. Employee was reassigned to
a position in another department. Although Employee received the same pay in his
new position, he no longer had any employees to manage, and he perceived the move
to have been a demotion. On August 23, 2002, Employer informed Employee that
Employee would receive a salary for two more months while he looked for another
job. Employer asserted that it took this action because there was not enough work for
Employee in his new position.
{3} 	Employee sued Employer, bringing claims for breach of an implied contract of
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employment and for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
among other claims. 	Employee believed that he was not terminated because of
inadequate job performance or as a cost-cutting measure, but instead because of
interpersonal difficulties he had with a superior at work and a contractor who was a
friend of the superior. 	The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Employer.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{4} 	Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence before the district
court would allow a reasonable factfinder to find in favor of the non-moving party on
that issue of fact. See Goradia v. Hahn Co., 111 N.M. 779, 782, 810 P.2d 798, 801
(1991). We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Tafoya v. Rael, 2008-NMSC-057, ¶ 11, 145 N.M. 4, 193 P.3d 551. In doing
so, we “construe all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the party that
opposed the motion.” 	Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2008-NMSC-015, ¶ 7, 143 N.M.
601, 179 P.3d 1209 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
{5} 	Employee asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
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favor of Employer because genuine issues of material fact exist on the question of
whether there was an implied contract that Employee would not be terminated except
for cause and after Employee was afforded the benefit of certain disciplinary
proceedings that would have given him a chance to correct any problem his employer
may have had with him.
General Principles
{6} 	Employment is generally terminable at will, absent an express contract to the
contrary. Lopez v. Kline, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 539, 953 P.2d 304 (filed
1997). There is an exception, however, when an employer creates an implied contract
limiting its ability to terminate an employee at will, by either providing that
termination will only be for cause or providing for certain procedural protections prior
to termination. See Mealand v. E. N.M. Med. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-089, ¶ 9, 131 N.M.
65, 33 P.3d 285. Such an implied contract is created when an employer’s “words or
conduct . . . support a reasonable expectation on the part of employees that they will
be dismissed only in accordance with specified procedures or for specified reasons.”
Id. The factfinder must examine the totality of the circumstances of the employment
relationship when considering whether an employer’s words or conduct constituted
an implied promise modifying the at-will relationship. Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶
12. 	An implied promise may be found in written or oral representations, in the
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conduct of the parties, or in a combination of representations and conduct. 	See
Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427-28, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234-35
(1989).
{7} 	Whether an implied contract exists is generally a question of fact. 	See
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 115 N.M. 665, 669, 857 P.2d 776, 780 (1993).
Therefore, the issue ordinarily should not be decided on summary judgment.
Kiedrowski v. Citizens Bank, 119 N.M. 572, 575, 893 P.2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1995).
But, because an employee’s expectation based on an employer’s words or conduct
must meet “a certain threshold of objectivity,” id., an employer may be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if the employee’s expectations are not objectively
reasonable. See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-089, ¶ 9. Therefore, the issue this Court must
decide on review of the district court’s order granting summary judgment is “whether,
on the evidence before the [district] court, a reasonable jury could find that
[Employer’s] words and conduct support an objectively reasonable expectation that
its employees will be dismissed only in accordance with specified procedures and for
specified reasons.” Id.
Employee’s Objectively Reasonable Belief in the Existence of an Implied
Contract
{8} 	Employee presented evidence that Employer promulgated an employee
handbook (Handbook) and a manager’s reference guide (Guide) that contained
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representations that could reasonably be construed to assure employees that they
would be terminated only for cause and after the use of certain remedial disciplinary
procedures. 	The Handbook states that Employer’s 	“[p]ersonnel policies and
procedures are specifically designed to meet the needs of employees” and that
Employer “endeavor[s] to provide a positive environment where each employee
enjoys . . . individual responsibility for career development.” The Handbook includes
a section on employee performance, which states that Employer seeks to create a
“performance evaluation program [that] is as fair, efficient, and productive as
possible,” in order to “provide[] documentation in support of promotion and other
personnel decisions,” ensure that an employee’s performance is linked to his pay, and
“provide[] specific performance feedback, . . . enabling [the employee] to grow and
develop” professionally. The Handbook also includes a section called the “Rules of
Conduct and Progressive Discipline Process,” which states that its rules “are provided
for your general information and to assure uniform and fair administration of
disciplinary action if ever it is necessary.” 	It states unequivocally, “[y]ou will be
expected to abide by these rules.” 	The Handbook then sets out three types of
misconduct, with numerous detailed examples of each, and provides the consequences
for such acts. The Handbook states that the list “is not an all-inclusive list” and that
“[a]ny disciplinary action will, of course, be based on the facts and circumstances in
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each specific case[,] as well as the total record of the employee(s) involved.”
{9} 	The Guide states that it is “intended to define managers’ and employees’
responsibilities 	within 	division 	policies, 	procedures 	and 	practices; 	provide 	a
framework for decision making; and establish reasonable boundaries of behavior and
authority.” The Guide informs managers that an employee’s “[g]ood performance,
misconduct 	or 	poor 	performance 	should 	be 	recorded 	when 	it 	occurs 	and
communicated to the employee immediately, regardless of when the formal, scheduled
appraisal is given.” With respect to deficient job performance, the Guide states that
[i]f a manager finds an employee’s overall performance unsatisfactory,
the manager places the employee on a Performance Action Track. 	At
the 	time 	of 	this 	decision, 	the 	manager 	must 	contact 	Human
Resources, and a specialist advisor will be assigned.
The Performance Action Track is from 2 months to 6 months in duration
and ends with either fully satisfactory performance or application of
progressive discipline, which may lead to termination.
The Guide also contains a section on Performance Improvement Plans. That section
explains that a
Performance Improvement Plan serves as a notice of need for improved
performance. The Plan must include:
