July 18, 2019- A. Blair Dunn v. Kathy Brandt, No. A-1-CA-36299

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICrO
2 Opinion Number: _____ _
3 Filing Date: JULY 18, 2019
4 	No. A-1-CA-36299
5 A. BLAIR DUNN,
6 	Plaintiff-Appellant,
7 v.
8 KATHY BRANDT, Guardian Ad
9 Litem for Second Judicial District
10 	Court, and SECOND JUDICIAL
11 	DISTRICT COURT,
12 	Defendants-Appellees.
13 	APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
14 Albert J. Mitchell, Jr., District Judge
15 	W estem Agriculture, Resource
16 and Business Advocates, LLP
17 A. Blair Dunn
18 Albuquerque, NM
19 Pro Se Appellant
20 Brant & Hunt, Attorneys
21 	John M. Brant
22 Albuquerque, NM
23 	for Appellee Kathy Brandt
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 7/18/2019 8:56 AM

1 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
2 Ari Biernoff, Assistant Attorney General
3 Joseph Dworak, Assistant Attorney General
4 Santa Fe, NM
5 for Appellee Second Judicial District Court
6 Martinez, Hart, Thompson & Sanchez, P.C.
7 F. Michael Hart
8 Julio C. Romero
9 Albuquerque, NM
10 Peter Klages
11 	Albuquerque, NM
12 	for Amici Curiae Advocacy, Inc., Pegasus Legal Services for Children, Martha
13 	Kaser, Sarah Armstrong, and Tiffany Oliver Leigh

1 	OPINION
2 V ANZI, Judge.
3 	{t} 	Plaintiff A. Blair Dunn appeals the dismissal of his enforcement action under
4 the Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA). NMSA 1978, §§ 14-2-1 to -12 (1947,
5 as amended through 2019). We affirm because disclosure of the records to Plaintiff
6 is barred by a protective order or by the judicial deliberation privilege recognized in
7 Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018-NMSC-022, ,-r 39,415 P.3d 505.
8 BACKGROUND
9 	{2} 	Plaintiff is the petitioner in a domestic relations matter in the Second Judicial
10 District Court (the SJDC) that involves his child, now ten years old. See Dunn v.
11 	Dunn, 	No. 	D-202-DM-2011-00839. 	On 	Plaintiffs 	motion, 	the 	district 	court
12 	appointed Defendant Kathleen Brandt (Brandt) as guardian ad litem to the child. See
13 	NMSA 1978, § 40-4-8 (1993) (permitting appointments of guardians ad litem); see
14 also Rule 1-053 .3 NMRA (governing appointment of guardians ad litem in domestic
15 	relations cases).1 Consistent with Rule 1-053.3(F), the order required Brandt to:
16
17
18
19
a.
b.
interview the child face-to-face outside the presence of both
parents and counsel i[f] the child is [six] (6) years of age or older;
interview all parties and any available parent subject [to] Rule[]
16-402 NMRA;
1Amendments to Rule 1-053 .3 became effective on December 31, 2017. These
amendments are not relevant to our analysis. All citations herein are to the current
rule, except as noted.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
1.
interview each mental health professional treating the child after
obtaining any necessary authorization[;]
interview any other person[s] and/or review any relevant records
the 	[guardian 	ad 	litem] 	deems 	reasonably 	necessary 	after
obtaining any necessary authorization;
determine the child's wishes, if appropriate;
submit, but do not file, a written report of investigation and
separate written recommendations to all parties and counsel at
least ten days before the recommendations are filed with the
court, except in the case of emergency;
file the recommendations, but not the report, with the [c]ourt;
perform the duties to the child as set forth in Rule 1-053.3(H)
and (I) NMRA[;] and[]
[i]nvestigate any health/medical issues affecting the minor child.
16 Plaintiff served Brandt with -a 	discovery request 	seeking "all 	correspondence
17 received by you or produced by you-whether transmitted by electronic means or
18 	by USPS-with either party or any other person in relation to the 	[domestic
( 	'
19 relations] case." In response, Brandt sought a protective order, in which she asserted
20 that she "serves as an arm of the [district c]ourt and assists the [district] court in
21 	discharging its duty to adjudicate the child's best interests and as such should not
22 have to disclose her work prior to the submission of a report" and that "P[laintiff]'s
23 	discovery request is overbroad, oppressive and unduly burdensome. Mor~over it
24 appears to be calculated as part of a litigation strategy to intimidate [Brandt] or
2

