March 7, 2019-State of New Mexico v. William Martinez, No. A-1-CA-35560

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 	STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 	Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. 	No. A-1-CA-35560
5 WILLIAM MARTINEZ,
6 	Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
8 Karen L. Townsend, District Court Judge
9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
10 	Santa Fe, NM
11 	John J. Woykovsky, Assistant Attorney General
12 	Albuquerque, NM
13 	for Appellee
14 	Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
15 	Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
16 	Santa Fe, NM
17 for Appellant
18 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
19 	B. ZAMORA, Judge.
20 	{ t} 	A jury convicted Defendant William Martinez of aggravated fleeing a law
21 	enforcement officer (aggravated fleeing), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-
22 	1.1 (2003). On Defendant's appeal, we hold that (1) there was sufficient evidence
23 	Defendant drove in a manner that endangered the life of another; (2) the admission

1 at trial of Defendant's municipal court convictions arising from this incident does
2 not constitute error; and (3) the district court properly sentenced Defendant as a
3 habitual offender based on his prior felony conviction resulting from his plea in a
4 juvenile proceeding. We affirm.
5 	BACKGROUND
6 	{2} 	Defendant' s conviction stems from a high-speed pursuit that ensued after he
7 fled from Officer Devon Conroy. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Officer Conroy,
8 wearing his full uniform and badge and driving his marked patrol car, observed
9 Defendant driving his truck on a dirt road without a license plate light. Defendant's
10 truck began spinning around in a circular motion, creating a dust cloud. Increasing
11 	his speed, Defendant drove westbound onto an asphalt road into a residential
12 	community. Officer Conroy followed Defendant and activated his emergency lights,
13 	but Defendant failed to stop. Officer Conroy, following Defendant at sixty-eight
14 miles per hour, drove through a patch of dirt in the road where the asphalt had been
15 	removed. As Officer Conroy pursued Defendant, another dust cloud created by
16 	Defendant's truck obstructed the officer's view. The dirt portion of the roadway was
17 slightly 	curved, 	a 	circumstance 	which, 	combined 	with 	the 	reduced 	visibility
18 	occasioned by the dust cloud, caused Officer Conroy to lose control of his vehicle,
19 	which spun around approximately 180 degrees before coming to rest. At the same
20 time, Defendant' s truck veered off the roadway. As Defendant drove back onto the
2

1 roadway, his truck grazed the passenger's side of Officer Conroy's patrol car. In
2 addition to his emergency lights, Officer Conroy then activated his sirens and
3 continued pursuing Defendant. Defendant again sped through residential streets, this
4 time driving through three stop signs.
5 	{3} 	Defendant 	next 	proceeded 	northbound 	on 	a 	highway. 	At 	a 	speed 	of
6 approximately eighty miles per hour, Defendant passed an SUV that was stopped at
7 an intersection adjoining the highway. Increasing his speed to approximately ninety-
8 five miles per hour, Defendant passed a semi-truck that was driving northbound in
9 the right-hand lane. As Defendant approached the semi-truck, he drifted into its lane,
10 then swerved back into his own lane immediately before he passed the semi-truck.
11 	Throughout the 	pursuit, 	Officer 	Conroy 	observed that 	Defendant was 	having
12 	difficulty staying within his own traffic lane. The pursuit ultimately came to an end
13 	when Defendant pulled into a residential driveway and jumped from his truck while
14 it was still in motion. Defendant's truck became immobilized after striking a fence
15 	and trampoline. Defendant fled on foot, and Officer Conroy eventually found him
16 hiding under a mobile home.
17 {4} 	Defendant was charged in district court with aggravated fleeing, 	and in
18 	municipal court with possession of drug paraphernalia and various traffic offenses.
19 Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges in municipal court and served ten days in
20 jail.
3