• 	identification of performance deficiencies
• 	clearly written expectations and goals that the employee must
achieve for fully satisfactory performance
• 	the period of time in which improved performance is expected
• 	possible consequences if performance is not fully satisfactory at
the end of the Plan period [and]
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• 	a schedule of planned, periodic meetings to document and assess
progress[.]
. . . .
If an employee subject to a Performance Improvement Plan does not
meet the required level of performance, the employee is issued a formal,
final notice requiring immediate improved performance. 	This is
considered the final step in progressive discipline prior to termination.
The Guide additionally contains steps for managers to use in coaching and counseling
employees in order to improve performance.
{10} 	The Guide states that Employer’s “own best interest lies in ensuring fair
treatment of all employees and in making certain that disciplinary actions are prompt,
uniform, and impartial. The major purpose of any disciplinary action is to correct the
problem, prevent recurrence, and prepare the employee for satisfactory service in the
future.” 	The 	Guide 	provides 	that 	while 	there 	may 	be 	some 	extreme 	rule
violations—such as “theft, assault on another employee, or a willful violation of a
safety rule that could produce a life-threatening situation”—that might warrant
immediate termination, “most rule violations, including poor or unacceptable work
performance, are handled in accordance with the Process Guidelines outlined in this
section. 	Managers and employees are expected to understand and implement this
process.”
{11} 	The Guide contains a section entitled “Wrongful Discharge.” 	That section
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states that
[s]ince most wrongful discharge claims are based on employees’
contentions 	that 	they 	were 	arbitrarily 	or 	unjustly 	terminated, 	an
organization’s establishment of and adherence to a progressive discipline
policy can protect an employer from such liability.
While employment [with Employer] is at will, [Employer] applies
processes within progressive discipline to provide for application of a
test for just cause.
. . . .
Although promising to use a just cause test might undermine the at-will
nature of employment, some employers choose to apply the test in order
to create a sense of fairness.
The Guide then sets out several steps Employer uses in order to ensure that the
requirement of just cause for termination is met. 	It states that “[a]ny proposed
discipline beyond formal documented counseling must be reviewed by a higher level
of management, in consultation with the Human Resources . . . Manager. The purpose
of this review is to ensure that discipline is justified and uniformly applied.”
Although the Guide seeks to ensure uniformity, it indicates that “[m]anagers, with
approval from the Human Resource Department, can modify application of the
Process Guidelines to reflect mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the employee’s
length of service, or the employee’s past record.”
{12} 	Employee presented evidence that Employer trained its managers that they were
expected to use the progressive disciplinary procedures outlined in the Handbook and
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the Guide and that employees could rely on progressive discipline being applied to
them. Furthermore, Employee presented evidence that it was Employer’s practice to
discharge an employee only for cause and after first giving an employee the
opportunity to remedy the problem through the progressive disciplinary process.
{13} 	Employer points out that there was also evidence in the record to suggest that
a reasonable employee should not have relied on Employer’s representations that
employees would be terminated only for cause and after progressive discipline. The
Handbook states:
This 	guide 	is 	not 	a 	contract 	of 	employment 	or 	a 	guarantee 	of
employment for any period of time, and nothing herein changes the at-
will nature of your employment.
. . . .
No manager is authorized to create binding employment contracts on
behalf of the company with any individual, whether orally or in writing,
except through procedures as may be authorized by the Senior Executive
Vice President of Human Resources.
. . . .
The policies, procedures, and programs outlined in this handbook are
designed to serve as guidelines to keep you informed of relevant facts
about your employment. 	They are not intended to create any kind of
contractual relationship and are subject to change at [Employer’s]
discretion, with or without notice.
. . . .
[R]elease for unsatisfactory performance or violations of rules of
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conduct or for any reason can take place at times other than during [an
employee’s] initial review period.
{14} 	The Guide contains similar disclaimers:
Managers and employees should understand that the guide does not
modify the company’s “at will” employment doctrine nor provide
employees any kind of contractual rights. The guide does not form an
expressed or implied contract or promise that the policies outlined will
be applied in all cases. [Employer] may add, revoke, or modify policies
at any time.
The Guide also states that “[a]lthough employment with [Employer] is based on
mutual consent and both the employee and [Employer] have the right to terminate
employment at will, with or without cause or advance notice, [Employer] may use
progressive discipline at its discretion.”
{15} 	Employer also points to certain statements Employee made during his
deposition: 	Employee stated that no representative of Employer ever told him he
could only be terminated for cause, he did not remember anything that any
representative of Employer ever did that led him to believe that he could only be
terminated for cause, and there was nothing in writing that he received establishing
that he could only be terminated for cause. Employee also stated that he believed that
the use of progressive discipline was within a manager’s discretion.
{16} 	In light of the conflicting evidence before the district court, we agree with
Employee that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Employer and
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Employee had an implied contract that Employer would only terminate Employee for
cause and after certain disciplinary procedures were followed. 	Whether such an
implied contract exists is based on the totality of the circumstances of the employment
relationship between the parties, see Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 12, and a reasonable
jury could conclude that the evidence of Employer’s statements in the Handbook, the
Guide, and the managers’ training sessions, along with the evidence that Employer
had a practice of only terminating for cause, reasonably led Employee to rely on
Employer’s words and conduct.
{17} 	While we recognize that Employer also made contrary representations in the
Handbook and the Guide, such disclaimers are not dispositive. First, the Handbook
and the Guide themselves contain specific policies regarding termination for just cause
and the use of progressive discipline that an employee might reasonably conclude
modify the at-will relationship, despite these disclaimers. See, e.g., Beggs v. City of
Portales, 2009-NMSC-023, ¶ 20, ___ N.M. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,558, May 20,
2009) (“[E]ven where a personnel manual purports to disclaim any intentions of
forming contractual obligations enforceable against an employer, a fact finder may
still look to the totality of the parties’ statements and actions, including the contents
of [the] personnel manual, to determine whether contractual obligations were
created.”); Kiedrowski, 119 N.M. at 575, 893 P.2d at 471 (“[A]n implied contract can