1 otherwise force her to withdraw." Plaintiff apparently did not respond to Brandt's
2 motion, and the district court issued a protective order on March 3, 2016 (the
3 protective order), stating, "The Guardian ad Litem's Motion for Protective Order is
4 granted. The Guardian ad Litem shall not be required to respond to P[laintiff]'s
5 Interrogatories or Request for Production."
6 {3} 	Four days later, Plaintiff ema~led Brandt a request to "produce all records of
7 communications sent or received by you in any form in the [domestic relations]
8 case." Plaintiff stated, "As ... you are an arm of the [district c]ourt please treat this
9 	[as] an IPRA request ... to you in your official capacity." Brandt did not respond to
10 this request. On March 11, 2016, Plaintiff sent a copy of the request to the designated
11 	custodian of records at the SJDC. After first requesting additional time to respond,
12 the records custodian denied Plaintiffs request on March 30, 2016. See § 14-2-10
13 	(permitting the records custodian to request additional time to respond to broad
14 requests); § 14-2-11 (governing denial of IPRA requests). The records custodian
15 	based the denial on its conclusion that (1) Brandt's records were not public records
16 as defined by IPRA; (2) the SJDC records custodian is not the proper custodian of
17 the records; (3) the records are subject to the protective order issued in the domestic
18 relations case; and (4) Brandt is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity under Kimbrell
19 v. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, 331 P.3d 915.
3

1 {4} 	Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	instant 	action 	for 	a 	declaratory 	judgment 	ordering
2 production of the records, naming both Brandt and the SJDC as defendants. All
3 parties moved for summary judgment. After hearing argument, the district court
4 granted 	summary judgment 	in 	favor 	of Brandt 	and 	the 	SJDC 	(collectively,
5 Defendants) and denied Plaintiffs motion. Plaintiff appealed.
6 DISCUSSION
7 	{5} 	Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any
8 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
9 law." Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. On appeal, Plaintiff does not argue that the presence
10 	of a "genuine issue as to any material fact" requires reversal of the district court's
11 judgments. Instead, he maintains that the district court erred in ruling that, assuming
12 records responsive to his IPRA request exist, Defendants nevertheless did not violate
13 	IPRA by withholding them. "We review an order granting summary judgment de
14 novo." Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank ofBelen, 2013-NMCA-018, ,-r 22,
15 	294 P.3d 1276.
16 {6} 	"Our democratic system of government necessarily 'assumes the existence of
17 an informed citizenry .... Without some protection for the acquisition of information
18 about the operation of public institutions 	: . . the process 	of self-governance
19 contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance.' " Republican Party
20 	of N.M v. NM Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMSC-026, ,-r 1, 283 P.3d 853
4

1 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1978) (Stevens, J., Brennan,
2 J. & Powell, J. dissenting)). IPRA "give[s] practical effect to this principle[.]"
3 Republican Party ofN.M., 2012-NMSC-026, 11. "Recognizing that a representative
4 government is dependent upon an informed electorate," the Legislature declared
5 "that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs
6 of 	government[.]" Section 	14-2-5. 	Any 	analysis 	of 	IPRA 	actions 	therefore
7 "begin[ s] . . . with the strong presumption that the public has a right to inspect the
8 [records] at issue." Cox v. N.M Dep 't of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, 1 16, 148
9 N.M. 934,242 P.3d 501. "This right is limited only by the Legislature's enumeration
10 	of certain categories of records that are excepted from inspection." Republican Party
11 	of N.M, 2012-NMSC-026, 113. The statutory exceptions conclude with a catch-all
12 category: 	"as 	otherwise 	provided by 	law." 	Section 	14-2-l(H). 	This 	category
13 	"includes statutory and regulatory bars to disclosure, constitutionally mandated
14 privileges, and privileges established by our rules of evidence." Pacheco, 2018-
15 NMSC-022, 139 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16 {7} 	On appeal, Plaintiff argues that a guardian ad litem's records are subject to
17 IPRA because a guardian ad litem acts as an "arm of the court." In support of this
18 	proposition, Plaintiff argues that the nine factors set forth in State ex rel. Toomey v.
19 	City of Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, 287 P.3d 364, indicate that
20 Brandt functioned as a public entity whose records fall within IPRA's reach. Plaintiff
5