1 {5} 	At trial, the State, without objection, admitted the municipal court judgment
2 and sentence. On that document, lines intended to identify defense counsel and the
3 prosecutor or prosecuting officer were left blank. No additional pleadings from the
4 municipal court proceedings were admitted at trial, nor were they made part of the
5 record. During trial, Officer Conroy testified about the municipal court proceedings,
6 stating that he "told [his] side of the story, and [Defendant] was standing there." The
7 officer recounted that Defendant said, "Yup, that's pretty much what happened," and
8 then he pleaded guilty.
9 	{6} 	The jury returned a guilty verdict on the sole count of aggravated fleeing.
10 Defendant was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment on the underlying charge
11 	and an additional eight years of imprisonment based on his status as a habitual
12 offender. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied.
13 	DISCUSSION
14 I.
15 	{7}
Aggravated Fleeing a Law Enforcement Officer
Defendant first 	argues that his 	conviction for 	aggravated fleeing 	is not
16 	supported by sufficient evidence. We review whether there is sufficient evidence to
17 	support Defendant's 	conviction "from a highly deferential 	standpoint." State 	v.
18 Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ,-r 20, 	150 N.M. 	110, 257 P.3d 930. "The test for
19 	sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or
20 circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
4

1 with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Montoya, 2015-
2 NMSC-010, ,r 52, 345 P .3d 1056 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
3 will disregard all evidence and inferences that support a contrary result. See State v.
4 Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ,I 19, 126 N.M. 438,971 P.2d 829.
5 	{8} 	Defendant 	solely 	contests 	whether 	there 	is 	sufficient 	evidence 	that 	he
6 "actually" endangered the life of another, as required by the aggravated fleeing
7 statute. The State counters that the aggravated fleeing statute does not require
8 "evidence 	of a near collision" nor does it require actual endangerment of an
9 identifiable motorist. Even if actual endangerment is required, the State maintains
10 there is sufficient evidence that other motorists were actually endangered.
11 	{9} 	Aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer consists of a "person willfully
12 and carelessly driving his vehicle in a manner that endangers the life of another
13 person after being given a visual or audible signal to stop ... by a uniformed law
14 	enforcement officer in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle." Section
15 	30-22-1.l(A) (emphasis added); 	see also UJI 	14-2217 NMRA (stating that, to
16 	sustain an aggravated fleeing conviction, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
17 	doubt 	that 	"[t]he 	defendant drove 	willfully 	and 	carelessly 	in 	a 	manner that
18 	endangered the life of another person"). The aggravated fleeing statute does not
19 	explicitly define what constitutes endangerment. State v. 	Vest, 2018-NMCA-060,
20 i19, 428 P.3d 287, cert. granted, 2018-NMCERT-_ (No. S-l-SC-37210, Sept. 24,
5

1 2018). However, during the pendency of this appeal, this Court determined in Vest
2 "that 	the 	aggravated 	fleeing 	statute 	requires 	that 	the 	[s]tate 	prove 	actual
3 endangerment 	to 	another 	person[.]" 	Id. 	, 	10. 1 In 	particular, 	we 	defined
4 endangerment to be "the exposure to the peril or harm [that] is an actual or current
5 condition facing the impacted person." Id. , 9. While concluding that "potential or
6 future harm" is insufficient, id., we cautioned that the statutory requirement of
7 endangerment should not be so strictly construed as to require a fleeing suspect to
8 drive "within inches of another vehicle" or to avoid a collision by "extraordinary
9 evasive maneuvering." Id., 15.
10 	{IO} 	Here, Defendant sped through residential streets, ran stop signs, and sped
11 	through a dirt patch in the road causing a dust cloud to obstruct Officer Conroy's
12 	view. Both the officer and Defendant lost control of their vehicles. As a result,
13 	Defendant's truck made contact with Officer Conroy's patrol car. In addition, while
14 driving approximately ninety-five miles per hour as he approached a semi-truck,
15 	Defendant's truck drifted into the semi-truck's lane, and Defendant then swerved his
16 truck back into his lane immediately before passing the semi-truck. This Court has
17 found sufficient evidence of endangerment under circumstances similar to those in
18 this case. See State v. Coleman, 2011-NMCA-087, ,, 21-22, 150 N.M. 622, 264
1 In light of the recent holding in 	Vest, 	the State's argument that actual
endangerment is not required under the aggravated fleeing statute is not well taken.
2018-NMCA-060,, 7.
6