12
still exist in spite of a disclaimer, where the employer’s conduct reasonably leads
employees to believe that they will not be terminated without just cause and a fair
procedure.”); cf. McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 5-6, 791 P.2d 452, 456-57
(1990) (holding that a disclaimer in a supervisor’s manual was not dispositive on the
issue of whether the manual modified an express employment contract). 	Read
together, 	the 	Handbook 	and 	the 	Guide 	provide 	that 	progressive 	disciplinary
procedures apply both to poor job performance and to misconduct. 	Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Employee, a reasonable jury could find that
because Employer established such extensive and specific policies and procedures for
using progressive discipline to address both performance and misconduct, these
representations indicated both that 1) employees would not be terminated for no
reason at all, and 2) progressive disciplinary procedures would apply except in the
most extreme cases. See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 12-13 (stating that the use
of specific examples in a handbook of business reasons for termination could lead an
employee to reasonably infer that the employer “would not discipline or discharge an
employee for a reason unrelated to a legitimate business need” and that “[a]n
employee might reasonably believe that [the employer] would not have described the
progressive discipline system in such detail, nor would it have disseminated the policy
to employees, if the progressive discipline policy was simply a non-binding set of
13
guidelines to be used in management’s complete discretion”).
{18} 	Second, even if an employee manual contains clear disclaimers, these may be
superceded by other representations made by the employer outside of the manual—for
instance, in oral statements. See Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 9 n.1, 16. And, in this
case, Employee presented evidence that Employer put on managers’ training sessions
at which Employer represented that termination was for cause and only after
progressive discipline.
{19} 	Employer argues that summary judgment was appropriate because it is clear
that the policies of termination for just cause and progressive discipline were
discretionary with Employer. 	But the evidence on this issue was sufficiently
conflicting to present an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. 	Although there was
language in the Handbook and the Guide indicating that the use of progressive
discipline was discretionary, there was also language indicating that managers and
employees “must” or were “expected to” use the outlined procedures. Furthermore,
because the disciplinary procedures contained statements that there were some
infractions that would lead to immediate termination and statements that managers had
discretion to take into account an employee’s work history when determining how to
discipline the employee, a reasonable jury might conclude that this was the sort of
discretion that Employer could reasonably be expected to use—not total discretion to
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fire employees without reason or warning. To the degree that Employer drafted the
Handbook and the Guide to contain internal contradictions, it is for the jury to
determine how a reasonable employee would have understood the language in the
documents. 	The fact that there was some evidence indicating that use of the
procedures was discretionary does not require a determination as a matter of law that
there was no implied contract. 	See Hudson v. Vill. Inn Pancake House of
Albuquerque, Inc., 2001-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 8-18, 23, 131 N.M. 308, 35 P.3d 313
(affirming the finding of an implied contract only to discharge for cause and after
specific warnings and an opportunity to correct deficient performance even though
there was conflicting evidence about whether the use of warnings was mandatory or
discretionary).
{20} 	Finally, we note that this Court recently concluded that Employer made no
representations in an employee handbook and in certain training sessions that would
create a question of material fact as to whether a different employee had an implied
contract that she would only be terminated for cause. 	See Zarr v. Washington Tru
Solutions, LLC, 2009-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 17-23, ___ N.M. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No.
27,553, Apr. 1, 2009). Employer has not argued that Zarr controls this case, and we
conclude that it does not. It does not appear that the plaintiff in Zarr relied on the
Guide as part of her evidence of an implied contract, and we believe that the Guide
15
contains significant representations—both as to the fact that progressive discipline
applies, not only to incidents of misconduct but also to cases of poor job performance,
and as to the fact that Employer uses a just cause standard for termination—that help
to create genuine issues of material fact in this case. 	The difference between the
outcome here and in Zarr highlights just how fact-dependent our inquiry must be
when a claim of breach of an implied contract is raised. In this case, the evidence
Employee presented to the district court demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Employer’s words and conduct would lead a reasonable employee to
believe that Employer was bound by an implied contract.
Employee’s Subjective Belief that Employer Would Not Fire Him Except for
Cause and After the Application of Progressive Discipline
{21} 	Employer asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Employee
made statements in his deposition that could be construed to mean that he had no
subjective expectation that he would only be terminated for cause and after
progressive discipline. 	However, there is ample evidence in the record that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Employee, indicates that Employee did in fact
have such a subjective expectation. 	Although Employee said at one point in his
deposition that progressive discipline was discretionary with each manager, just
moments earlier, Employee also testified that in the managers’ training he received,
progressive discipline was presented as what was expected of him and was not
16
optional. 	It should be left to a jury to sort out any potential conflict in these
statements.
{22} 	Employee also repeatedly stated in his deposition that he subjectively expected
progressive discipline to apply to him. In response to a question about whether he
understood that his employment was at will, Employee said:
In a sense. 	But I believe, and I’m not sure if it’s in this same
document or the manager handbook or maybe both, there are also built-
in steps when an employee is deficient or has a disciplinary problem that
you go through those steps to correct whatever the deficiency is. And in
my mind, that’s what would lead to the at will. 	I don’t think the
company was into discharging people willy-nilly for no reason at all.
. . . .
And I had every reason to believe that had there been something wrong
with my performance, that I would have been placed in one of the
programs spelled out in these documents, that there is a series of steps
that a manager and an employee would go through to improve whatever
the deficiency was . . . . And, logically, at the end of that process, if I
still hadn’t cut the mustard, then the at will might kick in. But otherwise
why are those things in those documents?
When asked what Employee understood “at will” to mean, Employee responded:
I think it means you can discharge somebody for any reason . . . [o]r for
no reason. But I also maintain that the company wasn’t into doing that
to people. The doctrine of the company was and always has been, as far