1 further argues that the quasi-judicial immunity recognized in Kimbrell does not
2 immunize Brandt from IPRA actions, and that none of the exceptions to IPRA apply
3 to Brandt's records. Plaintiff does not address Brandt's argument that the protective
4 order precludes disclosure here, except to state that "[t]he protective order does not
5 provide a shield because it is rooted in the same flawed logic as the IPRA denial"
6 and that "[i]t is beyond argument that [Plaintiff] is allowed to accept the reasoning
7 of the [d]istrict [c]ourt that [Brandt] was an agent of the [district c]ourt, and upon
8 that basis assert that [Brandt] was potentially subject to IPRA."
9 	{8} 	IPRA does not address the effect of a protective order on disclosure of public
10 records, nor did we locate, after diligent search, a New Mexico case considering
11 	whether a protective order falls within IPRA's "as otherwise provided by law"
12 exception. 	Compare 	§ 	14-2-l(H), 	with 	65 	Pa. 	Stat. 	and 	Cons. 	Stat. 	Ann.
13 	§ 67.305(a)(3) (West 2009) (providing that records may be exempt from public
14 "disclosure under any ... Federal or State law or regulation or judicial order or
15 	decree" (emphasis added)). See Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022,, 39. Without deciding
16 that question, we nevertheless conclude that the district court properly granted
17 	summary judgment to Defendants because the protective order precludes disclosure
18 	ofBrandt's records to Plaintiff under the circumstances here. We also conclude that,
19 to the extent the SJDC is in possession of communications between the district court
6

1 and Brandt, the judicial deliberation privilege recognized in Pacheco protects those
2 records from public disclosure.
3 I. 	The Protective Order Precludes Disclosure 	of Brandt's Records 	to
4 	Plaintiff Under the Circumstances
5 {9} 	Assuming without deciding that Brandt's records are public records subject to
6 IPRA, denial of Plaintiffs request did not violate IPRA because the protective order .
7 prohibits disclosure of the records to Plaintiff. It is undisputed that the protective
8 order prohibits disclosure to Plaintiff of the same materials covered by the IPRA
9 request. Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction
10 to enter the protective order. "[P]ersons subject to an injunctive order issued by a
11 	court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or
12 reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order." GTE Sylvania,
13 Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980); In re Philip M
· 14 Kleinsmith, 2005-NMCA-136, ,, 11-12, 138 N.M. 601, 124 P.3d 579. Statutes
15 	governing public access to records do not negate this fundamental rule. In GTE
16 Sylvania, Inc., for instance, the United States Supreme Court held that an agency did
17 not "improperly" withhold public documents when a federal district court injunction
18 prohibited it from releasing the documents pending trial. GTE Sylvania, Inc., at 378,
19 386. The Court noted that, because of the injunction, "[t]here simply has been no
20 discretion for the agency to exercise[,]" id. at 386, and that there was nothing in the
21 	Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) text or history to suggest that, "in adopting
7