1 P.3d 523 (holding that the defendant endangered the lives of his passengers and the
2 pursuing officer when he drove through stop signs in a residential area in excess of
3 one hundred miles per hour); see also State v. Padilla, 2006-NMCA-107, ~ 5, 140
4 N.M. 333, 142 P.3d 921 	("[The d]efendant barely missed colliding with another
5 motorist."), rev 'don other grounds, 2008-NMSC-006, ~ 34, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d
6 299. From these facts, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant
7 drove in a manner that actually endangered the lives of others, including Officer
8 Conroy.
9 {I 1} 	In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, Defendant directs 	us 	to Officer
10 	Conroy's testimony that he would have discontinued the pursuit had he believed
11 	other motorists were in danger and that law enforcement policies prohibited him
12 	from endangering others during a pursuit. Defendant's reliance on this testimony is
13 	unavailing since "contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for
14 reversal." 	State 	v. 	Guerra, 	2012-NMSC-027, ~ 27, 284 P.3d 1076 (alteration,
15 	internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 	We 	will not "substitute 	[our]
16 judgment for that of the fact[-]finder, nor [will we] reweigh the evidence." State v.
17 Perea, 2001-NMSC-026, ~ 5, 130 N.M. 732, 31 P.3d 1006. The jury was, therefore,
18 	free to weigh the evidence as it deemed appropriate. Viewing the evidence in the
19 	light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient
7

1 evidence 	to 	support 	the 	jury's 	conclusion 	that 	Defendant's 	driving 	actually
2 endangered the lives of others.
3 II. 	Admission of Municipal Court Convictions
4 	{12} 	Defendant next claims the admission at trial of his municipal court convictions
5 arising from this incident violated the presumption of innocence and basic due
6 process rights, as well as the right to counsel. Defendant concedes he did not
7 preserve his objections at trial, but nevertheless asserts that the admission of his
8 judgment and sentence and his statements from the municipal court proceedings
9 amount to structural, plain, and fundamental error. Because Defendant solely asserts
10 constitutional violations, we need not address his claims for plain or structural error.
11 	See State v. Samora, 2013-NMSC-038, ,r 5, 307 P.3d 328 (reviewing unpreserved
12 	claims of constitutional violations for fundamental error); State v. Gwynne, 2018-
13 	NMCA-033, ,r 27,417 P.3d 1157 (applying plain error "only in evidentiary matters"
14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), cert. denied, 2018-NMCERT-_
15 	(No. S-l-SC-36926, Apr. 10, 2018); State v. Nguyen, 2008-NMCA-073, if 9, 144
16 N.M. 197, 185 P.3d 368 ("[S]tructural error is a defect affecting the framework
17 	within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself."
18 	(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We review the admission of the
19 judgment and 	sentence 	and 	Defendant's 	statements 	from 	the 	municipal 	court
20 	proceedings for fundamental error.
8

1 {13} 	The doctrine of fundamental error is an exception to the requirement that a
2 defendant preserve his arguments and objections in the district court. See State v.
3 Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ,r 11, 144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192. We apply the doctrine
4 only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id. 	,I 13.
5 "Accordingly, we will use the doctrine to reverse a conviction only if the defendant's
6 guilt is so questionable that upholding a conviction would shock the conscience, or
7 where, notwithstanding the apparent culpability of the defendant, substantial justice
8 has not been served." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant
9 has the burden of demonstrating fundamental error. See State v. Astorga, 2016-
10 NMCA-015, ,r 5, 365 P.3d 53. In reviewing a claim for fundamental error, we must
11 	first determine whether an error occurred. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ,r 11. Only if an
12 	error has occurred, do we then consider whether the error was fundamental. Id.; see
13 	State v. 	Cabezuela, 	2011-NMSC-041, ,I,I 49-52, 	150 N.M. 	654, 265 P.3d 705
14 (concluding that because there was no error in the admission of certain testimony at
15 	trial there was no need to determine whether the alleged error was fundamental).
16 	{14} 	For the first time on appeal, Defendant claims his constitutional rights were
17 	violated by the district court's admission of evidence from "what appeared to be"
18 	uncounseled 	municipal 	court convictions. 	Defendant argues 	that 	admitting 	an
19 uncounseled misdemeanor conviction at trial is similar to using an uncounseled
20 misdemeanor conviction to enhance a defendant's sentence, a practice generally
9