as I’m concerned, and it’s written into some of these documents, that we
treat our employees with dignity and respect, and that doesn’t mean
shoving them out the door for no reason.
When asked about whether he understood the disclaimer that the Handbook does not
17
create a contract, Employee said, “[b]ut if there is not an implied contractual
relationship, why even bother to put the corrective steps in this document? I mean,
it’s contradictory.” To the degree that Employee’s deposition testimony reflected a
degree of subjective confusion about the relationship between representations by
Employer that employment was at will and other representations by Employer that
employment 	would 	only 	be 	terminated 	for 	just 	cause 	and 	after 	disciplinary
proceedings, the confusion was created by the potentially contradictory nature of
Employer’s own statements. It is not appropriate on summary judgment to single out
those portions of Employee’s deposition that acknowledge that no representative of
Employer ever expressly stated that employment was not at will or that progressive
discipline would be applied in all cases and ignore those portions of Employee’s
deposition that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Employee, reasonably
state that Employee subjectively expected that he would be fired only for cause and
after progressive discipline. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to the nature of Employee’s subjective expectations.
Employer’s Representations Regarding Progressive Discipline
{23} 	Finally, we note our disagreement with Employer’s suggestion that Employer’s
representations about progressive discipline are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
Employer suggests that because Employer claims that Employee was not fired either
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due to misconduct or poor job performance, but instead was fired for some other
reason or no reason at all, Employer’s representations about progressive discipline
would not control its conduct in this case, even if there were an implied contract to
apply progressive discipline in cases of poor work performance or misconduct.
Assuming that the representations in the Handbook and the Guide create an implied
contract to follow those procedures in cases of misconduct and poor performance, we
cannot say that, as a matter of law, those representations are irrelevant to the question
of whether the implied agreement between Employer and Employee left Employer
free to terminate employees simply because a superior did not like them or for some
other non-business-related reason. 	A reasonable jury could conclude that such an
interpretation of the Handbook and the Guide would be unreasonable and would
render the disciplinary procedures contained within them meaningless since Employer
could then always fire an employee for an arbitrary reason in order to avoid having
to follow the procedures. Because Employer promulgated such a comprehensive and
specific set of procedures for handling almost all types of work-related problems and
made a number of statements to suggest that these policies were put into place in order
to create a sense of fairness, a jury could conclude that a reasonable employee might
understand that these representations were intended to inform employees that they
would not be terminated arbitrarily, for no reason, or for reasons that cannot be
19
justified by reference to legitimate business interests. 	See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-
089, ¶¶ 12-13. Therefore, Employer’s representations about the use of progressive
discipline are relevant even when Employer terminates an employee for reasons it
asserts are unrelated to performance or misconduct.
{24} 	Employer cites to statements by the district court during the hearing to support
its argument that progressive discipline is irrelevant. 	However, the district court
appeared to rely more heavily on the Handbook than on the Guide or other evidence
for its conclusion that Employer’s policies regarding progressive discipline were not
relevant. But the district court was required to look at the totality of the circumstances
of the employment relationship, and Employer’s representations in the Guide and in
management training sessions were part of the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, it was error to view the Handbook as the document that primarily
defined the employment relationship.
EMPLOYER’S BREACH OF ANY IMPLIED CONTRACT
{25} 	Employee asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Employer’s stated reasons for firing Employee were pretextual. This argument raises
the issue of whether any implied contract between the parties was breached by
Employer’s alleged conduct of firing Employee without cause and/or without the
required disciplinary procedures and concealing the true nature of its action by
20
asserting that Employee was fired for legitimate business reasons. Employer does not
dispute that there are material questions of fact on this issue; instead, Employer simply
points out that this issue is not relevant to the question of whether the parties were
bound by an implied contract. 	Because we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, the parties will have the opportunity on remand to present
evidence to the jury on this issue of whether any implied contract was breached.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND AN IMPLIED
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
{26} 	Without directing this Court to any particular portion of the recording of the
summary judgment hearing, Employee asserts that the district court’s summary
judgment order was based in part on its flawed conclusion that an employer-employee
relationship could be both at will and controlled by an implied contract. We need not
address this argument as we have reversed the district court’s ruling. However, in
order to clarify the matter for the parties on remand, we note that to the degree that
there was an implied contract between the parties, it only covered those matters for
which there were representations that were sufficiently specific for a reasonable
employee to rely upon. See, e.g., Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 (holding that where
an employer made representations that a reasonable jury might conclude constituted
an implied contract not to terminate an employee due to her illness, the implied
contract was limited to termination for illness, and not for any other cause).
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BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
{27} 	Employee argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
Employee’s claim that Employer breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 	Both Employee and Employer agree that the basis of the district court’s
ruling was that there could be no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when
the employment relationship was at will. Because we have concluded that there is a
question of fact as to whether the relationship was at will or whether it was governed
by an implied contract, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing Employee’s
claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CONCLUSION
{28} 	There are questions of material fact as to whether there was an implied contract
that Employee would only be fired for cause and after the application of progressive
disciplinary procedures. 	Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Employer on Employee’s claims of breach of an
implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
We remand for a trial on the merits of these claims.
{29} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
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JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
______________________________
ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:

Filing Date: _June 30, 2009

NO. 28,443
CHRIS L. WEST,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

WASHINGTON TRU SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant- Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY
Charles C. Currier, District J udge

Martin Law Firm
W.T. Martin, Jr.
Carlsbad, NM

for Appellant

Sheehan, Sheehan & Stelzner, P.A.
Jaime Dawes

kim A. Gnffith

Luis G. Stelzner

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	Chris West (Employee) appeals that portion of an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Washington Tru Solutions, LLC (Employer) on Employee’s
claims of breach of an implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. As there are questions of material fact regarding the existence
of an implied contract that Employee would not be terminated except for just cause
and after the use of progressive disciplinary procedures, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Employee was a long-time management-level employee of Employer. In June
2001, Employer decided to merge Employee’s department with another department
and replace Employee as manager of communications. Employee was reassigned to
a position in another department. Although Employee received the same pay in his
new position, he no longer had any employees to manage, and he perceived the move
to have been a demotion. On August 23, 2002, Employer informed Employee that
Employee would receive a salary for two more months while he looked for another
job. Employer asserted that it took this action because there was not enough work for
Employee in his new position.
{3} 	Employee sued Employer, bringing claims for breach of an implied contract of

2
employment and for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
among other claims. 	Employee believed that he was not terminated because of
inadequate job performance or as a cost-cutting measure, but instead because of
interpersonal difficulties he had with a superior at work and a contractor who was a
friend of the superior. 	The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Employer.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{4} 	Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence before the district
court would allow a reasonable factfinder to find in favor of the non-moving party on
that issue of fact. See Goradia v. Hahn Co., 111 N.M. 779, 782, 810 P.2d 798, 801
(1991). We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Tafoya v. Rael, 2008-NMSC-057, ¶ 11, 145 N.M. 4, 193 P.3d 551. In doing
so, we “construe all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the party that
opposed the motion.” 	Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2008-NMSC-015, ¶ 7, 143 N.M.
601, 179 P.3d 1209 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
{5} 	Employee asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in

3
favor of Employer because genuine issues of material fact exist on the question of
whether there was an implied contract that Employee would not be terminated except
for cause and after Employee was afforded the benefit of certain disciplinary
proceedings that would have given him a chance to correct any problem his employer
may have had with him.
General Principles
{6} 	Employment is generally terminable at will, absent an express contract to the
contrary. Lopez v. Kline, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 539, 953 P.2d 304 (filed
1997). There is an exception, however, when an employer creates an implied contract
limiting its ability to terminate an employee at will, by either providing that
termination will only be for cause or providing for certain procedural protections prior
to termination. See Mealand v. E. N.M. Med. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-089, ¶ 9, 131 N.M.
65, 33 P.3d 285. Such an implied contract is created when an employer’s “words or
conduct . . . support a reasonable expectation on the part of employees that they will
be dismissed only in accordance with specified procedures or for specified reasons.”
Id. The factfinder must examine the totality of the circumstances of the employment
relationship when considering whether an employer’s words or conduct constituted
an implied promise modifying the at-will relationship. Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶
12. 	An implied promise may be found in written or oral representations, in the

4
conduct of the parties, or in a combination of representations and conduct. 	See
Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427-28, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234-35
(1989).
{7} 	Whether an implied contract exists is generally a question of fact. 	See
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 115 N.M. 665, 669, 857 P.2d 776, 780 (1993).
Therefore, the issue ordinarily should not be decided on summary judgment.
Kiedrowski v. Citizens Bank, 119 N.M. 572, 575, 893 P.2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1995).
But, because an employee’s expectation based on an employer’s words or conduct
must meet “a certain threshold of objectivity,” id., an employer may be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if the employee’s expectations are not objectively
reasonable. See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-089, ¶ 9. Therefore, the issue this Court must
decide on review of the district court’s order granting summary judgment is “whether,
on the evidence before the [district] court, a reasonable jury could find that
[Employer’s] words and conduct support an objectively reasonable expectation that
its employees will be dismissed only in accordance with specified procedures and for
specified reasons.” Id.
Employee’s Objectively Reasonable Belief in the Existence of an Implied
Contract
{8} 	Employee presented evidence that Employer promulgated an employee
handbook (Handbook) and a manager’s reference guide (Guide) that contained

5
representations that could reasonably be construed to assure employees that they
would be terminated only for cause and after the use of certain remedial disciplinary
procedures. 	The Handbook states that Employer’s 	“[p]ersonnel policies and
procedures are specifically designed to meet the needs of employees” and that
Employer “endeavor[s] to provide a positive environment where each employee
enjoys . . . individual responsibility for career development.” The Handbook includes
a section on employee performance, which states that Employer seeks to create a
“performance evaluation program [that] is as fair, efficient, and productive as
possible,” in order to “provide[] documentation in support of promotion and other
personnel decisions,” ensure that an employee’s performance is linked to his pay, and
“provide[] specific performance feedback, . . . enabling [the employee] to grow and
develop” professionally. The Handbook also includes a section called the “Rules of
Conduct and Progressive Discipline Process,” which states that its rules “are provided
for your general information and to assure uniform and fair administration of
disciplinary action if ever it is necessary.” 	It states unequivocally, “[y]ou will be
expected to abide by these rules.” 	The Handbook then sets out three types of
misconduct, with numerous detailed examples of each, and provides the consequences
for such acts. The Handbook states that the list “is not an all-inclusive list” and that
“[a]ny disciplinary action will, of course, be based on the facts and circumstances in

6
each specific case[,] as well as the total record of the employee(s) involved.”
{9} 	The Guide states that it is “intended to define managers’ and employees’
responsibilities 	within 	division 	policies, 	procedures 	and 	practices; 	provide 	a
framework for decision making; and establish reasonable boundaries of behavior and
authority.” The Guide informs managers that an employee’s “[g]ood performance,
misconduct 	or 	poor 	performance 	should 	be 	recorded 	when 	it 	occurs 	and
communicated to the employee immediately, regardless of when the formal, scheduled
appraisal is given.” With respect to deficient job performance, the Guide states that
[i]f a manager finds an employee’s overall performance unsatisfactory,
the manager places the employee on a Performance Action Track. 	At
the 	time 	of 	this 	decision, 	the 	manager 	must 	contact 	Human
Resources, and a specialist advisor will be assigned.
The Performance Action Track is from 2 months to 6 months in duration
and ends with either fully satisfactory performance or application of
progressive discipline, which may lead to termination.
The Guide also contains a section on Performance Improvement Plans. That section
explains that a
Performance Improvement Plan serves as a notice of need for improved
performance. The Plan must include:
• 	identification of performance deficiencies
• 	clearly written expectations and goals that the employee must
achieve for fully satisfactory performance
• 	the period of time in which improved performance is expected
• 	possible consequences if performance is not fully satisfactory at
the end of the Plan period [and]