1 [FOIA] to curb agency discretion to conceal information, Congress intended to
2 require an agency to commit contempt of court in order to release documents." Id.
3 at 387.2 Several states have applied this reasoning in the context of their own public
4 records laws. See, e.g., In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949,
5 ,r 64 (stating that, "where a ... court with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction
6 issues an injunction, the injunction must be obeyed, however erroneous it may be,
7 until it is modified or set aside by the court itself or reversed by a higher court" even
8 when the records sought are public records); 	Bangor Pub/ 'g 	Co. 	v. 	Town 	of
9 Bucksport, 682 A.2d 227, 230 (Me. 1996) ("The [defendants] ... properly refused
10 to disclose the documents that had been ruled exempt by the protective order. Both
11 	were parties to the protective order; thus each would be in contempt for violating a
12 	court order if they disclosed the confidential documents.").
13 	{to} 	Similarly, we discern nothing in IPRA's plain language or in IPRA case law
14 suggesting that our Legislature intended to require a governmental entity to disclose
15 	public records in defiance of a court order. Although the exceptions to IPRA's
16 mandate 	of disclosure are narrowly drawn, a party may prevail on an IPRA
20ur courts have declined to rely on federal case law to construe IPRA,'. noting
that IPRA provides greater access to public records than its federal counterp.art and
differs in other respects. See, e.g., San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass 'n v. KNME-TV,
2011-NMSC-011, ,r 38, 150 N.M. 64,257 P.3d 884. Here, however, we rely on GTE
Sylvania, Inc. only as to the impact of a court order on an agency's ability to comply
with a statute. To the extent we construe IPRA, we rely on New Mexico case law.
8

1 enforcement action under Section 14-2-12 only if the custodian's denial of the
2 request is "wrongful." Faber v. King, 2015-NMSC-015, 111, 348 P.3d 173 ("IPRA
3 	... forbids the agency from wrongfully denying the request."). An agency's denial
4 of an IPRA request is wrongful when the agency withholds documents based on an
5 inapplicable privilege or exemption. See, e.g., Edenburn v. N.M Dep 't of Health,
6 2013-NMCA-045, 1 40, 299 P.3d 424 (stating that the agency was "liable for
7 wrongful withholding" of the requested documents where the agency relied on a
8 privilege that had been negated by case law). However, a denial in accordance with
9 an enforceable court order can hardly be wrongful. See City of Las Cruces v. Pub.
10 Emp. Labor Relations Bd., 1996-NMSC-024, 1 9, 121 N.M. 688, 917 P.2d 451
11 	(noting that "[t]here may be circumstances under which the information contained
12 	in a . [public] record can be justifiably withheld". (internal quotation marks and
13 	citation omitted)); In re Philip M Kleinsmith, 2005-NMCA-136, 1 11 ("Generally,
14 a party must obey an order issued by a court with subject matter and personal
15 jurisdiction until the order is set aside."); cf GTE Sylvania, Inc. 445 U.S. at 387 ("To
16 construe the lawful obedience of an injunction issued by a federal district court with
17 jurisdiction to enter such a decree as 'improperly' withholding documents ... would
18 	do violence to the common understanding of the term 'improperly' and would;extend
19 	[FOIA] well beyond the intent of Congress."). Indeed, "[t]he orderly process of law
20 demands that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by courts possessed
9

1 of jurisdiction ... and one who defies the order of a court having jurisdiction does
2 so at his peril." Gedeon v. Gedeon, 1981-NMSC-065, 115, 96 N.M. 315, 630 P.2d
3 267 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4 {11} 	Moreover, to view IPRA as superseding a protective order would be contrary
5 to constitutional separation of powers principles. "The district court is given broad
6 discretion" to issue protective orders under Rule 1:..026(C) NMRA. Bd. of Comm 'rs
7 of Dona Ana Cty. v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-NMCA-102, 1 8, 134 N.M. 283,
8 76 P.3d 36, overruled on other grounds by Republican Party ofN.M, 2012-NMSC-
9 026, 1 18. Rule 1-026 provides that the district court may limit discovery in a number
10 	of situations. See Rule 1-026(B)(2) (providing that "[t]he court shall limit use of
11 	discovery methods" when the discovery sought is duplicative or burdensome); Rule
12 	1-026(C) (permitting the district court to issue a protective order, in its dis~retion,
13 	that prohibits, limits, or directs discovery). Rule 	1-026 is promulgated by our
14 	Supreme Court, which has "the ultimate rule making authority over procedure[.]"
15 	State v. 	Serna, 2013-NMSC-033, 1 14, 305 P.3d 936. "[The Supreme] Court's
16 plenary authority to regulate procedure stems from [its] constitutional power of
17 	'superintending control over all inferior courts.' "Id. (quoting N.M. Const. art. VI,
18 	§ 3). Based on the constitutional authority vested in the Supreme Court, it is well-
•
19 	settled that "the Legislature cannot override by statute what th[ e Supreme] Court has
20 promulgated by rule." Serna, 2013-NMSC:..033, 113. Since the protective order here
10