1 disallowed, 	at least where the underlying proceeding results in a sentence 	of
2 imprisonment and no valid waiver of counsel was obtained therein. See State v.
3 	Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-061, ,r,r 5, 14, 27, 124 N.M. 388, 951 P.2d 605 (explaining
4 that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, "state courts now may use an
5 uncounseled prior misdemeanor conviction to enhance a sentence under a recidivist
6 statute, 	provided the 	uncounseled 	conviction did 	not 	result 	in 	a 	sentence 	of
7 imprisonment"). Defendant, without citation to supporting New Mexico authority,
8 asks us to apply a similar approach in concluding that an uncounseled conviction is
9 inadmissible at trial. But even assuming, as Defendant urges, that an uncounseled
10 municipal court conviction resulting in a jail sentence and obtained without a valid
11 	waiver of counsel, is inadmissible in a subsequent district court trial, Defendant has
12 	failed to demonstrate that any such error occurred in this case.
13 	{ts} 	Here, the municipal court judgment and sentence is ambiguous as to whether
14 Defendant was represented and, if he was not, whether Defendant knowingly and
15 	voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Specifically, as noted, the lines that would
16 	normally denote the identities of counsel for the defendant and the municipality were
17 left blank. We will not speculate as to whether Defendant was unrepresented, or
18 	alternatively, whether he signed a valid waiver of his right to counsel. See State v.
19 Reyes, 2005-NMCA-080, ,r,r 7-8, 137 N.M. 727, 114 P.3d 407 (stating a defendant
20 has the right to represent himself pro se, 	as 	long as he does 	so knowingly,
10

1 intelligently, and voluntarily); State v. Pino, 1997-NMCA-001,, 1, 122 N.M. 789,
2 932 P.2d 13 (holding that prior conviction from a criminal proceeding, "where an
3 indigent defendant's waiver of counsel lacked the countersignature of a district
4 public defender, is valid to enhance a later conviction"); see also Rule 8-50l(A)(4)
5 NMRA (stating a municipal court judge must advise the defendant of "the right, if
6 any, to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings"); Form 9-401A
7 NMRA 	(waiver 	of 	counsel 	criminal 	form 	for 	municipal 	courts). 	Defendant
8 nonetheless argues it is the State's burden to establish that he knowingly and
9 intelligently waived his right to counsel. While this may be true had Defendant raised
10 the issue during trial- 	instead of raising it for the first time on appeal-the State
11 	would have had an opportunity to respond, or to supplement its presentation of
12 	evidence at trial. We can only review matters contained within the record. See State
13 	v. Gilbert, 1983-NMSC-083,, 22, 100 N.M. 392,671 P.2d 640. Here, the record is
14 ambiguous, and to grant the relief requested by Defendant, we would have to find
15 	fundamental 	error based on conjecture. Because we cannot ascertain, 	without
16 	speculating, whether Defendant was unrepresented or whether he validly waived his
17 right to counsel, we cannot say that the admission of the municipal court conviction
18 	was error. See State v. Ross, 2007-NMCA-126,, 10, 142 N.M. 597, 168 P.3d 169
19 (stating that even where the defendant relies on a claim of fundamental error he still
20 bears the burden of creating an adequate record for review of the issues on appeal).
11