7
• 	a schedule of planned, periodic meetings to document and assess
progress[.]
. . . .
If an employee subject to a Performance Improvement Plan does not
meet the required level of performance, the employee is issued a formal,
final notice requiring immediate improved performance. 	This is
considered the final step in progressive discipline prior to termination.
The Guide additionally contains steps for managers to use in coaching and counseling
employees in order to improve performance.
{10} 	The Guide states that Employer’s “own best interest lies in ensuring fair
treatment of all employees and in making certain that disciplinary actions are prompt,
uniform, and impartial. The major purpose of any disciplinary action is to correct the
problem, prevent recurrence, and prepare the employee for satisfactory service in the
future.” 	The 	Guide 	provides 	that 	while 	there 	may 	be 	some 	extreme 	rule
violations—such as “theft, assault on another employee, or a willful violation of a
safety rule that could produce a life-threatening situation”—that might warrant
immediate termination, “most rule violations, including poor or unacceptable work
performance, are handled in accordance with the Process Guidelines outlined in this
section. 	Managers and employees are expected to understand and implement this
process.”
{11} 	The Guide contains a section entitled “Wrongful Discharge.” 	That section

8
states that
[s]ince most wrongful discharge claims are based on employees’
contentions 	that 	they 	were 	arbitrarily 	or 	unjustly 	terminated, 	an
organization’s establishment of and adherence to a progressive discipline
policy can protect an employer from such liability.
While employment [with Employer] is at will, [Employer] applies
processes within progressive discipline to provide for application of a
test for just cause.
. . . .
Although promising to use a just cause test might undermine the at-will
nature of employment, some employers choose to apply the test in order
to create a sense of fairness.
The Guide then sets out several steps Employer uses in order to ensure that the
requirement of just cause for termination is met. 	It states that “[a]ny proposed
discipline beyond formal documented counseling must be reviewed by a higher level
of management, in consultation with the Human Resources . . . Manager. The purpose
of this review is to ensure that discipline is justified and uniformly applied.”
Although the Guide seeks to ensure uniformity, it indicates that “[m]anagers, with
approval from the Human Resource Department, can modify application of the
Process Guidelines to reflect mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the employee’s
length of service, or the employee’s past record.”
{12} 	Employee presented evidence that Employer trained its managers that they were
expected to use the progressive disciplinary procedures outlined in the Handbook and

9
the Guide and that employees could rely on progressive discipline being applied to
them. Furthermore, Employee presented evidence that it was Employer’s practice to
discharge an employee only for cause and after first giving an employee the
opportunity to remedy the problem through the progressive disciplinary process.
{13} 	Employer points out that there was also evidence in the record to suggest that
a reasonable employee should not have relied on Employer’s representations that
employees would be terminated only for cause and after progressive discipline. The
Handbook states:
This 	guide 	is 	not 	a 	contract 	of 	employment 	or 	a 	guarantee 	of
employment for any period of time, and nothing herein changes the at-
will nature of your employment.
. . . .
No manager is authorized to create binding employment contracts on
behalf of the company with any individual, whether orally or in writing,
except through procedures as may be authorized by the Senior Executive
Vice President of Human Resources.
. . . .
The policies, procedures, and programs outlined in this handbook are
designed to serve as guidelines to keep you informed of relevant facts
about your employment. 	They are not intended to create any kind of
contractual relationship and are subject to change at [Employer’s]
discretion, with or without notice.
. . . .
[R]elease for unsatisfactory performance or violations of rules of

10
conduct or for any reason can take place at times other than during [an
employee’s] initial review period.
{14} 	The Guide contains similar disclaimers:
Managers and employees should understand that the guide does not
modify the company’s “at will” employment doctrine nor provide
employees any kind of contractual rights. The guide does not form an
expressed or implied contract or promise that the policies outlined will
be applied in all cases. [Employer] may add, revoke, or modify policies
at any time.
The Guide also states that “[a]lthough employment with [Employer] is based on
mutual consent and both the employee and [Employer] have the right to terminate
employment at will, with or without cause or advance notice, [Employer] may use
progressive discipline at its discretion.”
{15} 	Employer also points to certain statements Employee made during his
deposition: 	Employee stated that no representative of Employer ever told him he
could only be terminated for cause, he did not remember anything that any
representative of Employer ever did that led him to believe that he could only be
terminated for cause, and there was nothing in writing that he received establishing
that he could only be terminated for cause. Employee also stated that he believed that
the use of progressive discipline was within a manager’s discretion.
{16} 	In light of the conflicting evidence before the district court, we agree with
Employee that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Employer and