1 was permitted by Rule 1-026 and issued by a court with jurisdiction, it follows that
2 "construing [IPRA] to invalidate [this] otherwise providently entered protective
3 order would raise serious constitutional questions about the validity of that law."
4 	Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 944 N .E.2d 1019, 1023 (Mass. 2011 ); see
5 Gonzales v. Atnip, 1984-NMCA-128,, 23, 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d 1343 ("Any
6 legislative scheme which would control or exercise the inherent powers of the
7 judiciary would be violative of Article III and Article VI, Section 1 of the New
8 Mexico Constitution." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We conclude
9 that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants because the
10 protective order barred disclosure of the requested records to Plaintiff.
11 	{12} 	Faber does not hold otherwise. In that case, the plaintiff sued a public entity
12 for gender discrimination in employment, and the federal district court granted the
13 	defendant's motion for a stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss
14 based on immunity. See 2015-NMSC-015, , 	2. The plaintiff then filed an IPRA
15 	request "seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the
16 the [defendant's o]ffice." Id., 3. The records custodian denied the request, stating
17 that the request "appear[ed] to circumvent the discovery process and the [stay]." Id.
18 	(internal quotation marks omitted) The plaintiff then filed an IPRA enforcement
19 action in the state district court. See id. , 4. "The state district court found that the
20 stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights
11

1 granted ... by IPRA, and that the [defendant] violated IPRA by denying [the
2 plaintiff]'s ... request." Id. 	The state district court awarded damages and the
3 defendant appealed. See id. 1 5.
4 {13} 	On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he determination of the IPRA
5 violation was not at issue." Id. Hence, the Court did not address the propriety of the
6 district court's ruling that the discovery stay did.not foreclose the plaintiffs IPRA
7 action. Moreover, Faber is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike here, the federal
8 court's order did not prohibit disclosure of any records to the plaintiff. Instead, the
9 stay merely paused the discovery process pending the court's determination of
10 whether the defendant was immune from suit. See id. 1 2; cf City of Allentown v.
11 	Brenan, 52 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (holding that a public records
12 request was not barred by a court order where the federal judge's order did not
13 	preclude disclosure of the requested records, but rather, was "premised solely upon
14 the untimeliness of [the p]laintiffs'" motion to compel disclosure and a lack of
15 	authority, and the federal judge "never suggested that the additional discovery
16 materials were precluded or protected from disclosure").
17 	{14} 	We recognize that IPRA and discovery are different and distinct methods to
18 	obtain information and that citizens' involvement in litigation alone does not deprive
19 them of their ability to obtain public records under IPRA. Cf Republican Party of
20 NM, 2012-NMSC-026, 1 49 (noting differences between discovery and IPRA
12