1 III. 	Habitual Offender Enhancement
2 	{16} 	Defendant' s final argument is that the district court improperly enhanced his
3 sentence as a habitual offender under NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-1 7 (2003 ), by
4 relying upon an adult conviction resulting from a juvenile plea agreement. The issue
5 before this Court is the proper interpretation ofNMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-18(C)
6 (1996), the statutory provision relating to judgments under the Delinquency Act. We
7 review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Sta te v. Duhon, 2005-NMCA-
8 120, ,r 10 , 138 N.M. 466, 122 P.3d 50 ; see also State v. Leon, 2013-NMCA-01 l , ,r
9 43 , 292 P.3d 493 ("Whether [the d]efendant's previous felony conviction can be
10 used for the purposes of sentence enhancement under Section 31-18- 17 is a question
11 	of law that we review de novo." ).
12 	A. 	Section 32A-2-18 Applies to Convictions Resulting From a Plea
13 	{17} 	In June 	1996, when he was a juvenile charged 	as 	a youthful offender,
14 	Defendant pleaded guilty to several violent felonies and was sentenced as an adult.
15 	The district court enhanced his sentence in this case, as a habitual offender, based
16 	on this prior conviction. A habitual offender pursuant to Section 31-l 8-17(A), is a
17 person convicted of at least one prior felony "that was part of a separate transaction
18 	or occurrence." In order to enhance Defendant's sentence as a habitual offender, the
19 	State had to prove that Defendant is the same person who has been convicted of a
20 prior felony and that "less than ten years has passed since [he] completed serving
12

1 [his] sentence, probation, or parole." State v. Clements, 2009-NMCA-085, if 22, 146
2 N.M. 745, 215 P.3d 54. Under the Delinquency Act, a "judgment in proceedings on
3 a petition ... resulting in a juvenile disposition shall not be deemed a conviction of
4 	[a] crime[.]" Section 32A-2-18(A). However, Section 32A-2-18 goes on to state:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
B. 	If a judgment resulting from a youthful offender or serious
youthful offender proceeding under the Delinquency Act results in an
adult sentence, a record of the judgment shall be admissible in any other
case or proceeding in any other court involving the youthful offender
or serious youthful offender.
C. 	If a judgment on a proceeding under the Delinquency Act
results in an adult sentence, the determination of guilt at trial becomes
a conviction for purposes of the Criminal Code.
13 	Section 32A-2-l 8(B), (C) (emphasis added). Thus, where "(the d]efendant was
14 sentenced as an adult, rather than adjudicated delinquent, and was convicted of a
15 	felony for the purposes of the Criminal Code, the Habitual Offender Statute is
16 applicable." Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, if 45.
17 	{IS} 	Defendant does not dispute that he entered into a plea agreement for felony
18 	offenses as a juvenile. Nor does he contend that felony convictions arising from acts
19 committed by juveniles do not count for 	purposes 	of adult habitual 	offender
20 	enhancements. See id. ,I 44 ("[T]he Habitual Offender Statute simply applies to
21 	anyone convicted of a felony."). Rather, he argues that the plea agreement did not
22 	result in an adult conviction. He claims his sentence was wrongfully enhanced
23 	because the language of Section 32A-2-18(C) is unambiguous and permits only
13

1 youthful offenders found guilty at trial to be sentenced as adults. The State responds
2 that Defendant is erroneously interpreting Section 32A-2-18(C) as applying only to
3 convictions resulting from a trial. The State argues that Subsection (C) cannot be
4 read in isolation, but rather, must be read in the context of the other statutory
5 sections.
6 	{19} 	We must discern which of the competing interpretations of Section 32A-2-
7 	18(C) is correct. If a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to "the plain meaning of
8 the words of [the] statute, unless this leads to an absurd or unreasonable result." State
9 v. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ,-J 7, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801. When interpreting
10 	a statute, we do not simply look to the statute's language, we also consider the
11 	background, history, and overall structure of the statute and "the particular statute's
12 	function within a comprehensive legislative scheme[.]" 	State v. Rivera, 	2004-
13 	NMSC-001 , ,-J 13, 	134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. If the result would be absurd,
14 	unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute, we "will not employ a
15 	formalistic and mechanical statutory construction." State v. Moya, 2007-NMSC-
16 	027, ,-J 6, 	141 	N.M. 817, 	161 	P.3d 862 (internal quotation marks and citation
17 omitted). 	Rather than adopting a construction that would render the 	statute' s
18 	application absurd, we construe the statute according to its obvious spirit. Id. When
19 	doing so, "courts may substitute, disregard or eliminate, or insert or add words to a
20 statute." Id. 	(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We must construe a
14