11
Employee had an implied contract that Employer would only terminate Employee for
cause and after certain disciplinary procedures were followed. 	Whether such an
implied contract exists is based on the totality of the circumstances of the employment
relationship between the parties, see Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 12, and a reasonable
jury could conclude that the evidence of Employer’s statements in the Handbook, the
Guide, and the managers’ training sessions, along with the evidence that Employer
had a practice of only terminating for cause, reasonably led Employee to rely on
Employer’s words and conduct.
{17} 	While we recognize that Employer also made contrary representations in the
Handbook and the Guide, such disclaimers are not dispositive. First, the Handbook
and the Guide themselves contain specific policies regarding termination for just cause
and the use of progressive discipline that an employee might reasonably conclude
modify the at-will relationship, despite these disclaimers. See, e.g., Beggs v. City of
Portales, 2009-NMSC-023, ¶ 20, ___ N.M. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,558, May 20,
2009) (“[E]ven where a personnel manual purports to disclaim any intentions of
forming contractual obligations enforceable against an employer, a fact finder may
still look to the totality of the parties’ statements and actions, including the contents
of [the] personnel manual, to determine whether contractual obligations were
created.”); Kiedrowski, 119 N.M. at 575, 893 P.2d at 471 (“[A]n implied contract can

12
still exist in spite of a disclaimer, where the employer’s conduct reasonably leads
employees to believe that they will not be terminated without just cause and a fair
procedure.”); cf. McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 5-6, 791 P.2d 452, 456-57
(1990) (holding that a disclaimer in a supervisor’s manual was not dispositive on the
issue of whether the manual modified an express employment contract). 	Read
together, 	the 	Handbook 	and 	the 	Guide 	provide 	that 	progressive 	disciplinary
procedures apply both to poor job performance and to misconduct. 	Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Employee, a reasonable jury could find that
because Employer established such extensive and specific policies and procedures for
using progressive discipline to address both performance and misconduct, these
representations indicated both that 1) employees would not be terminated for no
reason at all, and 2) progressive disciplinary procedures would apply except in the
most extreme cases. See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 12-13 (stating that the use
of specific examples in a handbook of business reasons for termination could lead an
employee to reasonably infer that the employer “would not discipline or discharge an
employee for a reason unrelated to a legitimate business need” and that “[a]n
employee might reasonably believe that [the employer] would not have described the
progressive discipline system in such detail, nor would it have disseminated the policy
to employees, if the progressive discipline policy was simply a non-binding set of

13
guidelines to be used in management’s complete discretion”).
{18} 	Second, even if an employee manual contains clear disclaimers, these may be
superceded by other representations made by the employer outside of the manual—for
instance, in oral statements. See Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 9 n.1, 16. And, in this
case, Employee presented evidence that Employer put on managers’ training sessions
at which Employer represented that termination was for cause and only after
progressive discipline.
{19} 	Employer argues that summary judgment was appropriate because it is clear
that the policies of termination for just cause and progressive discipline were
discretionary with Employer. 	But the evidence on this issue was sufficiently
conflicting to present an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. 	Although there was
language in the Handbook and the Guide indicating that the use of progressive
discipline was discretionary, there was also language indicating that managers and
employees “must” or were “expected to” use the outlined procedures. Furthermore,
because the disciplinary procedures contained statements that there were some
infractions that would lead to immediate termination and statements that managers had
discretion to take into account an employee’s work history when determining how to
discipline the employee, a reasonable jury might conclude that this was the sort of
discretion that Employer could reasonably be expected to use—not total discretion to

14
fire employees without reason or warning. To the degree that Employer drafted the
Handbook and the Guide to contain internal contradictions, it is for the jury to
determine how a reasonable employee would have understood the language in the
documents. 	The fact that there was some evidence indicating that use of the
procedures was discretionary does not require a determination as a matter of law that
there was no implied contract. 	See Hudson v. Vill. Inn Pancake House of
Albuquerque, Inc., 2001-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 8-18, 23, 131 N.M. 308, 35 P.3d 313
(affirming the finding of an implied contract only to discharge for cause and after
specific warnings and an opportunity to correct deficient performance even though
there was conflicting evidence about whether the use of warnings was mandatory or
discretionary).
{20} 	Finally, we note that this Court recently concluded that Employer made no
representations in an employee handbook and in certain training sessions that would
create a question of material fact as to whether a different employee had an implied
contract that she would only be terminated for cause. 	See Zarr v. Washington Tru
Solutions, LLC, 2009-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 17-23, ___ N.M. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No.
27,553, Apr. 1, 2009). Employer has not argued that Zarr controls this case, and we
conclude that it does not. It does not appear that the plaintiff in Zarr relied on the
Guide as part of her evidence of an implied contract, and we believe that the Guide

15
contains significant representations—both as to the fact that progressive discipline
applies, not only to incidents of misconduct but also to cases of poor job performance,
and as to the fact that Employer uses a just cause standard for termination—that help
to create genuine issues of material fact in this case. 	The difference between the
outcome here and in Zarr highlights just how fact-dependent our inquiry must be
when a claim of breach of an implied contract is raised. In this case, the evidence
Employee presented to the district court demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Employer’s words and conduct would lead a reasonable employee to
believe that Employer was bound by an implied contract.
Employee’s Subjective Belief that Employer Would Not Fire Him Except for
Cause and After the Application of Progressive Discipline
{21} 	Employer asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Employee
made statements in his deposition that could be construed to mean that he had no
subjective expectation that he would only be terminated for cause and after
progressive discipline. 	However, there is ample evidence in the record that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Employee, indicates that Employee did in fact
have such a subjective expectation. 	Although Employee said at one point in his
deposition that progressive discipline was discretionary with each manager, just
moments earlier, Employee also testified that in the managers’ training he received,
progressive discipline was presented as what was expected of him and was not