1 requests). Our holding does not undermine that principle. Instead, it rests entirely on
2 the fact of the protective order and the public's interest in "the orderly pro·cess of
3 law." 	Gedeon, 	1981-NMSC-065, 	, 	15 	(internal 	quotation marks 	and 	citation
4 omitted). A contrary holding would subject Defendants to conflicting orders from
5 the court, which would work a "disservice to the orderly administration of justice[.]"
6 Bangor Pub/ 'g Co., 682 A.2d at 231.
7 II. 	The 	Judicial 	Deliberation 	Privilege 	Precludes 	Disclosure 	of
8 	Communications Between the District Court Judge and Brandt
9 {15} 	Plaintiff argues that the SJDC is obliged to disclose communications between
10 Brandt and the judge presiding over the domestic relations case. Plaintiff contends
11 	he "is entitled to [Brandt's] communications with the [district c]ourt. No statutory
12 or otherwise cognizable privilege or exception applies to such communications."
13 	However, in Pacheco, decided in the midst of briefing for this appeal, our Supreme
14 Court held that a judicial deliberation privilege protects from public disclosure a
15 judge's "internal decision-making communications that are at the core 	of the
16 constitutional duties of the judicial branch[.]" 2018-NMSC-022, , 	3. Applying a
17 "functional analysis," the Court went on to hold that the privilege protects from
18 	disclosure a judge's communication with the judge's staff, as well as other "judicial
19 branch colleague[s]." Id.,, 46, 54. Thus, the question here is whether the judge's
20 communications with Brandt fall within that privilege.
13

1 {16} 	We conclude that they do. "The function ofRule 1-053.3 guardians ad litem
2 is without question to act as an arm of the court[.]" Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ,14;
3 see § 40-4-8. Moreover, the guardian ad litem "assists the court in discharging its
4 duty to adjudicate the child's best interests." Rule 1-053.3(A) (emphasis added).
5 Other provisions of Rule 1-053.3 emphasize the guardian ad litem's role vis a vis
6 the appointing judge. For instance, Rule 1-053.3(C) provides that "[t]he guardian ad
7 litem appointed under this rule is a 'best interests attorney' who shall provide
8 independent services to protect the child's best interests without being bound by the
9 child's or either party's directive or objectives and who shall make findings and
10 recommendations." Rule 1-053.3(F)(l) and (2) set forth the guardian ad litem's
11 	duties, which include interviewing the parties and relevant service providers, as well
12 as determining the child's wishes. The guardian ad litem must file recommendations
13 	with the district court. Rule l-053.3(F)(4) and (5). Importantly, Rule 1-053.3(D)
14 provides that "[i]n no event shall the court delegate the ultimate determination of the
15 	child's best interests, unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate such issues[.]"
16 Together, these provisions indicate that, in carrying out the delegated tasks, a
17 guardian ad litem "act[ s] as an extension of the court by performing quasi-judicial
18 	functions of investigating the facts and report[s] to the court what placement [i]s in
19 the child's best interests." Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 1991-NMSC-013,, 22,
20 	111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and
14

1 citation omitted). Impairment of a guardian ad litem's work therefore "obstruct[s]
2 the pathway to ascertaining the truth and impair[ s] the judge's ability to perform his
3 or her judicial duties." Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, 1 12. In other words, as to the
4 specific 	cases 	for 	which 	guardians 	ad 	litem 	are 	appointed, 	their 	function 	is
5 tantamount to that of a member of the judge's staff. Cf Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022,
6 1 53 (holding that the privilege protects communications between a judge and a law
7 librarian whose duties include providing legal information and research services to
8 judges). It follows that the judicial deliberation privilege bars public disclosure of
9 Brandt's communications with the district court judge presiding over the domestic
10 relations matter.
11 	CONCLUSION
12 {17} 	We hold that the district court properly granted Defendants' motions for
13 	summary judgment 	and 	denied 	Plaintiffs 	motion 	because, 	assuming 	without
14 deciding that Brandt's records and communications fall within IPRA's definition of
15 	"public records," the protective order precludes disclosure of Brandt's records to
16 Plaintiff and the judicial deliberation privilege protects communications between
17 Brandt and the district court. Because these conclusions are dispositive, we do not
18 	address whether (1) the quasi-judicial immunity recognized in Kimbrell protects
19 Brandt from an IPRA enforcement suit; (2) Plaintiff properly named Brandt as a
20 defendant in this IPRA action; or (3) Plaintiffs IPRA action is an improper collateral
15

1 attack on the protective order. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of
2 Plaintiffs complaint.
3 	{18}
4
5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 WE CONCUR:
7 	dftt-~8 KRIINA BOG~, Judge
16