1 statute in its entirety, so that each part of the statute is given meaning and no part is
2 rendered superfluous. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001 , 118.
3 	{20} 	As we more fully explain below, applying the plain meaning rule to the words
4 "determination of guilt at trial" in Section 32A-2-18(C) would lead to an absurd
5 result, would be inconsistent with other provisions of Section 32A-2-18, and would
6 be contrary to the "statute's function within a comprehensive legislative scheme."
7 See Rive ra , 2004-NMSC-001, 1 13. 	First, construing Section 32A-2-18(C) as
8 applicable only to convictions following trial, and not to convictions made pursuant
9 to plea agreements, would-on 	several bases-lead to absurd results. 	Such an
10 	interpretation 	would 	unjustifiably 	punish 	those 	juveniles 	who 	exercise 	their
11 	constitutional right to proceed to trial, and in the process, run afoul of the prohibition
12 	against imposing "a harsher sentence merely because the defendant pleads not guilty
13 	and exercises his right to a jury trial." State v. Bonilla, 2000-NMSC-037, 112 , 130
14 N.M. 1, 15 P.3d 491 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v.
15 	Maestas , 2007-NMCA-155, 1126, 44, 143 N.M. 104, 173 P.3d 26 (holding that the
16 judge' s "policy of allowing those who plead guilty to remain free pending sentencing
17 and requiring those who were found guilty after electing to go to trial to begin
18 	serving their mandatory time" was an abuse of discretion). "A practice which
19 discourages the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty, which deters the Sixth
20 Amendment right to demand a jury trial and which chills the assertion of these
15

1 constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them is patently
2 unconstitutional." Bonilla, 2000-NMSC-037, 1 7 (internal quotation marks and
3 citation omitted). The determination of guilt pursuant to a plea has the same legal
4 force as the determination of guilt by trial. A guilty plea "is not simply a strategic
5 choice; it is itself a conviction[.]" Florida v. Nixon, 	543 U.S. 	175, 187 (2004)
6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We fail to identify a basis upon
7 which the Legislature might construct a punitive framework designed to address
8 ongoing recidivism in a particular class of offenders and then opt to excuse felony
9 convictions--even those committed by juveniles-so long as the defendant entered
10 	into a plea agreement with the state. Thus, it would lead to an absurd result for
11 	Section 32A-2-l 8(C) to apply disparate treatment upon convictions obtained after
12 trial and those obtained after a plea.
13 	{21} 	Second, when read in its entirety, Section 32A-2-18 distinguishes youthful
14 	offenders who receive an adult sentence from those who do not, regardless of
15 	whether the determination of guilt is the result of a plea or trial. Under the statutory
16 	framework, when the proceedings result in an adult sentence, the judgment is no
17 	longer considered a juvenile adjudication. See State v. Nanco, 2012-NMCA-109,
18 1 4, 288 P .3d 527 ("A youthful offender is a delinquent child subject to adult or
19 juvenile sanctions who is fourteen to eighteen years of age at the time of the offense
20 and who is adjudicated for [a] specified felony offense[.]" (internal quotation marks
16

1 omitted)). Moreover, Section 32A-2-18(B) specifically discusses the admissibility
2 of adult sentences in other proceedings and does not limit its applicability to
3 convictions obtained only after a trial. Rather, Subsection (B) applies to any adult
4 convictions imposed on juveniles. Section 32A-2-18(B). If the Legislature intended
5 for adult convictions resulting from a plea to be inadmissible in other proceedings,
6 it could have included such exclusionary language in Subsection (B). Reading
7 Subsections (B) and (C) together, a conviction for a juvenile sentenced as an adult
8 is admissible in other proceedings, even if the conviction resulted from a plea
9 agreement. Section 32A-2-l 8(B), (C).
10 	{22} 	Finally, we look to Section 32A-2-18(C) and its relation to other relevant
11 	statutory provisions. Other statutes explicitly referencing the potential penalties for
12 	a 	youthful 	offender 	do 	not 	distinguish 	between 	a youthful 	offender 	who 	is
13 	adjudicated guilty at trial and an offender who enters into a plea agreement. Se e, e.g.,
14 NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J) (2009) (defining "youthful offender" in the Delinquency
15 	Act as "a delinquent child subject to adult or juvenile sanctions"); NMSA 1978,
16 	§ 32A-2-20(A), (E) (2009) ("The court has the discretion to invoke either an adult
17 	sentence or juvenile sanctions on a youthful offender. ... If the court invokes an
18 	adult sentence, the court may sentence the child to less than, but shall not exceed,
19 the mandatory adult sentence."); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15 .2(B) (1996) (defining
20 "youthful offender" in the Criminal Sentencing Act as "a delinquent child subject to
17