16
optional. 	It should be left to a jury to sort out any potential conflict in these
statements.
{22} 	Employee also repeatedly stated in his deposition that he subjectively expected
progressive discipline to apply to him. In response to a question about whether he
understood that his employment was at will, Employee said:
In a sense. 	But I believe, and I’m not sure if it’s in this same
document or the manager handbook or maybe both, there are also built-
in steps when an employee is deficient or has a disciplinary problem that
you go through those steps to correct whatever the deficiency is. And in
my mind, that’s what would lead to the at will. 	I don’t think the
company was into discharging people willy-nilly for no reason at all.
. . . .
And I had every reason to believe that had there been something wrong
with my performance, that I would have been placed in one of the
programs spelled out in these documents, that there is a series of steps
that a manager and an employee would go through to improve whatever
the deficiency was . . . . And, logically, at the end of that process, if I
still hadn’t cut the mustard, then the at will might kick in. But otherwise
why are those things in those documents?
When asked what Employee understood “at will” to mean, Employee responded:
I think it means you can discharge somebody for any reason . . . [o]r for
no reason. But I also maintain that the company wasn’t into doing that
to people. The doctrine of the company was and always has been, as far
as I’m concerned, and it’s written into some of these documents, that we
treat our employees with dignity and respect, and that doesn’t mean
shoving them out the door for no reason.
When asked about whether he understood the disclaimer that the Handbook does not

17
create a contract, Employee said, “[b]ut if there is not an implied contractual
relationship, why even bother to put the corrective steps in this document? I mean,
it’s contradictory.” To the degree that Employee’s deposition testimony reflected a
degree of subjective confusion about the relationship between representations by
Employer that employment was at will and other representations by Employer that
employment 	would 	only 	be 	terminated 	for 	just 	cause 	and 	after 	disciplinary
proceedings, the confusion was created by the potentially contradictory nature of
Employer’s own statements. It is not appropriate on summary judgment to single out
those portions of Employee’s deposition that acknowledge that no representative of
Employer ever expressly stated that employment was not at will or that progressive
discipline would be applied in all cases and ignore those portions of Employee’s
deposition that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Employee, reasonably
state that Employee subjectively expected that he would be fired only for cause and
after progressive discipline. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to the nature of Employee’s subjective expectations.
Employer’s Representations Regarding Progressive Discipline
{23} 	Finally, we note our disagreement with Employer’s suggestion that Employer’s
representations about progressive discipline are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
Employer suggests that because Employer claims that Employee was not fired either

18
due to misconduct or poor job performance, but instead was fired for some other
reason or no reason at all, Employer’s representations about progressive discipline
would not control its conduct in this case, even if there were an implied contract to
apply progressive discipline in cases of poor work performance or misconduct.
Assuming that the representations in the Handbook and the Guide create an implied
contract to follow those procedures in cases of misconduct and poor performance, we
cannot say that, as a matter of law, those representations are irrelevant to the question
of whether the implied agreement between Employer and Employee left Employer
free to terminate employees simply because a superior did not like them or for some
other non-business-related reason. 	A reasonable jury could conclude that such an
interpretation of the Handbook and the Guide would be unreasonable and would
render the disciplinary procedures contained within them meaningless since Employer
could then always fire an employee for an arbitrary reason in order to avoid having
to follow the procedures. Because Employer promulgated such a comprehensive and
specific set of procedures for handling almost all types of work-related problems and
made a number of statements to suggest that these policies were put into place in order
to create a sense of fairness, a jury could conclude that a reasonable employee might
understand that these representations were intended to inform employees that they
would not be terminated arbitrarily, for no reason, or for reasons that cannot be

19
justified by reference to legitimate business interests. 	See Mealand, 2001-NMCA-
089, ¶¶ 12-13. Therefore, Employer’s representations about the use of progressive
discipline are relevant even when Employer terminates an employee for reasons it
asserts are unrelated to performance or misconduct.
{24} 	Employer cites to statements by the district court during the hearing to support
its argument that progressive discipline is irrelevant. 	However, the district court
appeared to rely more heavily on the Handbook than on the Guide or other evidence
for its conclusion that Employer’s policies regarding progressive discipline were not
relevant. But the district court was required to look at the totality of the circumstances
of the employment relationship, and Employer’s representations in the Guide and in
management training sessions were part of the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, it was error to view the Handbook as the document that primarily
defined the employment relationship.
EMPLOYER’S BREACH OF ANY IMPLIED CONTRACT
{25} 	Employee asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Employer’s stated reasons for firing Employee were pretextual. This argument raises
the issue of whether any implied contract between the parties was breached by
Employer’s alleged conduct of firing Employee without cause and/or without the
required disciplinary procedures and concealing the true nature of its action by

20
asserting that Employee was fired for legitimate business reasons. Employer does not
dispute that there are material questions of fact on this issue; instead, Employer simply
points out that this issue is not relevant to the question of whether the parties were
bound by an implied contract. 	Because we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, the parties will have the opportunity on remand to present
evidence to the jury on this issue of whether any implied contract was breached.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND AN IMPLIED
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
{26} 	Without directing this Court to any particular portion of the recording of the
summary judgment hearing, Employee asserts that the district court’s summary
judgment order was based in part on its flawed conclusion that an employer-employee
relationship could be both at will and controlled by an implied contract. We need not
address this argument as we have reversed the district court’s ruling. However, in
order to clarify the matter for the parties on remand, we note that to the degree that
there was an implied contract between the parties, it only covered those matters for
which there were representations that were sufficiently specific for a reasonable
employee to rely upon. See, e.g., Lopez, 1998-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 (holding that where
an employer made representations that a reasonable jury might conclude constituted
an implied contract not to terminate an employee due to her illness, the implied
contract was limited to termination for illness, and not for any other cause).

21
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
{27} 	Employee argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
Employee’s claim that Employer breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 	Both Employee and Employer agree that the basis of the district court’s
ruling was that there could be no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when
the employment relationship was at will. Because we have concluded that there is a
question of fact as to whether the relationship was at will or whether it was governed
by an implied contract, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing Employee’s
claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CONCLUSION
{28} 	There are questions of material fact as to whether there was an implied contract
that Employee would only be fired for cause and after the application of progressive
disciplinary procedures. 	Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Employer on Employee’s claims of breach of an
implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
We remand for a trial on the merits of these claims.
{29} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________

JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge

22

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