1 adult or juvenile sanctions"); Rule 10-226(D)(2) NMRA (stating that when the
2 children's court accepts a plea agreement from a youthful offender, "the court shall
3 inform the respondent child that it may impose any disposition or sentence that is
4 authorized by law, up to and including the maximum adult sentence"); Form 10- 731
5 NMRA (stating that a valid waiver of arraignment requires that the child understand
6 the charges and potential penalties which range "from being sentenced as an adult
7 to prison time, to a disposition as a delinquent child in need of care or supervision").
8 Thus, interpreting 	Section 	32A-2-l 8(C), 	as 	Defendant proposes, would 	be 	in
9 contradiction of various other statutory provisions. See Rivera, 2004-NMSC-OO 1,
10 ~ 18 (stating that"[ w ]e are generally unwilling to construe one provision of a statute
11 	in a manner that would make other provisions null or superfluous"). We hold that
12 	Section 32A-2- l 8( C) applies to a juvenile sentenced as an adult regardless of
13 	whether the conviction was the result of a plea or trial.
14 	{23} 	Since it is undisputed that Defendant was sentenced as an adult for felony
15 	offenses he committed as a juvenile, the district court correctly used that earlier
16 	conviction 	to 	sentence 	Defendant 	as 	a 	habitual 	offender. 	Section 	31-18-1 7
17 (providing for enhancement of basic sentence for prior felony convictions); see
18 	Leon, 2013-NMCA-Ol l , ~ 45 ("Because [the d]efendant was sentenced as an adult,
19 rather than adjudicated delinquent, and was convicted of a felony for the purposes
20 	of the Criminal Code, the Habitual Offender Statute is applicable." ). Defendant had
18

1 three usable prior felony convictions for purposes of habitual offender enhancement;
2 therefore, the district court properly enhanced his sentence by eight years. See § 31-
3 	18-17(C).
4 B. 	The Holding in State v. Jones Does Not Apply Retroactively
5 	{24} 	Defendant claims his prior conviction as a youthful offender cannot be used
6 	as a habitual offender enhancement because he was not afforded his right to an
7 amenability hearing. In State v. Jones, our Supreme Court held that a youthful
8 offender could not waive his statutory right to an amenability hearing, even pursuant
9 to a plea agreement. 2010-NMSC-012, ,-i 46, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474. However,
10 Defendant's claim disregards that the Jones court explicitly stated its holding would
11 	not apply retroactively.
12 	{25} 	Our Supreme Court stated, " [w]e recognize that the rule that we announce
13 	today is a new rule and that we must determine how it is to be applied[,]" and then
14 concluded, "[b]ecause we see no justification for applying today's rule retroactively,
15 	we hold that the rule applies only to this and all other cases in which a verdict has
16 not been reached and those cases on direct review in which the issue was raised and
17 preserved 	below." 	Id. 	,-i 	49 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
18 Defendant was sentenced in 1996, which was years prior to our Supreme Court's
19 2010 	decision 	in 	Jones. 	As 	such, 	Jones 	is 	inapplicable 	to 	Defendant's 	prior
20 	conviction as a youthful offender.
19

1 CONCLUSION
2 	{26} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
3 	{27} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
5
6 WE CONCUR:
.
7) - ~
8 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
9 	~ ~L 	*"
10 	JEN 	~ATTREP, Judge
20